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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with operational analysis of UML 2.x sequence diagram spec-
iﬁcations. By operational analysis we mean analysis based on a characterization of
the executions of sequence diagrams, or in other words an operational semantics for
sequence diagrams. We deﬁne two methods for analysis of sequence diagram speciﬁ-
cations – reﬁnement veriﬁcation and reﬁnement testing – and both are implemented
in an analysis tool we have named ‘Escalator’. Further, we make the ﬁrst steps in the
direction of extending our approach with support for availability analysis.
In order to facilitate operational analysis, we deﬁne an operational semantics for
UML 2.x sequence diagrams. The operational semantics is loyal to the intended seman-
tics of UML, and is proven to be sound and complete with respect to the denotational
semantics for sequence diagrams deﬁned in STAIRS – a framework for stepwise devel-
opment based on reﬁnement of sequence diagram speciﬁcations.
The operational semantics has a formalized meta-level, on which we deﬁne execu-
tion strategies. This meta-level allows us to make distinctions between positive and
negative behavior, between potential and universal behavior, and between potential
and mandatory choice, all of which are inherently diﬃcult in an operational semantics.
Based on the operational semantics and its formalized meta-level, we deﬁne trace
generation, test generation and test execution. Further, based on a formalization of
reﬁnement in STAIRS, the trace generation is used to devise a method for reﬁnement
veriﬁcation, and the test generation and the test execution are used to deﬁne a method
for reﬁnement testing. Both are methods for investigating whether or not a sequence
diagram speciﬁcation is a correct reﬁnement of another sequence diagram speciﬁcation.
The operational semantics, the reﬁnement veriﬁcation and the reﬁnement testing
are implemented with the term rewriting language Maude, and these implementations
are integrated in the Escalator tool. In addition, Escalator provides a graphical user
interface for working with sequence diagram speciﬁcations and for running the analyses.
In order to facilitate availability analysis, we deﬁne a conceptual model for service
availability where the basic properties of availability are identiﬁed. Further, we extend
the operational semantics with support for one class of these basic properties, namely
real-time properties, and outline how the operation semantics extended with time can
be applied to make methods for timed analysis of sequence diagram speciﬁcations.
iii
Abstract
iv
Preface
The work of this thesis was conducted within, and funded by, the Basic ICT Research
project SARDAS (15295/431) under the Research Council of Norway. During my pe-
riod as a doctoral student I have been connected to the University of Oslo, to SINTEF,
and have had a half year visit to the University of Twente.
I would like to express my greatest thanks to my supervisor, Ketil Stølen, for his
capable, persistent and spirited supervision. The quality of his ideas and his feedback
has been of great importance for the result.
I also wish to thank the other principal researchers of the SARDAS project, Øystein
Haugen, Rolv Bræk and Birger Møller-Pedersen, for their continuous feedback to my
work, and our guest scientists Manfred Broy, Ina Schieferdecker and Thomas Weigert
for the great insights they brought with them on their visits to Oslo. Thanks also
to my fellow doctoral students in the project, Atle Refsdal, Judith Rossebø, Ragnhild
Kobro Runde and Knut Eilif Husa, for all the interesting discussions.
Thanks to the people of the Precise Modelling and Analysis group at the Depart-
ment of Informatics, University of Oslo. The group has, under the leadership of Olaf
Owe and Einar Broch Johnsen, been a stimulating environment to be a doctoral stu-
dent.
Thanks to the people of the Cooperative and Trusted Systems department at SIN-
TEF Information and Communication Technology, where I have been so fortunate to
have had my oﬃce during the work of my thesis, and its research director Bjørn Skjel-
laug for arranging thing so that I was able to start, and ﬁnish, my doctoral project.
Thanks to Fredrik Seehusen and Ida Hogganvik for all the stimulating discussions in
the periods we shared oﬃce, and also to the rest of the people in the Quality and Secu-
rity Technologies group for creating an environment in which positive and constructive
feedback is a matter of habit.
Thanks to the Formal Methods and Tools group at the University of Twente which,
under leadership of Arend Rensink and Ed Brinksma, was so forthcoming in letting
me stay there for a six months visit, and to the people of the group. A special thank
to Marie¨lle Stoelinga for supervising me during my visit, and special thanks to Tomas
Krilavicˇius and Laura Branda´n Briones for giving me a social life while in Twente.
Thanks to my parents, Helga Soldal and Svein Lund, for all their support, and to
Svein for proof reading my thesis. To Ole Emil Hansen Lund, my grandfather and
possibly the person that ever held the highest faith in me: I am writing this in memory
of you.
Thanks to all my friends for just being supportive and good friends: Kathrin Greiner
(my only friend, except colleagues, that ever read and understood parts of my thesis),
Gudrun Kløve Juuhl and Tarjei V˚agstøl (and little Dagny), Bendik Steinsland and Liv
Kjersti Moen, Aslak Indreeide, Bendik Indreeide, Ingrid Baltzersen, Monika Bru¨ckl
v
Preface
(deeply missed), Arnved Soldal Lund (my brother) and Lajla-Margrethe Lindskog (and
little Oskar), Nina Reim, Sigurd Jorde, Eirik Nordby and Bodil Hauso, Jokke and Mari
Fjeldstad, and all the rest of you.
Finally, my deepest thanks to my girlfriend Eva Marie Meling Mathisen, for all her
love, support and patience.
Oslo, November 2007
Mass Soldal Lund
vi
Contents
Abstract iii
Preface v
Contents vii
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xvii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Sequence diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Formal semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.6 Structure of thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.7 Relation to other publications by the author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
I Research questions and methods 7
2 Problem statement 9
2.1 Main hypothesis and goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Success criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Research method 13
3.1 Computer science as a science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2 Research process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3 Research methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4 Choice of research methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
II Background 21
4 Sequence diagrams 23
4.1 Graphical notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2 Basic semantic model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3 Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
vii
Contents
5 STAIRS 27
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2.1 Messages and events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2.2 Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.2.3 Syntax constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.3 Denotational semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.3.1 Well formed traces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.3.2 The denotation function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.3.3 Weak sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.3.4 Interleaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3.5 Strict sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3.6 Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.3.7 Negative behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.3.8 Universal behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.3.9 Iteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.4 Reﬁnement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.4.1 Reﬁnement of interaction obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.4.2 Reﬁnement of sequence diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6 Maude 39
6.1 Speciﬁcation language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.2 Interpreter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.3 Reﬂexivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
III Operational semantics 47
7 Introduction to operational semantics 49
7.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.2 Deﬁnition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.3 Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.3.1 Partial vs. complete speciﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.3.2 Global vs. local view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.3.3 Weak sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.3.4 Negative behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.3.5 Potential vs. mandatory choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8 Definition of operational semantics 55
8.1 The execution system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.2 Communication model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.2.1 One FIFO for each message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.2.2 One FIFO for each pair of lifelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.2.3 One FIFO for each lifeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
8.2.4 One global FIFO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
8.3 The projection system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.3.1 The empty diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.3.2 Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
viii
Contents
8.3.3 Weak sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.3.4 Interleaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.3.5 Strict sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
8.3.6 Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
8.3.7 Negative behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
8.3.8 Universal behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
8.3.9 Iteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.4 Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.4.1 Diagram projection part . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.4.2 Enabled and executed projection parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
8.4.3 Weak fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
8.5 Soundness and completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
9 Meta-strategies 69
9.1 The one trace with mode strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
9.2 The all traces strategy and a method for reﬁnement veriﬁcation . . . . 70
10 Implementation of operational semantics 75
10.1 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
10.1.1 Lifelines and gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
10.1.2 Messages and events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
10.1.3 Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
10.2 Operational semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
10.2.1 Execution system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
10.2.2 Projection system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
10.2.3 Meta-strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
10.3 Conventions for use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
11 Related work on operational semantics 91
IV Testing 97
12 Introduction to testing 99
13 Testing of sequence diagram specifications 103
13.1 Test format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
13.2 Test generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
13.2.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
13.2.2 Test generation algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
13.3 Test execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
13.3.1 Projection system for tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
13.3.2 Meta-system for test execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
13.3.3 Test runs and verdicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
13.3.4 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
13.4 Asynchronous testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
ix
Contents
14 The ‘Escalator’ tool 121
14.1 Use cases of Escalator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
14.2 Architecture of Escalator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
14.3 Use of Escalator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
15 Case study 131
15.1 The BuddySync system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
15.2 Reﬁnement veriﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
15.2.1 Assumptions and success criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
15.2.2 The BuddySync speciﬁcation for the reﬁnement veriﬁcation . . . 133
15.2.3 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
15.2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
15.2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
15.3 Reﬁnement testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
15.3.1 Assumptions and success criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
15.3.2 The BuddySync speciﬁcation for the reﬁnement testing . . . . . 151
15.3.3 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
15.3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
15.3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
16 Related work on testing 167
V Availability 169
17 Introduction to availability 171
18 A conceptual model for service availability 173
18.1 Characterizing aspects of service availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
18.1.1 Deﬁnitions of availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
18.1.2 Attributes, means and threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
18.1.3 Viewpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
18.1.4 Diversity of services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
18.1.5 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
18.2 Properties of service availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
18.2.1 Exclusivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
18.2.2 Accessibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
18.3 The conceptual model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
18.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
19 Towards analyzing availability 183
19.1 Operational semantics with data and variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
19.1.1 Data and variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
19.1.2 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
19.1.3 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
19.1.4 Guards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
19.2 Operational semantics with time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
19.2.1 Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
19.2.2 Events with timestamps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
x
Contents
19.2.3 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
20 Case study 195
20.1 Assumptions and success criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
20.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
20.2.1 Results of the literature survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
20.2.2 Request-reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
20.2.3 Delayed message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
20.2.4 Absolute and relative delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
20.2.5 Speciﬁcation of timer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
20.2.6 Use of timer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
20.2.7 Examples of timing constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
20.2.8 Pacemaker setup scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
20.2.9 Protocol for an audio/video component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
20.2.10Heartbeat packet emission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
20.2.11ATM example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
20.2.12AMT test case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
20.2.13ATM speciﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
20.2.14Summary of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
20.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
21 Related work on timed specification and analysis 219
21.1 Relation to STAIRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
21.1.1 Relation to STAIRS with data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
21.1.2 Relation to timed STAIRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
21.2 Formalisms for timed speciﬁcation and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
21.3 Sequence diagrams with data and time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
VI Discussion and conclusions 227
22 Discussion 229
23 Conclusions 235
23.1 Main contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
23.2 Further work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Bibliography 239
Index 253
A Proofs of soundness, completeness and termination of the operational
semantics 261
A.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
A.2 Simple sequence diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
A.3 Sequence diagrams with high-level operators and ﬁnite behavior . . . . 296
A.4 Sequence diagrams with inﬁnite loops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
xi
Contents
B The normal form used in the “all traces” execution strategy 323
B.1 Normal form for sequence diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
B.2 Justiﬁcation for the normal form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
B.3 Proofs of equivalence of the normal form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
C Maude implementation of the operational semantics 341
C.1 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
C.2 Operational semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
C.2.1 Communication medium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
C.2.2 Projection system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
C.2.3 Execution system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
C.3 Meta-strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
C.3.1 One trace with mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
C.3.2 All traces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
xii
List of Figures
1.1 Sequence diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4.1 Sequence diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1 Sequence diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13.1 Example speciﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
13.2 Example test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
13.3 Speciﬁcation d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
13.4 Speciﬁcation d2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
13.5 Speciﬁcation d3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
13.6 Test T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
13.7 Test T2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
13.8 Test T3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
13.9 Speciﬁcation d1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
13.10 Speciﬁcation d∗1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
14.1 Use cases for Escalator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
14.2 Class diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
14.3 Parts diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
14.4 Collaboration diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
14.5 Generic user scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
14.6 The SeDi editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
14.7 Testing wizard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
14.8 Test viewer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
15.1 RequestService0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
15.2 OﬀerService0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
15.3 RemoveRequest0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
15.4 RemoveOﬀer 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
15.5 SubscribeService0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
15.6 UnsubscribeService0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
15.7 RequestService1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
15.8 OﬀerService1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
15.9 Match1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
15.10 SaveRequest1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
15.11 SaveOﬀer 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
15.12 RequestService2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
15.13 OﬀerService2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
xiii
List of Figures
15.14 MatchRequest2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
15.15 MatchOﬀer 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
15.16 Match2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
15.17 SaveRequest2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
15.18 SaveOﬀer 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
15.19 RemoveRequest2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
15.20 RemoveOﬀer 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
15.21 RequestService3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
15.22 MatchRequest3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
15.23 SaveRequest3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
15.24 Match3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
15.25 OﬀerService3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
15.26 MatchOﬀer 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
15.27 SubscribeService4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
15.28 UnsubscribeService4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
15.29 RequestService4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
15.30 OﬀerService4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
15.31 RequestService0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
15.32 OﬀerService0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
15.33 RemoveRequest0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
15.34 RemoveOﬀer 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
15.35 SubscribeService0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
15.36 UnsubscribeService0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
15.37 RequestService1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
15.38 OﬀerService1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
15.39 SaveRequest1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
15.40 SaveOﬀer 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
15.41 Match1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
15.42 RequestService2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
15.43 OﬀerService2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
15.44 MatchRequest2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
15.45 MatchOﬀer 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
15.46 Match2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
15.47 SaveRequest2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
15.48 SaveOﬀer 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
15.49 RemoveRequest2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
15.50 RemoveOﬀer 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
15.51 RequestService3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
15.52 OﬀerService3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
15.53 MatchRequest3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
15.54 MatchOﬀer 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
15.55 SaveRequest3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
15.56 Match3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
15.57 RequestService4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
15.58 OﬀerService4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
15.59 SubscribeService4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
15.60 UnsubscribeService4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
xiv
List of Figures
18.1 Conceptual model of dependability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
18.2 Jonsson’s conceptual model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
18.3 Viewpoints for analyzing availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
18.4 The Service Availability Forum framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
18.5 Quality vs. timeliness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
18.6 Quality vs. timeliness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
18.7 The overall picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
19.1 Diagram with data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
19.2 Diagram with data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
19.3 Guarded alt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
19.4 Guarded xalt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
19.5 Sequence diagram with time constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
19.6 Time constraints expressed with variables, timestamps and constraints 194
20.1 Request-reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
20.2 Request-reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
20.3 Request-reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
20.4 Request-reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
20.5 Delayed message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
20.6 Delayed message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
20.7 Absolute and relative delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
20.8 Absolute and relative delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
20.9 Speciﬁcation of a timer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
20.10 Speciﬁcation of a timer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
20.11 Use of a timer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
20.12 Use of a timer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
20.13 Examples of time constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
20.14 Examples of time constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
20.15 Pacemaker setup scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
20.16 Pacemaker setup scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
20.17 Part of a protocol for an audio/video component . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
20.18 Part of a protocol for an audio/video component . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
20.19 Heartbeat packet emission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
20.20 Heartbeat packet emission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
20.21 ATM example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
20.22 ATM example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
20.23 ATM test case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
20.24 ATM test case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
20.25 ATM speciﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
20.26 ReturnCard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
20.27 TryAgain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
20.28 ConﬁscateCard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
20.29 Transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
20.30 GetBalance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
20.31 Withdraw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
20.32 ATM speciﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
20.33 ReturnCard’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
xv
List of Figures
20.34 TryAgain’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
20.35 ConﬁscateCard’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
20.36 Transaction’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
20.37 GetBalance’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
20.38 Withdraw’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
21.1 Sequence diagram with time constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
A.1 Diagram with single receive event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
xvi
List of Tables
13.1 Test results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
15.1 Lifelines at the diﬀerent abstraction levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
15.2 Diagrams at the diﬀerent abstraction levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
15.3 Reﬁnement veriﬁcation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
15.4 Reﬁnement veriﬁcation results of Overview diagrams . . . . . . . . . . 150
15.5 Exceptions to speciﬁcation of number of tests and runs . . . . . . . . 162
15.6 Testing results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
15.7 Testing results cont. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
15.8 Potential and actual test runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
20.1 Speciﬁcations with real-time properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
20.2 Results of the case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
xvii
List of Tables
xviii
Chapter 1
Introduction
In the current practice of production of computer systems there are great challenges.
The size and complexity of software is ever increasing. Keeping track of all parts,
interactions and dependencies in these systems is likewise becoming more and more
diﬃcult, and construction and management of them takes a conciderable eﬀort.
Our dependency on computer systems and their correct operations is also increasing.
Software is now an integrated part of our infrastructure and therefore of our society.
In this situation it is vital that computer systems are dependable, available, safe and
secure. This thesis focuses in particularly on the property of availability, but the results
are also relevant for dependability in general.
Ensuring the desirable properties of large software systems requires good methods
and languages for specifying the systems and good methods and tools for analyzing
the systems. We believe analysis at the level of speciﬁcations could reveal problems of
the system design before the systems are built, and should therefore be beneﬁcial for
system development. This view is consistent with the underlying ideas of both model
driven development1 (MDD) and formal methods2. Our aim is to work within both
MDD and formal methods, and to make contributions to both ﬁelds.
In this thesis we develop a theory and a tool for analyzing speciﬁcations of message
interactions. Speciﬁcations are made with the notation of sequence diagrams3, and
more precisely the tool analyses the relation between speciﬁcations of diﬀerent levels
of abstraction and detail. We show how the speciﬁcation language and tool may be
used to specify and analyse aspects of availability.
In software engineering4 and MDD the focus is often on practical usability of spec-
iﬁcation languages, analysis methods and tools. This means that if a method for
speciﬁcation and analysis of a system is to have value, it should be practical. In formal
methods the focus has traditionally been the mathematical properties of the methods,
such as soundness, completeness and decidability. A formal foundation is necessary if
we are to make precise and sound methods and tools. Unfortunately, formal speciﬁ-
cation languages and methods often require high competence in speciﬁc mathematical
formalisms and are diﬃcult to use by people who do not possess that competence [50].
1Model driven development is software development with models as the artifacts driving the de-
velopment, as opposed to, e.g. code as the driving artifacts. See, e.g., [10, 42] for references on model
driven development.
2Formal methods refer to the practice of using mathematical and logical formalisms to specify and
analyze computer systems. See, e.g., [26, 76, 184,189] for more information on formal methods.
3Speciﬁcally we apply UML 2.x [134] sequence diagrams. See section 1.1 and chapter 4.
4Software engineering is the ﬁeld and practice of building software systems. See, e.g. [170].
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Figure 1.1: Sequence diagram
We adopt sequence diagrams as our speciﬁcation language and an existing deno-
tational formalization as its formal semantic foundation. By using sequence diagrams
we get a speciﬁcation language that is used in practice, and by adopting a formalized
semantics we get the wanted formal foundation.
We implement a tool in which sequence diagrams are automatically analyzed. The
tool allows the user to carry out the analysis without deep understanding of its formal
basis. This means that the tool may be practical in use also for system developers
that are not experts in formal methods. The methods for analysis are based on formal
notions of reﬁnement,5 but apply testing techniques.6
1.1 Sequence diagrams
Sequence diagrams is a graphical notation for speciﬁcation of message interaction be-
tween system components. Several notations for sequence diagrams exist. Most promi-
nent are Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) sequence diagrams [134, 151] and their
predecessor Message Sequence Charts (MSC) [85]. Both are are speciﬁcation languages
that have proved themselves to be of great practical value in system development.
We adopt UML sequence diagram as our notation. UML sequence diagrams have
wide-spread use and several tools for making sequence diagram speciﬁcations are avail-
able. The UML standard deﬁnes the graphical notation and a well-deﬁned abstract
syntax. Figure 1.1 shows an example of a sequence diagram where two components
exchange messages. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed introduction to UML sequence
diagrams.
1.2 Formal semantics
The semantics of UML sequence diagrams is stated informally in the UML standard.
This opens for ambiguities and may lead to diﬀerent interpretations of the same dia-
grams. However, when a modeling language such as sequence diagrams is used either
5Reﬁnement is a formalization of the concept of a speciﬁcation becoming less underspeciﬁed. See,
e.g., [27, 70, 158] for more information on reﬁnement. See also section 5.4.
6See e.g. [24, 91, 178,179,183], and also chapter 12.
2
1.3 Analysis
for development of a system or as documentation, it is important that the people in-
volved have a common interpretation of the language. This motivates formal semantics
in which the meaning of diagrams are unambiguously stated. This is even more im-
portant for tool makers. The only way to make sure that the makers and users of, for
example an analysis tool, have same understanding of what results the tool provides,
is by basing it on formal theory.
For this purpose we base our work on STAIRS.7 STAIRS provides a formal trace
based denotational semantics for sequence diagrams. This semantics assigns meaning to
a sequence diagram by characterizing the execution histories that the diagram speciﬁes.
A thorough presentation of STAIRS is found in chapter 5.
1.3 Analysis
In model driven development one will typically start with a high-level model providing
a coarse speciﬁcation of the system to be developed. Over the course of the develop-
ment the model will be reﬁned into a speciﬁcation closer to the implementation of the
system. Such reﬁnements will consist of decompositions, adding details and possibly
functionality, and removing non-determinism. In practice there will always be a certain
amount of backtracking as new insights emerges, better solutions are found, require-
ments evolve etc. It might also be that parts of the system are developed before, or
faster than, other parts. However, the general direction will be more and more reﬁned
models.
Our focus is that of analyzing the relationship between speciﬁcations at diﬀerent
levels of abstraction, more speciﬁcally whether a low- level speciﬁcation is a correct
reﬁnement of a high-level speciﬁcation. We can operate with the expression “correct
reﬁnement” because we have a formal foundation on which we base our work, namely
STAIRS. In this formal framework, the notion of reﬁnement is deﬁned mathematically
in a way that captures our intuitive understanding of reﬁnement of speciﬁcations.
Within formal methods there exists several approaches for doing analysis – manual
or automated proofs (see e.g. [63]) simulation and bisimulation (see e.g. [125]), and
model checking (see e.g. [34, 63]), among others. There are usability issues with these
methods similar to those of formal languages – they are often diﬃcult to understand
and use for non-experts. A more fundamental issue with several of the formal methods
is their lack of scalability. A strive for completeness often leads to state-explosion when
the size of the analyzed systems increase (see e.g. [34]).
We aim at developing methods for analyzing sequence diagram speciﬁcation based
on testing techniques. There exists a formal testing theory (see chapter 12). We can
apply this to make (formally) sound analysis methods based on testing techniques and
also relate them to reﬁnement. Testing has a practical angle where completeness may
be sacriﬁced for the sake of the performance of the testing techniques and in this way
give better scalability.
Testing is in its nature operational – when we are doing testing we are studying
executions. This means we are in need of an operational semantics, a semantics that
precisely characterize executions step by step – instead of characterizing the resulting
7STAIRS is a denotational semantics and reﬁnement theory for UML sequence diagrams. STAIRS
– with some variations – is deﬁned in a number of publications; works cited in this thesis include
[68–70,144–147,153–159].
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histories as the denotational semantics of STAIRS does. This means we can apply
testing techniques to speciﬁcations in the same way testing techniques may be ap-
plied to implementations An important contribution of this thesis is an operational
semantics that is equivalent to the denotational semantics of STAIRS. This opera-
tional semantics constitutes the foundation for the development of analysis methods.
The operational semantics is implemented in Maude, a formal speciﬁcation language
based on rewrite theory. With use of the operational semantics implemented in Maude
and the Maude interpreter, we are able to execute sequence diagrams. Because Maude
is a formal language, we may do our implementation without the risk that the meaning
of the semantics is lost because the language of the implementation is ambiguous. An
introduction to Maude in found in chapter 6.
1.4 Availability
Availability is often deﬁned as the property of being accessible and usable on demand
by an authorized entity [78, 81]. Languages and methods for analyzing availability
properties require that availability is reduced to properties expressible by primitives
in the language. Using the above deﬁnition means that properties “accessible” and
“usable” must be reduced to something we can specify and analyze. In chapter 18
we present a model where availability is decomposed into basic aspects that may be
expressed and analyzed. One of these aspects is timeliness, a property closely related
to what is sometimes called soft real-time properties. We show how our speciﬁcation
language and operational semantics can be enhanced to handle time, and hence one
aspect of availability.
1.5 Contributions
In this thesis there are ﬁve main contributions:
• We deﬁne an operational semantics for UML 2.x sequence diagrams. The op-
erational semantics is proved to be sound and complete with respect the deno-
tational semantics of STAIRS, and is implemented given an implementation in
rewrite logic.
• Based on the operational semantics a method for reﬁnement veriﬁcation is de-
ﬁned.
• Based on the operational semantics we deﬁne a test generation algorithm for
sequence diagrams and characterize test execution with respect to sequence di-
agrams. Together, the test generation and test execution is used to device a
method for doing reﬁnement testing.
• We build a tool for analysis of sequence diagrams based on our operational se-
mantics and our testing theory for sequence diagrams. This tool is based on the
implementation of the operational semantics, and implements both the reﬁne-
ment veriﬁcation method and the reﬁnement testing method.
• We present a conceptual model of availability that shows how the high-level
property of availability may be decomposed and reduced into properties that can
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be speciﬁed and analyzed. In a ﬁrst step towards using this conceptual model as a
basis for analyzing availability, we extend our operational semantics for sequence
diagrams to handle one of these properties, namely real-time.
1.6 Structure of thesis
The thesis is structured into six parts, where the main contributions are found in
parts III–V. Each of these parts starts with a introduction chapter and ends with a re-
lated work chapter. State-of-the-art is spread out through these introduction chapters,
in addition to part II which provides background chapters. Related work is spread out
through the related works chapters. In detail, the structure of the thesis is as follows:
Part I Research questions and methods provides a characterization of the prob-
lem to solve (chapter 2) and research methods (chapter 3).
Part II Background provides background on sequence diagrams (chapter 4), ST-
AIRS (chapter 5) and Maude (chapter 6).
Part III Operational semantics contains an introduction (chapter 7), the deﬁni-
tion of the operational semantics (chapter 8), deﬁnition of meta-strategies for ex-
ecution of sequence diagram (chapter 9), the implementation of the operational
semantics (chapter 10), and related work with respect to operational semantics
of sequence diagrams (chapter 11).
Part IV Testing contains an introduction to testing theory (chapter 12), our testing
theory for sequence diagrams (chapter 13), a presentation of our tool (chapter 14),
a case study on use of the tool (chapter 15), and related work with respect to
testing based on sequence diagrams (chapter 16).
Part V Availability contains an introduction (chapter 17), a presentation of our con-
ceptual model for availability (chapter 18), deﬁnition of our operational semantics
with time (chapter 19), a case study in the use of our time enhanced sequence
diagrams (chapter 20), and related work with respect to timed speciﬁcation and
analysis (chapter 21).
Part VI Discussion and conclusions provides discussions (chapter 22) and conclu-
sions (chapter 23).
In appendices A and B we provide detailed proofs, and in appendix C we provide
implementation details.
1.7 Relation to other publications by the author
Aspects of this thesis have been published earlier as preliminary results in the following
publications:
[A] M. S. Lund and K. Stølen. Deriving tests from UML 2.0 sequence diagrams with
neg and assert. In 1st International Workshop on Automation of Software Test
(AST’06), pages 22–28. ACM Press, 2006. (Same as [113] in the bibliography.)
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[B] M. S. Lund and K. Stølen. A fully general operational semantics for UML
2.0 sequence diagrams with potential and mandatory choice. In 14th Interna-
tional Symposium on Formal Methods (FM’06), number 4085 in Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 380–395. Springer, 2006. (Same as [114] in the
bibliography.)
[C] M. S. Lund and K. Stølen. A fully general operational semantics for UML
sequence diagrams with potential and mandatory choice. Research report 330,
90 pages, Department of Informatics, University of Oslo, 2007. (Same as [115] in
the bibliography.)
[D] J. E. Y. Rossebø, M. S. Lund, A. Refsdal, and K. E. Husa. A conceptual model
for service availability. In Quality of Protection: Security Measurements and
Metrics (QoP’05), number 23 in Advances in Information Security, pages 107–
118. Springer, 2006. (Same as [149] in the bibliography.)
[E] J. E. Y. Rossebø, M. S. Lund, A. Refsdal, and K. E. Husa. A conceptual model
for service availability. Research report 337, 28 pages, Department of Informatics,
University of Oslo, 2006. (Same as [150] in the bibliography.)
In detail, the relations to these publications are:
• Chapter 4 is based on [C].
• Chapter 5 is based on [A,C].
• Chapter 7 is based on [C].
• Chapter 8 is based on [A,C].
• Chapter 9 is based on [A,C].
• Chapter 11 is based on [C].
• Sections 13.1–13.2 are based on [A].
• Chapter 16 is based on [A].
• Chapter 18 is based on [D,E].
• Appendix A is based on [C].
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Chapter 2
Problem statement
In chapter 1 we gave a brief presentation of the problems we seek to address and our
solutions to them. In this chapter we elaborate and state our aims more clearly and
explicitly. In section 2.1 we present our overall hypothesis and goal, and in section 2.2
we specify success criteria for our solution. The success criteria may be understood as
overall requirements to the artifacts resulting from our work.
2.1 Main hypothesis and goal
Stated very loosely our aim is to contribute to improving system development. Based
on our views presented in chapter 1, we formulate our overall hypothesis and starting
point as follows:
System development will beneﬁt (become more eﬀective and less costly, and produce
better software systems) from:
• Methods and tools for doing analysis of systems at the model or speciﬁcation1
level. In this we include:
– Analysis of behavior, but also analysis of such properties as availability.
– Analysis of consistency between diﬀerent levels of abstractions, i.e. that spec-
iﬁcations at a lower level are reﬁnements of speciﬁcation at higher level.
• An integration of practical or pragmatic methods with formal methods. Speciﬁcally
this refers to:
– Integration of an approach based on diagram based speciﬁcation languages
with an approach based on languages with formal semantics.
– Integration of formal reﬁnement theory with practical testing techniques.
A full investigation of this hypothesis is an enormous task that lies far beyond the
scope of this thesis. However, we do seek to contribute to the investigation of the
hypothesis by formulating a goal that will, if it is reached, indicate the validity of the
hypothesis. We formulate our overall goal as:
1In the following we will use the terms model and specification interchangeably.
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Develop a method and tool to analyze reﬁnements and decompositions of speciﬁcations
expressed in a diagram based language. The methods and tool should:
• Handle functional behavior as well as aspects of availability.
• Have a sound formal foundation.
• Apply testing techniques.
• Be practical in use also for people without background in formal methods.
Even though reaching this goal clearly does not validate the hypothesis, we may
argue that it supports the hypothesis. If such methods and tools as described in the goal
are developed and successfully applied, it would mean that a combination of practical
diagram based languages and formal semantics is feasible, as well as a combination
of formal reﬁnement theory and testing techniques. Further it would indicate the
beneﬁt from having methods and tools that analyze behavior and availability properties
at the speciﬁcation level and in the relation between speciﬁcations at diﬀerent levels
of abstraction. Since the feasibility and beneﬁt from such methods and tools are
exactly what the hypothesis postulates, successful application of methods and tools as
described in the goal would indeed be support of the hypothesis.
2.2 Success criteria
In the following a number of success criteria for our analysis method and tool are
formulated. They may be seen partly as subgoals of the overall goal and partly as
additional requirements. The success criteria deﬁne a number of requirements for the
outcome of our project, and in chapter 22 we use these criteria for evaluating our results
and to determine to what degree our goal is reached.
Success criterion 1 The method should support model driven development by oﬀering
the capability of analyzing the relation between models or speciﬁcations at diﬀerent levels
of abstraction.
Model driven development is a way of doing system development where models always
are at the base of what is being done. Every stage of the development has speciﬁc
kinds of models associated to it. For every step the models evolve and new models are
made based on the models of the previous steps, and over the course of development
the models will become more and more reﬁned and closer to code/implementation. In
this setting it is important that the models at diﬀerent levels of abstraction, belonging
to diﬀerent stages of the development, are related in the appropriate way. In this
sense a method that analyzes the relation between models will support model driven
development by ensuring the correct relation between models.
Success criterion 2 The method should oﬀer the capability of analyzing aspects of
availability.
What is said above about speciﬁcations and models in general, holds equally well
for availability. In model driven development there is a need for keeping consistency
between speciﬁcations and models at diﬀerent levels of abstraction, and this is also
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true for availability speciﬁcations. Hence our method should facilitate analyzing the
relation between speciﬁcations of availability aspects at diﬀerent levels of abstractions.
This is especially important for availability and related properties as they often will be
important high-level requirements of software systems, and these requirements ideally
should be reﬂected in lower level speciﬁcations.
The high-level deﬁnitions of availability we ﬁnd in standards such as [78,81] cannot
be applied directly to speciﬁcation and analysis. We need to break the deﬁnitions down
to aspects we may express in a speciﬁcation language, and that we are able to analyze
in a meaningful way. It is not realistic to develop a method to analyze all possible
aspects of availability within the scope of this thesis, hence we focus on some selected
aspects.
Success criterion 3 The method should make use of functional models.
System development is often focused on the behavior of systems, and hence around
functional models or speciﬁcations in model driven development. Properties such as
availability, sometimes referred to as non-functional properties2, are often speciﬁed
in separate text-based documents, e.g. stating the required availability. Instead of
operating with separate “availability documents” or “availability speciﬁcations” we
believe that speciﬁcation of availability properties should be embedded in functional
speciﬁcations, and that this would increase the chance of these properties getting the
attention they deserve.
Success criterion 4 The method should handle modularity.
Industrial system development is moving towards component based development. Re-
use of components and the use of third party components is increasing. In large projects
few or no persons are involved in all parts of the development. In such a situation both
development methods and methods for analysis must handle modularity.
This means that our methods should be able to do analysis of components sepa-
rately. Even more relevant is analysis of whether the composition of components yields
the expected results.
Success criterion 5 The method should be based on practical testing techniques.
Testing is the chief method for establishing correctness of computer systems and their
conformance to requirements and speciﬁcations. This means testing is well understood,
is well known by practitioners and is supported by several tools. Testing is also prag-
matic in the sense that completeness (full coverage) usually is sacriﬁced for the sake
of performance of the testing, or in other words that it is possible to do useful testing
within time frames less that what would be needed to do a complete analysis.
We wish to use these characteristics of testing to our beneﬁt. By basing ourselves
on testing techniques we should be able to make a method for analysis that can be
more easily applied in system development in its current state. We believe we may gain
these beneﬁts even though we do testing of speciﬁcations rather than implementations.
Success criterion 6 The method should be formally sound.
2We do not necessarily recognize them as non-functional.
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Soundness in this respect is that the outcome of an analysis using our method is valid,
and that the outcome follows from the input.
As stated earlier we believe speciﬁcation languages and analysis methods should be
founded on mathematical formalism. This is necessary for knowing what a speciﬁcation
expresses and how results of an analysis should be interpreted. Further it is necessary
in tool making because the tool maker should have the same interpretation of the
methods as the tool users.
When we base our method on mathematical formalism it also means that we can
apply mathematical reasoning and mathematical proofs to ensure that the method is
sound.
Success criterion 7 The output from the method should useful.
By useful we mean that a software developer using the method should be able to use
its output for a practical purpose, such as to, e.g. improve a system design or make
a convincing argument that a speciﬁcation will indeed fulﬁll speciﬁed requirements.
This is clearly a necessary criterion when developing methods for improving system
development.
In order to fulﬁll this criterion, output of our method must reﬂects our intuition
about the real world, and the method must be designed in such a way that anomalies
do not corrupt the output.
Success criterion 8 The method should be supported by a fully or partially automatic
tool.
As the above, this is a necessary criterion if our method should ever be applied in prac-
tical system development and not only remain an academic exercise. The development
of tools of industrial standard is clearly outside the scope of this thesis. We do however
think it is important to develop prototypes as “proofs of concept” to demonstrate that
our method may be practically applied.
Practical application requires that the tool must be usable also for persons without
high competence in the method and its theoretic foundation. Hence, for a tool to be
practical, is should automate the method to as high a degree as possible.
Success criterion 9 Application of the method at early stages of the system develop-
ment improves the quality of systems with availability requirements.
We have already stated that we aim at improving system development. Clearly then,
one of the success criteria is that the method we develop actually improves system
development. It might not be immediately evident what improved system development
is, but obviously improved products of the development is one important aspect of what
constitute an improvement in the development process.
Success criterion 10 Application of the method makes development of systems with
availability requirements more eﬃcient and less costly.
This criterion is related to the pervious one, and refers to another aspect of improv-
ing system development. While the previous success criterion states that we aim at
improvements in the products of system development, this criterion states that these
products should be produced using less resources. In other words our success criterion
is that application of our method should make it possible to do system development
with less eﬀort.
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In this chapter we discuss and motivate the research methods used in the work of this
thesis. We start by giving a general view of computer science as a scientiﬁc activity and
its relation to other sciences in section 3.1. Then in section 3.2 we present an overall
research process, and in section 3.3 we provide an overview of the research methods
available. Finally, in section 3.4 we account for the research methods used.
It is common to distinguish between various branches of studies of computer related
topics (sometimes informatics is used as a common name). An example is found in [37,
p. 10]:
This distinction can be simply (and perhaps contentiously) made by suggest-
ing that, while computer science is about how computers function as hardware
and software, and software engineering is about building technical systems and
ensembles of hardware and software that meet given speciﬁcations, information
systems is about understanding what is or might be done with these technical
systems, and their eﬀects in the human/organizational/social world.
In many research projects these diﬀerent branches are interwoven, so in the following
we use the term computer science broadly and loosely to embrace all of the above.
Hence we see computer science to be the study of computerized systems in all their
aspects.
3.1 Computer science as a science
A distinction may be made between pure science, applied science and technology [48,
166]. In pure science the objective is to investigate laws and properties of things and
the relation between them, to increase our knowledge of the world and to formulate
theories of the laws governing the world. In contrast to this, applied science is the
activity of using the knowledge and theories of pure science in order to fulﬁll some
purpose. The fundamental diﬀerence between pure science and applied science is that
pure science is about acquiring knowledge for the purpose of knowing, while applied
science is about using knowledge for practical purposes.
Technology, which includes engineering, is the invention, development and produc-
tion of artifacts, where by artifact we mean something human made, created to serve a
(not necessarily practical) purpose. Technology and applied science are closely related.
What distinguishes the two is that technology may be based on experience in addition
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to scientiﬁc knowledge and that applied science is not necessarily about creating arti-
facts. However, it is clear that there is a big overlap, and it is often impossible to place
a research project in one, but not the other, of these categories.
Also the distinction between pure science (characterized by knowledge) on the one
side and applied science and technology (characterized by purpose) on the other is not
always a sharp distinction. Often, advances in pure science may result from advances
in applied science and technology, and advances in applied science and technology may
be a result of advances in pure science. These advances may be strongly connected and
may appear from the same activity.
Computer science as a ﬁeld belongs to both pure science, applied science and tech-
nology. For example the theory of computation [36, 105] may be seen as pure science
while compiler construction (which uses elements from the theory of computation) is
both applied science and technology. While compiler construction (designing and im-
plementing a compiler) is applied science, the designing and implementing of most
other computer programs must be seen as technology, but not as applied science. A
computer program is clearly an artifact created to serve a purpose, but seldom based
on scientiﬁc knowledge. Research in computer science is usually about inventing and
developing new artifacts or improving existing artifacts (see e.g. [54,55]), and therefore
lean over to the applied science/technology end of the scale.
What distinguishes artifacts from naturally occurring objects or entities is that
they are human creations and that they are created for a human purpose, see e.g.
[48, 164, 166]. At the same time, artifacts must obey the same natural laws as any
other objects and entities. An important remark here is that “artifact” must not
be confused with something necessarily physical. Computer science produces a wide
range of artifacts lacking a physical nature. Examples of non-physical artifacts of
computer science can be algorithms, programming languages and system development
methodologies.
While most computer scientists seldom are interested in the physical workings of a
computer they are often interested in the running or execution of a computer program.
The running of a computer program is a physical process, and may be studied as a
such, see e.g. [127] and [164, pp. 19–21]. This shows that computer science is (partly)
an empirical science and may be studied by means of experimental methods inspired by
empirical sciences. Several advocates of this view may be found, e.g., [15, 49, 165, 175,
176, 191]. However, we oppose the view that computer science is chieﬂy an empirical
science [127]. Mathematical artifacts such as algorithms and formal models may be
studied by mathematical methods such as formal proofs.
The artifacts of computer science are neither purely technical nor technological.
They may also be, e.g., organizational. Examples of this include system development
methodologies and other computer related processes. Also the more technical or tech-
nological artifacts often interact with humans, for example graphical user interfaces.
Hence, some parts of computer science, especially what is often called information sys-
tems, are closely related to social sciences such as organizational sciences or behavioral
sciences. The implication of this is that also research methods from the social sciences
are relevant for computer science [37, 72].
In summary we conclude that analytic, as well as empirical research methods, are
of great relevance for computer science research, and that research methods can be
borrowed from natural sciences and mathematics, as well as from the social sciences.
This means we oppose the view presented in e.g. [64, 65] that computer science is
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fundamentally diﬀerent from other sciences and that research methods in computer
science must reﬂect this special nature of computer science rather than being inspired
by the research methods of other science.1
3.2 Research process
We have argued that computer science may apply methods from mathematics, natural
sciences and social sciences, but we still need to see this in relation to the applied
nature of computer science. Further, the methods need to be related to the research
activity as a processes.
In pure science, the investigation of an object aims to discover its properties or
to see whether it can be used to conﬁrm or reject a theory. Either way the purpose
is that of gaining knowledge. In applied science and technology, the purpose of an
investigation of the properties of an artifact is to investigate the success of the artifact.
The success of an artifact is the degree to which it fulﬁlls its purpose, see e.g. [116].
We can formulate hypotheses about, and do hypothesis testing on, artifacts the
same way we can formulate hypotheses about, and to hypothesis testing on, natural
occurring objects, see e.g. [15]. This means that we can apply the same research
methods and the same kind of research process for applied science and technology that
we apply for pure science.
Classical research is characterized by an iterative process. In classical research this
process may, very simpliﬁed, be described as 1) the observation of some phenomena
that are not explained by existing theory, 2) the making of a theory to explain the
observed phenomena, 3) justifying the new theory by arguing that it better explains
the phenomena and/or testing of the theory by experiments, or other methods.
For applied science and technology we can describe a similar process for conducting
research: 1) The possibility, need or wish for a new or improved artifact to serve some
purpose, 2) development of the artifact, 3) evaluating the success of the artifact by
arguing that it fulﬁlls its purpose and/or testing the artifact by experiments, or other
methods.
A parallel may be observed. In classical research the iteration of the process will
ideally yield better and better theories to explain more and more phenomena. In
applied or technological research, iteration of the process will ideally yield better and
better artifacts to serve more and more purposes. Views similar to this is found in
e.g. [116, 166,169].
Even though this is a simpliﬁed account of research, and may be more normative
than descriptive, it is suﬃcient for our purpose. The research process that we have
followed in this work is a practical adaption of the process characterized above:
1. Speciﬁcation of requirements for the artifacts that are developed in the work of
this thesis by means of success criteria (see chapter 2).
2. Development of the artifacts in accordance to the requirements.
3. Evaluation of the artifacts developed with respect to how well they fulﬁll the
success criteria (chapter 22).
1We do, however, recognize that computer science has some distinctive characteristics and accepts
demonstrations (“proof of concept”, prototyping) as a valid method in computer science [64,65,116]–
but not as its sole method.
15
Research method
3.3 Research methods
In this section we give a brief presentation of various research methods and approaches.
We base the presentation of [37, 116, 122, 190, 191]. Taken together we believe they
provide a representative picture of the research methods available. In the presentation
we focus on the generality, precision and realism of the various methods. This is
important since no method can maximize all of these three simultaneously. Methods
that give high generality sacriﬁce precision and realism, and so forth [122].
Based on the above cited literature we may group and summarize a number of
research methods:
Demonstration. By demonstration we mean the production of an artifact and in-
vestigation of its feasibility by observing it working. This is similar to the in-
stantiation building activity in [116], technical development in [37] and assertion
in [191], and might also be referred to as prototyping and proof of concept. This
is a simple method that is often applied early in development projects, but to a
large degree lacks generality.
Field study. A ﬁeld study is the systematic observation of an artifact (or pheno-
menon) in its natural (real world) environment. The researcher will usually try
not to interact with the object(s)/system(s) during the study and will often
observe speciﬁc variables to answer speciﬁc questions. This is a method which
gives high realism, but may lack precision and generality.
There also exists a number of variations of this method. What is called project
monitoring in [191] is a weak form of ﬁeld study, where data is collected from
the ﬁeld and analyzed, but without pre-established questions to be answered.
Related to this are also what are called lessons learned and legacy data in [191],
where historically recorded observations and data are analyzed.
A ﬁeld experiment in [122] or replicated experiment in [191] is a ﬁeld study where
one signiﬁcant variable is changed and the eﬀect of this is observed. An example
of this may be observing the eﬀect of introducing a new development tool in
system development projects.
A variant of ﬁeld study (or ﬁeld experiment) is case study [190]. In a case study
one speciﬁc case or situation is studied, which may give deeper insight in the
case or situation, but less generality. A further variant of case study is action
research (or collaborative research). In action research the researcher ceases to
be an outside observer and takes part in the case or situation under study. The
researcher is then himself or herself part of the subject and contributes with his
or her skills and knowledge to the case or situation. This may give an even deeper
understanding of the case or situation, but with the sacriﬁce of generality and
the risk of observations being subjective.
Laboratory experiment. In a laboratory experiment (called synthetic environment
experiment in [191]) an artiﬁcial (synthetic) environment is created in which
the researcher can control the variables and make sure that conditions remain
stable throughout the experiment. A task is performed several times in this
artiﬁcial environment with or without changing the variables of the environment.
Speciﬁc variables of the subjects are observed or preferably measured. A typical
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laboratory experiment in computer science would be to let a number of users
perform speciﬁc tasks on a user interface with controlled variations in the tasks
they perform and/or the user interface. This method gives high precision because
of the controlled environment, but may lack realism for the same reason. The
generality may be reasonable if the subjects are carefully chosen.
A variant of laboratory experiment is what in [191] is called dynamic analysis.
This refers to exposing an artifact (e.g., a computer program) to various (con-
trolled) conditions or situations (e.g., input) and observe or measure the result.
An example may be performance, stress or load tests of computer programs. This
is also related to experimental simulation in [122]. Benchmarking is a speciﬁc
type of dynamic analysis. A benchmarking test usually applies a collection of
representative test data (a benchmark suite) that is given as input to several
computer programs of the same type in order to observe or measure diﬀerences
in, e.g. the performance of, the computer programs.
Simulation. A simulation refers to the study of a model instead of the actual thing,
usually running on a computer. In [191], simulation is closely related to dynamic
analysis with the diﬀerence being that a model of the environment is used instead
of a real environment. Examples may be running a computer program together
with a model of user behavior or on a simulated hardware platform while testing
its performance. In [122], computer simulation refers to observing the behavior
of a model of a real system while the model is running on a computer.
Survey. In a survey (sample survey in [122]) data is collected in form of responses
to questions addressed to the subjects of the study. Usually the responses are
collected by means of a questionnaire. If the subjects and questions are carefully
chosen this method gives high generality, but lacks precision and realism.
A variant is to have the questions answered in structured (or in-depth) interviews
[37] with the subjects. Often then, there will be fewer subjects, but the questions
and answers will typically be more extensive. This may give deeper understanding
of the topic under study, but compromises the generality. In another variant,
called judgment study in [122], responses are gathered from a small group of
judges subjected to a speciﬁc set of stimuli. This increases precision, but also
compromises generality. Gathering expert opinions may be a further variant of
survey.
Formal analysis. The archetype of formal analysis (formal theory in [122] and theo-
retical research or formal-mathematical analysis in [37]) is theorem proving. From
a set of axioms and/or a mathematical model a theorem concerning some proper-
ties of the topic under study is formulated and proved using mathematical proof
techniques.
We also consider less mathematical, but analytic, methods as formal analysis.
Building a structured argument, for example a thought experiment, must be con-
sidered formal analysis. Static analysis in [191] is a related type of formal analysis.
Static analysis is concerned with investigating the characteristics of an artifact
looking at its structural properties. An example of static analysis is complexity
measures of computer programs based on analyzing the code of the programs.
17
Research method
The activity of building or developing concepts and relations between concept
(called conceptual development in [37]) must also be considered formal analysis.
This activity is related to the constructs and model building activities in [116].
Forming of concepts and models may be based on empiric observations and is
then related to empirical methods, but concept and model building may also be
purely analytical.
Formal analysis scores high on generality, but due to its analytic rather than
empirical nature, low in realism and precision.
Review. The method called (literature) review in [37] and literature search in [191]
is based on analyzing and comparing results from previously published research.
This method is sometimes called (literature) survey, but must not be confused
with the (sample) survey discussed above. Reviews are seldom the sole method
of a research project, but are often used for identifying the current state of, and
important results within, the domain of the research project. The purpose of a
review may be to gather published empirical results and use these for testing a
hypothesis. In this case, a review is sometimes called a meta-analysis. A potential
problem with reviews is bias in the selection of published works and data in the
study.
3.4 Choice of research methods
Our work is to a large degree about developing artifacts, more speciﬁcally a method and
a tool for analyzing speciﬁcations. Artifacts are produced to fulﬁll a purpose, and the
success of an artifact is the degree to which it fulﬁlls this purpose. The success criteria
formulated in chapter 2 should be seen as high-level requirements to our method and
tool, and hence as statements of the purpose of the artifacts.
The technical work, i.e. the development, have constituted the main eﬀort in the
work of this thesis. The aims of the work have been to not do everything from scratch,
but build on existing theories, to build a tool as well as a method, and to make a
method that is formally sound. The development was iterative in two ways. It has
been iterative in the sense that the operational semantics was developed ﬁrst, then the
testing theory, and then the real-time extension. Each of these iterations have been
preceded by literature reviews in order to identify the state-of-the-art, and to determine
what existing theories could be used and where new development was needed. These
literature reviews are reﬂected in chapters 7, 11, 12, 16, 18 and 21.
The other way the work was iterative is that the implementation of the tool and the
proving of theorems have been carried out along with the development of the method.
This way, there has been continuously feedback to the method development that has
helped improving the method with respect to soundness, feasibility and usability.
When we evaluate our artifacts with respect to the success criteria, our chief research
methods are formal analysis and demonstrations. Formal analysis is used in several of
its forms to build arguments about the properties of our artifacts. Demonstrations are
applied to show the feasibility of our artifacts.
It can be argued that formal analysis and demonstrations are too weak in order to
properly evaluate some of the success criteria. In order to obtain a proper evaluation of
these success criteria, some variants of ﬁeld study, laboratory experiment, simulation
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or survey should be applied. The main focus of our work has been the development
of artifacts and, though unfortunately, there has not been suﬃcient time within the
time-span of the project to conduct such kinds of evaluations in large scale. We have
however expose our method and tool two studies that may be considered as small and
limited laboratory experiments, in the from of dynamic analyses, and as small and
limited case studies.
Success criterion 1 The method should support model driven development by oﬀering
the capability of analyzing the relation between models or speciﬁcations at diﬀerent
levels of abstraction.
This success criterion is evaluated by formal analysis in form of structured ar-
guments, by demonstration in form of the development of a tool, and small and
limited laboratory experiments in form of dynamic analysis. The dynamic anal-
ysis consists of exposing our tool to example input and comparing the actual
output with expected output. Because we use a real speciﬁcation we can also
categorize this analysis as a case study. The tool is documented on chapter 14
and the case study in chapter 15.
Success criterion 2 The method should oﬀer the capability of analyzing aspects of
availability.
The research method applied for this success criterion is formal analysis in form
of conceptual development, in combination with a literature review, in order to
identify aspects of availability. In addition, a small and limited case study, in
combination with a literature review, was carried out to evaluate our treatment
of real-time. The conceptual development is documented in chapter 18, and the
case study is documented in chapter 20.
Success criterion 3 The method should make use of functional models.
This criterion is evaluated by means of formal analysis in form of structured
arguments.
Success criterion 4 The method should handle modularity.
The evaluation of this criterion is closely related to evaluation of success crite-
rion 1. The methods applied are formal analysis in form of structured argument
based on the tool development documented in chapter 14, and the case study
documented in chapter 15.
Success criterion 5 The method should be based on practical testing techniques.
This criterion is evaluated by means of formal analysis in the forms of struc-
tured argument and static analysis, but also by demonstration in the form of the
tool development documented in chapter 14, and the case study documented in
chapter 15.
Success criterion 6 The method should be formally sound.
This criterion is evaluated by means of formal analysis in the forms of theorem
proving (mathematical proof) and structured arguments. The proofs are docu-
mented in appendices A and B.
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Success criterion 7 The output from the method should useful.
This is evaluated by means of the case study documented in chapter 15, together
with formal analysis in form of static analysis and structured arguments.
Success criterion 8 The method should be supported by a fully or partially automatic
tool.
Obviously this criterion is evaluated by the tool development (demonstration).
Further, the criterion is evaluated by formal analysis in the form of structured
arguments and static analysis, and by the case study documented in chapter 15.
Success criterion 9 Application of the method at early stages of the system develop-
ment improves the quality of systems with availability requirements.
Ideally we should have conducted a larger ﬁeld study in order to evaluate this
success criterion. However, since there has not been suﬃcient time to conduct
such ﬁeld studies we have to resort formal analysis in the form of structured
arguments in order to evaluate this criterion.
Success criterion 10 Application of the method makes development of systems with
availability requirements more eﬃcient and less costly.
As with success criterion 9, a proper evaluation of this criterion would require a
larger ﬁeld study. Because we have not been able to carry out any ﬁeld study
within the time-span of our project, for the evaluation of this criterion we also
have to resort to formal analysis in the form of structured arguments.
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Chapter 4
Sequence diagrams
Sequence diagrams are a graphical speciﬁcation language deﬁned in the Uniﬁed Mod-
eling Language (UML) 2.x1 standard [134]. Sequence diagrams as deﬁned in the UML
2.x standard are the last of a sequence of languages that have evolved over the last 15
to 20 years. Both UML sequence diagrams and their predecessor Message Sequence
Charts (MSC) [85] are speciﬁcation languages that have proved themselves to be of
great practical value in system development.
An early version called Time Sequence Diagrams was standardized in the 1980s
(see [47,82]). Better known are MSCs that were ﬁrst standardized by ITU in 1993 (see
e.g. [20]). This standard is usually referred to as MSC-92, and describes what is now
called basic MSCs. This means that MSC-92 did not have high-level constructs such
as choice, but merely consisted of lifelines and messages. MSC-92 had a lifeline-centric
textual syntax2, and was given a semantics formalized in process algebra.
In 1996, a new MSC standard was deﬁned, called MSC-96 [83]. In this standard,
high-level constructs and high-level MSCs were introduced, a kind of diagrams that
show how control ﬂows between basic MSCs. Further an event-centric textual syntax3
and a new semantics were deﬁned [84]. This semantics is also a kind of process alge-
bra, but holds substantial diﬀerences from the MSC-92 semantics. Finally, the MSC-96
standard was revised in 1999 and became MSC-2000 [85], but kept the MSC-96 seman-
tics. A further discussion on the MSC semantics is found in chapter 11.
The ﬁrst versions of the Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML 1.x) [131] included a
version of sequence diagrams similar to MSC-92, i.e., consisting of only lifelines and
messages and no high-level constructs. An important diﬀerence, however, was that the
sequence diagrams of UML 1.x did not have the frame around the diagram, which in
MSC-92 allowed messages to and from the environment of the speciﬁed system.
Sequence diagrams in UML 2.x may be seen as a successor of MSC-2000, since
many of the MSC language constructs have been incorporated in the UML 2.x variant
1The UML standard exists in versions 1.3, 1.4, 1.4.2, 1.5, 2.0 and 2.1.1. The for us relevant changes
occurred in the transition from version 1.5 to version 2.0. Hence, in this thesis we will operate with
UML 1.x and UML 2.x with versions 1.4 [131] and 2.1.1 [134] as representatives.
2Lifelines represent the timelines of communicating parts or components in a sequence diagram (see
section 4.1). In “MSC-terminology”, lifelines are called instances or instance lines. A lifeline-centric
syntax means that each lifeline is characterized by itself and a diagram as a collection of lifelines.
3In an event-centric syntax events, as opposed to lifelines, are the basic building blocks of a diagram.
The event-centric syntax of MSCs is more general than the lifeline centric-syntax in that all diagrams
expressed in the lifeline-centric syntax can be expressed in the event-centric syntax, but not the other
way around.
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Figure 4.1: Sequence diagram
of sequence diagrams. This means that even though we work with UML 2.x sequence
diagrams, much of the related work concerns MSCs. UML 2.x sequence diagrams are,
however, neither a subset nor a superset of MSC-2000; there are both similarities and
diﬀerences between the languages [67]. Most notably MSCs do not have any notion of
negative behavior (see below).
4.1 Graphical notation
The UML 2.x standard deﬁnes the graphical notation, but also an abstract syntax, for
the diagrams. Hence the language has a well-deﬁned syntax.
Figure 4.1 shows a sequence diagram d in the graphical notation. A sequence dia-
gram consists of a frame, representing the environment of the speciﬁed system, and one
or more lifelines , representing components of the system. Arrows represent messages
sent between lifelines or between a lifeline and the environment of the diagram. If the
beginning or the end of an arrow is at a lifeline, this represents an event . Where an
arrow meets the frame, there is a gate. Combined fragments are operators, like the
choice operator alt, and each combined fragment has one or more operands.
In the diagram of ﬁgure 4.1 we see two components (lifelines) i and j. i receives a
message a from gate g and them makes a choice between sending message b or message
c to j.
4.2 Basic semantic model
The UML standard deﬁnes the semantics of sequence diagrams informally. Most no-
tably, this is a trace-based semantics:
The semantics of an Interaction4 is given as a pair of sets of traces. The two
trace sets represent valid traces and invalid traces. The union of these two sets
need not necessarily cover the whole universe of traces. The traces that are not
included are not described by this Interaction at all, and we cannot know whether
they are valid or invalid. [. . . ]
4In the UML standard, Interaction is used as the common name for diagrams specifying interaction
by sending and receiving of messages. Sequence diagrams are then one kind of Interaction [our note].
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Basic trace model: The semantics of an Interaction is given by a pair [P, I]
where P is the set of valid traces and I is the set of invalid traces. P ∪ I need
not be the whole universe of traces.
A trace is a sequence of event occurrences denoted 〈e1, e2, ..., en〉. [. . . ]
Two Interactions are equivalent if their pair of trace-sets are equal. [134, pp.
479–480]
The STAIRS semantics is a formalization of sequence diagrams based on an exten-
sion of this semantics model. We adopt the semantic model of STAIRS, and thereby
the semantic model described in the UML standard. This means we operate with the
concepts of positive and negative behavior.5 Behavior that is neither positive nor neg-
ative is referred to as inconclusive. A presentation of the STAIRS semantics is found
in chapter 5.
4.3 Operators
In the diagram of ﬁgure 4.1 we saw an operator alt. The UML standard deﬁnes a
number of operators of sequence diagrams that can be used in a similar way. Operators
are either unary or they have two or more operands. The standard deﬁnes eight unary
operators opt, break, loop, critical, neg, assert, ignore and consider, and four operators
seq, alt, par and strict that may be viewed as binary or n-ary. Of these we handle
the unary operators opt, loop, neg and assert, and all of latter, treated as binary. In
addition we introduce two additional operators: the unary operator refuse and the
binary operator xalt. We also introduce a constant skip. We consider seq, par and strict
as simple operators and the remaining as high-level operators. Below we give a short
description of each of the operators we use:
seq is called the weak sequencing operator, and deﬁnes a sequencing of its left argu-
ment and its right argument such that events on the left side must come before
event on the right side if they belong to the same lifeline. In addition the causal-
ity of messages is preserved, but except for these two constraints the result may
be any merge of the left side and the right side. See also section 7.3.3.
par is the parallel operator and deﬁnes interleaving of the events from each of its
arguments. The result is any merge of the left side and the right side that
preserves the causality of messages.
strict denotes strict sequencing, which means the left side must happen before the
right side.
opt is option. This unary operator represents a choice between its argument and
nothing.
neg is the negative operator and deﬁnes negative or invalid behavior. This oper-
ator represents a choice between this negative behavior or nothing. See also
section 7.3.4.
5We will use the terms negative and invalid interchangeably. Further, positive and valid should be
understood to be synonyms when we talk about behaviors.
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refuse is introduced to handle an ambiguity in the interpretation of neg (see [155]).
While neg deﬁnes a choice between negative behavior and nothing, refuse just
deﬁnes negative behavior.
assert is the assertion operator and deﬁnes what may be considered a kind of univer-
sal behavior. This means that only the behavior of its arguments may be positive
behavior and all other behavior is negative or invalid. See also section 7.3.1.
loop deﬁnes iteration of the behavior of its argument. The loop may be inﬁnite or
have a speciﬁed number of iterations.
alt is the alternative operator and represents a (non-deterministic) choice between
its arguments.
xalt is called explicit alternative and is introduced to resolve an ambiguity in the
interpretation of alt. While alt represents underspeciﬁcation, xalt deﬁnes a non-
deterministic choice representing an actual choice in the speciﬁed system. See
also section 7.3.5.
skip represents the empty diagram.
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STAIRS
In this chapter we give a presentation of STAIRS. STAIRS may be seen as a develop-
ment method based on UML 2.x sequence diagrams. This chapter covers the two main
components of STAIRS, a denotational semantics for sequence diagrams and a reﬁne-
ment theory based on this denotational semantics. In addition to these two components
there exist pragmatics for STAIRS [157], and extensions with time [70], data [158] and
probabilities [145, 146]. The time and data extensions are given a short treatment in
chapter 21.
In section 5.1 we give a brief introduction to the semantic model of STAIRS. Sec-
tion 5.2 presents an abstract textual syntax for sequence diagrams, based on [70],
that is used in deﬁning the denotational semantics. In section 5.3 the denotational
semantics is presented. The presentation is heavily based on [68] but also includes
elements from [70,155], more speciﬁcally treatments of inﬁnite loop and the refuse op-
erator which are not found in [68]. Section 5.4 provides a presentation of reﬁnement
as deﬁned in [70, 159].
5.1 Introduction
The STAIRS semantics is trace based and uses an extended version of the basic se-
mantic model from the UML standard. Instead of a single pair (p, n) of positive
(valid) and negative (invalid) traces, the semantic model of STAIRS is a set of pairs
{(p1, n1), (p2, n2), . . . , (pm, nm)}. A pair (pi, ni) is referred to as an interaction obliga-
tion. The word “obligation” is used in order to emphasize that an implementation
of a speciﬁcation is required to fulﬁll every interaction obligation of the speciﬁcation.
This semantic model makes it possible to distinguish between potential and mandatory
choice (see section 7.3.5).
A trace is a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequence of events 〈e1, e2, . . . , ei, . . .〉. Let H be the
trace universe. For each interaction obligation (pi, ni) we have that pi ⊆ H is inter-
preted as positive traces and ni ⊆ H as negative traces, and all interaction obligations
are independent of each other. The union pi ∪ ni needs not exhaust the trace universe,
so H \ (pi ∪ ni) may diﬀer from ∅ and is referred to as inconclusive traces. Further we
allow speciﬁcations to be inconsistent, i.e., we may have that pi ∩ ni = ∅.
In the following we assume the semantic model of STAIRS, and regard the STAIRS
semantics as a correct formalization of sequence diagrams. This means, e.g., that the
correctness of our operational semantics is evaluated with respect to the denotational
semantics of STAIRS.
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5.2 Syntax
The graphical notation of sequence diagrams is not suited as a basis for deﬁning seman-
tics, and the abstract syntax of the UML standard contains more information than we
need for the task. Instead we apply a simpler abstract syntax. This is an event centric
syntax in which the weak sequential operator seq is employed as the basic construct
for combining diagram fragments.
The atom of a sequence diagram is the event . An event consists of a message and
a kind where the kind decides whether it is the transmit or the receive event of the
message. A message is a signal, which represents the contents of the message, together
with the addresses of the transmitter and the receiver. Formally a signal is a label, and
we let S denote the set of all signals. The transmitters and receivers are lifelines. Let
L denote the set of all lifelines. Further let G denote the set of all gates. We treat gates
as a special kind of lifelines, hence we have G ⊂ L. Gates are conceptually diﬀerent
from lifelines, but in this way deﬁnitions involving lifelines carry over to gates, and this
has some practical advantages.
5.2.1 Messages and events
A message m is deﬁned as a triple
(s, t, r) ∈ S × L × L
of signal s, transmitter t and receiver r. M denotes the set of all messages. We
sometimes use the signal to denote the message when the lifelines are implicitly given
by, or not relevant in the context. On messages we deﬁne a transmitter function
tr. ∈M→ L and a receiver function re. ∈M→ L:
tr.(s, t, r)
def
= t re.(s, t, r)
def
= r
We let K = {!, ?} be the set of kinds, where ! represents transmit and ? represents
receive. An event e is then a pair of a kind and a message:
(k,m) ∈ K ×M
E denotes the set of all events. We sometimes write !s and ?s as shorthand for the
events (!, (s, t, r)) and (?, (s, t, r)). On events we deﬁne a kind function k. ∈ E → K
and a message function m. ∈ E →M:
k.(k,m)
def
= k m.(k,m)
def
= m
We let the transmitter and receiver functions also range over events, tr. , re. ∈ E → L:
tr.(k,m)
def
= tr.m re.(k,m)
def
= re.m
Further we deﬁne a lifeline function l. ∈ E → L that returns the lifeline of an event
and a function l−1. ∈ E → L that returns the inverse lifeline of an event (i.e. the
receiver of its message if its kind is transmit and the transmitter of its message if its
kind is receive), which may be a gate (since, as explained above, gates are deﬁned as
a special kind of lifelines):
l.e
def
=
{
tr.e if k.e = !
re.e if k.e = ?
l−1.e def=
{
tr.e if k.e = ?
re.e if k.e = !
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5.2.2 Diagrams
A sequence diagram is built up of events, the binary operators seq, par, strict, alt
and xalt, and the unary operators opt, refuse, neg, assert and loop. Related to the
terminology of the graphical syntax, the operators represent combined fragments and
their arguments the operands. In addition we let skip represent the empty sequence
diagram. Let D be the set of all syntactically correct sequence diagrams. D is deﬁned
recursively as the least set such that
skip ∈ D
e ∈ E ⇒ e ∈ D
d1, d2 ∈ D ⇒ d1 seq d2 ∈ D ∧ d1 par d2 ∈ D ∧
d1 strict d2 ∈ D ∧ d1 alt d2 ∈ D ∧
d1 xalt d2 ∈ D
d ∈ D ⇒ neg d ∈ D ∧ refuse d ∈ D ∧
opt d ∈ D ∧ assert d ∈ D
I ⊆ (N ∪ {0,∞}) ∧ di ∈ D for i ∈ I ⇒ alti∈I di ∈ D
d ∈ D ∧ I ⊆ (N ∪ {0,∞}) ⇒ loop I d ∈ D
d ∈ D ∧ n ∈ (N ∪ {0,∞}) ⇒ loop〈n〉 d ∈ D
with some additional constraints deﬁned below.
Composition of diagrams by matching and elimination of gates are outside the scope
of this presentation. Note therefore that this is a grammar for sequence diagrams and
not composition as such.
The operator alti∈I is referred to as generalized alt. In the deﬁnition of this operator
and the two loops we have that N is the set of non-zero natural numbers and ∞ is a
number greater than all other numbers and has the property∞−1 =∞. The intention
behind loop I d is that d should be looped any number n ∈ I times. The operator
loop〈n〉 is referred to as loop with counter as the intention of loop〈n〉 d is that d should
be looped n times.
As can be expected, we have associativity of seq, par, strict, alt and xalt. We
also have commutativity of par, alt and xalt. Proofs with respect to the denotational
semantics can be found in [70]. Furthermore, the empty sequence diagram skip is the
identity element of seq, par and strict. The combination of skip and loop is discussed
in section 8.3.1. We assume the following precedence of the operators: refuse, assert,
loop, neg, opt, seq, strict, par, alt, xalt such that refuse binds stronger than assert, etc.
Note that an event at a gate cannot be part of a diagram. Hence, the representation
of diagram d in ﬁgure 5.1 is:
d = (?, (a, g, i)) seq ((!, (b, i, j)) seq (?, (b, i, j)) alt (!, (c, i, j)) seq (?, (c, i, j)))
A number of functions that we will need later is deﬁned over the syntax of diagrams.
The function ll. ∈ D → P(L) returns the set of lifelines present in a diagram. For
e ∈ E and d, d1, d2, di ∈ D the function is deﬁned recursively:
ll.e
def
= {l.e}
ll.skip
def
= ∅
ll.(op d)
def
= ll.d, op ∈ {neg, refuse, opt, assert, loop}
ll.(d1 op d2)
def
= ll.d1 ∪ ll.d2, op ∈ {seq, par, strict, alt, xalt}
ll.(alti∈I di)
def
=
⋃
i∈I ll.di
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The function gates. ∈ D → P(G) returns the gates of a diagram:
gates.e
def
=
{{l−1.e} if l−1.e ∈ G
∅ if l−1.e ∈ G
gates.skip
def
= ∅
gates.(op d)
def
= gates.d, op ∈ {neg, refuse, opt, assert, loop}
gates.(d1 op d2)
def
= gates.d1 ∪ gates.d2, op ∈ {seq, par, strict, alt, xalt}
gates.(alti∈I di)
def
=
⋃
i∈I gates.di
The function msg. ∈ D → P(M) returns the messages of a diagram:
msg.e
def
= {m.e}
msg.skip
def
= ∅
msg.(op d)
def
= msg.d, op ∈ {neg, refuse, opt, assert, loop}
msg.(d1 op d2)
def
= msg.d1 ∪msg.d2, op ∈ {seq, par, strict, alt, xalt}
msg.(alti∈I di)
def
=
⋃
i∈I msg.di
The function ev. ∈ D → P(E) returns the events of a diagram:
ev.e
def
= {e}
ev.skip
def
= ∅
ev.(op d)
def
= ev.d, op ∈ {neg, refuse, opt, assert, loop}
ev.(d1 op d2)
def
= ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2, op ∈ {seq, par, strict, alt, xalt}
ev.(alti∈I di)
def
=
⋃
i∈I ev.di
5.2.3 Syntax constraints
We impose some restrictions on the set of syntactically correct sequence diagrams D.
First, we assert that a given event should syntactically occur only once in a diagram:
d1 op d2 ∈ D ⇒ ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅, op ∈ {seq, par, strict, alt, xalt}
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Secondly, if both the transmitter and the receiver lifelines of a message are present
in a diagram, then both the transmit event and receive event of that message must be
in the diagram:
d ∈ D ∧m ∈ msg.d ∧ tr.m ∈ ll.d ∧ re.m ∈ ll.d ⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d ∧ (?, m) ∈ ev.d
Thirdly, if both the transmit event and the receive event of a message are present in
a diagram, they have to be inside the same argument of the same high-level operator.
op d ∈ D ∧m ∈ msg.d
⇒ (tr.m ∈ G ⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d) ∧ (re.m ∈ G ⇒ (?, m) ∈ ev.d),
op ∈ {refuse, assert, loop}
d1 op d2 ∈ D ∧m ∈ msg.di
⇒ (tr.m ∈ G ⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.di) ∧ (re.m ∈ G ⇒ (?, m) ∈ ev.di),
op ∈ {alt, xalt}, i ∈ {1, 2}
A way of phrasing this constraint is that in the graphical notation, messages are not
allowed to cross the frame of a high-level operator or the dividing line between the
arguments of a high-level operator.
Fourthly, we assume there is no syntactical repetition of gates in a diagram:
d1 op d2 ∈ D ⇒ gates.d1 ∩ gates.d2 = ∅, op ∈ {seq, par, strict, alt, xalt}
Finally, we do not allow the operators refuse and assert to be empty:
refuse skip ∈ D
assert skip ∈ D
5.3 Denotational semantics
In this section we give the denotational semantics of STAIRS as presented in [68, 70,
155]. In [70] the semantics is given as a timed three event version. In our work, and
hence in the following presentation we apply the untimed two event version of [68,155].
The operators strict, generalized alt and loop with counter, deﬁned in sections 5.3.5,
5.3.6 and 5.3.9, respectively, are additions we have made to STAIRS and are hence not
found in the above cited works. In addition we have given a new, however semantically
equivalent, deﬁnition of loop I.1
5.3.1 Well formed traces
STAIRS is a trace based semantics. A trace is a sequence of events, used to represent
a system run. In each trace, a transmit event should always be ordered before the
corresponding receive event. We let H denote the set of all traces that complies with
this requirement. Formally this is handled by a constraint on traces.
We use 〈〉 to denote the empty trace, and | and # to denote, respectively, trunca-
tion and length of traces. For concatenation of traces, ﬁltering of traces, and ﬁltering
of pairs of traces, we have the functions  , S© , and T© , respectively. t1t2 denotes a
1The proof of this equivalence may be found as lemma 16 in appendix B.3 of [115].
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trace that equals t1 if t1 is inﬁnite or otherwise is the trace consisting of t1 immediately
followed by t2. The ﬁltering function S© is used to ﬁlter away elements from a trace.
By A S©t we denote the trace obtained from the trace t by removing all elements in t
that are not in the set of elements A. For example, we have that:
{1, 3} S©〈1, 1, 2, 1, 3, 2〉 = 〈1, 1, 1, 3〉
The function T© ﬁlters pairs of traces with respect to pairs of elements in the same way
as S© ﬁlters traces with respect to elements. For any set of pairs of elements P and
pair of traces u, by P T©u we denote the pair of traces obtained from u by 1) truncating
the longest trace in u at the length of the shortest traces in u if the two sequences are
of unequal length; 2) for each j ∈ [1 . . . k], where k is the length of the shortest trace
in u, selecting or deleting the two elements at index j in the two traces, depending on
whether the pair of these elements is in the set P or not. For example, we have that:
{(1, f), (1, g)} T©(〈1, 1, 2, 1, 2〉, 〈f, f, f, g, g〉) = (〈1, 1, 1〉, 〈f, f, g〉)
Deﬁnitions of S© and T© are found as deﬁnition 4 on page 267 and deﬁnition 7 on
page 275 in appendix A.2.
The semantic constraint on traces may now be formalized. It asserts that for all
traces h ∈ H, if at a point in a trace we have an receive event of a message, then up to
that point we must have had at least as many transmits of that message as receives.
∀i ∈ [1..#h] : k.h[i] = !⇒ #({(!, m.h[i])} S©h|i) > #({(?, m.h[i])} S©h|i) (5.1)
5.3.2 The denotation function
As explained above, the semantic model of STAIRS is a set of interaction obligations,
where an interaction obligation is a pair (p, n) of sets of traces where the ﬁrst set is
interpreted as a set of positive traces and the second set is a set of negative traces.
In the following we let O be the set of all interaction obligations. The semantics of
sequence diagrams is deﬁned by a function
[[ ]] ∈ D → P(O) (5.2)
that for any sequence diagram d yields a set [[ d ]] of interaction obligations.
The semantics of the empty sequence diagram skip is deﬁned as only the empty
positive trace:
[[ skip ]]
def
= {({〈〉}, ∅)} (5.3)
For a sequence diagram consisting of a single event e, its semantics is given by:
[[ e ]]
def
= {({〈e〉}, ∅)} (5.4)
5.3.3 Weak sequencing
Weak sequencing is the implicit composition mechanism combining constructs of a
sequence diagram, and is deﬁned by the seq operator. First, we deﬁne weak sequencing
of trace sets:
s1  s2 def= {h ∈ H | ∃h1 ∈ s1, h2 ∈ s2 : ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©h = e.l S©h1e.l S©h2} (5.5)
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where e.l denotes the set of events that may take place on the lifeline l:
e.l
def
= {e ∈ E | l.e = l}
Weak sequencing of interaction obligations is deﬁned as:
(p1, n1)  (p2, n2) def= (p1  p2, (n1  p2) ∪ (n1  n2) ∪ (p1  n2)) (5.6)
Using this deﬁnition, the semantics of the seq operator is deﬁned as:
[[ d1 seq d2 ]]
def
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (5.7)
5.3.4 Interleaving
The par operator represents a parallel merge of traces such that the order of the events
in the merged traces is preserved in the resulting traces. In order to deﬁne par, we ﬁrst
deﬁne parallel execution on trace sets:
s1 ‖ s2 def= {h ∈ H | ∃p ∈ {1, 2}∞ :
π2(({1} × E) T©(p, h)) ∈ s1 ∧
π2(({2} × E) T©(p, h)) ∈ s2}
(5.8)
In this deﬁnition, we make use of an oracle, the inﬁnite sequence p, to resolve the non-
determinism in the interleaving. It determines the order in which events from traces
in s1 and s2 are sequenced. π2 is a projection operator returning the second element
of a pair. Formally:
πi(s1, s2)
def
= si, i ∈ {1, 2}
Parallel merge of interaction obligations is deﬁned as:
(p1, n1) ‖ (p2, n2) def= (p1 ‖ p2, (n1 ‖ p2) ∪ (n1 ‖ n2) ∪ (p1 ‖ n2)) (5.9)
The semantics of the par operator is then deﬁned as:
[[ d1 par d2 ]]
def
= {o1 ‖ o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (5.10)
5.3.5 Strict sequencing
The strict operator speciﬁes strict sequencing. Strict sequencing of trace sets is deﬁned
as:
s1  s2 def= {h ∈ H | ∃h1 ∈ s1, h2 ∈ s2 : h = h1h2} (5.11)
Strict sequencing of interaction obligations is deﬁned as:
(p1, n1)  (p2, n2) def= (p1  p2, (n1  p2) ∪ (n1  n2) ∪ (p1  n2)) (5.12)
The semantics of the strict operator is deﬁned as:
[[ d1 strict d2 ]]
def
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (5.13)
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5.3.6 Choice
The alt operator deﬁnes potential choice. The semantics is the inner union of the
interaction obligations:
[[ d1 alt d2 ]]
def
= {(p1 ∪ p2, n1 ∪ n2) | (p1, n1) ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ (p2, n2) ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (5.14)
The unary operator opt is deﬁned as a derived operator from alt:
opt d
def
= skip alt d (5.15)
Let
⊎
be a generalization inner union of interaction obligations such that
⊎
i∈I
Oi
def
= {
(⋃
i∈I
pi,
⋃
i∈I
ni
)
| ∀i ∈ I : (pi, ni) ∈ Oi} (5.16)
where Oi are sets of interaction obligations. We deﬁne the generalized alt in the fol-
lowing fashion:
[[ alt
i∈I
di ]]
def
=
⊎
i∈I
[[ di ]] (5.17)
The xalt operator deﬁnes mandatory choice. All implementations must be able to
handle every interaction obligation, so the the semantics of xalt is deﬁned as the union
of interaction obligations deﬁned by its arguments:
[[ d1 xalt d2 ]]
def
= [[ d1 ]] ∪ [[ d2 ]] (5.18)
5.3.7 Negative behavior
To specify negative behavior we use the operator refuse. The reason for this is that
the UML operator neg is ambiguous and has (at least) two distinct interpretations.
Following [155] we deﬁne refuse as one of the interpretations and let neg represent the
other as a derived operator. refuse is deﬁned as:
[[ refuse d ]]
def
= {(∅, p ∪ n) | (p, n) ∈ [[ d ]] } (5.19)
Note that refuse deﬁnes all positive and negative behavior as negative, so nested refuse
does not yield positive behavior. The neg operator is deﬁned as a derived operator
from refuse:
neg d
def
= skip alt refuse d (5.20)
5.3.8 Universal behavior
Universal behavior is speciﬁed by the operator assert:
[[ assert d ]]
def
= {(p, n ∪ (H \ p)) | (p, n) ∈ [[ d ]]} (5.21)
Note that assert deﬁnes all behavior that is not positive as negative and hence empties
the set of inconclusive traces.
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5.3.9 Iteration
The semantics of loop is deﬁned by a semantic loop construct μn, where n is the number
of times the loop should be iterated. For n ∈ N ∪ {0} (ﬁnite loop), μn is deﬁned as:
μ0 O
def
= {({〈〉}, ∅)}
μ1 O
def
= O
μn O
def
= O  μn−1 O if n > 1
(5.22)
With this loop construct, loop〈n〉 is deﬁned as:
[[ loop〈n〉 d ]] def= μn [[ d ]] (5.23)
loop I is deﬁned a derived operator:
loop I d
def
= alt
i∈I
loop〈i〉 d (5.24)
In order to deﬁne inﬁnite loop we need some auxiliary deﬁnitions. We deﬁne the chains
of interaction obligation as:
chains(O)
def
= {o¯ ∈ O∞ | o¯[1] ∈ O ∧
∀j ∈ N : ∃o ∈ O : o¯[j + 1] = o¯[j]  o} (5.25)
From a chain of interaction obligations we deﬁne its chains of positive and negative
traces:
pos(o¯)
def
= {t¯ ∈ H∞ | ∀j ∈ N : t¯[j] ∈ π1(o¯[j]) ∧
∃t ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {t}} (5.26)
negs(o¯)
def
= {t¯ ∈ H∞ | ∃i ∈ N : ∀j ∈ N : t¯[j] ∈ π2(o¯[j + i− 1]) ∧
∃t ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {t}} (5.27)
For every chain of traces t¯ we have that for all l ∈ L, the sequence
e.l S©t¯[1], e.l S©t¯[2], e.l S©t¯[3], . . .
is a chain ordered by the preﬁx relation . We let unionsqlt¯ denote the least upper bound
of this chain and deﬁne the approximations of t¯ as:
unionsqt¯ def= {h ∈ H | ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©h = unionsql t¯ } (5.28)
For a chain of interaction obligations we deﬁne:
unionsqo¯ def=
( ⋃
t¯∈pos(o¯)
unionsqt¯,
⋃
t¯∈negs(o¯)
unionsqt¯
)
(5.29)
and let inﬁnite loop be deﬁned as:
μ∞ O
def
= {unionsqo¯ | o¯ ∈ chains(O)} (5.30)
The UML standard deﬁnes two loops loop(n) and loop(n,m), where n is the minimum
number and m the maximum number of iterations. We may deﬁne these as derived
operators:
loop(n) d
def
= loop [n..∞] d
loop(n,m) d
def
= loop [n..m] d
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5.4 Refinement
Reﬁnement is to make a speciﬁcation more concrete and closer to implementation by
removing underspeciﬁcation. For sequence diagrams, which are partial speciﬁcations,
this means two things:
1. Making the speciﬁcation more speciﬁc by removing inconclusive behavior, i.e.,
making inconclusive behavior positive or negative.
2. Making the speciﬁcation more concrete by removing non-determinism, i.e., mak-
ing positive behavior negative.
In the following we formalize a number of reﬁnement relations, based on [70, 159], to
capture various aspects of the intuitive understanding of reﬁnement. The reﬁnement
relations are relations x ∈ D × D → B between sequence diagrams, where x
represents decorations we apply for distinguishing the diﬀerent relations. For diagrams
d, d′, the relation d x d′ is to be read “d′ is an x-reﬁnement of d” or “d′ x-reﬁnes d.”
5.4.1 Refinement of interaction obligations
In order to deﬁne the reﬁnement relations for diagrams we ﬁrst need to deﬁne reﬁnement
of interaction obligations. The most general reﬁnement, which captures both the above
items, is the relation r ∈ O ×O → B:
(p, n) r (p′, n′) def= p ⊆ p′ ∪ n′ ∧ n ⊆ n′
Each of the above items give rises to a special case of this general reﬁnement. Item 1 is
referred to as (proper) supplementing and is formalized by a relation s ∈ O×O →
B:
(p, n) s (p′, n′) def= (n ⊂ n′ ∧ p ⊆ p′) ∨ (n ⊆ n′ ∧ p ⊂ p′)
Item 2 is called (proper) narrowing and is formalized by the relation n ∈ O×O →
B:
(p, n) n (p′, n′) def= p′ ⊂ p ∧ n′ = n ∪ (p \ p′)
In some situations it may by useful to assert that no new functionality should be added
to the speciﬁcation, or in other words that the set of positive behavior is not allowed
to increase. This is formalized in a relation rr ∈ O × O → B called restricted
reﬁnement:
(p, n) rr (p′, n′) def= (p, n) r (p′, n′) ∧ p′ ⊆ p
5.4.2 Refinement of sequence diagrams
The denotation [[ d ]] of a diagram d characterizes a set of interaction obligations. In
the most general case we say that a diagram d′ reﬁnes diagram d if and only if all
interaction obligations of [[ d ]] are reﬁned by an interaction obligation in [[ d′ ]]. This is
formalized by the general reﬁnement relation g ∈ D ×D → B:
d g d′ def= ∀o ∈ [[ d ]] : ∃d′ ∈ [[ o′ ]] : o r o′
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Likewise we deﬁne a restricted general reﬁnement relation rg ∈ D×D → B based
on restricted reﬁnement of interaction obligations:
d rg d′ def= ∀o ∈ [[ d ]] : ∃o′ ∈ [[ d′ ]] : o rr o′
Both general reﬁnement and restricted general reﬁnement allow a diagram d′, which
reﬁnes a diagram d, to include new interaction obligations, i.e. interaction obligations
that are not reﬁnements of interaction obligations of d. In some situations it may be
useful to disallow this option of adding interaction obligations in a reﬁnement. Limited
reﬁnement l ∈ D×D → B and restricted limited reﬁnement rl ∈ D×D → B
are reﬁnement relations that formalize this limitation with respect to general reﬁnement
and restricted general reﬁnement:
d l d′ def= d g d′ ∧ ∀o′ ∈ [[ d′ ]] : ∃o ∈ [[ d ]] : o r o′
d rl d′ def= d rg d′ ∧ ∀o′ ∈ [[ d′ ]] : ∃o ∈ [[ d ]] : o rr o′
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Chapter 6
Maude
As stated earlier, one of our main contributions is an operational semantics and its
implementation in Maude. In this chapter we give a brief introduction to Maude, in
order to present the capabilities of Maude and to help the reader better understand
our Maude implementation.
Maude is two things; a speciﬁcation language and an interpreter of this language.
We start by presenting the language in a example driven fashion (section 6.1), and then
introducing the main functionality of the interpreter (section 6.2). Also we present some
of the reﬂexive properties of Maude (section 6.3). We do not apply the full language,
and only present the parts that we use. For a more thorough introduction we refer
to [35, 121, 139]. For more formal treatments of rewrite logic we refer to [28, 123].
6.1 Specification language
Maude speciﬁcations are organized in modules, and modules contain deﬁnitions of
sorts, operators, equations and rules. A module may be a functional module or a
system module. The only real diﬀerence is that system modules may contain rewrite
rules, while functional modules may not. As an example we deﬁne a module for lists
of natural numbers:
mod LIST is
endm
This is a system module. A functional module would start with fmod and end with
endfm. A module may include other models. Maude contains a number of predeﬁned
modules for common data types like the natural numbers or the Booleans, so we may
add the line
include NAT .
to the module above to include the predeﬁned deﬁnitions of the natural numbers.
Data types in Maude are called sorts. In our example we add the following lines to
our module:
sort List .
subsort Nat < List .
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This means we deﬁne a sort List, and deﬁne the sort Nat from the included module
NAT as a subsort of List. This way a single natural number is also regarded as a
singleton list.
Operators are functions from a Cartesian product of sorts to a single sort. Special
operators called constructors are used to deﬁne the values of sorts. The members
of a sort are those terms (called ground terms) that are built from the constructor
operators. We deﬁne the constructors of our lists as:
op nil : -> List [ctor] .
op _,_ : List List -> List [ctor assoc id: nil] .
Here nil is meant to represent the empty list, and since it has zero arguments it
is a constant. The keyword ctor is used to assert that it a constructor. As list
concatenation operator we use comma in mixﬁx notation. This is also a constructor,
and the statement assoc id: nil deﬁnes it as associative and with nil as the identity
element. In addition to these two constructors, the constructors of the sort Nat become
constructors of the sort List because Nat is a subsort of List. Now we have that, e.g.,
2 , 4 , 3, 1
and
0 , nil , nil , 1
are ground terms of the sort List. Operators that are not constructors may be seen
as functions that operate on sorts. If we want a length function of the lists we deﬁne
its signature as:
op length : List -> Nat .
A operator is deﬁned by a set of equations. The operator length may for example be
deﬁned as
eq length(nil) = 0 .
eq length(N , L) = 1 + length(L) .
if we ﬁrst have deﬁned N as a variable of type Nat and L as a variable of type List.
Equations may be conditional. An alternative deﬁnition the upper equation above
could be:
ceq length(L) = 0 if L == nil .
Condition may also be of the form L :: List, which checks for sort membership,
or N := M * K, which assigns a value to a variable. Also the condition may be a
conjunction of several sub-conditions. This is called the functional part of Maude, and
as we can see, it is quite similar to a functional programming language.
In addition to functional deﬁnitions we may deﬁne rewrite rules, which also may
be conditional or unconditional. As an example we deﬁne a rule for sorting a list of
natural numbers:
crl [sort] : L , N , N’ , L’ => L , N’ , N , L’ if N’ < N .
In the condition of a rule, we may also have rewrites as sub-conditions.
Put together the whole module becomes:
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mod LIST is
including NAT .
sort List .
subsort Nat < List .
op nil : -> List [ctor] .
op _,_ : List List -> List [ctor assoc id: nil] .
op length : List -> Nat .
vars N N’ : Nat .
vars L L’ : List .
eq length(nil) = 0 .
eq length(N , L) = 1 + length(L) .
crl [sort] : L , N , N’ , L’ => L , N’ , N , L’ if N’ < N .
endm
This module deﬁnes lists of natural numbers, a length function for these lists, and a
rule for sorting the lists.
6.2 Interpreter
The Maude interpreter has three main commands; reduce, rewrite and search. The
command reduce applies the equations from left to right on the provided term and
reduces it until it becomes a ground term. If, for example, we issue the command
reduce in LIST : length(2 , 4 , 3 , 1) .
the Maude interpreter will produce the result:
rewrites: 9 in 2283767000ms cpu (0ms real) (0 rewrites/second)
result NzNat: 4
Because we have deﬁned the list concatenation operator to be associative and have nil
as the identity element, all reductions will happen modulo associativity and identity.
The rewrite command applies the rules of a module, from left to right, on a given
term, until no more rewrites are possible. Giving the command
rewrite in LIST : 2 , 4 , 3 , 1 .
will result in:
rewrites: 31 in 2283764000ms cpu (1ms real) (0 rewrites/second)
result List: 1,2,3,4
Between each rewrite, the interpreter will reduce as much as possible, and also rewrites
are applied modulo associativity, commutativity and identity if speciﬁed in the con-
structors. If the left side of more than one rule matches the term, the rules will be
applied semi non-deterministically. (By semi non-deterministically we mean that the
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interpreter does not have real non-determinism in application of the rules, but simu-
lates non-determinism by chosing which rule to apply based on the, usually arbitrary,
order in which the rules appear in the Maude code.)
serach makes a breadth ﬁrst search on all possible sequences of rewrites and returns
the terms matching the search criteria. Let us say we want to know what the result
may be after only one rewrite. We specify the search
search in LIST : 2 , 4 , 3 , 1 =>1 L:List .
and the Maude interpreter returns two solutions:
Solution 1 (state 1)
states: 2 rewrites: 5 in 24958464280ms cpu (1ms real)
(0 rewrites/second)
L --> 2,3,4,1
Solution 2 (state 2)
states: 3 rewrites: 13 in 24958464280ms cpu (1ms real)
(0 rewrites/second)
L --> 2,4,1,3
No more solutions.
states: 3 rewrites: 17 in 24958464280ms cpu (1ms real)
(0 rewrites/second)
If we specify the search
search in LIST : 2 , 4 , 3 , 1 =>! N:Nat , L:List , N’:Nat
such that N:Nat > N’:Nat .
we ask the interpreter to do as many rewrites as possible and look for solutions where
the ﬁrst number of the list is greater than the last number. Luckily, the interpreter
gives us this result:
No solution.
states: 8 rewrites: 111 in 4767057229ms cpu (2ms real)
(0 rewrites/second)
In addition we may specify searches using =>* and =>+, in which the interpreter will
look for solutions after, respectively, zero or more rewrites and one or more rewrites.
6.3 Reflexivity
Maude is a reﬂexive language. This means that modules, equations, etc. have meta-
representations and that these meta-representations may be manipulated as any other
terms. To access the meta-level the predeﬁned module META-LEVEL must be included.
In the example we deﬁne a module LIST-META in which we can perform manipulations
of the meta-level of the module LIST:
mod LIST-META is
including LIST .
including META-LEVEL .
endm
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We can now get a meta-representation of a term by using the predeﬁned function
upTerm:
reduce in LIST-META : upTerm(0,1) .
rewrites: 1 in -17206397862ms cpu (0ms real) (~ rewrites/second)
result GroundTerm: ’_‘,_[’0.Zero,’s_[’0.Zero]]
The result is a term of type GroundTerm. ’0.Zero is the meta-representation of 0,
’s_[’0.Zero] is the meta-representation of 1 (actually s 0, the successor function
s_ applied to 0) and ’_‘,_[...] is the meta-representation of the list concatenation
operator _,_. The command
reduce in LIST-META : upModule(’LIST, false) .
gives us a meta-representation of the module LIST. The parameter false asserts that
included modules should not be included in the meta-representation, whereas using
the parameter true instead would give a meta-representation that included the meta-
representation of the included modules. The result is as a term of type Module:
result Module: mod ’LIST is
including ’BOOL .
including ’NAT .
sorts ’List .
subsort ’Nat < ’List .
op ’_‘,_ : ’List ’List -> ’List [assoc ctor id(’nil.List)] .
op ’length : ’List -> ’Nat [none] .
op ’nil : nil -> ’List [ctor] .
none
eq ’length[’nil.List] = ’0.Zero [none] .
eq ’length[’_‘,_[’N:Nat,’L:List]]
= ’_+_[’s_[’0.Zero],’length[’L:List]] [none] .
crl ’_‘,_[’L:List,’N:Nat,’N’:Nat,’L’:List]
=> ’_‘,_[’L:List,’_‘,_[’N’:Nat,’_‘,_[’N:Nat,’L’:List]]]
if ’_<_[’N’:Nat,’N:Nat] = ’true.Bool [label(’sort)] .
endm
There is a number of functions that may be applied at the meta-level. metaReduce
and metaRewrite work as the commands reduce and rewrite, but at the meta-level.
metaApply and metaXapplymake one rewrite on a term with a speciﬁed rule, the former
at the top level of the term and the latter somewhere within the term. metaSearch does
search at the meta-level. In the following we will look closer at metaApply. The argu-
ments of this function is the meta-representation of a module, the meta-representation
of a term to be rewritten, the name of a rule, a possible empty set of substitutions
of values for the variables in the rule and a counter used to diﬀerentiate between dif-
ferent possible applications of the rule. The function returns a meta-representation of
the term after the rewrite, the type of the resulting term and the substitutions of the
values to variables used in the rewrite. By applying the sort rule to the list 3, 2, 1
and varying the counter we will see that there are two ways to apply the rule on the
list:
reduce in LIST-META : metaApply(upModule(’LIST, false), upTerm(3,2,1),
’sort, none, 0) .
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rewrites: 5 in -17329373866ms cpu (6ms real) (~ rewrites/second)
result ResultTriple:
{’_‘,_[’s_^2[’0.Zero],’s_^3[’0.Zero],’s_[’0.Zero]],’List,
’L’:List <- ’s_[’0.Zero] ;
’L:List <- ’nil.List ;
’N’:Nat <- ’s_^2[’0.Zero] ;
’N:Nat <- ’s_^3[’0.Zero]}
reduce in LIST-META : metaApply(upModule(’LIST, false), upTerm(3,2,1),
’sort, none, 1) .
rewrites: 5 in -13449941426ms cpu (0ms real) (~ rewrites/second)
result ResultTriple:
{’_‘,_[’s_^3[’0.Zero],’s_[’0.Zero],’s_^2[’0.Zero]],’List,
’L’:List <- ’nil.List ;
’L:List <- ’s_^3[’0.Zero] ;
’N’:Nat <- ’s_[’0.Zero] ;
’N:Nat <- ’s_^2[’0.Zero]}
reduce in LIST-META : metaApply(upModule(’LIST, false), upTerm(3,2,1),
’sort, none, 2) .
rewrites: 3 in 6603855571ms cpu (1ms real) (0 rewrites/second)
result ResultTriple?: (failure).ResultTriple?
The Maude interpreter will typically use the ﬁrst possible rewrite, which in this case is
swapping 3 and 2 in the list. If we for some reason would like to sort the list in such a
way that the sorting starts at the end of the list instead of the beginning, we could use
metaApply and deﬁne a rewriting strategy that always uses the rewrite that does the
rightmost possible swap of numbers in the list. One way this can be done is by adding
the following deﬁnitions to the module LIST-META:
sort ResultList .
subsort ResultTriple < ResultList .
op empty : -> ResultList [ctor] .
op _&_ : ResultList ResultList -> ResultList [ctor assoc id: empty] .
op mySort : List -> List .
op sorted : List -> Bool .
op getPossibilities : List Nat -> ResultList .
op findRightmost : ResultList -> ResultTriple .
op getTail : ResultTriple -> List .
op findTail : Substitution -> List .
op error : -> [List] .
var L : List .
vars N N’ : Nat .
var RT? : ResultTriple? .
vars RT RT’ : ResultTriple .
var RL : ResultList .
var V : Variable .
var T : Term .
44
6.3 Reﬂexivity
var S : Substitution .
ceq mySort(L) = L if sorted(L) .
ceq mySort(L)
= mySort(downTerm(getTerm(findRightmost(getPossibilities(L,0))),
error))
if not sorted(L) .
eq sorted(nil) = true .
eq sorted(N) = true .
eq sorted(N,N’,L) = N <= N’ and sorted(N’,L) .
ceq getPossibilities(L,N) =
if RT? :: ResultTriple then
RT? & getPossibilities(L,s N)
else
empty
fi
if RT? := metaApply(upModule(’LIST,false),upTerm(L),’sort,none,N) .
eq findRightmost(RT) = RT .
ceq findRightmost(RT & RL) =
if length(getTail(RT)) < length(getTail(RT’)) then
RT
else
RT’
fi
if RT’ := findRightmost(RL) .
eq getTail(RT) = findTail(getSubstitution(RT)) .
eq findTail(none) = nil .
eq findTail(V <- T ; S) =
if V == ’L’:List then
downTerm(T,error)
else
findTail(S)
fi .
The function mySort will sort a list of numbers by using the sort rule, but in such a
way that the swapping of numbers always occur as the rightmost possible swap in the
list.
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Part III
Operational semantics
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Chapter 7
Introduction to operational
semantics
One of the main contributions of this thesis is an operational semantics for UML
sequence diagrams. In this chapter we motivate this (section 7.1) and have a look at
the diﬀerences between denotational semantics and operational semantics (section 7.2).
Further we discuss some challenges speciﬁc for deﬁning operational semantics for UML
sequence diagrams (section 7.3).
The operational semantics itself is deﬁned in chapter 8. After that we present meta-
strategies for execution of the operational semantics in chapter 9, implementation of
the operational semantics in chapter 10 and other approaches to deﬁning operational
semantics for sequence diagrams in chapter 11.
7.1 Motivation
When sequence diagrams are used to get a better understanding of the system through
modeling, as system documentation or as means of communication between stakehold-
ers of the system, it is important that the precise meaning of the diagrams is under-
stood; in other words, there is need for a well-deﬁned semantics. Sequence diagrams
may also be put to further applications, such as simulation, testing and other kinds
of automated analysis. This further increases the need for a formalized semantics; not
only must the people who make and read diagrams have a common understanding of
their meaning, but also the makers of methods and tools for analyzing the diagrams
must share this understanding.
Methods of analysis like simulation and testing are in their nature operational;
they are used for investigating what will happen when a system is executing. When
developing techniques for such analysis, not only do we need to understand the precise
meaning of a speciﬁcation, we also need to understand precisely the executions that
are speciﬁed. This motivates formalization of semantics in an operational style.
In our work we have aimed at deﬁning an operational semantics that is close to the
UML standard in both syntax and semantics. Further we have aimed at facilitating ease
of extension and modiﬁcation when adapting the semantics to diﬀerent interpretations
and applications of sequence diagrams.
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7.2 Definition
STAIRS provides a denotational semantics for sequence diagrams, and we have mo-
tivated the need for operational semantics. Before we proceed, let us have a look at
the distinction between operational semantics and denotational semantics. David A.
Schmidt [161, p. 3] suggests the following:
The operational semantics method uses an interpreter to deﬁne a language. The
meaning of a program in the language is the evaluation history that the inter-
preter produces when it interprets the program. The evaluation history is a
sequence of internal conﬁgurations [. . . ]
The denotational semantics method maps a program directly to its meaning,
called its denotation. The denotation is usually a mathematical value, such as
a number or function. No interpreters are used; a valuation function maps a
program directly to its meaning.
As a methodology for language development he suggests that “a denotational semantics
is deﬁned to give the meaning of the language” and that “the denotational deﬁnition
is implemented using an operational deﬁnition” [161, p. 4]. Hoare and He [75, p. 258]
describe more explicitly the notion of an operational semantics:
An operational semantics of a programming language is one that deﬁnes not
the observable overall eﬀect of a program but rather suggests a complete set of
possible individual steps which may be taken in its execution. The observable
eﬀect can then be obtained by embedding the steps into an iterative loop [. . . ]
Taken together, these two descriptions suggest that formalizing an operational seman-
tics of a language is to deﬁne an interpreter for the language. The formal deﬁnition of
the interpreter describes every step that can be made in the execution of the language
in such a way that the executions are in conformance with the meaning of the language
as deﬁned by a denotational semantics. In our case the input to the interpreter is a
sequence diagram represented in an abstract syntax. The output of the interpreter is
a trace of events representing an execution.
7.3 Challenges
There are a number of challenges connected with making semantics for sequence dia-
grams, and obviously, choices must be made where the UML standard is ambiguous.
This section is dedicated to looking into these challenges in more detail.
7.3.1 Partial vs. complete specification
An old discussion related to sequence diagrams and MSCs is whether a speciﬁcation
consisting of a set of diagrams represents the full behavior of the speciﬁed system or
just examples of the behavior. In the former case we say that the set of sequence
diagrams is a complete speciﬁcation, and in the latter case a partial speciﬁcation.
The UML standard states clearly that sequence diagrams are partial speciﬁcations
since “[the union of valid and invalid traces] need not be the whole universe of traces”
[134, p. 480]. However, the operator assert can be used for specifying universal behavior
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in the sense that all behavior other than the behavior which is enclosed by the assert
is made negative.
This makes deﬁning an operational semantics somewhat more complicated than
in the case of complete speciﬁcations. It rules out solutions such as just viewing
sequence diagrams as, or translating them to, other formalisms for making complete
speciﬁcations, such as transition systems. In eﬀect, the trace universe becomes a
quantity that must be considered in the deﬁnition of the semantics. This excludes
a solution where the negative traces are considered as just the complement of the
positive traces.
7.3.2 Global vs. local view
In a certain sense, a sequence diagram has a global and a local view at the same
time. The lifelines of a sequence diagram do not synchronize and represent processes
that execute independently. This is the local view of the sequence diagram. At the
same time, the syntax allows operators that cover several lifelines, and hence provide
a global view. The best example is the alternative operator alt without guards, i.e. a
non-deterministic choice. Since the lifelines are independent and do not synchronize,
one of the lifelines may start executing the arguments of the operator before the other
lifelines. The choice, however, is global in the sense that all lifelines must choose the
same argument when resolving the choice. In [89, p. 369], Jonsson and Padilla make
the same observation:
The transition system will [. . . ] maintain a local state for each instance [. . . ] The
execution [. . . ] may follow either of two paths, depending on which alternative
is chosen in the [alt]. The crucial point here is that all three instances must
choose the same alternative even if they do not arrive simultaneously to the [alt]
in their execution. [. . . ] Thus, [one instance’s] entry into the ﬁrst alternative
has global consequences in that it “forces” the other instances to also choose the
ﬁrst alternative.
The result of this is that the semantics must reﬂect this duality; the semantics must
provide both the local and the global view of the speciﬁcations. A discussion of this
problem is also found in [94].
7.3.3 Weak sequencing
The weak sequencing operator seq is the implicit operator for composing sequence
diagrams. The operator deﬁnes a partial order of the events in a diagram, such that
the order along each lifeline and the causal relationship between the transmission and
the reception of messages are preserved while any other ordering of events is arbitrary.
Further there is no implicit synchronization between the lifelines in a sequence diagram.
An operational semantics must characterize the step by step execution speciﬁed
by the diagram. For each step, all enabled events must be selectable. This poses a
challenge, since due to the weak sequencing, there may be enabled events at arbitrary
depths in the syntactical term representing the diagram.
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7.3.4 Negative behavior
UML 2.x allows negative behavior to be speciﬁed by the neg operator in sequence
diagrams. In the semantic model, these behaviors end up in the set of negative traces
(see section 4.2). In denotational semantics like STAIRS or the trace semantics of
Harald Sto¨rrle [173,174] this is easily handled by manipulation of the traces and trace
sets (even though these two formalizations do not agree on the interpretation of neg).
It is however not clear what negative behavior means in an operational semantics.
If an operational semantics should describe a step by step the execution of a sequence
diagram it is not clear how we should distinguish a positive execution from a negative
execution. Immediate abortion, which is the naive solution, is not satisfactory for two
reasons: 1) We may be interested in complete negative executions, and 2) we need to
know that the execution was stopped because it reached a state in which it became
negative. The alternative is some way of waving a ﬂag. With this solution a meta-level
at which the ﬂag is seen and the behavior interpreted as negative is needed in order to
assign meaning to negative behavior.
We cannot know at the execution level that we are in a negative execution, and
it seems obvious that the only way of assigning meaning to negative behavior is by
adding a meta-level at which we may interpret behavior as positive or negative.
Even though he does not need it for his denotational semantics, Sto¨rrle [174] men-
tions the option:
One might also consider both the assert- and negate-operators as being meta-
logical in the sense that they express properties of traces rather that deﬁning or
modifying traces.
The solution for Live Sequence Charts (LSC) (for more on LSC see section 11) is
described in [62, p. 88]:
A hot condition [. . . ] must always be true. If an execution reaches a hot condition
that evaluates to false this is a violation of the requirements, and the system
should abort. For example, if we form an LSC from a prechart Ch and a main
chart consisting of a single false hot condition, the semantics is that Ch can never
occur. In other words, it is forbidden, an anti-scenario.
Even though they choose to abort a negative execution, this is guided by a meta-
variable Violating in their operational semantics [61].
Cengarle and Knapp oﬀer two ways of interpreting negative behavior. The ﬁrst [30],
is based on satisﬁes relations. Two such relations are provided: positively satisﬁes,
t |=p S, meaning that t is a positive trace of the diagram S, and negatively satisﬁes,
t |=n S, meaning that t is an negative trace of S. The second [31] is an operational
semantics. Two transition relations S
e−→p S ′ and S e−→n S ′ are provided, where the
former means that speciﬁcation S may produce event e in a positive execution and
the latter that S may produce e in a negative execution. Their exact interpretation
of negative behavior is not relevant in this discussion, but we notice that also their
solutions resort to use of a meta-level to distinguish between positive and negative
traces.
Whether it is obtained by waving a ﬂag, like in the LSC semantics, or by deﬁning
an extra structure, as in the approach of Cengarle and Knapp, an extra meta-level is
needed for giving an interpretation to neg and the related refuse operator.
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7.3.5 Potential vs. mandatory choice
A ﬁnal question is the ambiguity of the alternative operator alt, whether the non-
determinism introduced by the alternative operator represents underspeciﬁcation or
real choices in the speciﬁed system.
It can be argued that the alternative operator is useful for underspeciﬁcation, i.e.
that it represents a design decision to be made later, but practitioners often interpret it
as a choice between two alternatives that should both be present in the implementation.
Both interpretations have some problems attached to them.
The ﬁrst interpretation ﬁts well with the observation that sequence diagrams are
used for high-level speciﬁcation and that several steps of reﬁnement are needed on the
way to implementation. From this viewpoint it makes sense to interpret an alternative
as underspeciﬁcation. A problem with this is that if a sequence diagram is interpreted
as a partial speciﬁcation, the speciﬁcation becomes very weak; in eﬀect every behavior is
allowed if no negative behavior is speciﬁed. Another drawback is that it is not clear how
to represent non-deterministic choices that should be preserved in the implementation.
Such choices are essential in, e.g., speciﬁcation of security properties [87].
It may be argued that the second interpretation is more intuitive because the choice
operator is used for representing choices in the system and not design choices. The
drawback is of course that the possibility of underspeciﬁcation is then restricted.
In [68,70] this ambiguity is resolved by interpreting alt in the ﬁrst sense, as under-
speciﬁcation, and by introducing xalt (explicit alternative) as a choice operator in the
second sense; a choice that represents a choice in the system.
It is however not possible to distinguish these two kinds of choices at the execution
level; for a single execution it is irrelevant whether a choice is speciﬁed by an alt or an
xalt. But the distinction is relevant with respect to, e.g., reﬁnement and implementa-
tion, which means at the meta-level. As with the operator neg, an extra meta-level is
needed for giving an interpretation of xalt and to distinguish between the two kinds of
choice.
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Chapter 8
Definition of operational semantics
In this chapter we present operational semantics for UML sequence diagrams. As far as
possible the semantics is faithful to the standard and is sound and complete with respect
to the denotational semantics of STAIRS. The semantics is deﬁned so as to be easy to
extend and modify. This allows us to give a “default” or “standard” interpretation,
but also to experiment with the semantics and make variations on points unspeciﬁed
by the standard. Speciﬁcally it has a formalized meta-level which allows deﬁnition of
diﬀerent execution strategies. It is not based on transformations to other formalisms,
which makes it easy to work with.
Our solution to the challenges identiﬁed in section 7.3 is the combination of two
transition systems, which we refer to as the execution system and the projection system.
The execution system is a transition system over
[ , ] ∈ B × D (8.1)
where B represents the set of all states of the communication medium and D the set
of all syntactically correct sequence diagrams. We let EX def= B × D, and refer to the
elements of EX as execution states.
The projection system is a transition system over
Π( , , ) ∈ P(L)× B ×D (8.2)
where P(L) is the powerset of the set of all lifelines. The projection system is used for
ﬁnding enabled events at each stage of the execution and is deﬁned recursively. This
system handles the challenges related to weak sequencing and related to the global vs.
the local view in sequence diagrams.
These two systems work together in such a way that for each step in the execution,
the execution system updates the projection system by passing on the current state of
the communication medium, and the projection system updates the execution system
by selecting the event to execute and returning the state of the diagram after the
execution of the event.
In section 8.1 we deﬁne the execution system. Section 8.2 is devoted to the com-
munication medium, and in section 8.3 the projection system is deﬁned. In section 8.4
we deﬁne fairness, and in section 8.5 we present soundness and completeness results.
The meta-level is dealt with in chapter 9.
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8.1 The execution system
The execution system has two rules. The ﬁrst rule represents the execution of a single
event and uses the projection system to ﬁnd an enabled event to execute. It is deﬁned
as:
[β, d]
e−→ [update(β, e), d′] if Π(ll.d, β, d) e−→ Π(ll.d, β, d′) ∧ e ∈ E (8.3)
In general we assume the structure of the communication medium, i.e. the means
of communication, to be underspeciﬁed. The only requirement is that the following
functions are deﬁned:
• add ∈ B ×M→ B: Adds a message.
• rm ∈ B ×M→ B: Removes a message.
• ready ∈ B ×M → B: Returns true if the communication medium is in a state
where it can deliver the message and false otherwise.
The function update ∈ B × E → B is deﬁned as:
update(β, e)
def
=
{
add(β,m.e) if k.e = !
rm(β,m.e) if k.e =?
(8.4)
Since transmitter and receiver information is embedded into the messages, these func-
tions are suﬃcient. Usually we assume the most general communication model, i.e.
no ordering on the messages. This means that, e.g., message overtaking is possible.
Diﬀerent communication models are described in section 8.2 below.
The second rule of the execution system executes silent events. The rules of the
projection system handle the sequence diagram operators alt, xalt, refuse, assert and
loop〈n〉. (The operators opt, neg and loop I are derived operators, and therefore do
not have their own rules.) Resolving these operators, such as choosing the branch of
an alt, are considered silent events. We deﬁne the set of silent events to be
T = {τalt, τxalt, τrefuse , τassert , τloop} (8.5)
with T ∩E = ∅. The reason for introducing all these diﬀerent silent events is that they
give high ﬂexibility in deﬁning execution strategies by making the silent events and
their kinds available at the meta-level. The rule is simple:
[β, d]
τ−→ [β, d′] if Π(ll.d, β, d) τ−→ Π(ll.d, β, d′) ∧ τ ∈ T (8.6)
The empty diagram skip cannot be rewritten, but we assert that it produces the empty
trace, i.e.:
[β, skip]
〈〉−→ [β, skip] (8.7)
This also means that execution terminates when skip is reached.
Throughout this thesis we apply the following shorthand notation:
• If there exists a sequence of transitions
[β, d]
e1−→ [β1, d1] e2−→ · · · en−→ [βn, dn]
we write
[β, d]
〈e1,e2,...,en〉−−−−−−−→ [βn, dn]
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• We say that an event e is enabled in execution state [β, d] iﬀ there exists a
transition
[β, d]
e−→ [β ′, d′]
for some β ′, d′.
• We write
[β, d]
e−→
for
∃β ′, d′ : [β, d] e−→ [β ′, d′]
• If an event e is not enabled in [β, d] we write
[β, d]
e

• If for all events e we have that e is not enabled in [β, d] (i.e. no events are enabled
in [β, d]) we write
[β, d] 
8.2 Communication model
We assume that lifelines communicate by means of asynchronous message passing.
This assumption is however not suﬃcient in order to fully deﬁne the operational se-
mantics. We also need to make assumptions regarding the communication model, i.e.
the mechanisms for transporting messages between lifelines. In [44], a classiﬁcation of
four general communication models for Message Sequence Charts are characterized:
• One FIFO1 buﬀer for each message. This is equivalent to what may be called a
random access buﬀer.
• One FIFO buﬀer for each (ordered) pair of lifelines. All messages from one lifeline
to another will pass through a speciﬁc buﬀer.
• One FIFO buﬀer for each lifeline. All messages to a lifeline pass through the
same buﬀer.
• One global FIFO buﬀer. All messages sent between all lifelines pass through the
same buﬀer.
Further it is shown that the choice of communication model aﬀects the semantics of
the diagrams.
We adopt this classiﬁcation, but do not make any decision on which of these com-
munication models should be regarded as the “correct” one. Instead we deﬁne all four
and let them be options for instantiation of the underspeciﬁed communication medium
characterized in section 8.1. The “one FIFO for each message” model must be con-
sidered the most general of the models, and is also the model (implicitly) assumed by
STAIRS. We therefore use this model, deﬁned in section 8.2.1 below, as the default,
and apply this communication model in our soundness and completeness proofs.
1First In First Out.
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In the following sub-sections, we deﬁne the set of states of the communication
medium B, and the functions add ∈ B ×M → B, rm ∈ B ×M → B and ready ∈
B×M→ B. For all four we assume arbitrary size, i.e. that no messages are discarded
due to overﬂow.
Because events at gates are not present in the syntactical representation of a se-
quence diagram, we must assume that messages sent from gates are available in the
execution of the diagram (see also appendix A.1). For the ﬁrst two of our commini-
cation models we can handle this by deﬁning a function initC ∈ D → B that returns
a initial state of the commnuication medium containing the necessary messages for
execution of the diagram. For the other two communication models it does not make
sense to deﬁne such a function becuase the speciﬁc syntactic representation of the di-
agrams will aﬀect the order of the messages in the initial state of the communication
medium, and therefore also the order or the execution of events. In other words, dif-
ferent syntactic representations of semantically equivalent diagrams may give diﬀerent
inital states of the communication medium. In these communication models the initial
state of the communication medium should be explicitely speciﬁed.
8.2.1 One FIFO for each message
In this communication model, each message is assumed to have its own channel from
the transmitter to the receiver, something that allows for message overtaking. Because
we assume all messages to be unique and the messages to contain transmitter and
receiver information, there is no need for deﬁning the channels or buﬀers explicitly
– at any point in time a set of messages is suﬃcient to represent the state of the
communication medium. Hence, the set of states of the communication medium are
deﬁned as a powerset of the set of messages:
B def= P(M)
The functions add, rm and ready for manipulating the state of the communication
medium can then be deﬁned using set operations:
add(β,m)
def
= β ∪ {m}
rm(β,m)
def
= β \ {m}
ready(β,m)
def
= m ∈ β
(8.8)
The function initC for this communication medium is deﬁned as follows:2
initC (e)
def
=
{{m.e} if k.e =? ∧ tr.e ∈ G
∅ if k.e = ! ∨ tr.e ∈ G
initC (skip)
def
= ∅
initC (op d)
def
= initC (d), op ∈ {refuse, assert}
initC (d1 op d2)
def
= initC (d1) ∪ initC (d2), op ∈ {seq, par, strict, alt, xalt}
initC (loop〈n〉 d) def= initC (d) ∪ initC (loop〈n− 1〉 d)
2We assume in this deﬁnition that messages from diﬀerent iterations of a loop is distinguishable.
See appendix A.3 for details.
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8.2.2 One FIFO for each pair of lifelines
In this communication model, each pair of lifelines in a diagram is assumed to have a
directed channel in each direction through which the messages are transported. The
set of states of FIFO buﬀers F is deﬁned as sequences of messages:
F def= M∗
Each state of the communication model is represented as a function from pair of lifelines
to FIFO buﬀers, and the set of states of the communication medium B is then deﬁned
as the set of functions from pairs of lifelines to FIFOs:
B def= L× L → F
We can think of a state of the commuinication medium β as a mapping from pairs of
lifelines to FIFOs:
β = {(l1, l1) → b11, (l1, l2) → b12, . . . , (l2, l1) → b21, . . .}
Let emptyComm ∈ B be the set of empty channels, deﬁned as
emptyComm
def
= {(l, l′) → 〈〉 | l, l′ ∈ L}
Further, let β[(l, l′) → b] be the state β updated with the mapping (l, l′) → b, such
that:
(β[(l, l′) → b])(l′′, l′′′) =
{
b if l = l′′ ∧ l′ = l′′′
β(l′′, l′′′) otherwise
We then deﬁne a function comm ∈M→ B that returns the state of the commuinica-
tion medium that only contains a single message m:
comm(m)
def
= emptyComm[(tr.m, re.m) → 〈m〉]
For manipulation of the state of the communication medium we ﬁrst deﬁne an auxillary
“FIFO concatenation” function  ∈ B × B → B:
β1  β2 def= {(l, l′) → β1(l, l′)β2(l, l′) | l, l′ ∈ L}
The functions add, rm and ready for manipulating the state of the communication
medium are deﬁned as follows:
add(β,m)
def
= β  comm(m)
rm(β,m)
def
=
⎧⎨
⎩
〈〉 if β(tr.m, re.m) = 〈〉
β[(tr.m, re.m) → tail(β(tr.m, re.m))] if ready(β,m)
β if ¬ready(β,m)
ready(β,m)
def
= head(β(tr.m, re.m)) = m
The functions head ∈ M∗ →M and tail ∈ M∗ →M∗ are functions that return the
head and tail of a sequence in the usual fashion:
head(〈m〉b) def= m
tail(〈m〉b) def= b
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We deﬁne the initial state of the communication medium in the following way:
initC .e
def
=
{
comm(m.e) if k.e =? ∧ tr.e ∈ G
emptyComm if k.e = ! ∨ tr.e ∈ G
initC .skip
def
= emptyComm
initC .(op d)
def
= initC .d, op ∈ {refuse, assert}
initC .(d1 op d1)
def
= initC .d1  initC .d2, op ∈ {seq, par, strict, alt, xalt}
initC .(loop〈n〉 d) def= initC .d  initC .(loop〈n− 1〉 d)
Because all gate names are unique, this means the initial state of the communication
medium will contain a separate FIFO for each message sent from a gate to lifelines in
the diagram. The exception is messages from gates inside loops, where the FIFO will
be a sequence of messages whose length corresponds to the number of iterations of the
loop.
8.2.3 One FIFO for each lifeline
This communication model assumes that each lifeline has a single channel through
which all incomming messages are transported, regardless of the transmitters of the
messages. Similar to the above communication model, a state of the communication
medium is a function from lifelines to FIFOs. The diﬀerence is that the function only
takes as argument the receiver lifeline. The set of states of the communication medium
is deﬁned as
B def= L → F
where F is deﬁned as above.
We also deﬁne similar emptyComm, comm and  functions for this communi-
cation medium:
emptyComm
def
= {l → 〈〉 | l ∈ L}
comm(m)
def
= emptyComm[re.m → 〈m〉]
β1  β2 def= {l → β1(l)β2(l) | l ∈ L}
The functions add, rm and ready for manipulation of the state of the communication
medium are deﬁned as follows:
add(β,m)
def
= β  comm(m)
rm(β,m)
def
=
⎧⎨
⎩
〈〉 if β(re.m) = 〈〉
β[re.m → tail(β(re.m))] if ready(β,m)
β if ¬ready(β,m)
ready(β,m)
def
= head(β(re.m)) = m
8.2.4 One global FIFO
In this communication model, all messages are transported through a single channel
regardless of sender and receiver. This channel is represented by a FIFO buﬀer, and the
states of the communication medium are then equal the states of the buﬀer. Further
no transmitter and receiver information is needed.
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The states of the communication medium is hence deﬁned as the set of sequences
of messages:
B def= F
The functions add, rm and ready for manipulating the state of the communication
medium are deﬁned by use of sequnce manipulation operators:
add(β,m)
def
= β〈m〉
rm(β,m)
def
=
⎧⎨
⎩
〈〉 if β = 〈〉
tail(β) if ready(β,m)
β if ¬ready(β,m)
ready(β,m)
def
= head(β) = m
(8.9)
8.3 The projection system
In the following sub-sections we present the rules of the projection system for each of
the syntactic constructs.
8.3.1 The empty diagram
It is not possible to rewrite Π(L, β, skip). skip is the identity element of seq, par and
strict, and we therefore have that skip seq d, d seq skip, skip par d, d par skip, skip strict d
and d strict skip are treated as identical to d. We can also note that skip alt skip = skip
and skip xalt skip = skip. We do not allow the constructions refuse skip and assert skip.
loop〈∞〉 skip is more problematic (see section 8.3.9 for the deﬁnition of loop〈∞〉).
Seen as a program, this construct is similar to the java fragment while(true) { },
i.e., a program that produces nothing and never terminates. When related to the
denotational semantics, however, the semantics of loop〈∞〉 skip should be the empty
trace 〈〉, since the denotational semantics characterize observation after inﬁnite time.
A simple solution would be to syntactically disallow the construct all together. Because
we do not want to make too many syntactic constraints, and because we want to stay
close to the denotational semantics we choose to let loop〈∞〉 skip reduce to skip, even
though this may be seen as counter-intuitive from an operational point of view.
8.3.2 Event
The simplest case is the diagram consisting of only one event e. In this case the system
delivers the event if the event is enabled, given the set L of lifelines and the state of
the communication medium. This means ﬁrst that the event must belong to one of the
lifelines in the set L, and secondly that the event either must be a transmit event or
its message must be available in the communication medium. The need for L will be
evident in the deﬁnition of rules for seq below.
Π(L, β, e)
e−→ Π(L, β, skip)
if l.e ∈ L ∧ (k.e = ! ∨ ready(β,m.e)) (8.10)
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8.3.3 Weak sequencing
The weak sequencing operator seq deﬁnes a partial order on the events in a diagram;
the ordering of events on each lifeline and between the transmit and receive of a message
is preserved, but all other ordering of events is arbitrary. Because of this, there may
be enabled events in both the left and the right argument of a seq if there are lifelines
present in the right argument of the operator that are not present in the left argument.
This leads to two rules for the seq operator.
If there is an overlap between the given set of lifelines and the lifelines of the left
hand side of the seq, it means that the lifelines in this intersection may have enabled
events on the left hand side only. Hence, with respect to these lifelines, the system
must look for enabled events in the left operand.
Π(L, β, d1 seq d2)
e−→ Π(L, β, d′1 seq d2)
if ll.d1 ∩ L = ∅ ∧Π(ll.d1 ∩ L, β, d1) e−→ Π(ll.d1 ∩ L, β, d′1)
(8.11)
If the lifelines of the left hand side do not exhaust the given set of lifelines, it means
there are lifelines that are only present on the right hand side, and that there may be
enabled events on the right hand side of the operator. This means the system may
look for enabled events on the right hand side of the seq, but only with respect to the
lifelines not represented on the left hand side.
Π(L, β, d1 seq d2)
e−→ Π(L, β, d1 seq d′2)
if L \ ll.d1 = ∅ ∧ Π(L \ ll.d1, β, d2) e−→ Π(L \ ll.d1, β, d′2)
(8.12)
Note that the two conditions ll.d1∩L = ∅ and ll.d1 \L = ∅ are not mutually exclusive.
If both these condition are true at the same time there may be enabled events on both
sides of the seq operator. In such a case the rules may be applied in arbitrary order.
The transitions of the system are used as conditions in the recursion of these rules.
Therefore the rules will not be applied unless an enabled event is found deeper in the
recursion. Because of this, the system will always be able to return an enabled event
if enabled events exist.
8.3.4 Interleaving
The parallel operator par speciﬁes interleaving of the events from each of its arguments;
in other words parallel merge of the executions of each of the arguments. The rules
of par are similar to the rules of seq, but simpler since we do not have to preserve
any order between the two operands. One of the operands is chosen arbitrarily. As
with the seq rules, the use of transitions as the conditions of the rules ensures that an
enabled event is found if enabled events exist.
Π(L, β, d1 par d2)
e−→ Π(L, β, d′1 par d2)
if Π(ll.d1 ∩ L, β, d1) e−→ Π(ll.d1 ∩ L, β, d′1)
(8.13)
Π(L, β, d1 par d2)
e−→ Π(L, β, d1 par d′2)
if Π(ll.d2 ∩ L, β, d2) e−→ Π(ll.d2 ∩ L, β, d′2)
(8.14)
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8.3.5 Strict sequencing
The strict operator deﬁnes a strict ordering of events, so that all events on the left side
of the operator must be executed before the events on the right side. Obviously then,
only one rule is needed:
Π(L, β, d1 strict d2)
e−→ Π(L, β, d′1 strict d2)
if ll.d1 ∩ L = ∅ ∧ Π(ll.d1 ∩ L, β, d1) e−→ Π(ll.d1 ∩ L, β, d′1)
(8.15)
As we see, this rule is essentially equal to the left side rule for seq.
8.3.6 Choice
The rules for the two choice operators end the recursion; the choice is resolved and a
silent event is produced. By resolving the choice instead of looking for events deeper
down, we ensure that the same choice is made for all the lifelines covered by a choice
operator.
Π(L, β, d1 alt d2)
τalt−→ Π(L, β, dk) if L ∩ ll.(d1 alt d2) = ∅, for k ∈ {1, 2} (8.16)
Π(L, β, d1 xalt d2)
τxalt−→ Π(L, β, dk) if L ∩ ll.(d1 xalt d2) = ∅, for k ∈ {1, 2} (8.17)
The rules for alt and xalt are identical except for the kind of silent event they produce.
This reﬂects the fact that the operators are indistinguishable at the execution level.
Since they produce diﬀerent events, the kind of the choice is available at the meta-level
and this is used in the deﬁnition of meta-strategies. As with rule (8.10), there is a
condition that makes sure the rules are only applied if the event produced is relevant
to the set L of lifelines.
The operator opt is treated as an alt with one empty argument (see section 5.3.6).
8.3.7 Negative behavior
The rule for refuse produces a silent event when a refuse operator is resolved. This
ﬂags that the execution becomes negative and makes this information available at the
meta-level.
Π(L, β, refuse d)
τrefuse−−−→ Π(L, β, d) if ll.(refuse d) ∩ L = ∅ (8.18)
Similar to the choice rules, we have the condition that ll.(refuse d) ∩ L = ll.d ∩ L = ∅
to ensure that the produced event is relevant to the set of lifelines L.
The operator neg is treated as a choice between a negative branch and an empty
branch by making it a derived operator from alt and refuse (see section 5.3.7).
8.3.8 Universal behavior
The rule assert simply resolves the operator and produces a silent event. The silent
event makes the information that the execution has entered an “asserted” region avail-
able to the meta-level.
Π(L, β, assert d)
τassert−−−→ Π(L, β, d) if ll.(assert d) ∩ L = ∅ (8.19)
Again we have the same condition on the set of lifelines.
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8.3.9 Iteration
Informally, in loop I d there is a non-deterministic choice between the numbers of I,
which is formalized by making loop I a derived operator of generalized alt and loop〈n〉
(see section 5.3.9). If n ∈ I is picked, d should be iterated n times.
loop〈n〉 d is a loop with a counter. In the rule the counter is decreased by one
for each iteration. We also produce a silent event to represent the iteration of a loop.
Even though iteration of a loop in itself is not the most relevant information at the
meta-level, it may be useful for deﬁning execution strategies, for example if we want
to give iteration of the loop low priority.
Π(L, β, loop〈n〉 d) τloop−→ Π(L, β, d seq loop〈n− 1〉 d) if ll.(loop〈n〉 d) ∩ L = ∅ (8.20)
Also here we have the condition that ll.(loop〈n〉 d) ∩ L = ll.d ∩ L = ∅. Since we have
that ∞− 1 =∞, loop〈∞〉 d speciﬁes an inﬁnite loop. Further we assert that loop〈0〉 d
is equal to skip, i.e., loop〈0〉 d def= skip, so we do not need a special rule for this situation.
8.4 Fairness
With respect to diagrams that contain inﬁnite loop, we must assume weak fairness
between diagram parts for the operational semantics to be complete. This means that
an arbitrary diagram part may not be enabled inﬁnitely many consecutive execution
steps without being executed. With this assumption we avoid situations where some
part of a diagram is both enabled and starved for a iniﬁnitely long time. Below we
formalize this notion of weak fairness.
8.4.1 Diagram projection part
We deﬁne diagram projection parts to be the parts (or fragments) of a diagram that may
be reached by the recursion of the projection system. This means that any argument
of seq or par and the left argument of strict are projection parts, while arguments of
the high-level operators are not. In addition skip is a projection part of any diagram.
For example in the diagram
d = d1 seq ((d2 alt d3) par d4)
we have that skip, d1, d2 alt d3 and d4 are projection parts, while d2 and d3 are not.
The reason why the arguments of the high-level operators are not projection parts
is that events inside an argument of a high-level operator in a given state will not be
reached by the projection system and therefore will not be executed. Hence, for char-
acterizing what is executable in a state, the events inside the arguments of high-level
operators are irrelevant since it is the enclosing operator itself that will be executed.
Because skip is the identity element of seq, par and strict, skip will by deﬁnition be
a projection part of any diagram. We nevertheless formalize this explicitly in the
deﬁnition.
We deﬁne a relation  ∈ D × D → B where d  d′ should be read as “d is a
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projection part of d′.” We let 1 ∈ D ×D → B be deﬁned as
d 1 d
′ def= d = skip ∨
∃d′′ ∈ D : d′ = d seq d′′ ∨
d′ = d′′ seq d ∨
d′ = d par d′′ ∨
d′ = d′′ par d ∨
d′ = d strict d′′
(8.21)
and deﬁne  to be the reﬂexive and transitive closure of 1.
8.4.2 Enabled and executed projection parts
A diagram projection part d is executed in a execution step [β, d′] x−→ [β ′, d′′], x ∈ E∪T ,
if d is changed in the execution of the step (i.e. what is executed is d itself or a part of
d). We formalize this by means of a relation executed ∈ D×EX × (E ∪T )×EX → B:
executed(d, [β, d′], x, [β ′, d′′]) def=
d  d′ ∧
[β, d′] x−→ [β ′, d′′] ∧
∃d′′′ ∈ D : (Π(ll.d, β, d) x−→ Π(ll.d, β, d′′′) ∧ d′′′  d′′)
(8.22)
Obviously a diagram projection part d is enabled in [β, d′] if there exists an execution
step starting in [β, d′] in which d may be executed. This is formalized by the relation
enabled ∈ D × EX → B:
enabled(d, [β, d′]) def= ∃x, β ′, d′′ : executed(d, [β, d′], x, [β ′, d′′]) (8.23)
8.4.3 Weak fairness
We are now able to formalize the notion of weak fairness described above. An execution
is a sequence of execution steps:
[β1, d1]
x1−→ [β2, d2] x2−→ [β3, d3] x3−→ · · ·
We deﬁne
Ξ
def
= {[β1, d1] x1−→ [β2, d2] x2−→ [β3, d3] x3−→ · · · ∈ (EX × (E ∪ T ))∞ |
∀i ∈ N : executed(di, [βi, di], xi, [βi+1, di+1])}
to be the set of all inﬁnite executions. We say that an execution is weakly fair if
no diagram projection part that eventually becomes enabled, stays enabled forever,
without being executed inﬁnitely often.3 This is formalized in the relation wfe ∈ Ξ →
B:
wfe([β1, d1]
x1−→ [β2, d2] x2−→ [β3, d3] x3−→ · · · ) def=
∀d ∈ D, i ∈ N : (∀j ∈ N ∪ {0} : enabled(d, [βi+j, di+j])⇒
∃k ∈ N ∪ {0} : executed(d, [βi+k, di+k], xi+k, [βi+k+1, di+k+1]))
(8.24)
3An intuitive discussion of weak fairness can be found in [100].
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This deﬁnition is based on the assumption that all diagram fragments are unique,
something that follows from the assumption that every event in a diagram is unique.
An equivalent expression for wfe, that perhaps is closer to the above formulation
of a weakly fair execution, is the following:
wfe([β1, d1]
x1−→ [β2, d2] x2−→ [β3, d3] x3−→ · · · ) =
¬∃d ∈ D, i ∈ N : (∀j ∈ N ∪ {0} : enabled(d, [βi+j, di+j]) ∧
¬∃k ∈ N ∪ {0} : executed(d, [βi+k, di+k], xi+k, [βi+k+1, di+k+1]))
(8.25)
To ensure weak fairness of the operational semantics we place the following condition
on executions:
∀σ ∈ Ξ : wfe(σ) (8.26)
By using the deﬁnition of weakly fair executions we may express that a trace is
weakly fair. Let tr ∈ Ξ → (E ∪ T )∞ be a function that picks out all the events of an
execution and returns a trace:
tr([β1, d1]
x1−→ [β2, d2] x2−→ [β3, d3] x3−→ · · · ) def= 〈x1, x2, x3, . . .〉
The relation wft ∈ (E ∪T )×D → B formalizes that a trace is weakly fair with respect
to a diagram:
wft(t, d)
def
= ∃σ ∈ Ξ : π2(head(σ)) = d ∧ tr(σ) = t ∧ wfe(σ) (8.27)
The function head returns the ﬁrst element of σ, which is an execution state, and π2
returns the second element of an execution state, which is a diagram. The composition
π2(head(σ)) then gives the ﬁrst diagram in execution σ. Hence, wft(t, d) expresses that
the trace t represents a weakly fair execution starting with the diagram d.
8.5 Soundness and completeness
The operational semantics is sound and complete with respect to the denotational
semantics presented in section 5.3. Informally, the soundness property means that if
the operational semantics produces a trace from a given diagram, this trace should be
included in the denotational semantics of that diagram. By completeness we mean that
all traces in the denotational semantics of a diagram should be producible applying the
operational semantics on that diagram. In addition it can be shown that execution of
a diagram without initite loop always will terminate.
Let O be the set of all interaction obligations. [[ d ]] ∈ P(O) is the denotation of d.
We write t ∈ [[ d ]] for t ∈ ⋃(p,n)∈[ d ](p ∪ n). E S©t denotes the trace t with all events not
in E ﬁltered away. env!M.d is the set of messages m such that the receive event but
not the transmit event of m is present in d.
Theorem (Termination) Given a diagram d ∈ D without inﬁnite loops. Then exe-
cution of [env!M.d, d] will terminate.
The proof is found as proof of theorem 3 on page 297 in appendix A.3.
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Theorem (Soundness) Given a diagram d ∈ D. For all t ∈ (E ∪ T )∗, if there exists
β ∈ B such that [env!M.d, d] t−→ [β, skip] then E S©t ∈ [[ d ]].
The soundness theorem is a combination of theorem 1 on page 279 in appendix A.2,
that proves soundness of diagram with simple operators, theorem 4 on page 279 in
appendix A.3, that proves soundness of diagrams with high-level operators, and theo-
rem 6 on page 311 in appendix A.4, which proves soundess of diagrams with iniﬁnite
loops.
Theorem (Completeness) Given a diagram d ∈ D. For all t ∈ E∗, if t ∈ [[ d ]] then
there exist trace t′ ∈ (E ∪T )∗ and β ∈ B such that [env!M.d, d] t
′−→ [β, skip] and E S©t′ =
t.
This theorem a combination of theorem 2 on page 293 in appendix A.2, which proves
completeness of diagrams with simple operators, theorem 5 on page 306 in appen-
dix A.3, that proves completeness of diagrams with high-level operators and theorem 7
on page 317 in appendix A.4, where completeness of diagrams with inﬁnite loops is
proved.
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Chapter 9
Meta-strategies
There are several strategies we may choose when executing a sequence diagram and
generating the histories of its possible executions. Examples of this may be generating
one or a speciﬁc number of random traces, all traces, all preﬁxes of a certain length,
etc. We wish to have the possibility of varying the execution strategy without changing
the operational semantics of the sequence diagrams. The way to do this is to deﬁne
diﬀerent meta-strategies for executing the diagrams with the operational semantics.
In this chapter we formalize meta-levels that enclose the execution system. At these
meta-levels we can deﬁne meta-strategies that guide the execution and can be used for
handling the challenges related to negative behavior, and potential and mandatory
choice. Speciﬁcally, two such meta-levels, or meta-systems are deﬁned. In section 9.1
we introduce a meta-system with mode, i.e. a way of assigning properties to executions,
that are later used in the test generation algorithm of chapter 13. In section 9.2
we present a meta-system for generating all traces of a diagram and give reﬁnement
veriﬁcation as an application of this system.
9.1 The one trace with mode strategy
In this section we show how we can produce a trace while capturing the high-level
properties of the trace, e.g. the trace representing negative behavior.
In order to capture these properties we deﬁne a meta-system over
〈 , , , 〉 ∈ H × EX × P(L)×MO
where MO is a set of modes. The place of this tuple is a “container” for a trace,
the second place holds a state of the execution system, the third place holds a set of
lifelines that can be used for hiding internal communication in case we want a black
box view of the execution and the forth place represents the mode of the execution.
For this system we deﬁne the following execution rules:
〈t, [β, d], L,mo〉 −→ 〈t〈e〉, [β ′, d′], L,mo〉
if [β, d]
e−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ e ∈ E ∧ (l.e ∈ L ∨ l−1.e ∈ L) (9.1)
〈t, [β, d], L,mo〉 −→ 〈t, [β ′, d′], L,mo〉
if [β, d]
e−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ e ∈ E ∧ l.e ∈ L ∧ l−1.e ∈ L (9.2)
The idea of these rules is that we collect the trace from the execution, but only events
with messages related with the lifelines and gates in L. By applying gates.d as the set of
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lifelines we get a trace where all events represent communication with the environment
of the diagram, i.e. a black box view. If, instead, ll.d is used as the set of lifelines, we
get a glass box view.
The silent events are not visible in the trace collected, but may change the mode
of the execution by means of a function mode ∈ T ×MO →MO:
〈t, [β, d], L,mo〉 −→ 〈t, [β ′, d′], L,mode(τ,mo)〉 if [β, d] τ−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ τ ∈ T (9.3)
So far the set MO of modes and the mode function has been undeﬁned, and
obviously there are several way they may be deﬁned. Below we give the most obvious
deﬁnition as an example. When this meta-system is applied in the test generation
algotithm in chapter 13, a second deﬁnition of the mode set and the mode function is
used (see section 13.2.1).
Let the set of modes be deﬁned as:
MO def= {postive, negative}
Further, let the function mode be deﬁned as:
mode(τ,mo)
def
=
{
postitive if mo = positive ∧ τ = τrefuse
negative if mo = negative ∨ τ = τrefuse
If we use these deﬁnitions, and we have postive as the initial mode an execution, the
mode will represent the property of the produced trace of being positive or negative
behavior.
9.2 The all traces strategy and a method for refine-
ment verification
With this strategy we want to generate all possible traces of a diagram d and place them
in the correct semantic structure of STAIRS,1 i.e. as a set of interaction obligations
{(p1, n1), (p2, n2), . . . , (pm, nm)} where each interaction obligation (pi, ni), pi is a set of
positive traces and ni is a set of negative traces.
We make use of a meta-system over
{| , , |} ∈ H × EX × P(L)
As with the meta-system of section 9.1, the places of the triple is for collecting a
trace, holding a state of the execution system and specifying a set of lifelines used for
ﬁltering the produced trace. Each element {|t, [β, d], L|} ∈ H × EX × P(L) we refer to
as a meta-system state.
Instead of sets of traces we use “interaction obligations” of sets of positive and
negative executions, i.e. meta-system states. Initially we have a set consisting of a
single interaction obligation with the initial state of d as the only positive element and
no negative elements
{({{|〈〉, [initC .d, d], L|}}, ∅)} (9.4)
1We omit assert because this would require a way of producing all unspeciﬁed traces. Further, we
only concider ﬁnite loop and generalized loop with ﬁnite index set, so that the resulting semantics is
a ﬁnite structure.
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where L ⊆ L is the speciﬁed set of lifelines. From this we generate the full semantic
structure by deﬁning rules that for each execution state deduce the next steps to be
made, and in executing these steps rewrite the whole structure.
A feature of the strategy is that the executions are split every time an alt is executed
and that the interaction obligations are split every time an xalt is executed. Therefore,
the order in which the high level operators is resolved is signiﬁcant; in some cases,
resolving an alt before an xalt will lead to interaction obligations not characterized by
the denotational semantics because this will result in ﬁrst branching the execution and
then splitting the interaction obligation for each of these brances.2
In this strategy we therefore apply a normal form of sequence diagrams where loops
are eliminated and the high-level operators xalt, alt and refuse are pushed to the top
of the diagram (remember we only have ﬁnite loops, and no assert operators). In
the normal form all xalts are at the top of the diagram (i.e. as the most signiﬁcant
operators), followed by the altss which again are followed by the refuse operators.
Details of the normal form is found in appendix B. For the remainder of this section
we assume diagrams to be in this normal form.
Because of this normal form we can also assume the rules of the strategy to be
applied in a speciﬁc order; ﬁrst the rule for xalts, then the rule for alts, then the rules
for refuses, and ﬁnally the rules for execution of normal events.
The rule for resolving xalts is the ﬁrst to be applied. The rule involves splitting an
interaction obligation:
O ∪ {({{|t, [β, d], L|}}, ∅)} −→ O ∪ {({{|t, [β ′, d′], L|}}, ∅) | [β, d] τxalt−→ [β ′, d′]} (9.5)
After resolving all xalts, there will be a set of interaction obligations with one execution
in each interaction obligation.
If we want all traces, we need to make a branch in the execution for every alt. Hence
the rule for resolving alts splits executions inside the interaction obligations:
O ∪ {(P ∪ {{|t, [β, d], L|}}, ∅)} −→
O ∪ {(P ∪ {{|t, [β ′, d′], L|} | [β, d] τalt−→ [β ′, d′]}, ∅)}
if [β, d]
τxalt

(9.6)
The rules for resolving a refuse are more complicated since they concern an inter-
action obligation and not only one of the sets of an interaction obligation. Let P and
N be sets. The rule for resolving a refuse in a positive execution is then:
O ∪ {(P ∪ {{|t, [β, d], L|}}, N)} −→ O ∪ {(P,N ∪ {{|t, [β ′, d′], L|}})}
if [β, d]
τrefuse−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ [β, d] τxalt ∧ [β, d] τalt (9.7)
In an already negative execution, resolving a refuse makes no diﬀerence:
O ∪ {(P,N ∪ {{|t, [β, d], L|}})} −→ O ∪ {(P,N ∪ {{|t, [β ′, d′], L|}})}
if [β, d]
τrefuse−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ [β, d] τxalt ∧ [β, d] τalt (9.8)
The rules for executing events are ﬁrst applied after all high-level operators are
resoleved by the above rules. There are two rules; one for positive executions and
one for negative executions. Every time there is a possibility of more than one event
2An elaboration of this is found in appendix B.2.
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occurring ﬁrst, the execution must branch. Hence, the rules for executing events asserts
that for a given state, the generation must branch for every enabled event:
O ∪ {(P ∪ {{|t, [β, d], L|}}, N)} −→
O ∪ {(P ∪ {{|t〈e〉, [β ′, d′], L|} |
[β, d]
e−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ e ∈ E ∧ (l.e ∈ L ∨ l−1.e ∈ L)}, N)}
∪ {(P ∪ {{|t, [β ′, d′], L|} |
[β, d]
e−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ e ∈ E ∧ l.e ∈ L ∧ l−1.e ∈ L}, N)}
if [β, d]
τxalt
 ∧ [β, d] τalt ∧ [β, d] τrefuse
(9.9)
O ∪ {(P,N ∪ {{|t, [β, d], L|}})} −→
O ∪ {(P,N ∪ {{|t〈e〉, [β ′, d′], L|} |
[β, d]
e−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ e ∈ E ∧ (l.e ∈ L ∨ l−1.e ∈ L)})}
∪ {(P,N ∪ {{|t, [β ′, d′], L|} |
[β, d]
e−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ e ∈ E ∧ l.e ∈ L ∧ l−1.e ∈ L})}
if [β, d]
τxalt
 ∧ [β, d] τalt ∧ [β, d] τrefuse
(9.10)
Note also that these rules only append the executed events to the trace if the events
are related to the set of lifelines L.
In summary, these rules ensure that the structure ﬁrst is split into interaction
obligations by resolving xalts. After that executions are split by resolving alts, and then
moved to the negative executions if there are refuses to be resolved. When all high-level
operators have been removed, we have a structre consisting of simple diagrams which
then are executed until we have all the traces of the original diagram.
Refinement verification The “all traces” meta-strategy deﬁned above can be ap-
plied to devise a simple reﬁnement veriﬁcation method. The strategy produces sets of
interaction obligations of meta-system states, but by adding the following rules to the
system, we get a strategy that gives us sets of interaction obligations of traces:
O ∪ {(P ∪ {{|t, [β, d], L|}, N)} −→ O ∪ {(P ∪ {t}, N)}
if ∀x ∈ E ∪ T : [β, d] x (9.11)
O ∪ {(P,N ∪ {{|t, [β, d], L|})} −→ O ∪ {(P,N ∪ {t})}
if ∀x ∈ E ∪ T : [β, d] x (9.12)
The reﬁnement veriﬁcation is then conducted as follows. Let d1 and d2 be diagrams
in the normal form, and let O1 and O2 be sets of interaction obligations obtained by:
{({{|〈〉, [initC .d1, d1], L|}}, ∅)} −→! O1
and
{({{|〈〉, [initC .d2, d2], L|}}, ∅)} −→! O2
where −→! means applying the rules that deﬁne the relation −→ until no more appli-
cations are possible. L is the set of lifelines speciﬁed to be external in this veriﬁcation.
The diﬀerent types of reﬁnement, as deﬁned in section 5.4.2, can then be veriﬁed
by applying the following equivalences:
d1 g d2 ⇔ ∀o1 ∈ O1 : ∃o2 ∈ O2 : o1 r o2
d1 rg d2 ⇔ ∀o1 ∈ O1 : ∃o2 ∈ O2 : o1 rr o2
d1 l d2 ⇔ d1 g d2 ∧ ∀o2 ∈ O2 : ∃o1 ∈ O1 : o1 r o2
d1 rl d2 ⇔ d1 rg d2 ∧ ∀o2 ∈ O2 : ∃o1 ∈ O1 : o1 rr o2
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The reﬁnement relations o1 r o2 and o1 rr o2 used here are the same as deﬁned in
section 5.4.1.
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Chapter 10
Implementation of operational
semantics
In chapter 8 we presented an operational semantics for UML 2.x sequence diagrams. In
this chapter we present an implementation of the operational semantics in the rewrite
language Maude. Further we give some remarks on conventions for the use of the
implementation.
The main purpose of this chapter is that of documenting the implementation. We
do not implement inﬁnite behavior, but except from that, the full operational seman-
tics is implemented. Further the implementation is made with the property of being
extensible and conﬁgurable. In this sense, what is presented in this chapter is not
merely an implementation of the operational semantics, but also an implementation
of the underlying idea of a general, modiﬁable, extendible and conﬁgurable semantics
that provides a ﬁrm foundation for analysis of sequence diagrams and a tool box for
implementing sound methods of analysis.
We do not repeat deﬁnitions from other chapters, but it should still be possible to
read and understand it as a self-contained text. We do not assume familiarity with
Maude beyond what is presented in chapter 6. All the same, familiarity with chapter 8
and with Maude should provide a great advantage for the reader.
In the presentation of the Maude implementation we will stay close to the module
structure of the implementation. We will, however, sometimes drop the deﬁnitions
of auxiliary sorts and functions. In section 10.1 the implementation of the syntax
of sequence diagrams is presented. The implementation of the operational semantics
is presented in section 10.2. In section 10.3 we present conventions for usage of the
implementation and provide an example. The full code of the implementation is found
in appendix C.
10.1 Syntax
In this section we present the syntax of sequence diagrams, as deﬁned in section 5.2,
implemented in Maude.
10.1.1 Lifelines and gates
Lifelines and gates are deﬁned by the functional module LIFELINE:
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fmod LIFELINE is
sorts LLName Lifeline Gate .
subsort Gate < Lifeline .
op l : LLName -> Lifeline [ctor] .
op g : LLName -> Gate [ctor] .
endfm
The sort LLName deﬁnes the set of names of lifelines. It does, however, not have any
constructors. The idea behind this is that when a speciﬁc diagram is deﬁned, names
of lifelines and gates should be provided. This is further discussed in section 10.3.
The module further deﬁnes two sorts Lifeline and Gate, and Gate is deﬁned
as subsort of Lifeline. This means that the set of gates is included in the set of
lifelines and that gates are treated as lifelines. The constructors are operators l and
g, respectively, which both take a lifeline name as argument.
In addition, a functional module LLSET deﬁnes the sort LLSet as sets of lifelines.
We not do provide the module here, but refer to appendix C.1.
10.1.2 Messages and events
Messages are deﬁned by the functional module MESSAGE:
fmod MESSAGE is
including LIFELINE .
sorts Signal Msg .
op (_,_,_) : Signal Lifeline Lifeline -> Msg [ctor] .
ops tr re : Msg -> Lifeline .
var S : Signal .
vars T R : Lifeline .
eq tr(S, T, R) = T .
eq re(S, T, R) = R .
endfm
The module includes the module LIFELINE and deﬁnes two sorts Signal and Msg. As
with lifeline names, the sort Signal has no constructors; the signals should be provided
when deﬁning a speciﬁc diagram.
As in section 5.2.1, messages are deﬁned as tuples of signals, transmitter lifelines and
receiver lifelines. On messages we deﬁne a transmitter function tr and receiver function
re that return the transmitter lifeline and receiver lifeline of a message, respectively.
Events are deﬁned in the functional module EVENT:
fmod EVENT is
including MESSAGE .
sorts Event EventKind SEvent SEventKind .
subsort SEvent < Event .
76
10.1 Syntax
ops ! ? : -> EventKind [ctor] .
op (_,_) : EventKind Msg -> Event [ctor] .
op tau : SEventKind -> SEvent [ctor] .
op k : Event -> EventKind .
op m : Event -> Msg .
ops tr re l l-1 : Event -> Lifeline .
var M : Msg .
var K : EventKind .
eq k(K,M) = K .
eq m(K,M) = M .
eq tr(K,M) = tr(M) .
eq re(K,M) = re(M) .
ceq l(K,M) = tr(M) if K = ! .
ceq l(K,M) = re(M) if K = ? .
ceq l-1(K,M) = re(M) if K = ! .
ceq l-1(K,M) = tr(M) if K = ? .
endfm
The module deﬁnes four sorts: Event, representing the set of events, EventKind rep-
resenting the set of kinds (transmit and receive) of events, SEvent representing the
set of silent events, and SEventKind, the set of kinds of the silent events. The sort
EventKind has the two constants ! and ? as its constructors and only members. Events
are deﬁned as a tuples of kinds and messages. The sort SEvent has the constructor
tau which takes a silent event kind as parameter. The members of SEventKind are
not deﬁned in this module, but are deﬁned in operator speciﬁc modules as part of the
conﬁguration mechanism described later.
On the set of events we deﬁne a number of functions: k returns the kind of an event,
tr and re overload the functions deﬁned in MESSAGE and return the transmitter and
receiver of an event, l returns the lifeline of an event (i.e. the transmitter if the kind
is transmit and receiver if the kind is receive), and l-1 returns the opposite lifeline of
an event (i.e. the receiver of the message if the kind is transmit and the transmitter of
the message if the kind is receive).
10.1.3 Diagrams
In this section we present the Maude representation of the syntax of sequence diagrams.
The deﬁnitions are structured such that a module SD-SYNTAX gives the deﬁnition of
simple diagrams, i.e., diagrams built from events and the operators seq, par and strict.
The high-level sequence diagram operators, such as alt and loop are deﬁned in separate
modules (allowing conﬁgurability).
The syntax of simple diagrams is deﬁned in the functional module SD-SYNTAX:
fmod SD-SYNTAX is
including EVENT .
including LLSET .
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sort SD .
subsort Event < SD .
op skip : -> SD [ctor] .
op _seq_ : SD SD -> SD [ctor assoc prec 20] .
op _strict_ : SD SD -> SD [ctor assoc prec 25] .
op _par_ : SD SD -> SD [ctor assoc comm prec 30] .
op ll : SD -> LLSet .
op gates : SD -> LLSet .
vars D D’ : SD .
var E : Event .
eq D par skip = D .
eq skip seq D = D .
eq D seq skip = D .
eq D strict skip = D .
eq skip strict D = D .
eq ll(skip) = emptyLLSet .
eq ll(E) = l(E) .
eq ll(D seq D’) = ll(D) ; ll(D’) .
eq ll(D par D’) = ll(D) ; ll(D’) .
eq ll(D strict D’) = ll(D) ; ll(D’) .
eq gates(skip) = emptyLLSet .
eq gates(E) = if l-1(E) :: Gate then l-1(E) else emptyLLSet fi .
eq gates(D seq D’) = gates(D) ; gates(D’) .
eq gates(D par D’) = gates(D) ; gates(D’) .
eq gates(D strict D’) = gates(D) ; gates(D’) .
endfm
A sequence diagram is a deﬁned as a term of the sort SD. Event is deﬁned as a subsort
of SD, so that a single event is also a sequence diagram. SD has four constructors: The
constant skip for representing the empty diagram, and the binary, mixﬁx operators
seq, strict and par for building diagrams. The arguments of the constructor deﬁni-
tions deﬁne seq and strict as associative and par as associative and commutative.
Further the argument prec gives the precedence of the operators. In this case this
means that seq binds stronger than strict and strict binds stronger than par.
Even though skip is the identity element of the constructor operators we do not
specify this in the constructor deﬁnitions (as in the list example in chapter 6), but
deﬁne this by means of equations reducing, e.g., D seq skip to D for a diagram D. The
reason for this is pragmatic; the way in which equations and rewrite rules are deﬁned is
sometimes dependent of how identity is deﬁned. In our case this way makes the nicest
equations and rules.
The module deﬁnes two functions on sequence diagrams, the function ll which
returns the set of lifelines of a diagram and the function gates which returns the gates
of a diagram as a set of lifelines.
Every high-level operator is deﬁned in a separate module EXTENSION-〈operator
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name〉. The purpose of this is to allow conﬁgurability when deﬁning diagrams by
inclusion of the appropriate extension. This is further explained in section 10.3.
10.1.3.1 Choice
The module EXTENSION-ALT and EXTENSION-XALT deﬁne the alt operator and xalt
operator respectively:
fmod EXTENSION-ALT is
including SD-SYNTAX .
op _alt_ : SD SD -> SD [ctor assoc comm prec 35] .
op opt_ : SD -> SD [ctor prec 15] .
op alt : -> SEventKind [ctor] .
vars D D’ : SD .
eq skip alt skip = skip .
eq opt D = D alt skip .
eq ll(D alt D’) = ll(D) ; ll(D’) .
eq gates(D alt D’) = gates(D) ; gates(D’) .
endfm
fmod EXTENSION-XALT is
including SD-SYNTAX .
op _xalt_ : SD SD -> SD [ctor assoc comm prec 40] .
op xalt : -> SEventKind [ctor] .
vars D D’ : SD .
eq skip xalt skip = skip .
eq ll(D xalt D’) = ll(D) ; ll(D’) .
eq gates(D xalt D’) = gates(D) ; gates(D’) .
endfm
There are two things to notice in these modules: 1) We deﬁne alt and xalt as constants
of the sort SEventKind, which means we have tau(alt) and tau(xalt) as silent events.
2) The modules deﬁne the functions ll and gates also for diagrams containing the
operators alt and xalt.
Also note that the module EXTENSION-ALT in addition deﬁnes the unary operator
opt as an operator derived from alt by the equation eq opt D = D alt skip, and
that skip alt skip and skip xalt skip are reduced to skip.
10.1.3.2 Negative behavior
The module deﬁning the operators for negative behavior is similar to the other exten-
sions, and with neg deﬁned as an operator derived from refuse, alt and skip:
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fmod EXTENSION-REFUSE is
including SD-SYNTAX .
including EXTENSION-ALT .
op refuse_ : SD -> SD [ctor prec 1] .
op refuse : -> SEventKind [ctor] .
op neg_ : SD -> SD [ctor prec 10] .
var D : SD .
eq neg D = refuse D alt skip .
eq ll(refuse D) = ll(D) .
eq gates(refuse D) = gates(D) .
endfm
10.1.3.3 Universal behavior
The module deﬁning the operator assert is similar to the other extensions:
fmod EXTENSION-ASSERT is
including SD-SYNTAX .
op assert_ : SD -> SD [ctor prec 5] .
op assert : -> SEventKind [ctor] .
var D : SD .
eq ll(assert D) = ll(D) .
eq gates(assert D) = gates(D) .
endfm
10.1.3.4 Iteration
In order to deﬁne loop in the same way as in section 5.3.9 we need to deﬁne a sort
for the set of natural numbers. This is provided by the module NAT-SET (consult
appendix C.1 for details). Note that since we only implement ﬁnite behavior, we are
only dealing with ﬁnite sets of natural numbers. The module provides a function toSet
that converts an interval represented by the lower and upper bounds of the interval
such that, e.g., toSet(2, 5) = {2, 3, 4, 5}.
The loop operator is deﬁned in the module EXTENSION-LOOP:
fmod EXTENSION-LOOP is
including SD-SYNTAX .
including NAT-SET .
including EXTENSION-ALT .
op loop{_}_ : NatSet SD -> SD [ctor prec 7] .
op loop<_>_ : Nat SD -> SD [ctor prec 7] .
op loop(_,_)_ : Nat Nat SD -> SD [ctor prec 7] .
op loop : -> SEventKind [ctor] .
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var D : SD .
vars N N’ : Nat .
var I : NatSet .
eq loop< 0 > D = skip .
eq loop(N,N’) D = loop{toSet(N,N’)} D .
eq loop{emptyNatSet} D = skip .
eq loop{N} D = loop< N > D .
ceq loop{N , I} D = loop< N > D alt loop{I} D if I =/= emptyNatSet .
eq ll(loop< N > D) = ll(D) .
eq gates(loop< N > D) = gates(D) .
endfm
In this implementation we only deﬁne the ﬁnite loop. Note that we deﬁne three loops.
loop{I} D is the “standard STAIRS loop” where the set I represents a choice for how
many time the loop should be iterated, and loop< N > D is a loop to be iterated N
times. loop(N,N’) D is the loop as it is deﬁned in the UML standard and is treated as
a short hand notation for loop{I} D where I is the interval of natural numbers from N
to N’. As in section 5.3.9, loop{I} is deﬁned as a derived operator of loop< N > and
alt, but without deﬁning the generalized alt explicitly.
10.1.3.5 Full syntax
For use of the full syntax, a module SD-FULL-SYNTAX may be applied:
fmod SD-FULL-SYNTAX is
including SD-SYNTAX .
including EXTENSION-ALT .
including EXTENSION-XALT .
including EXTENSION-REFUSE .
including EXTENSION-ASSERT .
including EXTENSION-LOOP .
endfm
10.2 Operational semantics
In the implementation of the operational semantics, rules for both the execution system
and the projection system are implemented as rewrite rules in Maude. The rules of
our operational semantics are based on placing events on the arrows of the rules, like
labels on transitions of a labeled transition system. The rewrite rules of Maude do not
have an equivalent of this. Inspired by [185] we solve this by making the event part
of the state after the transition/rewrite. The event is in other words placed after the
arrow instead of above the arrow, and a transition of the form [β, d]
e−→ [β ′, d′] is in
the Maude implementation represented by a rewrite [B,D] => {E}[B’,D’].
The signature of the projection system is deﬁned by an operator PI of sort Pi in
module PI:
fmod PI is
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including SD-SYNTAX .
including COMMUNICATION .
sort Pi .
op PI : LLSet Comm SD -> Pi [ctor] .
op {_}_ : Event Pi -> Pi [ctor] .
endfm
Similar, the module EXEC deﬁnes a sort Exec for execution states, but for technical
reasons this module does not provide the signature itself. However the function update
is deﬁned and the signature of a function init is deﬁned.
fmod EXEC is
including PI .
sort Exec .
op {_}_ : Event Exec -> Exec [ctor] .
op init : SD -> Exec .
op update : Comm Event -> Comm .
var B : Comm .
var E : Event .
ceq update(B,E) =
(if k(E) == ! then
add(B,m(E))
else
rm(B,m(E))
fi)
if not E :: SEvent .
ceq update(B,E) = B if E :: SEvent .
endfm
Both these modules deﬁne a constructor operator {_}_ that allows for having the event
as part of the state as described above.
The module PI imports the module COMMUNICATION which provides a type COMM for
the communication medium as well as the signatures of the functions to manipulate
the communication medium:
fmod COMMUNICATION is
including MESSAGE .
including SD-FULL-SYNTAX .
sort Comm .
op emptyComm : -> Comm [ctor] .
ops add rm : Comm Msg -> Comm .
op ready : Comm Msg -> Bool .
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op initC : SD -> Comm .
endfm
In this module the type and the functions are undeﬁned; the deﬁnitions are provided by
a separate module depending on the choice of communication model. Implementations
of the four communication models deﬁned in section 8.2 are found in appendix C.2.1.
10.2.1 Execution system
The execution system is deﬁned in a module Execution where both the signature of
the execution states and the execution rules are given.
The most natural way of deﬁning the execution system would be to have two rewrite
rules, one implementing the rule for execution of a normal events, rule (8.3), and one
implementing the rule for execution of silent events, rule (8.6). The rules would look
like
crl [execute] :
[B, D] => {E}[update(B,E), D’]
if PI(ll(D), B, D) => {E}PI(L, B, D’)
/\ not E :: SEvent .
crl [execute-silent] :
[B, D] => {E}[B, D’]
if PI(ll(D), B, D) => {E}PI(L, B, D’)
/\ E :: SEvent .
where E :: SEvent is a test for whether E is a silent event or not (and in the latter
case a normal event). Because of performance issues, we instead implement this as a
single rule (the Maude interpreter in some cases works faster with fewer rules). This is
easily obtained by letting the function update (deﬁned in the module EXEC above) also
handle silent events (by doing nothing with the state of the communication medium in
case of a silent event). The implementation of the execution system is then deﬁned as
follows:
mod EXECUTION is
including EXEC .
op [_,_] : Comm SD -> Exec [ctor] .
var B : Comm .
vars D D’ : SD .
var E : Event .
var L : LLSet .
eq init(D) = [initC(D), D] .
crl [execute] :
[B, D] => {E}[update(B,E), D’]
if PI(ll(D), B, D) => {E}PI(L, B, D’) .
endm
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10.2.2 Projection system
The implementation of the projection system is a straight forward implementation
of every rule deﬁned in the system as a rewrite rule in Maude. The module below,
PI-SIMPLE, implements the rules of the projection system for simple diagrams, i.e.
rule (8.10) for events, rules (8.11) and (8.12) for seq, rules (8.13) and (8.14) for par and
rule (8.15) for strict. Because par, in the module SD-SYNTAX, is deﬁned as associative,
it is suﬃcient with one rule in the implementation.
mod PI-SIMPLE is
including PI .
vars D1 D1’ D2 D2’ : SD .
var E : Event .
vars L L’ : LLSet .
var B : Comm .
crl [PI-event] :
PI(L, B, E) => {E}PI(L, B, skip)
if l(E) in L /\
k(E) == ! or ready(B,m(E)) .
crl [PI-seq-left] :
PI(L, B, D1 seq D2) => {E}PI(L, B, D1’ seq D2)
if intersect(ll(D1),L) =/= emptyLLSet /\
PI(intersect(ll(D1),L), B, D1) => {E}PI(L’, B, D1’) .
crl [PI-seq-right] :
PI(L, B, D1 seq D2) => {E}PI(L, B, D1 seq D2’)
if L \ ll(D1) =/= emptyLLSet /\
PI(L \ ll(D1), B, D2) => {E}PI(L’, B, D2’) .
crl [PI-par] :
PI(L, B, D1 par D2) => {E}PI(L, B, D1’ par D2)
if PI(intersect(ll(D1),L), B, D1) => {E}PI(L’, B, D1’) .
crl [PI-strict] :
PI(L, B, D1 strict D2) => {E}PI(L, B, D1’ strict D2)
if intersect(ll(D1), L) =/= emptyLLSet /\
PI(intersect(ll(D1), L), B, D1) => {E}PI(L’, B, D1’) .
endm
For each of the modules EXTENSION-〈operator name〉 there is a module PI-〈operator
name〉. Below we show the module PI-ALT which implements the rule (8.16) for re-
solving alts. Also here, only one rule is necessary since the alt operator is deﬁned as
associative.
mod PI-ALT is
including PI .
including EXTENSION-ALT .
vars D1 D2 : SD .
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var L : LLSet .
var B : Comm .
crl [PI-alt] :
PI(L, B, D1 alt D2) => {tau(alt)}PI(L, B, D1)
if intersect(ll(D1 alt D2), L) =/= emptyLLSet .
endm
The other modules PI-〈operator name〉 follow exactly the same pattern, and may
be found in appendix C.2.2. For use of the full projection system, a model PI-FULL
that imports all the PI-modules may be applied:
mod PI-FULL is
including PI-SIMPLE .
including PI-ALT .
including PI-XALT .
including PI-REFUSE .
including PI-ASSERT .
including PI-LOOP .
endm
10.2.3 Meta-strategies
In order to implement the meta-strategies we ﬁrst deﬁne a module TRACE that deﬁnes
a type SDTrace for ﬁnite traces:
fmod TRACE is
including EVENT .
sort SDTrace .
subsort Event < SDTrace .
op emptyTrace : -> SDTrace [ctor] .
op _._ : SDTrace SDTrace -> SDTrace [ctor assoc id: emptyTrace] .
endfm
10.2.3.1 One trace with mode
For the implementation of the execution strategy of section 9.1 we introduce a module
META-EXEC-MODE where we deﬁne a type Meta and use this to deﬁne the signature of
the meta-system. Further we deﬁne a type Mode to represent the set of modes MO,
and provide the signature of the mode function:
mod META-EXEC-MODE is
including EXEC .
including TRACE .
sort Meta .
sort Mode .
op <_,_,_,_> : SDTrace Exec LLSet Mode -> Meta [ctor] .
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op mode : SEvent Mode -> Mode .
endm
The default modes deﬁned in section 9.1 are implemented in a seperat module
DEFAULT-MODE where the type Mode is given the values positive and negative, and
the function mode is deﬁned:
mod DEFAULT-MODE is
including META-EXEC-MODE .
ops positive negative : -> Mode [ctor] .
var T : SEvent .
var MO : Mode .
ceq mode(T,MO) = positive if MO == positive /\ T =/= tau(refuse) .
ceq mode(T,MO) = negative if MO == negative or T == tau(refuse) .
endm
In the module EXTERNAL-TRACE-MODE, the rules (9.1), (9.2) and (9.3) are imple-
mented as rewrite rules. These rules use transitions of the execution system as condi-
tion, which means we apply the built in mechanism in the Maude interpreter for (semi)
non-deterministic application of the rule:
mod EXTERNAL-TRACE-MODE is
including META-EXEC-MODE .
including SD-FULL-SYNTAX .
var T : SDTrace .
var E : Event .
vars V V’ : Exec .
var L : LLSet .
vars M M’ : Mode .
var D : SD .
var B : Comm .
var TAU : SEvent .
crl < T, V, L, M > => < T . E , V’, L, M >
if V => {E}V’ /\
not E :: SEvent /\
(l(E) in L or l-1(E) in L) .
crl < T, V, L, M > => < T, V’, L, M >
if V => {E}V’ /\
not E :: SEvent /\
not l(E) in L /\
not l-1(E) in L .
crl < T , V, L, M > => < T, V’, L, mode(TAU,M) >
if V => {TAU}V’ .
endm
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In addition to this implementation of the meta-strategy, we also provide another
implementation of the strategy. In this other implementation, the execution of the sys-
tem is randomized instead of using the build in mechanism in the Maude interpreter for
applications of the rules. We do not give the details here, but refer to appendix C.3.1.
10.2.3.2 All traces
When implementing the strategy for producing all traces, more work is required. Sim-
ilar to the above strategy we make use of the type SDTrace, and provide a module
where a type Meta is deﬁned and the signature of the meta-system given:
mod META-EXEC is
including EXEC .
including TRACE .
sort Meta .
op {|_,_,_|} : SDTrace Exec LLSet -> Meta [ctor] .
endm
In addition we deﬁne a module SEMANTICS that deﬁnes the types TraceSet, Inter-
actionObligation and IOSet which we need for characterizing the semantic structure
of STAIRS. We also need the transformation rules for obtaining the normal form of
diagram (see section B.1). An implementation of these is provided by the module
TRANSFORMATIONS.
The execution strategy is implemented by a module ALL-TRACES. In this module
the type Meta is made subsort of SDTrace. This way the semantic structure deﬁned in
SEMANTICS can be used to structure states of the meta-system as well as traces. In the
implementation we make use of the meta-level capabilities of Maude (see section 6.3)
so that for every state of the execution system we are able to obtain every possible
transition. In this way we deﬁne a function allTraces that from an execution state
produces the semantics of the diagram of that execution state. The implementation
of this execution strategy is rather lengthy so we do not provide it here, but it can be
found in appendix C.3.2.
Refinement verification. The reﬁnement veriﬁcation mechanism is implemented
in a module REFINEMENT. This module contains straight forward deﬁnintions of the
reﬁnement relations as Boolean operators:
ops _~>r_ _~>rr_ : InteractionObligation InteractionObligation -> Bool .
ops _~>g_ _~>rg_ _~>l_ _~>rl_ : IOSet IOSet -> Bool .
In addition, a mechanism for substitution of lifelines in traces is provided by a
module MAPPING. This mechanism may be applied if the reﬁnement veriﬁcation is used
for comparing diagrams with diﬀerent lifeline names. See appendix C.3.2.1 for details.
10.3 Conventions for use
In this section we present some conventions for the use of the implementation of the
operational semantics we have presented in this chapter. Further, we give examples of
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use of the Maude implementation together with the Maude interpreter. As example we
use the diagram d of ﬁgure 5.1 on page 30. As we saw in section 5.2.2, the syntactical
representation of this diagram is:
d = (?, (a, g, i)) seq ((!, (b, i, j)) seq (?, (b, i, j)) alt (!, (c, i, j)) seq (?, (c, i, j)))
We let a diagram be represented by a module, so the diagram d is represented by a
module D. This module must import the modules deﬁning the syntax of at least the
operators that are used in the diagram.
The types LLName (lifeline name) and Signal are without any values. In the module
D we therefore deﬁne the lifelines and gates of the diagram as constants of type LLName
and the signals of the diagram as constants of type Signal:
ops i j g : -> LLName .
ops a b c : -> Signal .
We can now build lifelines and gates from lifeline names, messages from lifelines, gates
and signal, events from messages, and diagrams from events. For increased readability
we also give names to lifelines, gates, messages and events ($ in these names is just
for avoiding name collisions, and ! and ? are used for readability). For example do we
deﬁne the event “reception of message a”, i.e. (?, (a, g, i)), by:
op $i : -> Lifeline .
eq $i = l(i) .
op $g : -> Gate .
eq $g = g(g) .
op $a : -> Msg .
eq $a = (a,$g,$i) .
op ?a : -> Event .
eq ?a = (?,$a) .
In the same fashion we give an explicit name to the diagram. The full deﬁnition of
diagram d may be:
mod D is
including SD-FULL-SYNTAX .
ops i j g : -> LLName .
ops $i $j : -> Lifeline .
op $g : -> Gate .
eq $i = l(i) .
eq $j = l(j) .
eq $g = g(g) .
ops a b c : -> Signal .
ops $a $b $c : -> Msg .
eq $a = (a,$g,$i) .
eq $b = (b,$i,$j) .
eq $c = (c,$i,$j) .
ops ?a !b ?b !c ?c : -> Event .
eq ?a = (?,$a) .
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eq !b = (!,$b) .
eq ?b = (?,$b) .
eq !c = (!,$c) .
eq ?c = (?,$c) .
op d : -> SD .
eq d = ?a seq (!b seq ?b alt !c seq ?c) .
endm
Use of the Maude interpreter With the above Maude representation D of the
diagram d, we can use the commands of the Maude interpreter to execute and, in other
ways, manipulate the diagram. In the following we give some examples.
By applying the command
reduce in D : d .
we get the Maude deﬁnition of the diagram:
result SD: (?,a,g(g),l(i)) seq ((!,b,l(i),l(j)) seq (?,b,l(i),l(j))
alt (!,c,l(i),l(j)) seq (?,c,l(i),l(j)))
In order to execute the diagram we need to import modules implementing the opera-
tional semantics. If we, e.g., want the full projection system and the communication
model with no ordering on messages, we add the following lines to the module:
including EXECUTION .
including PI-FULL .
including ONE-FIFO-MESSAGE .
If we want to apply the meta-system for generating a single trace with the default
deﬁnition of modes we also include the lines:
including EXTERNAL-TRACE-MODE .
including DEFAULT-MODE .
We can now execute the diagram using the rewrite command in the Maude interpreter:
rewrite in D : < emptyTrace,[$a,d],ll(d),positive > .
Because the diagram contains a message going from a gate to the lifeline of the diagram
(i.e. a), we start the execution with this message (i.e. $a) in the communication medium
in the initial state. This way the message is available for execution of ?a and execution
may proceed as it should and not stop because the event is disabled by the absence
of the message. In order to get a glass box view of the execution we provide all the
lifelines of the diagram to the meta-system, using the function ll(d).
The result is a state of the meta-system where further execution is not possible:
result Meta: < (?,a,g(g),l(i)) . (!,b,l(i),l(j)) . ?,b,l(i),l(j),
[emptyComm,skip],l(i) ; l(j),positive >
This way we obtain a (semi) non-deterministically generated trace. If we would like to
get all possible traces from this diagram we can apply the search command:
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search in D : < emptyTrace,[$a,d],ll(d),positive > =>!
< T:SDTrace,X:Exec,L:LLSet,M:Mode > .
Solution 1 (state 37)
states: 43 rewrites: 25065 in 7672014078ms cpu (274ms real)
(0 rewrites/second)
T:SDTrace --> (?,a,g(g),l(i)) . (!,b,l(i),l(j)) . ?,b,l(i),l(j)
X:Exec --> [emptyComm,skip]
L:LLSet --> l(i) ; l(j)
M:Mode --> positive
Solution 2 (state 38)
states: 43 rewrites: 25069 in 7672014078ms cpu (275ms real)
(0 rewrites/second)
T:SDTrace --> (?,a,g(g),l(i)) . (!,c,l(i),l(j)) . ?,c,l(i),l(j)
X:Exec --> [emptyComm,skip]
L:LLSet --> l(i) ; l(j)
M:Mode --> positive
No more solutions.
states: 43 rewrites: 25169 in 7672014078ms cpu (277ms real)
(0 rewrites/second)
Note, however, that this only gives us the traces (essentially as a ﬂat set) and not
the semantic structure of STAIRS. This we can obtain by applying the “all traces”
strategy, even though the result in this case is not particulary interesting:
reduce in D : allTraces([$a,d], ll(d)) .
rewrites: 1215 in -4295712345ms cpu (551ms real) (~ rewrites/second)
result InteractionObligation:
(((?,a,g(g),l(i)) . (!,b,l(i),l(j)) . ?,b,l(i),l(j)) +
(?,a,g(g),l(i)) . (!,c,l(i),l(j)) . ?,c,l(i),l(j)),
emptyTSet
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Related work on operational
semantics
In this chapter we present related work, which means other approaches to deﬁning
operational semantics to sequence diagrams. This presentation cannot, however, be
seen independently of the history of sequence diagrams. The various approaches of
deﬁning semantics to sequence diagrams have emerged at diﬀerent points in this history,
and are clearly inﬂuenced by the state of the language(s) at the time of their emergence
(see introduction of chapter 4).
In addition to the STAIRS semantics there exist some other approaches to deﬁning
denotational semantics for UML 2.x sequence diagrams [30,98,173,174]. As explained
section 7.2, denotational and operational semantics are complementary and serve dif-
ferent purposes. For this reason we do not go into detail on these approaches in this
discussion, nor on existing approaches to denotational semantics of MSC, like [92].
Several approaches to deﬁning operational semantics to UML 2.x sequence diagrams
and MSCs exist. We do, however, ﬁnd that none of these semantic deﬁnitions are
satisfactory for our purposes.
The approach of Cengarle and Knapp [31] has some similarities to our operational
semantics; for every execution step an event is produced and at the same time the syn-
tactical representation of the diagram is reduced by the removal of the event produced.
Contrary to ours, however, their semantics treats sequence diagrams as complete speci-
ﬁcations (with no inconclusive behavior), something that does not conform to the UML
standard (see sections 4.2 and 7.3.1). The rules are deﬁned so that a given diagram
produces a set of positive and negative traces that together exhaust the trace universe.
The neg operator is replaced by an operator not. This operator is deﬁned so that the
sets of positive and negative traces are swapped. This is unfortunate since specifying
some behavior as negative means also specifying the complement of this behavior as
positive. We claim that this is not what you intuitively expect when specifying negative
behavior.
There are also some problems on the technical level. The semantics is based on
a notion of composition of basic interactions where basic interactions are deﬁned as
partially ordered multisets (pomsets), but it is not clear how the pomsets are obtained;
in other words it is not clear what the atoms of the compositions are. If the atoms are
taken to be single events the reduction rules deﬁning the seq operator do not preserve
the message invariant (causality between transmission and reception of a message).
Cavarra and Klu¨ster-Filipe [29] present an operational semantics of UML 2.x se-
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quence diagrams inspired by Live Sequence Charts (LSC) (see below). The semantics
is formalized in pseudo-code that works on diagrams represented as locations in the
diagram, but no translation from diagrams to this representation is provided. A more
serious problem is the treatment of the choice operator alt. The operands of alts have
guards and there is nothing to prevent the guards of more operands in an alt to evalu-
ate to true. In this case the uppermost operand will be chosen, which means that the
alts essentially are treated as nested if-then-else statements and may not be used for
underspeciﬁcation. Further, each lifeline is executed separately which means that syn-
chronization at the entry of alt-fragments is necessary to ensure that all lifelines choose
the same operand. They also make the same assumption about negative behavior as in
LSCs, that if negative (neg) fragment is executed, then execution aborts (see section
7.3.4).
Harel and Maoz [60] use LSC semantics (see below) to deﬁne neg and assert. The
operators are deﬁned using already existing constructs of LSCs, and hence no changes
or additions to the LSC semantics are needed in their approach. Because of this they
also inherit the problems connected to LSCs.
In [58], Grosu and Smolka provide a semantics for UML 2.x sequence diagrams
based on translating the diagrams to Bu¨chi automata. The approach is based on
composing simple sequence diagrams (no high-level operators) in high-level sequence
diagrams (interaction overview diagrams), where a simple diagram may be a positive
or a negative fragment of the high-level diagram it belongs to. Positive behavior is
interpreted as liveness properties and negative behavior as safety properties. Hence,
for a high-level diagram two Bu¨chi automata is derived; a liveness automaton charac-
terizing the positive behavior of the diagram and a safety automaton characterizing
the negative behavior. Compared to our operational semantics the approach is based
on a large amount of transformation. Further the diagrams are composed by strict
sequencing rather than weak sequencing, and hence has implicit synchronization of
lifelines when entering or leaving a simple diagram.
In 1995 a formal algebraic semantics for MSC-92 was standardized by ITU [117,118].
MSC-92 has a lifeline-centric syntax and its semantics is based on characterizing each
lifeline as a sequence (total order) of events. These sequences are composed in parallel
and a set of algebraic rules transforms the parallel composition into a structure of
(strict) sequential composition and choice. The message invariant is obtained by a
special function that removes from the structure all paths that violate the invariant.
The main drawbacks of this semantics are that it is not a proper operational semantics
since a diagram ﬁrst has to be transformed into the event structure before runs can be
obtained, and that this transformation replaces parallel composition with choice and
hence creates an explosion in the size of the representation of the diagram. Further, the
lifeline-centric syntax is not suitable for deﬁning nested high-level constructs. In [137]
a similar semantics for UML 1.x sequence diagram is given.
MSC-96 got a standardized process algebra semantics in 1998 [84, 119, 120]. This
semantics is event-centric and has semantic operators for all the syntactic operators in
MSC-96. Further these operators are “generalized” to preserve the message invariant
by coding information about messages into the operators in the translation from syn-
tactical diagrams to semantic expressions. Runs are characterized by inference rules
over the semantic operators. Compared to our work, the most notable thing about
this semantics is that it has no notion of negative behavior, and therefore also makes
no distinction between negative behavior and inconclusive behavior (behavior that is
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neither positive nor negative). This is no surprise since MSC does not have the neg
operator, but it is still a shortcoming with respect to UML sequence diagrams. The
only available meta-level is a ﬂat transition graph, and this does not give suﬃcient
strength to extend the semantics with negative behavior. Neither is it possible to dis-
tinguish between potential and mandatory choice. Another shortcoming is the lack of
an explicit communication medium; the communication model is “hardcoded” in the
semantics by the “generalized operators” and does not allow for variation.
Another process algebra semantics of MSC is presented in [104]. This semantics
may in some respects be seen as more general than both the MSC-92 and the MSC-96
semantics. A simple “core semantics” for MSCs is deﬁned and this semantics is then
inserted into an environment deﬁnition. Varying the deﬁnition of the environment
allows for some of the same semantic variability and extendibility that we aim for in
our semantics, e.g., with respect to the communication model. However, the semantics
is heavily based on synchronization of lifelines on the entry of referenced diagrams and
combined fragments and diverges in this respect from the intended semantics of MSCs
and UML sequence diagrams. Further, the same strategy as for the MSC-92 semantics
is applied; interleaving is deﬁned by means of choice, and the message invariant is
obtained by removing deadlocks. In our opinion, this results in an unnecessary amount
of computation, especially in the cases where we do not want to produce all traces but
rather a selection of the traces that a diagram deﬁnes.
In [99] a semantics for MSC-92 is presented which is based on translating MSCs to
ﬁnite automata with global states. This approach has no high-level operators, but con-
ditions may be used for specifying choices between or iterations of diagrams. However,
the insistence on translating the diagrams to ﬁnite automata makes it impossible to
represent all reachable states because the combination of weak sequencing and loops
may produce inﬁnitely many states.
Realizability of MSCs is the focus of both [5,6] and [182]. They deﬁne synthesis of
MSC to concurrent automata and parallel composition of labeled transition systems
(LTS), respectively. (Each lifeline is represented as an automaton or LTS, which are
then composed in parallel.) Further they deﬁne high-level MSCs as graphs where
the nodes are basic MSCs. In addition, [182] deﬁnes both syntax and semantics for
negative behavior. In both approaches the translation of high-level MSCs to concurrent
automata/LTSs removes the semi-global nature of choices in a speciﬁcation, and the
high-level MSC graphs are non-hierarchical disallowing nesting of high-level operators.
Further, in [182] communication is synchronous.
Various attempts at deﬁning Petri net semantics for MSCs have been made [57,59,
73,163]. In [57,163] only basic MSCs are considered, and hence are of limited interest.
In [59], high-level MSCs are deﬁned as graphs where each node is a basic MSC. As
with the above mentioned semantics it is then possible to express choices and loops,
but the approach does not allow for nesting of high-level operators. In [73] a Petri net
translation of the alternative operator alt is sketched, but no loop deﬁned. In [19] a
Petri-net semantics for UML 1.x sequence diagrams is presented, but as with the Petri
net semantics of basic MSCs it has major limitations and is of little interest.
Kosiuczenko and Wirsing [96] make a formalization of MSC-96 in Maude. Their
semantics is problematic for two reasons: Every lifeline in a diagram is translated into
an object speciﬁed in Maude, and the behavior of these objects are speciﬁed by the
means of states and transition rules. We ﬁnd this problematic because in general the
states of a lifeline are implicit while this formalism assumes explicit states. Further,
93
Related work on operational semantics
this way of reducing diagrams to sets of communicating objects has the eﬀect that all
choices are made locally in the objects and the choice operator alt looses its semi-global
nature. Hence, this formalization does not capture the intended understanding of the
alt operator.
An interesting approach is that of Jonsson and Padilla [89]. They present a se-
mantics of MSC which is based on syntactical expansion and projection of diagram
fragments during execution. Each lifeline is represented by a thread of labels where
the labels refer to events or diagram fragments. The threads are executed in paral-
lel and when a label referring to a fragment is reached the fragment is projected and
expanded into the threads. Among the approaches referred to in this chapter, this
is probably the approach that most resembles our operational semantics since their
execution/expansion scheme resembles our execution/projection scheme. Because ex-
pansion produces silent events, the semantics can with small changes be extended with
neg and xalt. Expansions may happen at arbitrary points since there are no rules in
the semantics itself for when to expand. This creates a need for execution strategies,
and the approach may be seen as having an informal meta-level where ad hoc strate-
gies are described. However, if completeness is to be ensured, or if the semantics is
to be extended with negative and potential/mandatory behavior this meta-level must
be formalized. A problem with this semantics is that it requires explicit naming of all
diagram fragments and this yields an unnecessary complicated syntax. Another short-
coming is the lack of an explicit communication medium; the communication model is
“hardcoded” into the semantics and does not allow for variation.
Live Sequence Charts (LSC) [39, 61, 62] is a variant of MSC that does deﬁne a
meta-level. Diagrams may be tagged as universal or existential, and parts of diagrams
as hot or cold, and this is evaluated at the meta-level. This yields something similar
to the potential/mandatory distinction, and allows for specifying negative behavior.
There is however a diﬀerence; LSCs specify what must or may happen given that some
conditions are fulﬁlled, while our semantics distinguish between choices that must or
may be present in an implementation. Further the semantics complies with neither the
MSC nor the UML standard. Most importantly it requires synchronization between
lifelines at every entry point of diagram fragments, e.g. when resolving a choice.
As we see, none of these approaches to deﬁning operational semantics for UML
sequence diagrams and MSCs fulﬁll the intentions and criteria we have set for our
semantics. The shortcomings that dominate are:
• Non-conformance with the intended semantics of UML.
• No notion of explicit negative behavior and no distinction between negative be-
havior and inconclusive behavior (behavior that is neither positive nor negative).
• No distinction between potential and mandatory choice. (This is no surprise as
the alt/xalt distinction is an invention of STAIRS.)
• Lack of a proper meta-level that may be used for assigning meaning to negative
and potential/mandatory behavior.
• Lack of possibility and freedom in deﬁning and formalizing a meta-level.
• Lack of modiﬁability and extensibility, e.g., with respect to the communication
model.
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• Requiring transformations from the textual syntax into the formalism of the
approach.
Since our intentions have been to stay close to the UML standard in both syntax
and semantic, and to facilitate ease of extension and modiﬁcation when adapting the
semantics to diﬀerent interpretations and applications of sequence diagrams, it is clear
that none of the existing approaches suﬃce for our purposes.
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Chapter 12
Introduction to testing
Most system development methodologies recommend testing as the method for im-
proving the correctness and quality of the software developed. In the most general
case, testing means that an executable program is subjected to experiments where the
program is observed in order to ﬁnd out how it behaves under certain circumstances.
Typically the circumstances are input to the program and what is observed is the out-
put of the program, in which case the process is called functional testing.1 A typical
deﬁnition of functional testing is found in [16, p. 4]:
In functional testing the element is treated as a black box. It is subjected to
inputs and its outcomes are veriﬁed for conformance to its speciﬁcation.
This deﬁnition also brings in a second element, i.e. that the observations that are
made should be used for ensuring that the program is operating in accordance with
the speciﬁcation of the program.
In what is usually referred to as model based testing or speciﬁcation based testing,
this is taken a step further. In [183], four main approaches that may be called model
based testing are characterized:
1. Generation of test input data from a domain model.
2. Generation of test cases from an environment model.
3. Generation of test cases from a behavioral model.
4. Generation of test scripts from abstracts tests.
In the following we concentrate on the third of these forms of model based testing.
Test are derived from formal or semi-formal models (speciﬁcations) of the system under
development – often state machines, statecharts or as in our case sequence diagrams
– and the tests are used for investigating whether the program conforms to the model
(speciﬁcation).
Important system development methodologies, such as the Rational Uniﬁed Pro-
cess (RUP) [97], and other variants of the Uniﬁed Process, emphasize use case based
and scenario based development. In such development, requirements to the system
1There are of course other types of testing as well (see e.g. [91, 178, 188] for diﬀerent overviews).
E.g. if the circumstances are the hardware the program is executed on and what is observed is how
fast it performs, we can talk about performance testing. In the following, however, we concentrate on
functional testing.
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are speciﬁed as usage scenarios which then become the basis for system design, im-
plementation and testing. Also agile methods like Agile Model Driven Development
(AMDD) [8] and Test Driven Development (TDD) [88] recommend scenario or use case
based speciﬁcation.
Sequence diagrams easily ﬁnd their place in this kind of development, since they
can be applied for specifying usage scenarios. Both their focus on interactions and their
partial nature make them well suited for this. This in itself motivates test generation
from sequence diagrams, because it combines the approach of model based or speci-
ﬁcation based testing with the approach of use case or scenario based development.
In [183] it is shown how a model based testing approach ﬁts together with the Uniﬁed
Process and with agile methods, and in [152] an agile methodology based on modeling
with UML and model based testing is outlined.
To bring matters even a step further, we argue for testing not only implementations,
but also speciﬁcations. In an iterative model based development process, like e.g.
RUP, both requirement speciﬁcations (use cases) and design speciﬁcations are likely to
become more and more reﬁned as the project loops through the iterations. In the same
way as we would be interested in investigating whether an implementation conforms
to the speciﬁcation, we should also be interested in investigating whether a reﬁnement
of a speciﬁcation conforms to the original speciﬁcation (if not for any other reason
then that the implementation is more likely to be based on the reﬁnement). Because
we have an operational semantics for sequence diagrams, that essentially executes a
sequence diagram, we can treat a sequence diagram speciﬁcation as a program for the
purpose of testing. By this observation we can use testing as a means for investigating
whether a reﬁnement of a sequence diagram speciﬁcation is correct. We refer to this
as reﬁnement testing.
Many of the testing methods that have been created are based on heuristics, and
must be considered informal (see e.g. [91, 178, 179]). Our view is that the methods we
apply for analysis should have a formally sound foundation, and we hold this view also
with respect to methods for testing. When we deﬁne our testing method for sequence
diagrams it therefore makes sense to use formal testing theory as the staring point.
For the remainder of this chapter we have a brief look at formal testing theory. In
chapter 13 we present our testing theory for sequence diagrams, and in chapter 14 a
tool based on our operational semantics and our testing theory. Chapter 15 provides
a case study using the tool and chapter 16 provides related work.
Formal testing theory In the above deﬁnition of functional testing it is stated that
the outcome of the testing should be veriﬁed for conformance to its speciﬁcation. This
raises the question of how we should understand “conformance to speciﬁcation”. In
order to answer such a question in a satisfactory manner it is essential to have a theory
for testing that precisely states what conformance is.
In this context the most notable (formal) models for computer programs and pro-
cesses are process algebras/calculi (such as CCS [125] and CSP [74]), labeled transition
systems (LTS) [128] and ﬁnite state machines (FSM) [102,105]. The studies into these
formal models have lead to the deﬁnition of a number of equivalence relations and
preorders on processes, such as observation equivalence, trace equivalence, simulation,
bisimulation, and several more.
In [129], De Nicola and Hennessy formulated a theory for what they called “testing
equivalence” for CCS based on the notion of observer processes, and showed how the
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“testing preorders” they deﬁned could be used to characterize a number of already
deﬁned equivalence relations. In [128] the same testing relations where deﬁned for
labeled transition systems. Others, such as Phillips [142] and Abramsky [3] continued
this work by deﬁning even stronger testing relations.
The purpose of formulating these testing relations was to study the semantics of
programs and processes, but the theory turned out to be suitable as a theoretical
foundation for software testing. In [23], Brinksma made the ﬁrst attempts at using
this theory for test generation. The elaboration of this has led to the deﬁnition of a
number of conformance relations, and several tools based on these theories have been
developed (see e.g. [24, 25, 177, 180, 184]). A similar development originated from the
theory of ﬁnite state machines (see e.g. [32, 93, 95, 102]).
All formal testing theory is based on what is called the test hypothesis, which may
be formulates as follows [24]:
Correctness and validity of [the] speciﬁcation is assumed [...] [T]here is an im-
plementation [...] which is treated as a black box, exhibiting external behavior.
The [implementation] is a physical, real object that is in principle not amendable
to formal reasoning. We can only deal with implementations in a formal way, if
we make the assumption that any real implementation has a formal model with
which we could reason formally. This formal model is only assumed to exist, but
need not be known a priori. [This] allows to reason about implementations as
if they were formal objects, and, consequently, to express conformance of imple-
mentations with respect to speciﬁcations by means of a formal relation between
such models of implementations and speciﬁcations.
An implication of this assumption is that for a given formalism we can formulate a
testing theory, as long as we are able to characterize observation in the formalism
and we accept it as a model for implementations. A testing theory is general in the
sense that it is not based on any speciﬁc formalism, but rather on general principles of
processes and observations.
Having a formal theory for testing makes it possible to answer the question of
exactly what we mean by conformance and what it means for a test to fail or succeed.
Further it is possible to say formally what it means for a set of tests to be sound or
complete, give exact deﬁnitions of test coverage and formally state requirements for
test selection and test prioritizing.
Input-output conformance testing We base our work on the theory called input-
output conformance testing, or “ioco-testing” for short [177–179]. The theory is formal
and is based on labeled transition systems (LTSs). This makes it suitable as a starting
point for us, as our operational semantics can easily be related to LTSs.
The LTSs of the ioco theory distinguishs between input and output actions. In
addition, in these LTSs it is also possible to observe the absence of output, called
quiescence. Quiescence is treated as an action δ, and hence it can appear in the traces
of an LTS. A trace where δ is allowed to appear repeatedly is called a suspension trace.
A conformance relation ioco relates implementations and speciﬁcations such that
i ioco s holds if the implementation i conformers to the speciﬁcation s, where i and s
are LTSs. The relation is deﬁned as
i ioco s
def
= ∀σ ∈ Straces(s) : out(i after σ) ⊆ out(s after σ)
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where Straces(s) is the set of all ﬁnite suspension traces of s, after is a function
that returns all states of an LTS reachable by a (suspension) trace and out returns all
outputs, including δ, possible in a set of states. In other words, the relation states that
after every ﬁnite suspension trace, the possible outputs of the implementation should be
a subset of the outputs possible by the speciﬁcation. It can be shown that this relation
is stronger than trace inclusion (i.e. traces(i) ⊆ traces(s)) because the quiescence can
distinguish paths with the same ﬁnite traces but that diﬀers with respect to quiescence
in their states.
The ioco theory also provides a test generation algorithm. The algorithm is based on
providing stimulus to a speciﬁcation and making observations of its outputs or absence
of outputs, and based on that assigning verdicts pass and fail to the execution paths.
The algorithm has the property that, if U is a complete set of tests (test suite) generated
from a speciﬁcation s, then
∀i : i ioco s ⇐⇒ i passes U
where i passes U expresses that none of the tests in U , when executed in parallel with
i, has an execution path that result in a verdict fail.
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specifications
In this chapter we deﬁne an algorithm for generating tests from UML 2.x sequence
diagrams based on the operational semantics deﬁned in chapter 8. Further we show
how these tests can be applied for testing of reﬁnement. The algorithm is a modiﬁed and
adapted version of the algorithm presented in [178, 179] that takes into consideration
the partial nature of sequence diagrams as well as the notion of negative and universal
behavior introduced in UML 2.x with the operators refuse/neg and assert. We do not
consider the xalt operator. Distinguishing between potential and mandatory choice
requires building semantic structures that are not available in the framework we have
chosen for our testing theory. Hence, in this chapter we assume that the semantics of a
diagram d is a single interaction obligation, [[ d ]] = (p, n). We also make the restriction
that the loop operator is provided with a ﬁnite counter and that any generalized alt
operator have a ﬁnite index set. This ensures that p and n are ﬁnite sets of ﬁnite traces.
Because the STAIRS semantics considers preﬁxes of positive behavior as inconclusive
(unless assert is applied, in which case they are negative behavior) we seek to generate
maximal tests, i.e. tests that represent complete behavior. This is only possible if the
speciﬁcation from which we generate traces has ﬁnite behavior.
The algorithm generates tests in the form of sequence diagrams. These are abstract
tests in the terminology of [183], i.e. tests deﬁned by means of the abstract operations
and values used in the speciﬁcation the tests are generated from. We see the possibility
of transforming our abstract tests into test scripts, i.e. executable test cases designed
for testing implementations built on speciﬁc technologies [183] (see also the discussion
of the UML testing proﬁle in chapter 16), but do not pursue this any further.
In order to test reﬁnements we execute these abstract tests against other speciﬁ-
cations. In conformance testing, tests are generated from speciﬁcations and executed
against implementations. We deﬁne test execution where the “implementation” is a
sequence diagram. Conceptually this is unproblematic, since formal conformance test-
ing always assumes the existence of a formal model of the implementation even though
this model is unknown (the test hypothesis). We, instead, do test execution against a
formal model. A diﬀerence, however, is that an implementation can always be assumed
to be complete while our speciﬁcations may be partial.
This partiality of speciﬁcations has the result that generating tests from an abstract
speciﬁcation and executing them against a more concrete speciﬁcation does not capture
all fault situations we may want to detect. Speciﬁcally, if a trace is explicitly speciﬁed
103
Testing of sequence diagram speciﬁcations
in the abstract speciﬁcation as positive or negative, but is inconclusive (i.e. unspeciﬁed)
in the more concrete speciﬁcation, this is an incorrect reﬁnement we are not able to
capture by this way of testing.
We therefore make a distinction between “testing down” and “testing up”. “Testing
down” refers to the process described above where tests are generated from an abstract
speciﬁcation and executed against a more concrete speciﬁcation. “Testing up” refers
to the process of generating tests from the concrete speciﬁcation and executing them
against the abstract speciﬁcation. By “testing up” we capture the incorrect reﬁnements
overlooked by “testing down”, and hence the two “testing directions” complement each
other. However, if we are in a position where we can assume that the “implementation”
is complete, “testing down” is suﬃcient.
In sum the contents of this chapter is: 1) A test generation algorithm based on
a well-known algorithm for conformance testing and a formal operational semantics
for sequence diagrams, which takes as input sequence diagrams that may contain the
operators assert and neg/refuse and that produces abstract tests in the form of sequence
diagrams. 2) A characterization of how the same operational semantics can be applied
to execute the tests against sequence diagrams and how this may be used to test
reﬁnement steps in system development. We are not aware of any other approach that
does this.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 13.1 presents the format of our
tests and section 13.2 the test generation algorithm. In section 13.3 we characterize
test execution. In addition, section 13.4 provides some considerations with respect to
asynchronous testing.
13.1 Test format
In the following we will have two kinds of sequence diagrams. “Normal” sequence
diagrams that specify systems we refer to as speciﬁcations. The other kind of diagrams
we call tests. Tests are special sequence diagrams that may be seen as speciﬁcations of
test programs or test cases.
A test is a sequence diagram consisting of only one lifeline. We use tester as a
generic name of this lifeline. A test speciﬁes how a test program operates by sending
messages to the system under test and observing the messages received. In a test
we may also specify observation of absence of messages from the system under test.
Intuitively this can be thought of as timeouts in the test programs as they wait for
output from the system under test. In a test we also specify verdicts that the test
program will return after being executed against the system under test. Based on the
observations the test program does, it will give one out of three possible verdicts: pass,
fail or inconclusive.
The timeout/absence of reception is represented in a test by a special event θ(l)
where l is the lifeline of the test. Let Θ
def
= {θ(l) | l ∈ L} and Θ ∩ (E ∪ T ) = ∅. We
let θ range over the elements of Θ and use θ as shorthand notation for θ(l) when l is
implicitly given. We let l. also range over Θ so that l.θ(l′) def= l′.
The verdicts are represented by three terminating diagrams (similar to skip). These
three terminating diagrams then extend the deﬁnition of sequence diagrams:
pass, fail, inconc ∈ D
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Figure 13.1: Example speciﬁcation
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Figure 13.2: Example test
We let V def= {pass, fail, inconc} denote the set of verdicts.
In ﬁgure 13.1 we show a speciﬁcation of a simple vending machine; if a button
(represented by the message but) is pushed, the machine will make a non-deterministic
choice and provide either liquorice or chocolate (represented by the messages liq and
choc).1 A test generated from this speciﬁcation would typically look like:
T =!but seq (?liq seq pass alt ?choc seq pass alt θ seq inconc)
A graphical representation of this test is shown in ﬁgure 13.2. The intuitive under-
standing of this test should be the following: The test program sends a message but to
the system under test and then waits for output from the system. If the test observes
the system sending a message liq or a message choc it terminates with the verdict pass
because these are positive behaviors in the speciﬁcation d in ﬁgure 13.1 from which it is
generated. If the test observes absence of output from the system, this is inconclusive
behavior in the speciﬁcation d and the result is the verdict inconc.
13.2 Test generation
We deﬁne an algorithm for test generation. The algorithm takes speciﬁcations as input
and produces tests of the format shown above. The algorithm is based on the algorithm
provided in [178,179], which produce tests in the form of LTSs from LTS speciﬁcations.
The execution system deﬁned in section 8.1 may be interpreted as an LTS, and because
of this, deﬁning test generation in the fashion of [178, 179] is a natural choice for our
algorithm.
Both the UML standard and the STAIRS semantics divide the trace universe into
positive, negative and inconclusive traces for a given diagram, and hence regard se-
quence diagrams as partial speciﬁcations. This diﬀers from the approach of [178, 179]
which only operates with positive and negative traces. Hence it lacks the distinction
between negative and inconclusive behavior and the distinction between potential and
1This vending machine example is borrowed from [179].
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universal behavior we get from the sequence diagram operators refuse/neg and assert.
Therefore, one of the modiﬁcations we make to the test generation algorithm is an
adaption to a semantic model with inconclusive traces.
13.2.1 Preliminaries
As we have shown earlier (see section 7.3 and chapter 9), a meta-level is needed to
make the distinction between positive and negative behavior and between potential and
universal behavior. Because knowing these properties of executions is necessary in the
test generation (in order to have the tests terminate with the appropriate verdicts), we
apply the meta-system for generating traces with mode in the test generation algorithm.
(See section 9.1 for more background on the mode concept.) We need to distinguish
both negative and universal behavior from normal (positive partial) behavior. We use
the following set of modes:
MO def= {norm, ref, ass, assref}
The mode norm denotes a normal execution. ref denotes an execution that has entered
a refuse operator and ass denotes an execution that has entered an assert operator,
while assref denotes that both a refuse and an assert have been entered. The mode
function is deﬁned as:
mode(τ,mo)
def
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ass if τ = τassert ∧mo = norm
ref if τ = τrefuse ∧mo = norm
assref if (τ = τrefuse ∧mo = ass) ∨
(τ = τassert ∧mo = ref)
mo otherwise
(13.1)
Before we present the test generation algorithm, we also introduce some auxiliary
deﬁnitions. First of all we distinguish between internal and external events. The
external events of a speciﬁcation d are those events that transmit messages to gates or
receive messages from gates. We deﬁne EdO and E
d
I to be the external transmit events
and external receive events of d, respectively:
EdO
def
= {e ∈ ev.d | k.e = ! ∧ l−1.e ∈ G}
EdI
def
= {e ∈ ev.d | k.e =? ∧ l−1.e ∈ G}
The events in ev.d\(EdO∪EdI ) are then the internal events. A function enabledEvents ∈
EX → P(E) returns the set of enabled events of an execution state:
enabledEvents([β, d])
def
= {e ∈ E | ∃t ∈ T ∗, β ′ ∈ B, d′ ∈ D : [β, d] t
〈e〉−−−→ [β ′, d′]}
Note that this function returns the proper events that are possible next events from
an execution state, after the execution of any number of silent events.
We deﬁne quiescence in the manner of [179]. An execution state is quiescent if no
external transmit events or internal events are enabled. This is the same as saying that
only external receive events are enabled. We deﬁne a quiescence function δ ∈ EX → B
that returns true iﬀ an execution state is quiescent:
δ([β, d])
def
= enabledEvents([β, d]) ⊆ EdI
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Quiescence may be treated as an observable event. We let δ be a special event that we
use as a placeholder for observation of quiescence in a speciﬁcation; is not part of the
syntax of the speciﬁcations but an abstract event we make use of to denote quiescence
while generating tests.
A function out ∈ EX → P(E ∪ {δ}) returns the set of possible observations of an
execution state of a speciﬁcation:
out([β, d])
def
=
{{δ} if δ([β, d])
EdO ∩ enabledEvents([β, d]) if ¬δ([β, d])
The test generation algorithm involves maintaining a set of states. We do have the
execution states, but also need a way of keeping track of the modes of these execution
states. We therefore deﬁne a test generation state as a pair of an execution state and
a mode, and let ST denote the set of all test generation states:
ST def= EX ×MO
In the following we let S range over sets of test generation states, i.e., S ⊆ ST . We
overload the function out to range over sets of test generation states, and deﬁne:
out(S)
def
=
⋃
([β,d],mo)∈S
out([β, d])
The out function then returns the set of possible observations from a set of states,
independent of the modes of the states.
Similar to out, we deﬁne an overloaded function in ∈ EX → P(E),P(ST ) → P(E):
in([β, d])
def
= EdI ∩ enabledEvents([β, d])
in(S)
def
=
⋃
([β,d],mo)∈S
in([β, d])
Let EO be the set of external events. We deﬁne an overloaded function after ∈
ST × E∗O → P(ST ),∈ P(ST ) × E∗O → P(ST ) that returns the new test generation
states after execution of a trace of external events:
([β, d], mo) after t
def
= {([β ′, d′], mo′) |
〈〈〉, [β, d], gates.d,mo〉 −→∗ 〈t, [β ′, d′], gates.d,mo′〉}
S after t
def
=
⋃
([β,d],mo)∈S
([β, d], mo) after t
In the deﬁnition, −→∗ denotes the reﬂexive, transitive closure of the transition relation
−→ deﬁned by the meta-system. In order to get external traces from the meta-system
we use gates.d as the set of lifelines.
13.2.2 Test generation algorithm
We deﬁne a test generation algorithm that takes a speciﬁcation as input and produces a
test as output. Both the speciﬁcation and the test is in the form of sequence diagrams.
The structure of the algorithm is as follows:
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• A set of test generation states S and a set of events E are maintained. S changes
throughout the test generation, and initially it is the set of all states reachable
by zero or more internal or silent events, i.e. ([initC .d, d] after 〈〉) if d is the
speciﬁcation from which the test is generated from. E is a set of transmit events
such that EdO ⊆ E and remains unchanged thoughout the test generation. We
allow E to be bigger than EdO in order to generate tests that can observe a bigger
alphabet than the speciﬁcation we are generating tests from.
• For each step there is a non-deterministic choice of whether the test should 1)
observe the system under test or 2) provide stimulus to the system. Later we
formalize the algorithm by means of three rules (13.2), (13.3) and (13.2).
– If the ﬁrst option, formalized by rule (13.2), is chosen, the set of all possi-
ble observations that can be made in the curret set of states is calculated,
possibly including δ.
∗ For each event e in E a branch is made where e is converted to a re-
ceive event of the test. For the cases where e is among the possbible
observation the test generation continues with a new set of test gener-
ation states (S after 〈e〉). In the cases e is not in E, we have observed
something not speciﬁed by the speciﬁcation. We then get the verdict
fail or inconc depending on the set of test generation states S and the
test generation terminates in this branch.
∗ An additional branch is also made where the test speciﬁes a timeout
event θ. In this branch test generation continues (with the set of test
generation states (S after 〈〉)) only if δ is among the possible observa-
tions. In the other case we have observed something not speciﬁed by
the speciﬁcation; we get the verdict fail or inconc depending on the set
of test generation states S and the test generation terminates for that
branch.
In order to avoid an iniﬁnite recursion of producing timeout events in the
test generation we insist that immediately after a timeout event has been
generated, the choice of providing stimulus must be chosen.
– If the option, formalized by rule (13.3), of letting the test make stimulus to
the system is chosen, the set of receive events that the states of S accept is
calculated. One of these events is chosen, let us call it e, and transformed
to a transmit event of the test. The test generation then continues with the
set (S after 〈e〉) of states.
– If the last event produced in a branch of the test generation is a timeout
event and set of possible stimuli is empty, we have nothing more to do and
the generation of this branch terminates. We then give the verdict pass or fail
depending on the set of test generation states S and the “testing direction”.
Because we are interested in maxiaml tests (i.e. complete observations), this
is the only way we can get the verdict pass. (When we have termination
as decribed in the ﬁrst point we have inconclusive behavior unless assert is
used in the speciﬁcation.) This termination is formalized in rule (13.4).
The algorithm is formalized by means of a function:
testGen ∈ P(ST )× {0, 1} → D
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The function is deﬁned by means of three rules shown below. Because the algo-
rithm sometimes makes non-deterministic choices, the application of these rules is
non-deterministic. The restrictions in the application of the rules explained above is
guided by a bit such that the bit is 1 when a timeout was the last generated event, or
else 0.
When a test is built with the algorithm, we need to construct the events of the test
from the events of the speciﬁcation. A transmit event of the diagram corresponds to a
receive event of the test and vice versa. Further, the gates of the messages (remember
we are only dealing with external events) must be replaced with the lifeline of the test.
Let tester ∈ L be the lifeline of the test. We deﬁne a function p ∈ E → E that produce
an event for the test from an event of the speciﬁcation:
p((!, (s, l, g)))
def
= (?, (s, l, tester))
p((?, (s, g, l)))
def
= (!, (s, tester, l))
where we have that l ∈ G and g ∈ G.
The rule (13.2) is responsible for generating the parts of a test that do observation
of output from the system under test:
testGen(S, 0) =
[alte∈E (p(e) seq if e ∈ out(S) then
testGen(S after 〈e〉, 0)
else verdictObs(S ) fi)]
alt [θ(tester) seq if δ ∈ out(S) then
testGen(S after 〈〉, 1)
else verdictObs(S) fi]
(13.2)
Two main branches (enclosed in brackets) of the test are made, each of which becomes
the argument of an alt operator. The ﬁrst main branch is divided into one branch for
each of the events in the set E of transmit events. For each event e in E, a branch
is produced; in case e is an event the speciﬁcation may provide the test generation
continues; in the opposite case, the speciﬁcation cannot provide e, so a verdict is given
by the function verdictObs and the test generation terminates. The second main branch
represents observation of timeout; if quiescence is a possible observation in one of the
states in S, a timeout in the test is considered correct and the test generation continues,
or else a verdict based on S is provided by the function verdictObs. The rule can only
be applied if the argument bit is 0 in order to avoid inﬁnite recursion of generating
timeout events.
The verdict function verdictObs ∈ P(S) → V is deﬁned as follows:
verdictObs(S)
def
=
{
fail if ∀([β, d], mo) ∈ S : mo ∈ {ass, assref}
inconc if ∃([β, d], mo) ∈ S : mo ∈ {norm, ref}
If all states have mode either ass or assref, we only have universal behavior and observ-
ing something not speciﬁed by the in speciﬁcation would be bad. In all resulting cases
we just observe something unspeciﬁed, and hence the behavior is inconclusive.
The rule (13.3) generates the parts of the test that provide stimuli:
testGen(S, b) = p(e) seq testGen(S after 〈〉, 0) for some e ∈ in(S) (13.3)
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This stimulus must be something that one of the test generation states of S is ready
to accept, i.e. a speciﬁed reception, and is chosen non-deterministically from the set
in(S). The value of the argument bit b is irrelevant for this rule. After the event,
the test generation continues with all test generation states that are reachable after
execution of this event.
The rule (13.4) is the one that terminates the test generation:
testGen(S, 1) = verdictTermdir(S) if in(S) = ∅ (13.4)
As we see, this rule only applies if the argument bit is 1, i.e. if the last generated event
was a timeout, and if the set of possible stimuli in(S) is empty. Because this ensures
maximal tests, the verdicts given by this rule is diﬀerent from the verdicts given by
rule 13.2 above. The verdicts are determined by a function verdictTermdir ∈ P(ST )→
V:
In the assignment of these verdicts it is necessary to consider whether the test is
generated for “testing down” or “testing up”. The subscript dir is instantiated by down
or up depending on the selected testing direction. Because this branch of the test is
maximal, we can use the verdicts pass and fail instead of inconc, but we have to use
them diﬀerently depending on the direction. If the test is generated for “testing down”,
positive behavior is considered more general than negative behavior. The reason for
this is that in a reﬁnement d1 r d2, a positive trace of d1 can be both positive or
negative in d2 and we still have a correct reﬁnement. Hence, the verdict pass is given
if there is at least one state with mode norm or ass in this branch, and the verdicts are
as follows:
verdictTermdown(S) =
{
pass if ∃([β, d], mo) ∈ S : mo = norm ∨mo = ass
fail if ∀([β, d], mo) ∈ S : mo = ref ∨mo = assref
On the other hand, if the test is generated for “testing up”, negative behavior is
considered more general than positive behavior because a negative trace in d2 can be
either positive or negative in d1. Therefore we give the verdict fail if at least one state
at this point in the generation has the verdict ref or assref:
verdictTermup(S) =
{
pass if ∀([β, d], mo) ∈ S : mo = norm ∨mo = ass
fail if ∃([β, d], mo) ∈ S : mo = ref ∨mo = assref
We start test generation by applying the function testGen function on the set of
test generation states reachable from the initial state of the speciﬁcation by execution
of only silent and internal events. Hence, if want to generate a test T ∈ D from
speciﬁcation d, we apply:
T = testGen(([initC .d, d], norm) after 〈〉, 0)
Because the application of the rules deﬁned above are non-deterministic, there may
be several possible tests that can be derived from d, and a new application of the
testGen function may provide a diﬀerent result. However, because of the restrictions
on the speciﬁcations from which we generate tests (loops only with ﬁnite counter and
generalized alts only with ﬁnite index set), and because of the restrictions with respect
to timeout events in the algorithm, the test generation will always terminate.
A set of tests we refer to as a test suite. The maximal test suite that can be derived
from a speciﬁcation d can expressed by:
U = {T | T = testGen(([initC .d, d], norm) after 〈〉)}
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13.3 Test execution
In this section we show how we can apply the operational semantics to execute the
tests we generate against speciﬁcations. In order to do that we need to deﬁne a special
modiﬁed projection system for tests. Further we deﬁne a special meta-system for test
execution.
13.3.1 Projection system for tests
Test execution is, as test generation, based on our operational semantics. We do,
however, make two changes to the operational semantics of tests:
• Tests consists of timeout events in addition to transmit and receive events. We
must allow tests to execute these timeout events.
• In a test, an alt always occur in connection with observations of the system
under test. We do not want a test to non-deterministically chose what it wants
to observe, but to let the actual observation determine the choice. Therefore,
the alts of tests are deterministic choices based on observations, as opposed to
non-deterministic choices in speciﬁcations.
In order to achieve this we deﬁne a projection system for tests. We denote this
system the Π′ system. The Π′ system consists of rules identical to the Π system’s rules
for events and seq, i.e. the rules (8.10), (8.11) and (8.12) on page 61. In addition the
system has two rules. The ﬁrst is a rule for execution of timeout events:
Π′(L, β, θ) θ−→ Π′(L, β, skip) if θ ∈ Θ ∧ l.θ ∈ L (13.5)
The second additional rule is a rule that resolved an alt in connection with execution
of an event:
Π′(L, β, d1 alt d2)
e−→ Π′(L, β, d′k)
if Π′(L, β, dk)
e−→ Π′(L, β, d′k), k ∈ {1, 2}
(13.6)
This Π′ system is only applied for tests, while speciﬁcation being tested use the original
Π system. Because seq and alt are the only operators of tests, rules (8.10), (8.11), (8.12),
(13.5) and (13.6) are suﬃcient for a projection system for tests.
13.3.2 Meta-system for test execution
In the test generation algorithm the observation point is at the lifelines, which means
we do not assume any communication medium between the lifelines and the points
we do our observations. As a result of this we also have to deﬁne test execution with
the lifelines as the observation point. (A way to simulate a communication medium is
discussed in section 13.4.)
We achieve this by deﬁning a special meta-system for test execution, similar to the
system used in the test generation. In this system the speciﬁcations execute normally,
produce τ events and use the communication medium for internal communication be-
tween their lifelines. However, execution of tests is in accordance with the Π′ system
deﬁned above. Because we have the observation point directly at the lifeline and no
communication medium between the test and the speciﬁcation, messages sent between
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the speciﬁcation and the test are treated as being instantaneous. Further, the meta-
system handles timeout events in the appropriate way.
The meta-system is a system
〈 , , , 〉 ∈ H × EX ×MO×D
where the last place is for the test. In the following we deﬁne the rules of this system.
The ﬁrst two rules are concerned with execution of internal and silent events in the
speciﬁcation:
〈t, [β, d], mo, T〉 −→ 〈t, [β ′, d′], mo, T〉
if [β, d]
e−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ e ∈ E ∧ tr.e = tester ∧ re.e = tester
〈t, [β, d], mo, T〉 −→ 〈t, [β ′, d′], mode(τ,mo), T〉
if [β, d]
τ−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ τ ∈ T
In the latter of these rules, the function mode is identical to the deﬁnition (13.1) above.
For communication between the test and the speciﬁcation there are two rules; one
for the case where the test sends a message and the speciﬁcation receives, and one
where the speciﬁcation sends a message and the test receives:
〈t, [β, d], mo, T〉 −→ 〈t〈(!, m), (?, m)〉, [β, d′], mo, T ′〉
if Π′(ll.T, ∅, T ) (!,m)−→ Π′(ll.T, ∅, T ′) ∧
Π(ll.d, {m}, d) (?,m)−→ Π(ll.d, {m}, d′)
〈t, [β, d], mo, T〉 −→ 〈t〈(!, m), (?, m)〉, [β, d′], mo, T ′〉
if Π(ll.d, ∅, d) (!,m)−→ Π(ll.d, ∅, d′) ∧
Π′(ll.T, {m}, T ) (?,m)−→ Π′(ll.T, {m}, T ′)
In both rules we see that when the message m is transmitted and received, the trace
〈(!, m), (?, m)〉 is appended to the trace collected during the execution. This is due to
the fact that communication between the test and the speciﬁcation is instantaneous and
no other events may come in between. However, the order of these events is important
to preserve the message invariant in the trace, i.e. that the transmit of a message m
must precede the receive of m.
The ﬁnal rule is the rule that executes a timeout event in the test:
〈t, [β, d], mo, T〉 −→ 〈t〈θ〉, [β, d], mo, T ′〉
if Π′(ll.T, ∅, T ) θ−→ Π(ll.T, ∅, T ′) ∧ θ ∈ Θ ∧
∀x ∈ E ∪ T : Π(ll.d, β, d) x
This rule is applicable only if no external transmit or internal events in the speciﬁca-
tion is possible. As we can see, this is the same condition that makes a speciﬁcation
quiescent in the test generation algorithm. However, here we have no need for the δ
event to denote the situation explicitly.
As in the test generation, we let −→∗ denote the reﬂexive, transitive closure of −→.
Further we deﬁne the relation −→! as:
〈t, [β, d], mo, T〉 −→! 〈t′, [β ′, d′], mo′, T ′〉 def=
〈t, [β, d], mo, T〉 −→∗ 〈t′, [β ′, d′], mo′, T ′〉 ∧ 〈t′, [β ′, d′], mo′, T ′〉 
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Similar to the function p deﬁned as part of the test generation, we deﬁne a function
pr ∈ D → D that prepares a speciﬁcation for testing by substituting the gates with
the lifeline of the test:
pr((s, tr, re))
def
=
⎧⎨
⎩
(s, tr, re) if tr ∈ G ∧ re ∈ G
(s, tester, re) if tr ∈ G
(s, tr, tester) if re ∈ G
pr((k,m))
def
= (k, pr(m))
pr(skip)
def
= skip
pr(op d)
def
= op pr(d), op ∈ {refuse, assert, loop}
pr(d1 op d2)
def
= pr(d1) op pr(d2), op ∈ {seq, strict, par, alt}
With this system a test run is characterized by:
〈〈〉, [∅, pr(d)], norm, T〉 −→! 〈t, [β, d′], mo, v〉
Here, T ∈ D is the test and d ∈ D is the speciﬁcation that we execute the test against.
Further, t ∈ H is the trace resulting from the test execution, mo ∈ MO is the mode
resulting from the execution of the speciﬁcation and v ∈ V is the verdict given by the
test. Note that the test may terminate before the speciﬁcation, but also that we may
have d′ = skip. Because we use the −→! relation, the speciﬁcation will be executed as
much as possible (with internal and silent event) after the test has terminated.
13.3.3 Test runs and verdicts
We let the result of a test execution be a pair of a verdict and a trace (v, t) ∈ V ×H.
We distinguish between the verdict that the test returns in the test execution and
the verdict of the test run itself. The reason for this is that we also must take into
consideration the mode of the test execution to determine the ﬁnal verdict. Further,
this also depends on the direction of the testing (whether we are “testing down” or
“testing up”) and the state of the speciﬁcation after execution of the test.
The set of all test runs for a given test and speciﬁcation can be characterized by a
function:
execdir ∈ D ×D → P(V ×H)
where dir indicates the direction of the testing and may stand for either down or up.
In both cases the function is deﬁned as:
execdir(T, d)
def
= {(verdir(v,mo, d′), t) | ∃β, d′ :
〈〈〉, [∅, pr(d)], norm, T〉 −→! 〈t, [β, d′], mo, v〉}
The function
verdir ∈ V ×MO×D → V
is used to determine the ﬁnal verdict of each test run. It takes as its arguments the
verdict of the test, the mode of the execution, and the state of the speciﬁcation after
execution of the test. We need the latter do distinguish complete behavior in the
speciﬁcation from preﬁxes of complete behavior. In the semantic model of STAIRS,
only the complete behavior speciﬁed in a speciﬁcation is considered positive; preﬁxes
are considered inconclusive (or negative if assert is applied) if they are not at the same
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time explicitly speciﬁed as complete behavior (something which may be the case if for
example the operator opt is used in the speciﬁcation). Further, an extension of positive
behavior may be inconclusive behavior for the same reason. The same considerations
also hold for negative behavior. If the state of the speciﬁcation after the execution of
the test equals skip, we know that the test run represents a complete behavior in the
speciﬁcation. In the other case, the test run represents behavior that is not complete
in the speciﬁcation, but a preﬁx of speciﬁed behavior.
The deﬁnitions of verdown and verup are based on the notion of reﬁnement of in-
teraction obligations deﬁned in [70], which is to say: Let d1 and d2 be diagrams with
denotation [[ d1 ]] = (p1, n1) and [[ d2 ]] = (p2, n2). Then d2 reﬁnes d1, denoted d1 r d2,
iﬀ p1 ⊆ p2 ∪ n2 ∧ n1 ⊆ n2 (see also section 5.4).
When we deﬁne the function verdown, this is based on the following analysis of the
possible cases: Assume we are interested in the reﬁnement d1 r d2. We generate a
test T from speciﬁcation d1 and executes it against speciﬁcation d2, i.e. we are “testing
down”.
• If the test terminates with pass it means that the test run represents behavior
that is speciﬁed as positive in d1. Further, the pass indicates that the behavior
is maximal in d1. If the speciﬁcation after the test execution equals skip, the test
run represents complete (positive or negative) behavior in d2. In this case we
have correct reﬁnement and keep the verdict pass.
In the other case we also give the verdict pass for the following reason: The test
run has a extension in d2 (positive or negative) that is inconclusive behavior in
d1. We can know this because the test is maximal with respect to d1. We can
therefore consider the test run as a representative of inconclusive behavior in d1
that becomes positive or negative in d2, which is correct reﬁnement.
• If the test terminates with inconc it means the test run represents behavior that
is inconclusive in d1. It is then irrelevant what status this behavior has in d2 and
the ﬁnal verdict of the test run is pass regardless of the mode of the execution
and the state of the speciﬁcation.
• If the test terminates with fail it means the test run represents behavior that is
negative in d1. If the mode of the test execution is ref or assref, then the test
run represents behavior that is negative in d2, in which case it represents correct
reﬁnement and the ﬁnal verdict is therefore changed to pass. If the mode is norm
or ass, we may have two diﬀerent situations, and we need more information to
distinguish these two cases. If the speciﬁcation has terminated, i.e. what remains
of the speciﬁcation is skip, the test run represents complete positive behavior in
d2. It is not a correct reﬁnement and the verdict fail is given.
If what remains of the speciﬁcation is diﬀerent from skip we have the situation,
as we had above, that the rest run is a representative of a behavior that extends
the test run in such a way that it is inconclusive in d1 and positive or negative
in d2. In this case it can be considered a correct reﬁnement and the ﬁnal verdict
is changed to pass.
In summary we see that there is one case that gives the verdict fail, and all other cases
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give pass. Hence, we deﬁne verdown:
verdown(v,mo, d)
def
=
{
fail if v = fail ∧mo ∈ {norm, ass} ∧ d = skip
pass otherwise
For “testing up” we do a similar analysis. Again we are interested in the reﬁnement
d1 r d2, but this time we generate a test T from d2 and execute it against d1:
• If the test terminates with the verdict fail it means the test run represents behavior
that is negative in d2. Whatever the status of this behavior in d1 it must be a
correct reﬁnement, and we return the ﬁnal verdict pass.
• If the verdict of the test is inconc, the execution represents behavior that is
inconclusive in d2. Because the tests are maximal, there exist no extensions of
the behavior that is not inconclusive in d2. However, the behavior is speciﬁed in
d1 (as positive or negative). We are therefore dealing with an incorrect reﬁnement
where positive or negative behavior is made inconclusive, and the ﬁnal verdict of
the test run is given as fail.
• If the test gives the verdict pass, a more thorough analysis is necessary. The test
run represents behavior that is positive in d2, and the behavior must therefore
be positive or inconclusive in d1 for the reﬁnement to be correct.
If the remainer of the speciﬁcation is equal to skip, the test run represents com-
plete behavior in d1. If the mode is norm or ass, this complete behavior is positive
in d1, and we give the verdict pass. On the other hand, if the mode is ref or assref,
the behavior is negative in d1, and we give the verdict fail.
If the reminder of the speciﬁcation is diﬀerent from skip, the test run represents
a preﬁx of speciﬁed behavior in d1. If the mode is norm or ref, no assert operator
has been executed during the test execution. The test run represents behavior
that is inconclusive in d1, and we give the verdict pass. If the mode is ass or assref,
an assert operator have been executed during the test run. An assert makes all
unspeciﬁed behavior negative, so the test run represent negative behavior in d1
and the verdict fail must be given.
For “testing up” we then deﬁne these verdicts:
verup(v,mo, d)
def
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pass if v = fail ∨
(v = pass ∧ (mo = norm ∨
(mo = ass ∧ d = skip) ∨
(mo = ref ∧ d = skip)))
fail if v = inconc ∨
(v = pass ∧ (mo = assref ∨
(mo = ass ∧ d = skip) ∨
(mo = ref ∧ d = skip)))
The functions execdir return sets of pairs of verdicts and traces. Each such pair
represent a test run. Given a test T and diagram d we say that d passes the test T if
no verdicts are fail, i.e.:
d passesdir T ⇐⇒ ∀(v, t) ∈ execdir(T, d) : v = pass
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Figure 13.3: Spec. d
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Figure 13.4: Spec. d2
but
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sd d3
automaton
i
o
assert
Figure 13.5: Spec. d3
A diagram passes a test suite iﬀ it passes all the tests of the suite:
d passesdir U ⇐⇒ ∀T ∈ U : d passesdir T
If we want to compare two speciﬁcations d and d′, and we have test suites U and U ′
generated from d and d′ we can do this by checking whether
d′ passesdown U
and
d passesup U
′
Together, these two operations constitute what we call reﬁnement testing.
13.3.4 Examples
In ﬁgures 13.3, 13.4 and 13.5 we show three speciﬁcations d, d2 and d3 that are related
in the following manner:
d r d, d r d2, d r d3, d2 r d2, d3 r d3
d2 r d, d2 r d3, d3 r d, d3 r d2
Figures 13.6, 13.7 and 13.8 show three tests T , T2 and T3 generated from d, d2
and d3, respectively.
2 Using these tests we now investigate the relation between the
diagrams. The results of this testing are shown in table 13.1, where we use the following
shorthand notation for the traces:
tliq = 〈!but, ?but, !liq, ?liq〉
tchoc = 〈!but, ?but, !choc, ?choc〉
2Several things should be noted about these tests. 1) We have that EdO = E
d2
O = {!liq, !choc},
while Ed3O = {!choc}. In the generation of all three tests we have applied E = {!liq, !choc}. 2) The
constraint that test generation only terminates after a timeout event is relaxed to make the tests
more readable. 3) The tests are identical whether the option for “testing down” or for “testing up” is
applied and can therefore be used in both testing directions.
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Figure 13.6: Test T
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Figure 13.7: Test T2
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Figure 13.8: Test T3
From these results we make three observations. First, we see that the speciﬁcations
pass the tests in exactly the cases of correct reﬁnement, which gives an indication that
our testing scheme actually may be applied for checking of reﬁnement. Secondly, we see
that in two cases an incorrect reﬁnement was refuted by “testing down” alone, which
means “testing down” and “testing up” complement each other. Thirdly, we see that
none of the incorrect reﬁnements were refuted by “testing up” alone. This tells us that
none of the incorrect reﬁnements were due to introduction of new inconclusive behavior
Refinement Test runs Result
d r d execdown(T, d) = {(pass, tliq), (pass, tchoc)} d passesdown T
execup(T, d) = {(pass, tliq), (pass, tchoc)} d passesup T
d r d2 execdown(T, d2) = {(pass, tliq), (pass, tchoc)} d2 passesdown T
execup(T2, d) = {(pass, tliq), (pass, tchoc)} d passesup T2
d r d3 execdown(T, d3) = {(pass, tchoc)} d3 passesdown T
execup(T3, d) = {(pass, tliq), (pass, tchoc)} d passesup T3
d2 r d execdown(T2, d) = {(pass, tliq), (fail, tchoc)} ¬(d passesdown T2)
execup(T, d2) = {(pass, tliq), (fail, tchoc)} ¬(d2 passesup T )
d2 r d2 execdown(T2, d2) = {(pass, tliq), (pass, tchoc)} d2 passesdown T2
execup(T2, d2) = {(pass, tliq), (pass, tchoc)} d2 passesup T2
d2 r d3 execdown(T2, d3) = {(fail, tchoc)} ¬(d3 passesdown T2)
execup(T3, d2) = {(pass, tliq), (fail, tchoc)} ¬(d2 passesup T3)
d3 r d execdown(T3, d) = {(fail, tliq), (pass, tchoc)} ¬(d passesdown T3)
execup(T, d3) = {(pass, tchoc)} d3 passesup T
d3 r d2 execdown(T3, d2) = {(fail, tliq), (pass, tchoc)} ¬(d2 passesdown T3)
execup(T2, d3) = {(pass, tchoc)} d3 passesup T2
d3 r d3 execdown(T3, d3) = {(pass, tchoc)} d3 passesdown T3
execup(T3, d3) = {(pass, tchoc)} d3 passesup T3
Table 13.1: Test results
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sd d1
l1
a
l2
b
x
o1
o2
Figure 13.9: Speciﬁcation d1
(which would be the case with e.g. d r d3 if d3 did not have the assert operator), and
the examples presented in this section therefore do not exhaust all interesting cases.
13.4 Asynchronous testing
In the test generation and test execution deﬁned in the preceeding sections, the obser-
vation point is at the lifelines of the speciﬁcations. As a result, the test execution is
deﬁned as a form of synchronous communication between the test and the speciﬁca-
tion being tested (because messages between test and speciﬁcation are assumed to be
instantanuous).
Assume the speciﬁcation d1 of ﬁgure 13.9. Because the test generation algorithm
operates directly on the interface of the speciﬁcation, it will consider observation of
〈!b, !a〉 as inconclusive because !a must happen before !b.
However, if we were to assume that there is one communication link from l1 to the
point of observation and one from l2 to the point of observation, it would mean that
the message b may overtake message a so that we observe !b before !a. Because we
mainly deal with asynchronous communication, this must be considered an assumption
we would want to make in certain situations.
A solution to this is proposed by [181,186]. The proposed solution is to still deﬁne
the test generation and execution with the observation point direcly at the interface,
but to model the communication link explicitely as a process composed in parallel with
the processes we generate tests from and execute tests against.
sd d1*
l1
a
l2
b
xo1
o2
out
a
b
par
Figure 13.10: Speciﬁcation d∗1
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We can obain this by including a new lifeline out in d1 which receives and retrans-
mits all messages bound for the frame. The resulting speciﬁcation, called d∗1 is shown
in ﬁgure 13.10. This modiﬁed speciﬁcation is then used in test generation or test
execution.
When generating tests from d∗1 both 〈!a, !b〉 and 〈!b, !a〉 will be treated as observa-
tions of positive behavior, which is the desired situation. We may, of course, do the
same thing for receive events.
Further, we can state this as a general procedure for every given communication
model. Given a speciﬁcation d and the communication model with a single communi-
cation link for each message, we obtain a speciﬁcation d∗ in the following way:
1. If lifeline names in or out are used in d, i.e. in ∈ ll.d or out ∈ ll.d, rename these
lifelines with names not in ll.d.
2. Add the lifelines in and out to the speciﬁcation.
3. Let in have a par operator with one operand for each event in EdI .
4. Let out have a par operator with one operand for each event in EdO.
5. For each e ∈ EdI let the message m.e from the frame to l.e instead go from the
frame to in and then further from in to l.e is such a way that this happens within
its designated par operand, and so that all ordering, choices, loops, etc. on l.e are
preserved.
6. For each e ∈ EdO let the message m.e from l.e to the frame instead go from l.e
to out and then further from out to the frame in such a way that this happens
within its designated par operand, and so that all ordering, choices, loops, etc.
on l.e are preserved.
In the test generation and execution we deﬁned in sections 13.2 and 13.3 we implic-
itly assumed that the speciﬁcation that a test is generated from, and the speciﬁcation
the test is executed against, have the same names on their external lifelines. As a nice
byproduct of the procedure for producing “starred” speciﬁcations, we do not have to
worry about lifeline names when generating and executing tests as long as we maintain
a convention for naming these inserted lifelines in the “starred” speciﬁcations.
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The ‘Escalator’ tool
Escalator is a prototype tool developed to demonstrate the use of our operational se-
mantics and the analysis mechanisms we have deﬁned over the semantics, in particular
the test generation and test execution deﬁned in chapter 13. The tool makes direct use
of the Maude implementation of the operational semantics and the testing theory, but
also provides a user interface with a graphical sequence diagram editor to ease the use
sequence diagram speciﬁcations.
One of the strengths of sequence diagrams as a speciﬁcation language is their graph-
ical and diagram based appearance, which makes them easy to comprehend and work
with. The Maude implementation of the operational semantics does not have this
advantage because it presupposes a textual representation of the diagrams. However,
using the Maude interpreter for execution of diagrams via the operational semantics
has the advantage that Maude is a formal language and the that Maude interpreter is
developed to preserve the semantics of Maude. With an implementation of the oper-
ational semantics and the test generation algorithm in, e.g., a programming language
like Java or C, we would face the risk of unintentionally changing the semantics. By
using Maude, this risk of compromising the formality of our approach is reduced.
With Escalator we combine these two considerations by having a graphical editor as
frontend and the Maude interpreter as backend. This way we get both the beneﬁts of a
graphical diagram based speciﬁcation language and the beneﬁts of a formal foundation.
In section 14.1 we present the main use cases of Escalator, while in section 14.2 we
describe its architecture. Section 14.3 presents the user interface and its intended use.
In chapter 15 we conduct a case study with the help of Escalator.
14.1 Use cases of Escalator
The main functionality of Escalator is shown as use cases in the UML use case diagram
of ﬁgure 14.1.1 Below we give a brief, informal characterization of each of the use cases:
Draw sequence diagram. The user of Escalator can make a sequence diagram in
the graphical sequence diagram editor.
Configure semantics. The operational semantics allows various instantiations, e.g.,
with respect to the communication model. Making choices with respect to these
1The use cases are represented as ovals. An arrow labed include going from use case X to use
case Y indicates that conducting X involves conducting Y .
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diagram Configure
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Escalator
user
Escalator
«include»
«include»
«include»
«include»
«include»
«include»
«include»
Refinement
testing
«include»
«include»
Figure 14.1: Use cases for Escalator
possible variations is what we call conﬁguration of the semantics.
Generate Maude representation of sequence diagram. For sequence diagrams
to be executed by the Maude interpreter we need to have Maude representations
of the sequence diagrams that have been made in the graphical editor. Obviously
this requires that diagrams actually have been made.
Generate tests. Escalator can generate tests from sequence diagrams applying the
test generation algorithm deﬁned in section 13.2. This presupposes a Maude
representation of the diagram from which tests are generated.
Execute tests. Tests can be executed against sequence diagrams using the method
described in section 13.3. This requires that tests have been generated and that
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Escalator Maude
SeDi plugin Escalator plugin
Escalator 
user Eclipse
Figure 14.2: Class diagram
a Maude representation of the diagram against which the tests are executed is
generated.
Refinement testing. As explained in chapter 13, test execution and test generation
can togehter be used as a method for analysing the correctness of a reﬁnement.
This we refer to as reﬁnement testing.
Generate traces. Escalator can generate traces by executing a sequence diagram
with the Maude interpreter. This requires that a Maude generation of the dia-
gram is made.
Generate random traces. A specialization of test generation is the possibility of
generating a random sample of all the traces that a diagram characterizes using
the method described in sections 9.1 and 10.2.3.1.
Generate all traces. A specialization of test generation is the possibility of generat-
ing all traces characterized by a sequence diagram using the method described in
sections 9.2 and 10.2.3.2.
Refinement verification. By comparison of the traces generated from two sequence
diagrams, based on the deﬁnitions of reﬁnement given by STAIRS, Escalator
can analyse whether a diagram is a correct reﬁnement of another diagram. This
requires that all traces of the two diagrams have been generated, and is based on
the method for reﬁnement veriﬁcation described in sections 9.2 and 10.2.3.2.
14.2 Architecture of Escalator
Escalator is developed as an Eclipse plugin [43]. We do not ourselves implement an
editor, but integrate a simple, open source sequence diagram editor called SeDi [107],
itself an Eclipse plugin, into our tool. Maude is integrated into the tool by imple-
mentation of a kind of wrapper that can start the Maude interpreter as a separate
process. This wrapper provides a Java interface to facilitate communication with the
command-line interface of the Maude interpreter.
One can then perceive Escalator as consisting of three main component:
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Escalator
:Maude:Escalator plugin:SeDi plugin
Figure 14.3: Parts diagram
Escalator context
:Escalator
:Eclipse
:Escalator 
user
Figure 14.4: Collaboration diagram
• The SeDi plugin providing the sequence diagram editor.
• TheMaude wrapper enabling execution of and communication with the Maude
interpreter.
• The Escalator plugin providing the necessary functionality for analyzing sequence
diagrams with the operational semantics and the testing mechanisms.
The Escalator plugin serves two main purposes:
1. Generating Maude representations of sequence diagrams speciﬁed with the editor.
2. Providing user interfaces for specifying analyses of the diagrams, including con-
ﬁguration of the operational semantics, and for presentation of analysis results.
While speciﬁcation of sequence diagrams is done by means of the SeDi editor and the
analysis is carried out by using the Maude interpreter, the Escalator plugin can be seen
as lying between these to other components.
A class diagram giving a high-level view of Escalator is shown in ﬁgure 14.2.2
Escalator is represented as a class that contains the tree classes ‘Escalator plugin’,
2Classes are represented as boxes. The arrows between the boxes represents associations or relations
between the classes, and the direction of the arrows represent navigability or visibility. A black
diamond indicates that the class connected to the diamond is composed of the class the arrow points
to.
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sd Escalator scenario
:Maude:Escalator plugin:SeDi plugin :Eclipse
:Escalator 
user
Make diagram
Save diagram
Request operation
Get model
Get diagram
Diagram
Model Generate 
Maude rep.
Maude rep.
Command
Result
Save result
View result
Get result
Result
Result
Figure 14.5: Generic user scenario
‘SeDi plugin’ and ‘Maude’. We see that both the SeDi plugin and Maude is visible
to the Escalator plugin, but not the other way. This reﬂects the fact that SeDi and
Maude in a way stand alone, while the Escalator plugin integrates functionality from
these two components.
Escalator, through the SeDi plugin and the Escalator plugin, also gets functionality
from Eclipse itself, such as ﬁle and window management. For this reason Eclipse is
related to the SeDi plugin and the Escalator plugin, while Maude stands by itself and is
not related to Eclipse in the same way. The user communicates with Escalator through
the functionality provided by the Escalator plugin, the SeDi plugin and Eclipse, and
is therefore related to these three classes. The user does not, however, communicate
directly with Maude and is related directly to the Maude class.
In ﬁgure 14.3 a parts diagram for Escalator is provided.3 We have communication
3A parts diagram shows the structre of a class. The boxes represents parts (objects, roles) contained
by the class. The lines between the parts represents connectors (communication links).
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Figure 14.6: The SeDi editor
links between the SeDi plugin and Escalator plugin and between the Escalator plugin
and Maude. Through the link to the SeDi plugin, the Escalator plugin obtains diagrams
(represented in an internal model), and through the link to Maude it sends commands
and receives results from the executions of the Maude interpreter.
Both the SeDi plugin and the Escalator plugin have two external communication
links. For each of the components, one is a link for communication with Eclipse and one
is a link for communication with the user. Figure 14.4 shows the context of Escalator
in a collaboration diagram4, where we see the two communication links from Escalator
to the user and the two links from Escalator to Eclipse. In addition there is an obvious
link between the the user and Eclipse since the user is also able to communicate with
Eclipse independent of the functionality provided by Escalator.
4The oval represents a collaboration, which is a structural relationship between parts (objects,
roles). The lines between parts represent connectors (comminication links). The diﬀerence from a
parts diagram is that the parts of an collaboration exist independently and prior to the creation of
an instance of the collaboration, while the parts of a class is created togehter with an instance of the
class containing them.
126
14.3 Use of Escalator
Figure 14.7: Testing wizard
14.3 Use of Escalator
Most of the operations of Escalator follows a speciﬁc pattern: The user draws a diagram
in SeDi, saves it in the Eclipse ﬁle system and then requests an operation on the diagram
from Escalator. The Escalator plugin then retrieves the diagram in the form of SeDi’s
internal model and generates a textual Maude representation of the diagram. This
representation together with the appropriate commands are sent to Maude. When the
results are received from Maude, they are stored in Eclipse’s ﬁle system. The user can
request to view the results, in which case they are retrieved from Eclipse and presented
to the user is a suitable fashion. This generic scenario is presented in the sequence
diagram of ﬁgure 14.5. With some variations, this scenario applies to most of the
central use cases of ﬁgure 14.1.
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Figure 14.8: Test viewer
In the following we show how such a scenario will manifest itself for the user with
respect to combined test generation and test execution. The ﬁrst thing the user does
is to draw one or more diagrams with the SeDi editor. In ﬁgure 14.6 we see the editor
in which the diagram d from ﬁgure 13.3 is drawn. On the left we see the ﬁle manager,
where the diagram is saved as d.sd.
The user tells Escalator to perform operations on the diagrams with the help of
wizards. Figure 14.7 shows the wizard for combined test generation and test execution.
In this example the user tells Escalator to generate tests from the diagram d, and to
execute them against a diagram d2. The user has speciﬁed that ﬁve tests should
be generated from d and that each test should be run three times againt d2, both
applying the “testing down” option. The process should use random seeds, and the
process should be terminated if it has not completed within ﬁve minutes. Further it is
speciﬁed that the communication model with one FIFO buﬀer for each message should
be applied, that the resulting tests should be saved in a ﬁle tests.sui and that the
results of the test exectuion should be saved in a ﬁle tests.res. Clicking the Finish
button causes the test generation and execution to be carried out as speciﬁed. For all
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the use cases in ﬁgure 14.1 involving the user, similar wizards are provided.
When the test generation and test execution have completed, the tests and test
execution results are saved in the ﬁles tests.sui and tests.res, respectively. For
each kind of results (tests, test execution results, traces) Escalator provides a viewer
for the user to review the results. In ﬁgure 14.8 we show the viewer for test suites
(sets of tests) presenting the contents of tests.sui. Even though the user asked for
ﬁve tests the suite only contains two, because the same tests where generated several
times and Escalator does not keep duplicates of tests in a suite. Test2 in the suite can
be recognized as the test T of ﬁgure 13.6 (with the exception that in the generation
of T , for presentation purposes, the test generation algorithm was terminated one step
earlier than in generation of Test2). In the ﬁle manager on the left we can also observe
that in the process of generating and executing tests, Maude representations of the
diagrams have been generated and stored in the ﬁles d.maude and d2.maude.
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Case study
In this chapter we apply the Escalator tool on a case study. The main hypothesis is
that the tool is able to handle a medium sized case, and the main functions of the tool,
i.e. the reﬁnement veriﬁcation and the reﬁnement testing, provide the expected results.
The chosen case is a STAIRS speciﬁcation of a system called the “BuddySync
system”, documented in [154]. BuddySync is an imaginary and generic system for
management of services, for example ordering of taxis by SMS. Subscribers to Bud-
dySync may request and oﬀer services, and the system will match the requests with
the oﬀers and notify the users when matches are found. An elaborated description of
the system is found in section 15.1 below.
The reasons for choosing BuddySync for the case study are are follows:
• The case is developed for STAIRS, i.e. the case consists of a number of STAIRS
speciﬁcations and therefore applies STAIRS features such as mandatory choice.
• The case speciﬁes the system at diﬀerent levels of abstraction and hence is suitable
for applying the reﬁnement veriﬁcation and the reﬁnement testing functionality
of Escalator.
• The original BuddySync speciﬁcation was made by other people than the au-
thor of this thesis. Therefore the speciﬁcation of the case is not made with the
Escalator tool in mind.
• The size is suitable, i.e. the case is bigger then being a mere toy example, but
still manageable within a reasonable time frame.
Our case study consists of two parts. In the ﬁrst part we use the reﬁnement veri-
ﬁcation functionality of Escalator on the BuddySync speciﬁcation, and in the second
part we apply the reﬁnement testing functionality on the speciﬁcation. As is explained
in detail later, we use two diﬀerent versions of the speciﬁcation in the two cases, none
of which is identical to the original speciﬁcation in [154]. In section 15.2 the reﬁnement
veriﬁcation part of the case is presented and in section 15.3 we present the reﬁnement
testing part of the case.
15.1 The BuddySync system
The BuddySync case as deﬁned in [154] is a STAIRS speciﬁcation of the BuddySync
system. The system provides six usages speciﬁed by six diagrams RequestService,
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Level Lifelines
0 Requester, Provider, User, System
1 Requester, Provider, User, System
2 Requester, Provider, User, Control, MessageBoard
3 Requester, Provider, User, Control, MessageBoard
4 Requester, Provider, User, Control, MessageBoard, MemberList
Table 15.1: Lifelines at the diﬀerent abstraction levels
OﬀerService, RemoveRequest, RemoveOﬀer, SubscribeService and UnsubscribeService.
The full speciﬁcation is a diagram Overview that combines these six diagrams using
xalt:
Overview = RequestService xalt
OﬀerService xalt
RemoveRequest xalt
RemoveOﬀer xalt
SubscribeService xalt
UnsubscribeService
Through reﬁnement steps, variants of these diagrams exist at several levels of abstrac-
tion. We have identiﬁed ﬁve such levels, which we refer to as level 0 through level 4. In
order to distinguish between the variants of the diagrams at the diﬀerent levels we give
them names RequestService0, RequestService1, etc. in such a way that RequestService0
is the diagram RequestService at level 0, RequestService1 the diagram RequestService
at level 1, and so forth.
At the most abstract levels of the speciﬁcation of [154], the diagrams have two
lifelines :System and :User.1 In lower levels :System is decomposed into :Control,
:MessageBoard and :MemberList. It should also be noted that the speciﬁcation operates
with three instances of :User, namely requester:User, provider:User and user:User. For
simplicity we treat these instances as three diﬀerent lifelines Requester, Provider and
User. We also drop the colon in the lifeline names, as this no longer has any function
when we treat lifeline instances as separate lifelines. The lifelines present at the diﬀerent
levels of abstraction is presented in table 15.1.
Only the diagrams RequestService and OﬀerService are updated at every level.
Table 15.2 shows which diagrams we have at the diﬀerent levels. The placement of
the updated versions of the four remaining diagrams may seem somewhat arbitrary,
1The colon in front of the names denote that these lifelines are classes from which instances can
be made.
Level Diagrams
0 RequestService0, OﬀerService0, RemoveRequest0, RemoveOﬀer 0,
SubscribeService0, UnsubscribeService0
1 RequestService1, OﬀerService1
2 RequestService2, OﬀerService2, RemoveRequest2, RemoveOﬀer 2
3 RequestService3, OﬀerService3
4 RequestService4, OﬀerService4, SubscribeService4, UnsubscribeService4
Table 15.2: Diagrams at the diﬀerent abstraction levels
132
15.2 Reﬁnement veriﬁcation
but is based on the lifelines they contain. RemoveRequest2 and RemoveOﬀer 2 are
placed at level 2 because they contain the lifelines Control and MessageBoard, while
SubscribeService4 and UnsubscribeService4 are placed at level 4 because they contain
the lifeline MemberList, which is introduced at that level.
Because we use diﬀerent versions of the BuddySync speciﬁcation in the reﬁnement
veriﬁcation and the reﬁnement testing parts of the case, we do not give the detailed
presentation of the diagrams of the speciﬁcation here. The version used in the reﬁne-
ment veriﬁcation part is presented in section 15.2.2, and the version used in reﬁnement
testing part is presented in section 15.3.2. There we also account for the diﬀerences
between the two versions.
15.2 Refinement verification
In this part of the study we applied the reﬁnement veriﬁcation functionality of the
Escalator tool on the BuddySync speciﬁcation, i.e. we used the tool to investigate
whether the more concrete levels of the speciﬁcation are correct reﬁnements of the
more abstract levels. In section 15.2.1 we provide assumptions and success criteria for
this part of the case. Section 15.2.2 presents the BuddySync speciﬁcation as we used it
in the reﬁnement veriﬁcation, and in section 15.2.3 we present the setup of the case. In
section 15.2.4 we provide the results of the reﬁnement veriﬁcation and in section 15.2.5
we discuss the results.
15.2.1 Assumptions and success criteria
The success criterion for the reﬁnement veriﬁcation part of the case study is formulated
as follows:
The reﬁnement veriﬁcation functionality of the tool provides the expected
results when applied to the BuddySync speciﬁcation.
The BuddySync case is originally a case study in reﬁnement, and this should indicate
that the expected results are that level 1 of the speciﬁcation is a correct reﬁnement of
level 0, that level 2 is a correct reﬁnement of level 1 and so forth. However, because
we make some changes to the original speciﬁcation (these are explained below), this
might not necessarily be the case. Therefore, it is part of the success criterion that
any unexpected results are explained by identifying incorrect reﬁnements in a separate
analysis of the speciﬁcations.
15.2.2 The BuddySync specification for the refinement verifi-
cation
In this section we present the speciﬁcation of the BuddySync system as we used it in
the reﬁnement veriﬁcation. Some simpliﬁcations have been made with respect to the
diagrams provided in [154], due to the use of STAIRS features not supported by the
reﬁnement veriﬁcation functionality of Escalator. These simpliﬁcations are:
• We have removed the assert operator where it is used in the original speciﬁcation.
This also means that we have alts some places where assert was used to reﬁne
alts.
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• Parameters of diagrams and messages have been removed.
• User, Requester and Provider are treated as independent lifelines, as explained
in section 15.1.
• Actions, constraints and guards are removed. Some places we use a combination
of alt and refuse to simulate constraints.
We do not, however, ﬁnd the application of these features fundamental for the case.
The speciﬁcation follows in the sub-sections below, together with some explanatory
text. As the speciﬁcation is “borrowed”, we do not give much rationale for the way
the diagrams look or are made. The purpose of the presentation is merely that of
documenting the case. The presentation is structured by level.
15.2.2.1 Level 0
Level 0 gives the most abstract speciﬁcation of the functionality of the BuddySync
system. The speciﬁcation consists of the six diagrams of ﬁgures 15.1–15.6, which show
the interaction between users and the system. RequestService0 shows how a user of
the system in the role of requester can request a service form the system and get the
response either that somebody has agreed to perform the service or that the request
is registered. OﬀerService0 is symmetric for the provider role; the user oﬀers a service
to the system and gets one of two possible responses: an instruction to perform the
service or a message that the oﬀer has been registered.
RemoveRequest0 and RemoveOﬀer 0 allow requesters and providers to remove the
requests or oﬀers they have communicated to the system. In response they receive a
conﬁrmation that the request or oﬀer has been removed.
Finally, SubscribeService0 and UnsubscribeService0 allow users to subscribe and
unsubscribe to services. A user that subscribes to a service will get the answer that
he/she has been added as provider or requester, and a user that unsubscribes will get
the answer that he/she has been unsubscribed from the service.
It should be noted that in [154], messages are parameterized with variables to
identify the service that is invocated, and other information to the system. Both at
level 0 and at the remaining levels, we have suppressed this and left it unspeciﬁed.
request
requestRegistered
agreed
sd RequestService0
Requester
xalt
System
Figure 15.1: RequestService0
offer
offerRegistered
perform
sd OfferService0
System
xalt
Provider
Figure 15.2: OﬀerService0
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removeRequest
requestRemoved
sd RemoveRequest0
Requester System
Figure 15.3: RemoveRequest0
removeOffer
offerRemoved
sd RemoveOffer0
System Provider
Figure 15.4: RemoveOﬀer 0
subscribe
addedAsRequester
addedAsProvider
sd SubscribeService0
User
xalt
System
Figure 15.5: SubscribeService0
unsubscribe
unsubscribed
sd UnsubscribeService0
User System
Figure 15.6: UnsubscribeService0
15.2.2.2 Level 1
At level 1, the diagrams RequestService0 and OﬀerService0 are reﬁned into RequestSer-
vice1 and OﬀerService1. These reﬁned diagrams are shown in ﬁgures 15.7 and 15.8. In
these diagrams, the sequence diagram feature interaction occurrence is applied, repre-
sented in the diagrams as boxes with the label ref attached to them. RequestService1
refers to Match1 (ﬁgure 15.9) and SaveRequest1 (ﬁgure 15.10), and OﬀerService1 to
Match1 and SaveOﬀer 1 (ﬁgure 15.11).
We treat these references simply as syntactic substitutions of the references by the
diagrams to which they refer. This means that in the textual syntax we do for example
have:
Match1 = !perform seq ?perform seq !agreed seq ?agreed
SaveOﬀer1 = !oﬀerRegistered seq ?oﬀerRegistered
OﬀerService1 = !oﬀer seq ?oﬀer seq
(ref(Match1) xalt ref(SaveOﬀer1))
= !oﬀer seq ?oﬀer seq
(!perform seq ?perform seq !agreed seq ?agreed xalt
!oﬀerRegistered seq ?oﬀerRegistered)
Since this is purely syntactic, it has no eﬀect on the semantics of the diagrams.
The main diﬀerence compared to level 0 is that both Requester and Provider are
now present in the diagrams. Both messages perform and agreed are sent in both
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request
sd RequestService1
Requester
xalt
System Provider
ref Match1
ref SaveRequest1
Figure 15.7: RequestService1
offer
sd OfferService1
Requester
xalt
System Provider
ref Match1
ref SaveOffer1
Figure 15.8: OﬀerService1
perform
sd Match1
Requester System Provider
agreed
Figure 15.9: Match1
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needed
sd SaveRequest1
Requester System Provider
requestRegistered
opt
Figure 15.10: SaveRequest1
offerRegistered
sd SaveOffer1
Requester System Provider
Figure 15.11: SaveOﬀer 1
RequestService1 and OﬀerService1 (through the reference to Match1) to Provider and
Requester, respectively.
In SaveOﬀer 1, merely a notiﬁcation to the provider that the oﬀer is registered is
sent, so this represent no change with respect to the second xalt operand of OﬀerSer-
vice0. However, in SaveRequest1 an optional message needed to Provider is speciﬁed,
and hence represents a reﬁnement with respect to the second xalt operand of Request-
Service0.
15.2.2.3 Level 2
At level 2, the lifeline System is decomposed into the lifelines Control and Message-
Board. In accordance with this change, this level has the diagrams RequestService2,
OﬀerService2, RemoveRequest2 and RemoveOﬀer 2 as reﬁnements of RequestService1,
OﬀerService1, RemoveRequest0 and RemoveOﬀer 0.
After the decomposition of System into Control and MessageBoard, Control is the
interface towards the users of the system, while MessageBoard is an internal lifeline
that keeps track of pending oﬀers and requests. In RequestService2 (ﬁgure 15.12)
and OﬀerService2 (ﬁgure 15.13) this has the eﬀect that Control, upon reception of a
request or oﬀer message, sends ﬁndOﬀer or ﬁndRequest to MessageBoard and receives
a message matchFound or noMatch as reply.
Match1 in RequestService1 and OﬀerService1 is replaced by MatchRequest2 (ﬁg-
ure 15.14) and MatchOﬀer 2 (ﬁgure 15.15), respectively, in RequestService2 and Of-
ferService2. Both sends the matchFound reply before referring to Match2 (ﬁgure 15.16).
Match2 is identical to Match1 except that the lifeline System is replaced by Control.
The diagrams SaveRequest2 (ﬁgure 15.17) and SaveOﬀer 2 (ﬁgure 15.18), referred
to by RequestService2 and OﬀerService2, are identical to SaveRequest1 and SaveOﬀer 1
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request
sd RequestService2
Requester
xalt
Control MessageBoard
ref MatchRequest2
ref SaveRequest2
Provider
findOffer
Figure 15.12: RequestService2
findRequest
sd OfferService2
Requester
xalt
Control MessageBoard
ref MatchOffer2
ref SaveOffer2
Provider
offer
Figure 15.13: OﬀerService2
with the exceptions that the noMatch message is sent from MessageBoard to Control
and that Control, instead of System, sends messages to the users.
The alt constructs in these diagrams where the messages matchFound and noMatch
are speciﬁed as both positive and negative might seem strange. The rationale for this
is to express that both messages may be both positive and negative; matchFound is
positive if a match is found and negative if a match is not found. Similarly, noMatch
is positive if a match is not found, but negative if a match is found. In [154] this is
made explicit by use of constraints, but since we de not apply constraints in this case
study we have chosen this way of representing it.
The updated diagrams RemoveRequest2 (ﬁgure 15.19) and RemoveOﬀer 2 (ﬁgure
15.20) are similar to RemoveRequest0 and RemoveOﬀer 0. The diﬀerence is that Con-
trol, instead of System, communicates with the user of the system, and that Control
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matchFound
matchFound
sd MatchRequest2
Requester Control MessageBoard
ref Match2
Provider
refuse
alt
Figure 15.14: MatchRequest2
matchFound
matchFound
sd MatchOffer2
Requester Control MessageBoard
ref Match2
Provider
refuse
alt
Figure 15.15: MatchOﬀer 2
sd Match2
Requester Control MessageBoard Provider
perform
agreed
Figure 15.16: Match2
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noMatch
noMatch
sd SaveRequest2
Requester Control MessageBoard Provider
refuse
needed
requestRegistered
opt
alt
Figure 15.17: SaveRequest2
noMatch
sd SaveOffer2
Requester Control MessageBoard Provider
noMatch
refuse
offerRegistered
alt
Figure 15.18: SaveOﬀer 2
removeReq
sd RemoveRequest2
Requester Control MessageBoard
removeRequest
requestRemoved
Figure 15.19: RemoveRequest2
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removeOff
sd RemoveOffer2
Control MessageBoard Provider
removeOffer
offerRemoved
Figure 15.20: RemoveOﬀer 2
request
findOffer
sd RequestService3
Requester
alt
Control MessageBoard
ref MatchRequest3
ref SaveRequest3
Provider
xalt
alt
ref SaveRequest3
ref MatchRequest3
refuse
refuse
Figure 15.21: RequestService3
141
Case study
sends messages removeReq and removeOﬀ to MessageBoard when users remove re-
quests or oﬀers.
15.2.2.4 Level 3
At level 3, RequestService3 and OﬀerService3 reﬁne RequestService2 and OﬀerService2.
The transition from RequestService2 to RequestService3 (ﬁgure 15.21) introduces two
changes. The main diﬀerence is that in each of the xalt operands of the diagram, the
matchFound
matchFound
sd MatchRequest3
Requester Control MessageBoard
ref Match3
Provider
refuse
alt
Figure 15.22: MatchRequest3
noMatch
sd SaveRequest3
Requester Control MessageBoard Provider
noMatch
refuse
needed
requestRegistered
opt
alt
par
Figure 15.23: SaveRequest3
142
15.2 Reﬁnement veriﬁcation
sd Match3
Requester Control MessageBoard Provider
perform
agreed
par
Figure 15.24: Match3
findRequest
sd OfferService3
Requester
alt
Control MessageBoard
ref MatchOffer3
ref SaveOffer2
Provider
xalt
alt
ref SaveOffer2
ref MatchOffer3
offer
refuse
refuse
Figure 15.25: OﬀerService3
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matchFound
matchFound
sd MatchOffer3
Requester Control MessageBoard
ref Match3
Provider
refuse
alt
Figure 15.26: MatchOﬀer 3
contents of the other operand is made negative with a combination of alt and refuse.
The other diﬀerence is that MatchRequest2 and SaveRequest2 in RequestService2 are
replaced by MatchRequest2 (ﬁgure 15.22) and SaveRequest3 (ﬁgure 15.23). MatchRe-
quest3 is identical to MatchRequest2 with the sole exception that if refers to Match3
(ﬁgure 15.24) instead of Match2. In Match3, a par operator is placed around the mes-
sages perform and agreed, making them interleaved rather than sequenced along the
Control lifeline. The transition from SaveRequest2 to SaveRequest3 is similar; a par
operator is placed around the messages requestRegistered and needed, making them
interleaved on Control.
The changes from OﬀerService2 to OﬀerService3 (ﬁgure 15.25) are almost iden-
tical to the changes from RequestService2 to RequestService3; the contents of each
xalt operand is made negative in the other operand, and MatchOﬀer 2 is replaced by
MatchOﬀer 3 (ﬁgure 15.26). Note, however, that OﬀerService3 still refers to SaveOf-
fer 2. As with MatchRequest3, the only diﬀerence from MatchOﬀer 2 to MatchOﬀer 3 is
that MatchOﬀer 3 refers to Match3 instead of Match2.
15.2.2.5 Level 4
Level 4 deals with reﬁning the subscription functionality of the BuddySync system.
A lifeline MemberList is added to the speciﬁcation. The diagrams SubscribeService4
(ﬁgure 15.27) and UnsubscribeService4 (ﬁgure 15.28) reﬁne SubscribeService0 and Un-
subscribeService0 by decomposing the lifeline System into Control and MemberList.
Upon reception of a subscribe or unsubscribe message, Control sends a message add or
remove, respectively, to MemberList and receives a message ok from MemberList.
RequestService4 (ﬁgure 15.29) and OﬀerService4 (ﬁgure 15.30) are updates of Re-
questService3 and OﬀerService3 where the MemberList lifeline is added. Control sends
a message checkSubscription to MemberList after reception of request or oﬀer messages,
and receives as reply either a message subscriptionFound or a message subscriptionNot-
Found. A new xalt is introduced in each of the diagrams to represent this choice. In the
ﬁrst operand the message subscriptionNotFound is followed by a message notSubscribed
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subscribe
add
sd SubscribeService4
User
xalt
Control MemberList
ok
addedAsProvider
ok
addedAsRequester
Figure 15.27: SubscribeService4
remove
unsubscribe
sd UnsubscribeService4
User Control MemberList
ok
unsubscribed
Figure 15.28: UnsubscribeService4
from Control to the user (Requester in the case of RequestService4 and Provider in the
case of OﬀerService4). In the second operand of the new xalt, the message subscrip-
tionFound is sent from MemberList to Control, and the reminder is identical to the
versions of the diagrams at level 3.
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notSubscribed
request
sd RequestService4
Requester
alt
Control MessageBoard
ref MatchRequest3
ref SaveRequest3
Provider
findOffer
xalt
alt
ref SaveRequest3
ref MatchRequest3
MemberList
xalt subscriptionNotFound
subscriptionFound
refuse
refuse
checkSubscription
Figure 15.29: RequestService4
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MemberList
notSubscribed
offer
sd OfferService4
Requester
alt
Control MessageBoard
ref MatchOffer3
ref SaveOffer2
Provider
findRequest
xalt
alt
ref SaveOffer2
ref MatchOffer3
checkSubscription
xalt subscriptionNotFound
subscriptionFound
refuse
refuse
Figure 15.30: OﬀerService4
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15.2.3 Setup
The reﬁnement veriﬁcation case was carried out with the prototype version of the
Escalator tool available at the time of the conclusion of the work of this thesis. The
reﬁnement veriﬁcation mechanism of the tool compares two diagrams by generating
their traces and comparing their sets of interaction obligations.
In [70, 159] four reﬁnement relations are deﬁned: general reﬁnement, restricted
general reﬁnement, limited reﬁnement and restricted limited reﬁnement. These reﬁne-
ment relations are presented in section 5.4. In reﬁnement veriﬁcation, the Escalator
tool checks all of these four reﬁnement relations.
The reﬁnement veriﬁcation was applied to each diagram of the BuddySync speciﬁ-
cation for every update. This means, for example, that RequestService1 was compared
to RequestService0, RequestService2 was compared to RequestService1, RemoveRequest2
was compared to RemoveRequest0, and SubscribeService4 was compared to Subscribe-
Service0.
In addition to the veriﬁcation of these reﬁnements, we also did reﬁnement veri-
ﬁcations of the Overview diagram for some of the levels. The diagrams Overview 0,
Overview 1 and Overview 4 were deﬁned as follows:
Overview0 = RequestService0 xalt
OﬀerService0 xalt
RemoveRequest0 xalt
RemoveOﬀer0 xalt
SubscribeService0 xalt
UnsubscribeService0
Overview1 = RequestService1 xalt
OﬀerService1 xalt
RemoveRequest0 xalt
RemoveOﬀer0 xalt
SubscribeService0 xalt
UnsubscribeService0
Overview4 = RequestService4 xalt
OﬀerService4 xalt
RemoveRequest2 xalt
RemoveOﬀer2 xalt
SubscribeService4 xalt
UnsubscribeService4
Using these diagrams we did reﬁnement veriﬁcation between Overview 0 and Over-
view 4, and between Overview 1 and Overview 4.
Because some of the reﬁnements involve decomposition of lifelines, special care
was taken when the reﬁnements were speciﬁed. Escalator has a mechanism for hiding
lifelines in the trace generation, by specifying which lifelines should be considered
external. When traces are generated, only events that have a lifeline in the set of
external lifelines as transmitter or receiver will be present in the traces, and all other
events hidden. In Escalator it is also possible to specify lifeline mappings to be applied
in the reﬁnement veriﬁcation. When applied, lifelines in the events of the traces are
substituted according to the mappings. In this way, diagrams may be compared even
148
15.2 Reﬁnement veriﬁcation
if the names of their lifelines diﬀer. Both these mechanisms were carefully applied to
handle the decompositions of lifelines appropriately when investigating the reﬁnements
of the case.
15.2.4 Results
Table 15.3 provides the results of the reﬁnement veriﬁcation of the diagrams of the Bud-
dySync speciﬁcation. The leftmost column shows which reﬁnements that were checked.
For each reﬁnement the table shows which lifelines that were considered external in the
reﬁnement and the lifeline mappings applied, if any. The results are shown for each
of the four reﬁnement relations, abbreviated g for general, rg for restricted general, l
for limited and rl for restricted limited reﬁnement, where “Y” means it is a correct
reﬁnement and “N” that it is not a correct reﬁnement.
In addition to the reﬁnements reported in table 15.3, we also did reﬁnement ver-
iﬁcation of the Overview 0, Overview 1 and Overview 4 diagrams deﬁned in the above
Refinement Lifelines Mapping g rg l rl
RequestService0
? Requester Y Y Y Y
RequestService1
OﬀerService0
? Provider Y Y Y Y
OﬀerService1
RequestService1
? Requester, Control → System Y Y Y Y
RequestService2 Provider
OﬀerService1
? Requester, Control → System Y Y Y Y
OﬀerService2 Provider
RemoveRequest0
? Requester Control → System Y Y Y Y
RemoveRequest2
RemoveOﬀer 0
? Provider Control → System Y Y Y Y
RemoveOﬀer2
RequestService2
? All Y N Y N
RequestService3
OﬀerService2
? All Y N Y N
OﬀerService3
RequestService3
? Requester, Y Y N N
RequestService4 Provider,
MessageBoard
OﬀerService3
? Requester, Y Y N N
OﬀerService4 Provider,
MessageBoard
SubscribeService0
? User Control → System Y Y Y Y
SubscribeService4
UnsubscribeService0
? User Control → System Y Y Y Y
UnsubscribeService4
Table 15.3: Reﬁnement veriﬁcation results
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Refinement Lifelines Mappings g rg l rl
Overview 0
? Requester, Control → System N N N N
Overview4 Provider,
User
Overview 1
? Requester, Control → System Y N N N
Overview4 Provider,
User
Table 15.4: Reﬁnement veriﬁcation results of Overview diagrams
section. The result of these reﬁnement veriﬁcations are presented in table 15.4.
15.2.5 Discussion
From table 15.3, we see that most of the steps in the development of the speciﬁcation are
correct reﬁnements with respect to all of the four reﬁnement relations. The exceptions
are RequestService2  RequestService3 and OﬀerService2  OﬀerService3 that are
not restricted (general or limited) reﬁnements, and RequestService3  RequestService4
and OﬀerService3  OﬀerService4 that are not limited (restricted or unrestricted)
reﬁnements. An analysis of the diagrams reveals that the reason for the former is that
new positive behaviors are introduced in RequestService3 and OﬀerService3 by the
par operators introduced in the referred diagrams SaveRequest3 and Match3. Adding
positive traces to a speciﬁcation is not allowed in restricted reﬁnement.
The latter is a result of the new xalt operator in RequestService4 and OﬀerService4.
These xalts introduce new interaction obligations in the diagrams that are not reﬁne-
ments of pre-existing interaction obligations. This is not allowed in limited reﬁnement.
When we look at table 15.4 we note that Overview 4 is not a reﬁnement of Over-
view 0. The reason for this is that RequestService0 and OﬀerService0 do not have
communication involving, respectively, Provider and Requester, while this is introduced
in later levels. When in table 15.3, RequestService1 and OﬀerService1 are reﬁnements
of RequestService0 and OﬀerService0, it is because only Requester was external lifeline
in the case of RequestService and only Provider in the case of OﬀerService. When we
used both Requester and Provider as external lifelines in the reﬁnement veriﬁcation of
Overview, these reﬁnements were no longer valid.
Table 15.4 shows that Overview 4 is indeed a general reﬁnement of Overview 1, where
RequestService0 and OﬀerService0 are replaced by RequestService1 and OﬀerService1.
Overview 4 is not a restricted nor a limited reﬁnement of Overview 1. This is expected
since 1) RequestService3 and OﬀerService3 are not restricted reﬁnements of Request-
Service2 and OﬀerService2, 2) RequestService4 and OﬀerService4 are not limited re-
ﬁnements of RequestService3 and OﬀerService3, and 3) we know that the reﬁnement
relations are transitive and monotonic.
To summarize, we see that all unexpected results (in the sense that the tool re-
ported incorrect reﬁnements) can be explained as actual incorrect reﬁnements. An
analysis of the diagrams for the remaining cases reveals that these are in fact correct
reﬁnements. We can therefore conclude that the results of the reﬁnement veriﬁcation of
the BuddySync speciﬁcation are as expected, and that the success criterion is fulﬁlled.
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15.3 Refinement testing
In this second part of the case study we apply the reﬁnement testing functionality of the
Escalator tool to the BuddySync speciﬁcation. In section 15.3.1 we provide assumptions
and success criteria for the reﬁnement testing part of the study. Section 15.3.2 presents
the version of the BuddySync speciﬁcation applied, and section 15.3.3 presents the
setup of the reﬁnement testing part of the case study. In section 15.3.4 the results of
the reﬁnement testing are provided and in section 15.3.5 we discuss the results.
15.3.1 Assumptions and success criteria
In this part of the case study we still apply a simpliﬁed version of the BuddySync
speciﬁcation, but due to speciﬁcs of the reﬁnement testing functionality there are some
diﬀerences from the version applied in the reﬁnement veriﬁcation. These diﬀerence are
explained in the following section. We do reﬁnement testing of the same reﬁnements
that we applied the reﬁnement veriﬁcation to in the ﬁrst part of the case study.
For this part of the case study we formulate two success criteria:
1. The reﬁnement testing functionality of the tool provides the expected results when
applied to the BuddySync speciﬁcation. As with the ﬁrst part of the case, the
expected result is that all reﬁnements are correct, but also here we must con-
sider the possibility that the changes we have done in the speciﬁcation result in
incorrect reﬁnements.
2. The reﬁnement testing applied to the BuddySync speciﬁcation gives a reasonable
coverage of the speciﬁcation. As opposed to the reﬁnement veriﬁcation, the re-
ﬁnement testing is randomized. We therefore have no guarantee for full coverage
of the speciﬁcation in the reﬁnement testing. A desired property is that we have
reasonable coverage. By this we mean that even though not all details of the
speciﬁcation are covered by the reﬁnement testing, at least the major parts or
branches (e.g. alt operands) of the speciﬁcation are covered.
15.3.2 The BuddySync specification for the refinement testing
We make four changes to the BuddySync speciﬁcation with respect to the speciﬁcation
presented in section 15.2.2:
• The most visible change is that we remove the lifelines Requester, Provider and
User from all the diagrams so that all messages going to and from these lifelines
instead go to and from the frames of the diagrams. The reason for this is that in
the test generation and execution, the frame is used to deﬁne the interface of a
diagram.
• The testing mechanism does not handle the diﬀerence between alt and xalt; for
this reason we replace all xalts with alts. This applies to the diagrams Re-
questService0, OﬀerService0, SubscribeService0, RequestService1, OﬀerService1,
RequestService2, OﬀerService2, RequestService3, OﬀerService3, RequestService4,
OﬀerService4 and SubscribeService4.
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• In contrast to the reﬁnement veriﬁcation mechanism, the testing functional-
ity of Escalator does handle the assert operator. We therefore insert asserts
in the diagrams where there are asserts in the original speciﬁcation of [154].
This applies to the diagrams RemoveRequest0, RemoveOﬀer 0, UnsubscribeSer-
vice0, RemoveRequest2, RemoveOﬀer 2, RequestService4, OﬀerService4 and Un-
subscribeService4.
• In levels 2 through 4 we rename the lifeline Control to System. The reason for
this is that we need the interface/observation point of the diagrams to be the
same throughout the levels, and choose to use the lifeline name System to be this
interface/observation point.
The simpliﬁcation we did in the reﬁnement veriﬁcation when we removed actions,
constraints and guards from the original speciﬁcation of [154], still apply.
With these changes, the speciﬁcation of the BuddySync system is presented below:
• Level 0 of the speciﬁcation of the BuddySync system is found in ﬁgures 15.31–
15.36.
• Level 1 is found in ﬁgures 15.37–15.41.
• Level 2 is found in ﬁgures 15.42–15.50.
• Level 3 is found in ﬁgures 15.51–15.56.
• Finally, level 4 of the speciﬁcation is found in ﬁgures 15.57–15.60.
In this presentation we do not provide any explanatory text, but refer to the explana-
tions of the speciﬁcation given in section 15.2.2.
request
requestRegistered
agreed
sd RequestService0
alt
System
i1
o2
o1
Figure 15.31: RequestService0
offer
offerRegistered
perform
sd OfferService0
System
alt
i2
o4
o3
Figure 15.32: OﬀerService0
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removeRequest
requestRemoved
sd RemoveRequest0
System
i3
o5
assert
Figure 15.33: RemoveRequest0
removeOffer
offerRemoved
sd RemoveOffer0
System
i4
o6
assert
Figure 15.34: RemoveOﬀer 0
addedAsRequester
subscribe
addedAsProvider
sd SubscribeService0
alt
System
i5
o8
o7
Figure 15.35: SubscribeService0
unsubscribe
unsubscribed
sd UnsubscribeService0
System
i6
o9
assert
Figure 15.36: UnsubscribeService0
request
sd RequestService1
alt
System
ref Match1
ref SaveRequest1
i1
Figure 15.37: RequestService1
offer
sd OfferService1
alt
System
ref Match1
ref SaveOffer1
i2
Figure 15.38: OﬀerService1
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requestRegistered
needed
sd SaveRequest1
System
opt
o2
o10
Figure 15.39: SaveRequest1
offerRegistered
sd SaveOffer1
System
o4
Figure 15.40: SaveOﬀer 1
perform
sd Match1
System
agreed
o1
o3
Figure 15.41: Match1
findOffer
request
sd RequestService2
alt
System MessageBoard
ref MatchRequest2
ref SaveRequest2
i1
Figure 15.42: RequestService2
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findRequest
sd OfferService2
alt
System MessageBoard
ref MatchOffer2
ref SaveOffer2
offer i2
Figure 15.43: OﬀerService2
matchFound
matchFound
sd MatchRequest2
System MessageBoard
ref Match2
refuse
alt
Figure 15.44: MatchRequest2
matchFound
sd MatchOffer2
System MessageBoard
ref Match2
matchFound
refuse
alt
Figure 15.45: MatchOﬀer 2
sd Match2
System MessageBoard
perform
agreed
o1
o3
Figure 15.46: Match2
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noMatch
requestRegistered
noMatch
sd SaveRequest2
System MessageBoard
refuse
needed
opt
alt
o2
o10
Figure 15.47: SaveRequest2
noMatch
offerRegistered
noMatch
sd SaveOffer2
System MessageBoard
refuse
alt
o4
Figure 15.48: SaveOﬀer 2
removeReq
sd RemoveRequest2
System MessageBoard
removeRequest
requestRemovedo5
i3
assert
Figure 15.49: RemoveRequest2
removeOffer
removeOff
sd RemoveOffer2
System MessageBoard
offerRemoved
i4
o6
assert
Figure 15.50: RemoveOﬀer 2
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findOffer
request
sd RequestService3
alt
System MessageBoard
ref MatchRequest3
ref SaveRequest3
alt
alt
ref SaveRequest3
ref MatchRequest3
i1
refuse
refuse
Figure 15.51: RequestService3
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findRequest
sd OfferService3
alt
System MessageBoard
ref MatchOffer3
ref SaveOffer2
alt
alt
ref SaveOffer2
ref MatchOffer3
offer
i2
refuse
refuse
Figure 15.52: OﬀerService3
matchFound
matchFound
sd MatchRequest3
System MessageBoard
ref Match3
refuse
alt
Figure 15.53: MatchRequest3
matchFound
matchFound
sd MatchOffer3
System MessageBoard
ref Match3
refuse
alt
Figure 15.54: MatchOﬀer 3
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noMatch
noMatch
sd SaveRequest3
System MessageBoard
refuse
needed
requestRegistered
opt
alt
par
o2
o10
Figure 15.55: SaveRequest3
sd Match3
System MessageBoard
perform
agreed
par
o1
o3
Figure 15.56: Match3
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notSubscribed
request
sd RequestService4
System MessageBoard
ref MatchRequest3
ref SaveRequest3
findOffer
MemberList
checkSubscription
alt subscriptionNotFound
subscriptionFound
i1
o11
assert
alt
Figure 15.57: RequestService4
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MemberList
notSubscribed
offer
sd OfferService4
System MessageBoard
ref MatchOffer3
ref SaveOffer2
findRequest
checkSubscription
alt subscriptionNotFound
subscriptionFound
alt
i1
o11
assert
Figure 15.58: OﬀerService4
add
subscribe
sd SubscribeService4
alt
System MemberList
ok
addedAsProvider
ok
addedAsRequester
i5
o7
o8
Figure 15.59: SubscribeService4
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remove
unsubscribe
sd UnsubscribeService4
System MemberList
ok
unsubscribed
o9
i6
assert
Figure 15.60: UnsubscribeService4
15.3.3 Setup
As with the reﬁnement veriﬁcation part of the case, the reﬁnement testing part was
carried out with the prototype version of the Escalator tool available at the time of
the conclusion of the work on this thesis, however with the following reservation: Some
changes were made to the test generation and test execution (speciﬁcally some changes
in the assignment of verdicts) after the reﬁnement testing was conducted, and these
changes aﬀect the testing of some, but not all, of the reﬁnements. Some of the results
have therefore been updated according to these changes so that the results presented
below reﬂect the state of the tool at the time of the conclusion of the thesis. This
means that we present the results as they would have been if the reﬁnement testing
was conducted again using the same speciﬁcation on the updated tool.
In the reﬁnement testing part of the study we tested the same reﬁnements as were
checked by the reﬁnement veriﬁcation, with exception of the Overview diagrams. In
the reﬁnement testing we only handle diagrams with a single interaction obligation,
and hence only check for reﬁnement of interaction obligations, i.e. the relation r (see
section 5.4.1). For all pairs of diagrams tested we applied both “testing down” and
“testing up”. When doing reﬁnement testing of a reﬁnement d r d′, “testing down”
means tests are generated from d and executed against d′, while “testing up” means
tests are generated from d′ and executed against d. In the cases where a diagram that
tests were executed against had a larger alphabet of external transmit events than the
diagram the tests were generated from, these extra events were given as input to the
test generation.
Refinement Direction Tests Runs
OﬀerService2 r OﬀerService3 down 5 5
RequestService3 r RequestService4 down 5 3
RequestService3 r RequestService4 up 5 3
RequestService3 r RequestService4 up 1 5
OﬀerService3 r OﬀerService4 down 5 3
OﬀerService3 r OﬀerService4 up 5 3
Table 15.5: Exceptions to speciﬁcation of number of tests and runs
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The reﬁnement testing is randomized, and therefore the number of tests and number
of runs of each test must be speciﬁed. For the testing of most reﬁnements we speciﬁed 10
tests to be generated for each testing direction and 5 runs of each test. The exceptions
are shown in table 15.5. (Note that “testing up” of the reﬁnement RequestService3 r
RequestService4 was conducted twice. When presenting the results, the results of these
two iterations are aggregated.) All reﬁnement tests were carried out with random
seeds.
Also a timeout must be speciﬁed when doing reﬁnement testing. Due to a perfor-
mance issue in the implementation of the reﬁnement testing the time needed to carry
out the reﬁnement testing seems to increase exponentially with the number of oper-
ators in the speciﬁcation. We believe this to be an implementation issue and not a
fundamental ﬂaw in our test generation and test execution, and in view of this we ﬁnd
the time used by the tool for the reﬁnement testing uninteresting to report.
15.3.4 Results
The results of the reﬁnement testing are shown in tables 15.6 and 15.7. Each generated
test is given a name. The names numerate the tests and indicate whether they have
been generated and executed during “testing down” or “testing up”.
For each pair of diagrams that were tested we list the tests involved and the number
Diagrams Events Tests Runs Verdict
RequestService0 RequestService1 !perform, T
down
1 3 pass
!needed T down2 3 pass
T up3 2 fail
T up4 2 fail
OﬀerService0 OﬀerService1 !agreed T
down
5 2 pass
T down6 2 pass
T up7 2 fail
T up8 2 fail
RequestService1 RequestService2 T
down
9 2 pass
T down10 3 pass
T up11 3 pass
T up12 3 pass
OﬀerService1 OﬀerService2 T
down
13 2 pass
T down14 2 pass
T up15 2 pass
T up16 2 pass
RemoveRequest0 RemoveRequest2 T
down
17 1 pass
T down18 1 pass
T up19 1 pass
T up20 1 pass
RemoveOﬀer 0 RemoveOﬀer 2 T
down
21 1 pass
T down22 1 pass
T up23 1 pass
T up24 1 pass
Table 15.6: Testing results
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Diagrams Events Tests Runs Verdict
RequestService2 RequestService3 T
down
25 3 pass
T down26 3 pass
T up27 3 pass
T up28 3 pass
OﬀerService2 OﬀerService3 T
down
29 3 pass
T down30 2 pass
T up31 2 pass
T up32 2 pass
RequestService3 RequestService4 !notSubscribed T
down
33 3 pass
T down34 2 pass
T up35 4 pass
T up36 3 pass
OﬀerService3 OﬀerService4 !notSubscribed T
down
37 3 pass
T down38 2 pass
T up39 3 pass
T up40 3 pass
SubscribeService0 SubscribeService4 T
down
41 2 pass
T down42 2 pass
T up43 2 pass
T up44 2 pass
Unsubscribe- Unsubscribe- T down45 1 pass
Service0 Service4 T
down
46 1 pass
T up47 1 pass
T up48 1 pass
Table 15.7: Testing results cont.
of diﬀerent runs that were made with each test. The numbers reported here are lower
that the speciﬁed number of tests and test runs because the same tests and test runs
sometimes are generated more than once, due to the randomization. The tables also
show the verdict of each test. These verdicts are the verdicts of the runs of a test seen
together. The verdict pass is given if all the test runs gave verdict pass and fail is
given if at least one test run gave the verdict fail. The tables also specify which extra
events were given to the test generation algorithm.
As an example, the ﬁrst line of the table 15.6 should be read: Test T down1 was
generated from RequestService0 with the “down” option and the events !perform and
!needed as additions to the output alphabet of the diagram. The test was executed
against RequestService1 with the “down” option, which resulted in three diﬀerent runs
that all gave the verdict pass. Further, line three should be read: Test T up3 was
generated from RequestService1 using the “up” option and with no additional events
in the output alphabet. It was executed against RequestService0 with the “up” option,
which resulted in two runs of which at least one gave the verdict fail.
15.3.5 Discussion
When we look at tables 15.6 and 15.7 we observe that the testing of all reﬁnements
returned the verdict pass, except for the “testing up” of the reﬁnements RequestSer-
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vice0 r RequestService1 and OﬀerService0 r OﬀerService1.
In the ﬁrst of these cases we see that some of the test runs of T up3 and T
up
4 give the
verdict fail. The actual test runs that give this verdict are the test runs
〈θ, !request , ?request , !agreed , ?agreed〉
and
〈!request , ?request , !agreed , ?agreed〉
These runs both represent a trace that is present (positive) in RequestService0 but is
not present (inconclusive) in RequestService1. Hence this is not a correct reﬁnement
according to the deﬁnition of r.
The case of T up7 and T
up
8 is analogous. The runs of these tests giving the verdict
fail are
〈θ, !oﬀer , ?oﬀer , !perform, ?perform, θ〉
and
〈!oﬀer , ?oﬀer , !perform, ?perform, θ〉
Both represent a trace that is positive in OﬀerService0 but inconclusive in OﬀerSer-
vice1.
By inspecting the rest of the speciﬁcation we ﬁnd that the other tested reﬁnements
are indeed correct. We can therefore conclude that the reﬁnement testing gave the
expected results, and that the ﬁrst of the success criteria is fulﬁlled.
From tables 15.6 and 15.7 we see that for each of the reﬁnements, two tests were
generated in the “testing down” and two tests were generated in the “testing up”. If we
look at the diagrams in the reﬁnement testing part of the study, we observe that they
all follow a pattern where the System lifeline ﬁrst receives a message from the frame
of the diagram and then transmits one or more messages back to the frame. Stated
diﬀerently, all diagrams specify that the system receives an input and then does one
or more outputs. If we see this characteristic of the diagrams together with the test
generation algorithm, we realize that there are only two tests that can be generated
from each of the diagrams. We can therefore consider the test generation in this case
study to be complete.
The same is not true for test execution. Table 15.8 shows the potential (based on
an analysis of the diagrams in the study) and actual test runs of each test. What we
observe is that for most, but not all, of the tests, all possible test runs did appear in
the test execution. By inspecting the test runs we discover that for tests T down9 , T
down
25 ,
T down26 , T
down
30 , T
down
33 , T
up
35 , T
up
36 an T
down
37 we still had all main branches (i.e. alt operands)
covered. This leaves the tests T down34 and T
down
38 , where one branch each of the diagrams
they were tested against was not covered. These branches were, however, covered by
the test runs of tests T down33 and T
down
37 , which were part of testing the same reﬁnement
as T down34 and T
down
38 , respectively.
Based on this analysis of the test runs, we can safely say that the test execution had
reasonable coverage of the speciﬁcation. With complete test generation (i.e. all possible
tests were generated) and reasonable coverage in the test execution, we can conclude
that we have reasonable coverage of the speciﬁcation in the reﬁnement testing. This
means we also have fulﬁllment of the second success criterion.
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Test Potential Actual
T down1 3 3
T down2 3 3
T up3 2 2
T up4 2 2
T down5 2 2
T down6 2 2
T up7 2 2
T up8 2 2
T down9 3 2
T down10 3 3
T up11 3 3
T up12 3 3
T down13 2 2
T down14 2 2
T up15 2 2
T up16 2 2
T down17 1 1
T down18 1 1
T up19 1 1
T up20 1 1
T down21 1 1
T down22 1 1
T up23 1 1
T up24 1 1
Test Potential Actual
T down25 5 3
T down26 5 3
T up27 3 3
T up28 3 3
T down29 3 3
T down30 3 2
T up31 2 2
T up32 2 2
T down33 6 3
T down34 6 2
T up35 5 4
T up36 5 3
T down37 4 3
T down38 4 2
T up39 3 3
T up40 3 3
T down41 2 2
T down42 2 2
T up43 2 2
T up44 2 2
T down45 1 1
T down46 1 1
T up47 1 1
T up48 1 1
Table 15.8: Potential and actual test runs
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Related work on testing
Several approaches to generating tests from UML statecharts have been made (see
e.g. [66, 93, 136]) as well as other state based formalisms (see e.g. [102, 177–179, 183]
and also chapter 12). Several of these have been implemented in tools (e.g. [95, 180]).
Characteristic for such approaches is that statecharts and state based formalisms are
complete speciﬁcations, and further that they are methods for conformance testing of
implementations. They can therefore be seen as establishing a relation between design
and code, and further as operating on a lower level of abstraction that our sequence
diagram based approach. Because of this, they can be seen as being orthogonal to
our approach. We do not go any deeper into this, and in the following concentrate on
sequence diagram or MSC based approaches.
The UML Testing Proﬁle [133] is an extension of UML that deﬁnes a method
for specifying tests as sequence diagrams. In [13] a methodology for model driven
development with the proﬁle is provided. The proﬁle contains an informal notion of
test execution as well as mappings from tests speciﬁed with this proﬁle to tests in
JUnit and Testing and Test Control Notation (TTCN-3). TTCN-3 is a language for
speciﬁcation of tests in a MSC like notation, as well as a textual notation, and can
be seen as a predecessor of the UML Testing Proﬁle (see e.g. [38, 160]). Neither do,
however, specify or deﬁne test generation, and in this respect our work may be seen as
complementary to the UML Testing Proﬁle and TTCN-3.
Diﬀerent approaches to generating tests from sequence diagrams and MSCs exist.
In [167,168] a scheme for generating tests from UML 2.x sequence diagrams is described
in an informal manner. The sequence diagrams are allowed to contain the operator neg
in order to specify negative cases, but can not contain alt or other high-level operators.
The approach is based on also having UML protocol state machines describing the
system to obtain information on behavior that is inconclusive in the sequence diagrams.
In [52] a method for executing sequence diagrams as tests is described, and [22]
describes a method for extracting tests from sequence diagram speciﬁcations. Also in
these approaches the level of formality is not very high, and they seem to be mostly
experience and heuristic based approaches. Further, they are based on UML 1.x and
hence do not deal with high-level operators such as alt, assert and neg.
In [56] test generation from the Speciﬁcation and Description Language (SDL) [86]
with MSCs as test purposes is described, and [12] deﬁnes test generation from MSCs.
These approaches are more formal than the above mentioned UML sequence diagram
approaches, but still they are less general than our approach, because MSCs do not
contain the assert and neg operators.
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In [103] an approach for generating tests from MSCs is presented that is based on
ﬁrst translating MSCs to ﬁnite state machines and then apply other existing methods
for test generation from state machines. This approach therefore considers MSCs
as complete speciﬁcations. Further, the approach simpliﬁes the MSC semantics by
interpreting message passing as synchronous and by letting the lifelines synchronize.
Similar to our approach in some aspects is the approach of [143]. Tests are generated
from UML models (statecharts, class diagrams and object diagrams) with sequence dia-
grams as test objectives. The sequence diagrams may characterize acceptance scenarios
or rejection scenarios, and the partial nature of sequence diagrams is recognized. Both
statecharts and sequence diagrams are translated into LTSs, and the ioco algorithm is
used for test generation from these LTSs. The generated tests are then translated back
to a sequence diagram like notation.
Also the approach of [126] have some similarities to our work. In this approach,
abstract tests expressed as sequence diagrams are generated from a combination of
formalized use cases and sequence diagrams. The sequence diagrams are based on
UML 1.x and are interpreted with strict sequencing.
Our reﬁnement testing diﬀers from the above presented approaches in several ways.
Our test generation is based purely on generating tests from sequence diagrams with-
out any additional information. We stay loyal to the intended semantics of sequence
diagrams by interpreting them as partial speciﬁcations and with weak sequencing, and
we do not make simpliﬁcations to the semantics (e.g. by interpreting sequence diagrams
as complete speciﬁcation or with strict sequencing) to simplify the test generation. In
addition, our approach is more general as we allow sequence diagrams to contain the
operators neg and assert.
The approach of [177–179] and its implementation in the TorX tool [180] can prob-
ably be applied to validate ioco conformance between labeled transition systems, even
though this is not necessarily the intended use of the theory and the tool. In earlier
work [109–111] we have applied testing techniques to investigate reﬁnements of SDL
speciﬁcations. Except from these, we are not aware of any other approaches where
test generation and test execution are applied for investigating the relation between
speciﬁcations at diﬀerent levels of abstraction. Our reﬁnement testing is still unique as
an approach that is developed speciﬁcally for the purpose of testing reﬁnements and
that is based on sequence diagrams.
168
Part V
Availability
169

Chapter 17
Introduction to availability
This part of the thesis is concerned with developing methods for specifying and analyz-
ing availability based on speciﬁcations. An important trend in current system develop-
ment is the focus on services, cf. service oriented architecture (SOA) (see e.g. [46,130]).
We therefore ﬁnd it natural to apdopt a service oriented view of availability. This
works both ways; with a service oriented view on availability we ﬁnd an application
area for our approach to system speciﬁcation and analysis, but on the other hand a
sevice oriented view on system development creates an increasing demand for availabil-
ity of services. This also ﬁts our overall apporach to system speciﬁcation, as there is a
long tradition of using sequence diagrams and similar notations for specifying services.
In chapter 18 we present a conceptual model for service availability. There we
argue that in order to properly specify and analyze availability, the notion of service
availability must be decomposed into measurable properties. We view availability as
being a collection of exclusivity properties and accessibility properties. Exclusivity
properties are closely related to authentication, while accessibility is seen as a com-
bination of timeliness properties and quality properties. While quality is related to
quality of service (QoS), timeliness may be seen as a generalization of real-time prop-
erties. Within real-time, we may distinguish between hard real-time and soft real-time.
Services with hard real-time are characterized by strict deadlines to which they should
provided responses, while in services with soft real-time this requirement is relaxed
so that reasonable deviations to the deadlines are allowed. What distinguishes soft
real-time from hard real-time may be expressed by application of probabilities; where
hard real-time speciﬁes a deadline, soft real-time may specify a deadline with an as-
sociated probability, i.e., expressing that the deadline must be reached with a certain
probability.
While soft real-time may be a more appropriate model for many services, hard real-
time is easier to specify and analyze because we do not have to take the probabilities
into consideration. In this thesis we concentrate on hard real-time properties, and do
not go further into the topics of quality and soft real-time.
In chapter 19 we take a ﬁrst step towards specifying and analyzing availability prop-
erties by extending our operational semantics with support for hard real-time. Then,
in section 20, we investigate the possibility of applying our operational semantics ex-
tended with data and time to the speciﬁcation and analysis of availability properties by
conducting a case study. Chapter 21 provides related work with respect to speciﬁcation
and analysis of real-time properties.
171
Introduction to availability
172
Chapter 18
A conceptual model for service
availability1
Availability is an important aspect of today’s society. Vital functions as e.g. air traﬃc
control and telecom systems, especially emergency telecommunications services, are
totally dependent on available computer systems. The consequences are serious if even
parts of such systems are unavailable when their services are needed.
Traditionally, the notion of availability has been deﬁned as the probability that a
system is working at time t, and the availability metric has been given by the “uptime”
ratio, representing the percentage of time that a system is “up” during its lifetime [148].
This system metric has been applied successfully worldwide for years in the PSTN/-
ISDN2 telephony networks along with failure reporting methodologies [45]. This metric
does not suﬃciently characterize important aspects of service availability. Service avail-
ability needs a more enhanced metric in order to measure availability in a way that
meets the demands of today’s services which have been shown to have much more
bursty patterns of use than traditional PSTN/ISDN services [33].
Indeed, as the environment where services are deployed becomes more and more
complex [9] a more ﬁne-grained view on “what is availability” is needed. Several global
virus attacks have shown that availability is indeed aﬀected by security breaches, e.g.,
when e-mail servers are ﬂooded by infected e-mails, the availability for ordinary e-mails
decreases. Another example is denial of service (DoS) attacks, for which a service is
overloaded with requests with the only purpose of making the service unavailable for
other users.
In order to model and analyze the availability of computerized systems in a world
where the dependency on and the complexity of such systems are increasing, the tra-
ditional notion of availability is no longer suﬃcient. We present a conceptual model
for service availability designed to handle these challenges. The core of this model is
a characterization of service availability by means of accessibility properties and ex-
clusivity properties. Further, we seek to preserve well-established deﬁnitions from our
main sources of inspiration to the extent possible: security, dependability, real-time
systems, and quality of service (QoS).
In section 18.1 we provide the basis of our investigation into availability, including
diﬀerent viewpoints on and approaches to availability, and other aspects in the ﬁelds
1This chapter is based on [149, 150] and represents joint work with Judith E. Y. Rossebø, Atle
Refsdal and Knut Eilif Husa.
2Public Switched Telephone Network/Integrated Services Digital Network.
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of security and dependability. In section 18.2 the properties of service availability are
discussed, and in section 18.3 the overall conceptual model is presented. In section 18.4
a summary is provided.
18.1 Characterizing aspects of service availability
The setting for our investigation is derived from the ﬁelds of dependability and security,
and we therefore strive to conform to the well-established concepts and deﬁnitions
from these ﬁelds where there is a consensus. We also look to diﬀerent approaches
and viewpoints in dependability and security research to motivate and derive a set
of requirements for a service availability concept model which enables an augmented
treatment of availability that is more suited to securing availability in today’s and
future services.
18.1.1 Definitions of availability
Availability has been treated by the ﬁeld of dependability and the ﬁeld of security. The
deﬁnitions of availability commonly used in these ﬁelds are:
1. Readiness for correct service [11].
2. Ensuring that authorized users have access to information and associated assets
when required [80].
3. The property of being accessible and usable on demand by an authorized en-
tity [78, 81].
We ﬁnd the ﬁrst of these deﬁnitions to be insuﬃciently constraining for practical ap-
plication to design of services with high availability requirements. An integral part of
securing availability is ensuring that that the service is provided to authorized users;
this is not addressed by the ﬁrst deﬁnition. It is, however, addressed by the second, but
neither the ﬁrst nor the second captures the aspect of a service being usable. The third
deﬁnition captures all of these aspects, and therefore is the basis for our development
of a more reﬁned availability model.
In order to ensure service availability, it is essential to reﬁne this notion to include
addressing the aspect of ensuring that the service is provided to the authorized users
only. For example, in order to calculate penetration and usage parameters, the total
number of authorized users that are expected to access the service at a given time must
be known. This is important to prevent the service from being overloaded.
As already argued, there is a need to provide an enhanced classiﬁcation and model
of service availability in order to thoroughly analyze and enable the rigorous treatment
of availability throughout the design process depending on the requirements of the
individual services.
18.1.2 Attributes, means and threats
The IFIP WG 10.4 view on dependability is provided in [11]. Figure 18.1 shows their
concept model of dependability.
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Dependability
Attributes
Safety
Availability
Reliability
Confidentiality
Integrity
Maintainability
Fault Tolerance
Fault Prevention
Fault Removal
Fault Forecasting
Faults
Errors
Failures
Means
Threats
Security
Figure 18.1: Conceptual model of dependability
This conceptual model of dependability consists of three parts: the attributes of, the
threats to and the means by which dependability is attained. This is a nice approach
which motivates us to use a similar approach in our classiﬁcation of service availability.
Clearly, threats to availability such as denial of service, and means to availability such as
applying redundancy dimensioning techniques, have an important place in availability
analysis.
In [11], the means by which dependability can be attained are fault prevention,
fault tolerance, fault removal and fault forecasting. Fault prevention: how to prevent
introduction of faults. Fault tolerance: how to deliver correct service in the presence of
faults. Fault removal : how to reduce the number of faults, and ﬁnally fault forecasting :
how to estimate the present number, future incidents and likely consequences of faults.
This approach does not address all of the means by which service availability can
be obtained. This is because incidents resulting in loss of service availability do not
necessarily transpire due to faults and therefore classiﬁcation of means in terms of
faults as in [11] is, in our view, insuﬃcient for availability analysis. An example is the
hijacking of user sessions by an attacker or group of attackers, preventing the authorized
user or group of users from accessing the service. This incident results in loss of service
availability for a set of users, without incurring a fault in the system.
An unwanted incident is deﬁned in [171] as an incident such as loss of conﬁdentiality,
integrity and/or availability. A fault is an example of an unwanted incident. Therefore,
in order to classify threats to availability and means to achieve availability in a security
setting, we are also motivated by the approach used in the security ﬁeld of risk analysis
and risk management as in [40, 112].
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Threat
integrity
User
Environmental influence
delivery-of-service
reliability/availability
(safely)
denial-of-service
confidentiality/exclusivity
(safety)
System behavior
fault
introduction
Non-user
Object
system
vulnerability
Figure 18.2: Jonsson’s conceptual model
In [11], the threats to dependability are deﬁned as faults, errors and failures, and
these are seen as a causal chain of threats:
fault −→ error −→ failure
This understanding of threats serves nicely in the dependability model, however, we use
the deﬁnition of threat as deﬁned in [81]: a threat is a potential cause of an unwanted
event, which may result in harm to a system or organization and its assets. Unlike [11],
we do not consider such causal chains alone as the sole threats to availability, as service
availability may be reduced by e.g. a denial of service (DoS) attack which reduces the
service availability without causing a fault, error, or failure to the actual service itself.
18.1.3 Viewpoints
For our availability analysis, it is appropriate to evaluate whether we should consider a
system from a black box or white box perspective. In [90], Jonsson provides a concep-
tual model for security/dependability with a black box view as shown in ﬁgure 18.2.
In this system model view, Jonsson considers availability to be a purely behavioral
aspect related to the outputs of the system, solely with respect to the users. As can
been deduced from ﬁgure 18.2, exclusivity is a means to ensure availability. This
viewpoint is valid and useful for some aspects of availability analysis; however, we see
the need for evaluating availability from other viewpoints as well. Availability aspects
of the internal components of the system must also be analyzed.
We claim that aspects of availability must indeed be observed from both the input
side and the output side as well as the internal components of the system. For example,
denial of service attacks can be observed as malicious input to a system to ﬂood the
system.
It is also important to observe and analyze the internal behavior in the system in or-
der to analyze the availability aspects of components, in particular service components
which collaborate to deliver the service. Motivated by a service-oriented system view,
only a white box view allows and facilitates the speciﬁcation of the internal means to
achieve availability and the examination of internal causes that aﬀect availability.
Figure 18.3 summarizes the diﬀerent concerns for analyzing availability. From the
point of view of the user, the service is either available, or it is not. The system
view is well understood in the dependability ﬁeld, and as discussed above, Jonsson
provides an evaluation from a system viewpoint and with a security point of view.
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Service
availability
component
System
component
System
availability
component
Service
component +
+System viewpoint
Service viewpoint
Black box view White box view
Viewpoint 
of the user
Figure 18.3: Viewpoints for analyzing availability
The Service Availability Forum (SAF) is working on standardizing middleware for the
open interfaces between the layers [162], see ﬁgure 18.4. In our work on securing
availability in service composition, we are analyzing availability from the decomposed
service viewpoint, according to requirements of the users.
18.1.4 Diversity of services
In the current and future telecommunications market, there are many diﬀerent types
of services each of which may have diﬀerent requirements with respect to availability.
Telephony services, and in particular, emergency services, are examples of services with
stringent availability requirements. Internet-based services, however, have somewhat
diﬀerent requirements. Requirements for what may be tolerated of delays or timing
out of services are rather lax currently for e.g., online newspaper services.
For traditional telecommunications services, the requirement of 99, 999% availability
is still valid, however, it does not suﬃciently address all of the diﬀerentiated require-
ments with respect to service availability. More precisely, as advocated by SAF, there
is also a need for a customer centric approach to deﬁning availability requirements. The
availability concern of the Service Availability Forum is readiness for correct service
and in particular continuity of service, with a focus on the demands of the customers.
Service availability as deﬁned by the Service Availability Forum aims to meet the fol-
lowing demands:
• Customers demand and expect continuous service availability.
• Customers want always-on services and connections that are maintained without
disruption – regardless of hardware, software, or operator-caused system faults
or failures.
The availability concern of the Service Availability Forum is readiness for correct service
and in particular continuity of service, with a focus on the demands of the customers.
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Applications
Service availability
middleware
Operating system
Hardware
Application
interface
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Figure 18.4: The Service Availability Forum framework
The Service Availability Forum is concerned with availability of today’s systems from
the dependability perspective providing a transition from the application of dependabil-
ity to traditional telecommunications systems to current systems which are distributed.
We incorporate the ideas of the Service Availability Forum in our model, to enable
customer oriented availability requirements, however, extending these to include the
aspects of ensuring that unauthorized users cannot interrupt, hijack, or prevent the
authorized users from accessing a service.
18.1.5 Measures
As discussed above, we need a more ﬁne grained measure of availability than pure “up”
or “down”. Services can exist in numerous degraded but operational/usable/functional
states between “up” and “down” or “correct” and “incorrect”. It should be possible
to describe various states of availability in order to specify just how much a reduction
of service quality may be tolerated.
While both the Common Criteria [79] and Johnson [90] deﬁne security measures
and provide techniques for measuring security in general, there is a need for a more ﬁne
grained metric for measuring service availability that takes into account, for example,
measurement of how well user requirements are fulﬁlled, as well as a need for measuring
the ability to adequately provision a service to all of the authorized users requiring the
service at a given moment. Such a metric needs to take into account the appropriate set
of parameters, not just the usual average based on the mean time to failure (MTTF)
and the mean time to repair (MTTR).
18.2 Properties of service availability
We claim that service availability encompasses both exclusivity, the property of being
able to ensure access to authorized users only, and accessibility, the property of being at
hand and usable when needed. As such, contrary to, e.g. [11], which treats availability
as an atomic property, we see service availability as a composite notion consisting of
the following aspects:
• Exclusivity
• Accessibility
We elaborate on these two properties in the following sub-sections.
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18.2.1 Exclusivity
By exclusivity we mean the ability to ensure access for authorized users only. More
speciﬁcally, this involves ensuring that unauthorized users cannot interrupt, hijack, or
prevent the authorized users from accessing a service. This aspect is essential to prevent
the denial of legitimate access to systems and services. That is, to focus on prohibiting
unauthorized users from interrupting, or preventing authorized users from accessing
services. Our deﬁnition of exclusivity involves both users and non-users, i.e., ensuring
access to users while keeping unauthorized users out. This is in order to properly
address means of achieving exclusivity some of which will address ensuring access for
authorized users and others will address techniques for preventing unauthorized users
from accessing or interrupting services.
The goal with respect to exclusivity is to secure access to services for authorized
users in the best possible way. Essentially this means:
• Secure access to services for the authorized users.
• Provide denial of service defence mechanisms. Here we focus on prohibiting
unauthorized users from interrupting, or preventing users from accessing services.
• Ensure that unauthorized users do not gain access to services.
Note that attacks via covert channels or by eavesdropping can lead to loss of con-
ﬁdentiality without loss of exclusivity as the attacker is not accessing the service, but
passively listening in on service activity. Conﬁdentiality, however, consists of exclusiv-
ity and absence of unauthorized disclosure of information.
18.2.2 Accessibility
We deﬁne accessibility as the quality of being at hand and usable when needed. The
notion of “service” is rather general, and what deﬁnes the correctness of a service may
diﬀer widely between diﬀerent kinds of services. Accessibility is related to QoS [14,
135, 187], but what is considered relevant qualities vary from one domain to another.
Furthermore, QoS parameters tend to be technology dependent. An example of this
is properties like video resolution and frame rates [187], which are clearly relevant for
IP-based multimedia services and clearly not relevant in other service domains, such
as the Short Message Service (SMS) or instant messaging services.
What all services do seem to have in common is the requirement of being timely; for
a service to be accessible it must give the required response within reasonable time. In
addition to being timely, a service will be required to perform with some quality to be
usable. Hence, we divide accessibility properties into two major classes of properties:
timeliness properties and quality properties. Timeliness is the ability of a service to
perform its required functions and provide its required responses within speciﬁed time
limits. A service’s quality is a measure of its correctness and/or how usable it is.
Consider an online booking service. From the viewpoint of a user at a given point in
time, we could say that the quality of the service is either 1 or 0 depending on whether
the user gets a useful reply (e.g. conﬁrmation) or unuseful reply (e.g. timeout). (Over
time this can be aggregated to percentages expressing how often one of the two kinds
of responses will be given.)
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Figure 18.6: Quality vs. timeliness
In a multimedia service like video streaming, the frame rate may be seen as a
timeliness property (each frame should be timely) while the resolution of each frame
and the color depth are quality properties.
In both these examples we may see a dependency between timeliness and quality.
In the ﬁrst example (ﬁgure 18.5) we may assume a deadline t2 for the response to the
user for the service to be accessible. However, we must also assume some processing
time t1 for the service to be able to produce an answer. This means that the quality
requirement enforces a lower bound on the timeliness; if the deadline is too short the
user will always receive the timeout message. In other words we must have that t1 < t2
for the service to be accessible.
In the other example (ﬁgure 18.6) we may assume that higher quality requires more
processing time per frame. This means that a required quality q1 provides a lower limit
t1 on the processing time of each frame. Further, to get the required frame rate there
must be a deadline t2 for each frame, which provide an upper bound q2 on the quality.
This means the service must stay between this lower and upper bound to be accessible.
This approach may be seen as an elaboration of Meyer’s concept of performability
evaluation [124].
These considerations motivate a notion of service degradation. We deﬁne service
degradation to be reduction of service accessibility. Analogous to accessibility we de-
compose service degradation into timeliness degradation and quality degradation, and
see that these are quantities mutually dependent on each other. For example, graceful
degradation in timeliness may be a way of avoiding quality degradation if resources are
limited, or the other way around. A combination of graceful degradation in timeliness
and graceful degradation in quality may also be applied. Related to QoS, accessibility
may actually be considered a QoS tolerance cut-oﬀ, i.e., the point at which the QoS
deteriorates to a level where the service is deemed no longer usable, so that the service
is considered unavailable.
18.3 The conceptual model
Based on the above discussion we propose the overall model presented in ﬁgure 18.7
(presented as a UML class diagram) and further explained in the following text.
In the ﬁgure the relationships between availability, threats and means are shown.
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Figure 18.7: The overall picture
Availability is aﬀected by means and threats. Means ensures availability by preventing
and countering unwanted incidents and protects against threats. Threats may lead to
unwanted incidents causing reduction of availability.
There are many diﬀerent types of services, and they may have diﬀerent require-
ments with respect to availability. Availability requirements should be ﬂexible enough
to address the diﬀerent services consistently. We propose that availability is speci-
ﬁed by the means of availability policies and predicates over measurable properties of
services, and that these policies and predicates are decomposed in accordance to the
decomposition of availability in the conceptual model. An availability policy consists
of an accessibility policy (e.g., required resources) and an exclusivity policy (e.g., which
entities have permissions to use the service or system).
18.4 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a conceptual model for service availability that
takes into account a much broader spectrum of aspects that inﬂuence availability than
previously addressed by work in this area. We have argued that exclusivity is an aspect
of availability that has been generally neglected in the literature, and have shown where
it ﬁts in an enhanced notion of service availability. Further we have shown how QoS,
real-time and dependability considerations may be integrated in the model and treated
as accessibility properties.
Our conceptual model for availability embraces both a white box view as well
as a black box view of availability and, hence, addresses both internal and external
concerns of availability. The need for this is apparent in our current work on ensuring
availability in service composition that encompasses a collaboration of roles, which are
slices of behavior across distributed systems. These must be composed correctly in
order to achieve a service with the required availability.
The model also establishes the relationship between threats, means and availability
properties. Together these elements provide a framework in which all relevant views
and considerations of availability may be integrated, and a complete picture of service
availability may be drawn.
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Chapter 19
Towards analyzing availability
This chapter takes a ﬁrst step towards specifying and analyzing availability properties
by extending our operational semantics with support for hard real-time. As explained
below we choose an approach where time is treated as data. This means that we start
by extending the operational semantics with data handling, and then apply the data
handling mechanisms to extend the operational semantics with time. Data handling is
presented in section 19.1 and time in section 19.2.
19.1 Operational semantics with data and variables
In this section we present an extension of the operational semantics with data and
variables. Though inspired by STAIRS with data [156], there are certain diﬀerences.
These diﬀerences are explained in section 21.1.1.
We ﬁnd that the graphical syntax suggested by the UML standard is somewhat
sparse for a consistent treatment of data. Imagine you want to specify a scenario
where a lifeline l sends a value (e.g. 5) to a lifeline k, lifeline k squares the value and
sends the result back to l, and l then performs a check of whether or not it received the
square of the value it sent. This could be speciﬁed by the diagram sqr5 in ﬁgure 19.1.
The problem with this diagram is that it lacks bindings between the data present in its
various events. While this may be OK in a declarative setting we ﬁnd this unsatisfactory
when deﬁning an operational semantics; we want to actually execute the diagram and
b(m)
a(5)
sd sqr5
l k
m := 5 · 5
{m = 25}
Figure 19.1: Diagram with data
b(j := m)
a(i := n)
sd sqr
l k
n := 5
m := i · i
{j = n · n}
Figure 19.2: Diagram with data
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perform the calculations. We therefore propose a more detailed notation, as exempliﬁed
by the diagram sqr in ﬁgure 19.2. In this diagram all bindings are explicit and we have
the information necessary to do the calculations speciﬁed in the diagram.
All details of the textual syntax are given in section 19.1.2, after we have presented
some necessary preliminaries on data and variables in section 19.1.1. In section 19.1.3
the extended operational semantics with data is presented, and in section 19.1.4 we
provide a treatment of guarded choices.
19.1.1 Data and variables
We assume common data types such as Booleans, natural numbers, integers, reals,
strings, etc. and use common operators for these types when building expressions.
Further, we allow any data type as long as an axiomatic deﬁnition is provided, but we
will not provide such deﬁnitions. In order to keep things simple we let the types be
implicit and assume that all expressions are correct with respect to syntax and type.
Let Var , Val and Expr denote the sets of variables, values (constants) and expres-
sions, respectively. Obviously we have that Var ⊂ Expr and Val ⊂ Expr . Further let
var ∈ Expr → P(Var) be a function that returns the free variables of an expression.
An expression x ∈ Expr is closed if var(x) = ∅. We let CExpr denote the set of closed
expressions, deﬁned as:
CExpr
def
= {x ∈ Expr | var(x) = ∅}
We assume the existens of a function eval ∈ CExpr → Val that evaluates any closed
expression to a value.
Let σ ∈ Var → Expr be a (partial) mapping from variables to expressions. We
denote such a mapping σ = {v1 → x1, v2 → x2, . . . , vn → xn} for v1, v2, . . . , vn ∈ Var
and x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ Expr . If x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ Val we call it a data state. We let Σ
denote the set of all mappings and Σ̂ the set of all data states.
The empty mapping is denoted by ∅. dom.σ denotes the domain of σ, i.e.:
dom.{v1 → x1, v2 → x2, . . . , vn → xn} def= {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
For every σ ∈ Σ we assert that #σ = #(dom.σ). σ[v → x] is the mapping σ except
that it maps v to x, i.e.:
{v1 → x1, . . . , vn → xn}[v → x] def=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
{v1 → x1, . . . , vn → xn, v → x}
if v = vi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
{v1 → x1, . . . , vi → x, . . . vn → xn}
if v = vi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
We generalize σ[v → x] to σ[σ′] in the following way:
σ[{v1 → x1, v2 → x2, . . . , vn → xn}] def= σ[v1 → x1][v2 → x2] · · · [vn → xn]
σ(v) returns the expression that v maps to, and is only deﬁned for v ∈ dom.σ, i.e.:
{v1 → x1, . . . , vi → xi, . . . vn → xn}(vi) def= xi
x{σ} denotes the expression obtained from x by simultaneously substituting the
free variables of x with the expressions that these variables map to in σ. For example
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we have that (y+z){{y → 1, z → 2}} = 1+2. In addition we let σ′{σ} be the mapping
where this process is applied to all expressions in the range of σ′, i.e.:
{v1 → x1, v2 → x2, . . . , vn → xn}{σ} def= {v1 → x1{σ}, v2 → x2{σ}, . . . , vn → xn{σ}}
We also overload the function eval to evaluate all expressions in range of a mapping
only containing closed expressions:
eval({v1 → x1, . . . , vn → xn}) def= {v1 → eval(x1), . . . , vn → eval(xn)}
Similar to the mappings from variables to expressions we also operate with mappings
Δ ∈ L → Σ̂ from lifelines to data states. On these mappings we deﬁne operations
Δ[l → σ], Δ(l) and dom.Δ identical to the deﬁnition of σ[v → x], σ(v) and dom.σ
given above.
19.1.2 Syntax
In our approach lifelines are non-synchronizing. In recognition of lifelines as inde-
pendent entities, and messages as the only means of communication, we assume all
variables to be local to a lifeline. Assignments to variables are events belonging to
lifelines, and may also occur within parameterized messages. Formally, a variable of
a message is a local variable in both the transmitter and the receiver lifeline of the
message. This means that, for example in the diagram sqr of ﬁgure 19.2 above, both
lifeline l and lifeline k have a local variable i because the message a has a parameter i,
but the i of l and the i of k are not the same variable.
In the syntax deﬁned in section 5.2, the set of signals S is merely a set of labels. In
order to add parameters to messages we let N denote the set of all signal labels, and
deﬁne the set of signals to be:
S def= N × Σ
A signal (an element of S) is then a pair (s, σ). This way, all other deﬁnitions related
to messages carry over. Syntactically we represent a signal (s, σ) as s(σ).
We extend the deﬁnition of sequence diagrams (see page 29) with two new syntactic
constructs, assign and constr, to represent assignments and constraints. Let A and C
denote the set of assignments and constraints, respectively. A and C are deﬁned as
v ∈ V ar ∧ x ∈ Expr ∧ l ∈ L ⇒ assign(v, x, l) ∈ A
b ∈ Expr ∧ l ∈ L ⇒ constr(b, l) ∈ C
where we assume b in constr(b, l) to be a Boolean expression. We let A ⊂ D and C ⊂ D.
Note that A, C, E and T are pairwise disjoint. We let the function l. also range over
assignments and constraints:
l.assign(v, x, l)
def
= l
l.constr(x, l)
def
= l
With these new syntactical constructs, the textual representation of the diagram
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sqr of ﬁgure 19.2 becomes:
sqr = assign(n, 5, l) seq
(!, (a({i → n}), l, k)) seq
(?, (a({i → n}), l, k)) seq
assign(m, i · i, k) seq
(!, (b({j → m}), k, l)) seq
(?, (b({j → m}), k, l)) seq
constr(j = n · n, l)
We let the function var be overloaded to also range over diagrams in such a way
that it returns the variables manipulated or accessed by a diagram:
var((!, (s(ϕ), tr, re)))
def
=
⋃
v∈dom.ϕ({v} ∪ var(ϕ(v)))
var((?, (s(ϕ), tr, re)))
def
= dom.ϕ
var(assign(v, x, l))
def
= {v} ∪ var(x)
var(constr(x, l))
def
= var(x)
var(skip)
def
= ∅
var(op d)
def
= var(d), op ∈ {neg, refuse, opt, assert, loop}
var(d1 op d2)
def
= var(d1) ∪ var(d2), op ∈ {seq, par, strict, alt, xalt}
There is an asymmetry in the deﬁnition of the variables of transmit events and receive
events. The reason for this is that we assume the expressions in the parameters of
messages to be evaluated at the transmission point, and therefore the variables of
these expressions are not accessed by the receiver lifeline.
We let π ( ) ∈ L×D → D be a function that projects a diagram on a given lifeline
such that, e.g.:
πl(sqr) = assign(n, 5, l) seq
(!, (a({i → n}), l, k)) seq
(?, (b({j → m}), k, l)) seq
constr(j = n · n, l)
πk(sqr) = (?, (a({i → n}), l, k)) seq
assign(m, i · i, k) seq
(!, (b({j → m}), k, l))
We then have:
var(πl(sqr)) = {n, i, j}
var(πk(sqr)) = {m, i, j}
This provides an unambiguous assignment of the variables visible in a diagram to
lifelines.
19.1.3 Semantics
The execution system of the operational semantics provides us with execution states,
and this is something we make use of in our handling of data. We extend the execution
states to also hold mappings from lifelines to data states:
[β, d,Δ] ∈ B × D × (L → Σ̂)
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Δ contains a data state for each lifeline in d. In the initial state of an execution, each
of these data states should map all variables of the lifeline to values, i.e. all variables
should be deﬁned at the start of the execution. The set of possible initial mappings
from lifelines to data states, given a diagram d, can then be expressed by the following
function:
initData(d)
def
= {Δ ∈ L → Σ̂ | ∀l ∈ ll.d : Δ(l) ∈ Σ̂ ∧ var(πl(d)) ⊆ dom.(Δ(l))}
The rules of the projection system remain unchanged, with the exception of two
new rules for handling assignments and constraints:
Π(L, β, a)
a−→ Π(L, β, skip) if a ∈ A ∧ l.a ∈ L (19.1)
Π(L, β, c)
c−→ Π(L, β, skip) if c ∈ C ∧ l.c ∈ L (19.2)
The rules of the execution system, on the other hand, are redeﬁned to handle the
data states, the assignments and the constraints. Rule (8.6) for executing silent events
does not really change, but is adapted to the extended execution states:
[β, d,Δ]
τ−→ [β, d′,Δ] if Π(ll.d, β, d) τ−→ Π(ll.d, β, d′) ∧ τ ∈ T (19.3)
For executing assignments and constraints we deﬁne separate rules and special
events. For assignments we introduce the special event write(Δ,Δ′) where Δ and
Δ′ are the data states of the lifelines before and after the assignment. The rule for
assignment is deﬁned as:
[β, d,Δ]
write(Δ,Δ′)−−−−−−−→ [β, d′,Δ′] if Π(ll.d, β, d) assign(v,x,l)−−−−−−→ Π(ll.d, β, d′) (19.4)
with
σ = Δ(l)
Δ′ = Δ[l → σ[v → eval(x{σ})]]
What happens is that values from σ, the data state of lifeline l, are substituted for the
free variables in x, and x is then evaluated to a value. This value then replaces the old
value of v in the data state, and the new data state replaces the old data state of l.
The write event may be seen as superﬂuous since the execution states contain data
states. When we still produce this event it is for two reasons: 1) It provides us with
the possibility of doing analysis based on the produced traces alone. 2) It makes the
connection to the denotational semantics stronger, since the denotational semantics
with data operates with this kind of write events.
For constraints we introduce the special event check(b) with b ∈ B. The rule is
deﬁned as:
[β, d,Δ]
check(b)−−−−→ [β, d′,Δ] if Π(ll.d, β, d) constr(x,l)−−−−−→ Π(ll.d, β, d′) (19.5)
with
σ = Δ(l)
b = eval(x{σ})
I.e., σ is the data state of lifeline l, and values from σ are substituted for free variables
in x, and then x is evaluated to the Boolean value b. The event check(true) is produced
if the constraint evaluates to true in σ and check(false) if the constraint evaluates to
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false. This is a property we may use to distinguish positive from negative traces with
a suitable meta-level, i.e. a meta-level that treats the occurrence of check(false) in the
same way as an occurrence of τrefuse .
The rule for executing events is divided into two rules; one for transmit events and
one for receive events. When a transmit event occurs, the expressions representing the
parameters of the event’s message is evaluated with the values of the data state of the
transmitter lifeline. The evaluated data of the message is then used to update the data
state of the lifeline:
[β, d,Δ]
e−→ [update(β, e), d′,Δ′] if Π(ll.d, β, d) (!,(s(ϕ),tr,re))−−−−−−−−→ Π(ll.d, β, d′) (19.6)
where
σ = Δ(tr)
ϕ′ = eval(ϕ{σ})
e = (!, (s(ϕ′), tr, re))
Δ′ = Δ[tr → σ[ϕ′]]
This means that when the message is transmitted it’s variables no longer maps to
expressions, but to values, and these are the values that the message contains when it
is placed in the communication medium.
When a receive event is executed we would like this event’s message to contain
the evaluated values. Therefore we include in the set of functions that manipulate
the communication medium a function getData ∈ B × M → Σ̂ that retrieves the
data from a message in the communication medium. As with the other functions that
manipulate the communication medium (add, rm and ready), this function must be
deﬁned speciﬁcally for each communication model.
In the rule for executing a receive event (?, m), we retrieve the parameter values of
the message m from the communication medium and place them in the event instead of
the expressions we get from the syntactical representation of the event. The retrieved
parameter values are also used to update the data state of the receiver lifeline. The
rule is hence:
[β, d,Δ]
e−→ [update(β, e), d′,Δ] if Π(ll.d, β, d) (?,(s(ϕ),tr,re))−−−−−−−−→ Π(ll.d, β, d′) (19.7)
where
σ = Δ(re)
ϕ′ = getData(β, (s(ϕ), tr, re))
e = (?, (s(ϕ′), tr, re))
Δ′ = Δ[re → σ[ϕ′]]
19.1.4 Guards
In the UML standard, the choice operator alt may be guarded, as illustrated in ﬁg-
ure 19.3. Following [158] we also allow the xalt operator to have guards, as in ﬁgure 19.4.
For both alt and xalt we choose the same approach as [158] and view guarded
choices as special applications of the constraint construct. There is, however, a subtle
diﬀerence in the interpretation of alt and xalt; in a guarded alt, execution is allowed to
skip the alt altogether if none of the guards of the operands evaluate to true, while in
a guarded xalt this is not the case. The rationale for this with respect to alt is to stay
close to the UML standard. The reason for not having the option of skipping an xalt
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a
sd ga
l k
b
alt
[n = 0]
[n ≥ 0]
Figure 19.3: Guarded alt
c
sd gx
l k
d
xalt
[m = 0]
[m ≥ 0]
Figure 19.4: Guarded xalt
when all guards evaluate to false is that xalts are used for specifying choices that must
be present in an implementation, and it is then not desirable to have implicit operands
of the operator.
We do not introduce any special textual syntax for guarded choices. Hence, the
textual syntax of the two diagrams is:
ga = (constr(n = 0, l) seq !a seq ?a) alt
(constr(n ≥ 0, l) seq !b seq ?b) alt
constr(¬(n = 0 ∨ n ≥ 0), l)
gx = (constr(m = 0, l) seq !c seq ?c) xalt
(constr(m ≥ 0, l) seq !d seq ?d)
The operational semantics has already been deﬁned since guarded choices are just
macros on top of the syntactic constructs already dealt with above.
What should be noted is that we allow guards of diﬀerent operands of the same
choice to be true at the same time. Further, we do consider the lifeline a guard is
placed on as relevant, and therefore assign the constraint representing a guard to the
lifeline the guard in placed on in the diagram.
19.2 Operational semantics with time
In this section we show how the operational semantics with data deﬁned above may
be extended with time. The same way as the operational semantics with data is
inspired by STAIRS with data, the operational semantics with time is inspired by
timed STAIRS [70]. Though inspired by timed STAIRS, there are also diﬀerences.
These diﬀerences are discussed in section 21.1.2.
Section 19.2.1 introduces our handling of time, while section 19.2.2 provides our
approach to timestamps of events. In section 19.2.3 we provide an example of how our
time and data enhanced sequence diagrams can be applied.
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19.2.1 Time
In order to model time we introduce a special variable now ∈ Var .1 Because we
only have local variables, this variable is placed in the data state of every lifeline in a
diagram. We do, however, consider it a global variable in the sense that we make sure
that all the local now variables are updated simultaneously and with equal increments,
i.e. that the time of all lifelines are synchronized. Except for increments by a special
tick rule, the now variables are read only, something that may be ensured by the
following syntax constraint:
v = now ⇒ assign(v, x, l) ∈ D.
Because now is a variable in the data state of each lifeline of a diagram, it must
be initialized at the start of an execution. Further, it is necessary that all the now
variables are initialized with the same value. This can be obtained by constraining the
set of possible initial mappings from lifelines to data states:
initDataTime(d)
def
= {Δ ∈ initData(d) | ∃r ∈ R+ : ∀l ∈ ll.d : Δ(l)(now ) = r}
where R+ denotes the positive non-zero real numbers.
We introduce a special event tick(r), with r ∈ R+, that represents elapse of time
with increment r. Further we add to the execution system a rule that allows time to
elapse:
[β, d,Δ]
tick(r)−−−→ [β, d, nowInc(Δ, r)] (19.8)
with
r = δ(β, d,Δ)
being the time increment.
nowInc ∈ (L → Σ̂) × R+ → (L → Σ̂) is a function that increments the now
variable in every data state with the time increment, so that the time of all lifelines
remain synchronized:
nowInc(Δ, r)
def
= {l → σ[now → (σ(now) + r)] | l ∈ dom.Δ ∧ σ = Δ(l)}
δ ∈ B × D × (L → Σ̂) → R+ is a function that determines the time increment based
on the current state. The idea is then that the time model we choose to use in an
execution may be speciﬁed by the function δ. This can be either discrete or dense
time, with ﬁxed or randomized time increments, dependent or independent of the state
of execution, and with lazy or eager time. The simplest imaginable case may be a
discrete time model with unit time increments. In this case δ is deﬁned as:
δ([β, d, σ])
def
= 1
We do not go further into this, other than recognizing that there exists a variety of
ways to deﬁne the time increment function.
There are some properties one might desire of a time model to avoid a counter-
intuitive representation of time and anomalies. The ﬁrst of these is progress, i.e. that
time does not stop, but eventually advances. (Because advancement of time is alway
1For a discussion on diﬀerence approaches to modeling time, see section 21.2.
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enabled, progress and fairness become equivalent.) The other is to avoid Zeno’s para-
dox, i.e. that even if time always advances, it never reaches a given point in time.
Both these properties can be ensured by placing a requirement on execution similar to
what we did to ensure weak fairness of the operational semantics in section 8.4. The
requirement basically states that for every execution, at some point it will overtake
every possible points in time:
∀[β1, d1,Δ1] x1−→ [β2, d2,Δ2] x2−→ [β3, d3,Δ3] x3−→ · · · ∈ Ξ, r ∈ R+ :
∃i ∈ N : ∀l ∈ ll.di : Δi(li)(now) > r
This requirement also becomes a requirement on the time increment function δ; the
possibility of deﬁning δ is restricted to deﬁnitions that allow the requirement on exe-
cutions to be fulﬁlled.
19.2.2 Events with timestamps
In timed STAIRS, events have timestamps. This is deﬁned so that in the syntactic
representation of an event (i.e. in a diagram), it contains a timestamp tag, and in the
semantics representation of the event (i.e. in a trace) the timestamp tag is mapped to
a real number representing the point in time of the occurrence of the event.
It must be noted that timed STAIRS operates with three events: transmission,
reception and consumption. The diﬀerence between reception and consumption is that
reception is the event that a message is placed in the input buﬀer of the receiver,
and consumption the event that the message is removed from the input buﬀer and
the receiver starts processing the message. In the untimed version of the operational
semantics we have not dealt explicitly with this diﬀerence, but in the context of time
constraints this becomes relevant because we may want to place time constraints ex-
plicitly on the communication medium or on a lifeline. In the following we assume the
receive events of our operational semantics to be the receive events of timed STAIRS,
and hence that the consumption events are hidden. However, we assume that this does
not aﬀect the ordering of events.
The timestamp tags can be considered variables. Hence, in the operational seman-
tics, events are triples of kinds, messages and variables in the syntactic representation:
(k,m, t) ∈ K ×M×Var
In the following we use E def= K ×M× Var as the deﬁnition of the set of events E .
We let all functions on the old deﬁnition of E , e.g., k.e, m.e and l.e carry over to this
new deﬁnition. We deﬁne a function t. ∈ E → Var that returns the timestamp tag of
an event:
t.(k,m, t)
def
= t
In addition we put the constraint on diagrams that each timestamp tag is only allowed
to occure ones.
In the semantic representation of events, i.e. events that are produced in an execu-
tion step, they are tuples of kinds, messages, variables and reals:
(k,m, t → r) ∈ K ×M× Var × R+
We write t → r to emphasize that we view r as a value that t maps to. In timed
STAIRS the set of “semantic events” is denoted [[ E ]]. It should be noted that while
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the operational semantics as deﬁned in chapter 8 produces traces h ∈ (E ∪ T )ω, the
redeﬁned operational semantics with data and time produces traces h ∈ ([[ E ]] ∪ T ∪
{write(Δ,Δ′) |Δ,Δ′ ∈ L → Σ̂} ∪ {check(b) | b ∈ B} ∪ {tick(r) | r ∈ R+})ω.2
In addition to having these timestamp tags as part of events, we also consider them
variables of the lifelines on which the events occur. Hence, the function var is redeﬁned
for events to be:
var((!, (s(ϕ), tr, re), t))
def
= {t} ∪⋃v∈dom.ϕ({v} ∪ var(ϕ(v)))
var((?, (s(ϕ), tr, re), t))
def
= {t} ∪ dom.ϕ
In the initial data states, these timestamp variables will have arbitrary values as any
other variable. When an event is executed, two things happen: The timestamp tag t
of the event is assigned the current value of now, and at the same time an implicit
assignment assigns the value of now to the variable t of the lifeline on which the event
occurs. Thus, rule (19.6) for execution of transmit events is redeﬁned to:
[β, d,Δ]
e−→ [update(β, e), d′,Δ′] if Π(ll.d, β, d) (!,(s(ϕ),tr,re),t)−−−−−−−−−→ Π(ll.d, β, d′) (19.9)
where
σ = Δ(tr)
ϕ′ = eval(ϕ{σ})
e = (!, (s(ϕ′), tr, re), t → σ(now))
Δ′ = Δ[tr → σ[ϕ′][t → σ(now)]]
As can be seen, the only diﬀerence from rule (19.6) is that the timestamp tag and
variable t is set to have the value of now .
The rule (19.7) for receive events is redeﬁned analogously:
[β, d,Δ]
e−→ [update(β, e), d′,Δ] if Π(ll.d, β, d) (?,(s(ϕ),tr,re),t)−−−−−−−−−→ Π(ll.d, β, d′) (19.10)
where
σ = Δ(re)
ϕ′ = getData(β, (s(ϕ), tr, re))
e = (?, (s(ϕ′), tr, re), t → σ(now))
Δ′ = Δ[re → σ[ϕ′][t → σ(now)]]
Because the time of all lifelines are synchronized, these rules produce traces where
the events are ordered accoring to their timestamps.
19.2.3 Example
In order to illustrate the use of our formalism we apply an example from the UML
standard. The UML standard allows speciﬁcation of time constraints in sequence
diagrams in a declarative fashion, as shown in the following example [134, p. 509]:
The Sequence Diagram in Figure [19.5] shows how time and timing notation
may be applied to describe time observation and timing constraints. The User
sends a message Code and its duration is measured. The ACSystem will send
2We use Aω to denote the set A∗ ∪A∞, i.e. the set of ﬁnite and inﬁnite traces of elements from a
set A.
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Unlock
{d..3·d}
OK
sd UserAccepted
User ACSystem
CardOut {0..13}
Code d=duration
{t..t+3}
t=now
Figure 19.5: Sequence diagram with time constraints
two messages back to the User. CardOut is constrained to last between 0 and
13 time units. Furthermore the interval between the sending of Code and the
reception of OK is constrained to last between d and 3·d where d is the measured
duration of the Code signal. We also notice the observation of the time point
t at the sending of OK and how this is used to constrain the time point of the
reception of CardOut.
By using just our mechanisms for recording the points in time that messages are
transmitted and received, and for manipulating and putting constraints on data, we are
able to express the same time constraints with our time and data enhanced sequence
diagrams. Assume the events of the diagram have the following timestamp tags:
t.!Code = t1 t.?Code = t2
t.!CardOut = t3 t.?CardOut = t4
t.!OK = t5 t.?OK = t6
t.!Unlock = t7
Syntactically we place these timestamp tags along the lifelines, beside the events to
which they belong. The diagram UserAccepted ′ of ﬁgure 19.6 then expresses the same
time constraints as in UserAccepted .
The point in time of transmission of message Code is stored in the variable t1
and is also transmitted to ACSystem by having c := now as a parameter in the
message. Upon reception of the message Code, the point in time of the reception is
assigned to the variable t2. The duration of the message is calculated by the assignment
d := t4 − c, and this duration is transmitted back to User by the variable d′ in the
message OK. The timestamp tag of the reception of OK is t6, so the time constraint
between the transmission of Code and reception of OK is expressed by the constraint
{d′ ≤ t6 − t1 ≤ 3 · d′}. t, which is the point of time for transmission of OK is obtained
by having t := now as parameter to OK. Similarly, the point in time of transmission of
CardOut is made available to User by having co := now as a parameter in CardOut.
The timestamp tag for reception of CardOut is t4. The time constraint on the reception
of CardOut is then expressed by the constraint {t ≤ t4 ≤ t+3}, and the time constraint
on the duration of CardOut is expressed by the constraint {0 ≤ t4 − co ≤ 13}.
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Unlock
Code(c := now)
CardOut(co := now)
OK(d’ := d, t := now)
sd UserAccepted’
User ACSystem
d := t2 – c
{t ≤ t4 ≤ t + 3}
{0 ≤ t4 – co ≤ 13}
{d’ ≤ t6 – t1 ≤ 3 · d’}
t1 t2
t3
t4
t5t6
t7
Figure 19.6: Time constraints expressed with variables, timestamps and constraints
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Case study
This chapter reports on a case study on the use of the time enhanced sequence dia-
grams deﬁned in chapter 19. The study focuses on the expressiveness of our approach to
specify timing properties in sequence diagrams. A number of diﬀerent approaches and
notations for expressing real-time properties in sequence diagrams and similar speciﬁ-
cation languages exists. Our hypothesis is that our approach is suﬃciently general to
capture real-time properties expressed by other approaches and that it has suﬃcient
expressiveness to capture interesting real-time properties.
The case study consisted of two parts. In the ﬁrst part a literature survey was con-
ducted. In the survey a number of publications containing sequence diagram or MSC
speciﬁcations with time constraints or other characterizations of real-time properties
were identiﬁed. A collection of speciﬁcations were chosen from these publications and
harmonized in their notation (with the exception of their notation for time constraints
and properties). In the second part of the study we made new versions of the speciﬁ-
cations of the collection where we applied our approach to specifying time constraints
and properties, as deﬁned in chapter 19.
In section 20.1 we present assumptions and success criteria. Section 20.2 presents
the results of the study. In section 20.3, the results are discussed.
20.1 Assumptions and success criteria
In this study there are two main assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption is that the speci-
ﬁcations we have been able to identify through the literature survey are representative
for the variety of techniques and notation for expressing time constraints and real-time
properties one may expect to be applied to sequence diagrams and similar speciﬁcation
languages.
The second assumption is that our collection of speciﬁcations also represents speci-
ﬁcation of what we in the hypothesis called interesting real-time properties. By this we
mean that we expect the authors of the publications we have surveyed to present spec-
iﬁcations that illustrate how they intend their notation for real-time properties to be
used, and that they present examples of real-time properties they consider interesting
to specify.
With these assumptions we can concretize the hypothesis of this case study in two
success criteria:
1. Our approach is suﬃciently general to capture real-time properties expressed by
195
Case study
the approaches identiﬁed through the literature survey.
2. Our approach has suﬃcient expressiveness to capture the real-time properties in
the collection of speciﬁcations identiﬁed in the literature survey.
20.2 Results
This section presents the results of the case study. Section 20.2.1 presents the results
of the literature survey. In order to make the presentation easier to follow, we do not
present the collection of speciﬁcations identiﬁed in the survey separately, but present
them together with our new versions of the speciﬁcations. Each speciﬁcation in the
collection, together with our version of the speciﬁcation, is given a separate sub-section
following section 20.2.1. After these presentations, a summary of the results is provided
in section 20.2.14.
20.2.1 Results of the literature survey
The literature survey had four kinds of sources:
• Publications on STAIRS.
• Scientiﬁc papers with titles containing words like “UML”, “MSC”, “sequence
diagrams”, “interactions”, “time”, “timing” and “real-time”.
• Text books on using UML or MSC in development of real-time systems.
• Standards deﬁning notation for time constraints or real-time properties for UML
sequence diagrams or MSCs.
The result of the survey is a collection of speciﬁcations containing time constraints
or other characterizations of real-time properties. The speciﬁcations in the collection
Description Source Figure
Request-reply 1 [153, p. 14] 20.1
Request-reply 2 [53, p. 42] 20.2
Delayed message [53, p. 41] 20.5
Absolute and relative delay [192, p. 87] 20.7
Speciﬁcation of timer [7] 20.9
Use of timer [192, p. 96] 20.11
Examples of timing constraints [106, p. 662] 20.13
Pacemaker setup scenario [41, p. 239] 20.15
Protocol for an audio/video component [51, pp. 655–657] 20.17
Heartbeat packet emission [71, p. 710] 20.19
ATM example [145, p. 2] & [144, p. 33] 20.21
AMT test case [133, p. 54] 20.23
ATM speciﬁcation [17, pp. 15–17] & 20.25–20.31
[18, pp. 103–104]
Table 20.1: Speciﬁcations with real-time properties
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are presented in table 20.1. A short description to identify each speciﬁcation is given,
together with the source of the speciﬁcation and a reference to the ﬁgure(s) where we
present it.
In addition to this collection, we also identiﬁed some speciﬁcations with real-time
properties that we have decided to keep out of the study. The reason for not including
them in the collection is mainly to keep the study to a manageable size. The speciﬁ-
cations were selected to facilitate a large variation in notation for real-time properties,
large variation in the real-time properties characterized in the speciﬁcations and large
variation in the types of the sources. In addition we wanted at least one speciﬁca-
tion with some considerably size (i.e. more than one diagram). The criterion for size
is fulﬁlled by the ATM speciﬁcation, which is the only speciﬁcation in the collection
consisting of more than one diagram.
The speciﬁcations with real-time properties we identiﬁed, but did not chose for the
collection, are found in [70, 71, 77, 132, 134, 193–195]. In [132] there are two examples
of “proposed notation”, but the same notation is used by similar examples from [41],
which are included in the collection. In [194] we ﬁnd more or less the same examples
as in [192], with the exception of a concept called “instance delay” that only applies
to high-level MSCs. In [70, 77, 193, 195] there are examples of real-time properties,
but they use techniques and notations that we feel are covered by other speciﬁcations
in the collection. In [71] there are some larger speciﬁcations, but they are based on
using only MSC timers, which we also ﬁnd well covered by our selection. Also in the
UML standard [134] there is an example. We consider this example as an attempt to
present as may features as possible at the same time, and hence not an “interesting”
speciﬁcation as such. We have, however, used it as an example in section 19.2.3.
In the following we present the speciﬁcations of the collection together with our
versions. In order to make the presentation more consistent we have done some har-
monizing of the notation in the diagrams. Most notably we have “translated” MSCs
into UML sequence diagrams and we have removed irrelevant elements from some of
the speciﬁcations. In the speciﬁcation from [17] we have made some simpliﬁcations.
We have, however, kept the notation for time constraints and real-time properties as
they are in the original, with the exception that we have removed the units of mea-
surement such as seconds and milliseconds. Despite the changes we have implemented
to harmonize the notation, we believe we have managed to stay faithful to the time
related parts. We apply the convention that the name of a diagram is the same as
the name it has in the source, or a suitable descriptive name if it lacks a name in the
source. Our version of a diagram uses the same name, but followed by an apostrophe
mark ’.
20.2.2 Request-reply
A commonly used example of time constraints in sequence diagrams is what we may
call “request-reply” examples. What these examples have in common is that a life-
line receives a message and should relpy to the sender within some time limit. As
representatives for these we have chosen an example from [153, p. 14], reproduced in
ﬁgure 20.1, and an example from [53, p. 42], reproduced in ﬁgure 20.2. In the ﬁrst of
these speciﬁcations we see a notation where the time constraint is placed on the lifeline,
restraining the time span between reception of the message request and transmission
of message response in a declarative fashion. In the other example, the messages a and
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{0..5}
request
response
sd TimeConstaint1
Client Server
Figure 20.1: Request-reply
a
b
sd TimeConstaint2
O1 O2
{b.sendTime –
a.receiveTime < 1}
Figure 20.2: Request-reply
request
response
sd TimeConstaint1’
Client Server
{0 ≤ t2 – t1 ≤ 5}
t2
t1
Figure 20.3: Request-reply
a
b
sd TimeConstaint2’
O1 O2
{t2 – t1 < 1}
t2
t1
Figure 20.4: Request-reply
b are given attributes sendTime and receiveTime that are used for expressing a time
constraint between reception of a and transmission of b that is placed on the diagram.
It is, however, not clear whether there is any semantics related to the fact that the
constraint graphically is placed on the lifeline O2.
In our approach, the time constraints of both these speciﬁcation are treated in
the same way. We introduce timestamp tags on the events that are involved in the
time constraints, and use these timestamp tags to express the time constraints as con-
straint events on the lifelines on which the time constraints apply.1 Our versions of the
speciﬁcations of ﬁgures 20.1 and 20.2 are shown in ﬁgures 20.3 and 20.4, respectively.
20.2.3 Delayed message
In [53, p. 41], the same mechanism as used in the speciﬁcation of ﬁgure 20.2 is applied
for specifying a message with time delay. The speciﬁcation is found in ﬁgure 20.5. The
attributes sendTime and receiveTime of a message c is used in a constraint to say that
the message has transmission time greater than zero.
Our version of the speciﬁcation is shown in ﬁgure 20.6. The transmit event and send
event of the message are given the timestamp tags t1 and t2 respectively, but because
a timestamp tag must belong to a lifeline, the timestamp tag t1 is not available in
the constraint that we place on lifeline O2. We handle this by giving the message a
parameter t which is assigned the value of now at the transmission. The variable t is
1In these and in later speciﬁcations in this chapter, we sometimes hide the timestamp tags that
are not used in constraints.
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c
sd DelayedMessage
O1 O2
{c.receiveTime –
c.sendTime > 0}
Figure 20.5: Delayed message
c(t := now)
sd DelayedMessage’
O1 O2
{t2 – t > 0}
t2t1
Figure 20.6: Delayed message
available for O2 and holds the same value as t1, and can then be used to express the
time constraint on the message.
20.2.4 Absolute and relative delay
In a speciﬁcation from [192, p. 87], reproduced in ﬁgure 20.7, time constraints on the
lifelines are used for specifying both time delay of messages and time delay between
events at the same lifeline. In [192] this is referred to as relative delay. In addition, the
speciﬁcation gives constraints on the absolute points in time of occurrences of events,
referred to as absolute delay. Absolute time is denoted by a @. Both relative and
absolute delay are features of the MSC-2000 standard [85].
In the speciﬁcation, each event is given a label. In our version of the speciﬁcation,
shown in ﬁgure 20.8, we use these labels as timestamp tags. Because we have these
timestamp tags that are assigned the point in time that an event occur, we can easily
express both the absolute and relative delays using the same kind of constraints; {3 ≤
e − a ≤ 4} expresses the relative delay between transmission of m1 and transmission
of m3, while {3 ≤ e ≤ 4} expresses the absolute time delay of the transmission of
m3. The delay between transmission and reception of m1 is speciﬁed using the same
m3
[1,2)m1
m2
sd T
i j
[2]
[3,4]
[@0]
@[3,4]
a
b
c
d
e f
Figure 20.7: Absolute and relative delay
m3
m1(t := now)
m2
sd T’
i j
a b
cd
e f
{1 ≤ t – b < 2}
{f – c = 2}
{a = 0}
{3 ≤ e – a ≤ 4}
{3 ≤ e ≤ 4}
Figure 20.8: Absolute and relative delay
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m1 [1,2]
m2 [1,2]
sd Timer
p1 p2
s1
r2
r1
s2
[1,2]
set_timer
expire
timer
[5,6]
4
Figure 20.9: Speciﬁcation of a timer
{1 ≤ set_timer – s1 ≤ 2}
m1(t1 := now)
m2(t2 := now)
sd Timer’
p1 p2
s1
r2
r1
s2
set_timer
expire
timer {1 ≤ r1 – t1 ≤ 2}
{expire – set_timer  = 4}
{1 ≤ r2 – t2 ≤ 2} {5 ≤ s2 – r1 ≤ 6}
Figure 20.10: Speciﬁcation of a timer
method as we did for the delayed message in ﬁgure 20.5 above.
20.2.5 Specification of timer
In [7], the MSC-2000 mechanism for specifying time constraints is applied to specify a
timer, in addition to specifying time constraints on messages and lifelines. The speci-
ﬁcation is reproduced in ﬁgure 20.9. (The original is without labels on the messages;
in ﬁgure 20.9 these are added by us.)
As in the speciﬁcation of ﬁgure 20.7 the events are labeled. In our version, given in
ﬁgure 20.10, we use these labels as timestamp tags. We express the time constraints
in the same fashion as we did in ﬁgure 20.8. However, because the timer is speciﬁed as
a message with the lifeline p1 as both sender and receiver, we do not have to pass the
point in time that the timer was sent along with the message.
20.2.6 Use of timer
In [192, p. 96], an example of use of the timer construct from MSC-2000 is given. This
example is shown in ﬁgure 20.11, with the diﬀerence that the original is made with a
high-level MSC while in our reproduction we use the high-level operator xalt instead.
In the example a timer T1 is set, with ﬁve time units, by lifeline i after the transmission
of the message m1. The choice speciﬁes two alternatives: In the ﬁrst alternative the
timer is stopped after lifeline i has received a message n, while in the other, the timer
expires.
When we make our version of this speciﬁcation, shown in ﬁgure 20.12, we choose to
specify the timer as a lifeline, and not as a message as in ﬁgure 20.10. The new lifeline
T1 represents the timer, and again we use the event labels in the original speciﬁcation
as our timestamp tags. According to the explanation of the example in [192], the timer
speciﬁes a time delay of 5 between r and s, and a time delay in the interval (0, 5)
between r and t. We could easily have speciﬁed this by placing constraints {s− r = 5}
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n
m1
sd TimerUse
i j
e
r
e’
f f’
s
t
xalt
T1 [5]
T1
T1
Figure 20.11: Use of a timer
m1
n
sd TimerUse’
i j
e
r
e’
f f’
s
t
xalt
T1
startTimer(d := 5)
stopTimer
timeoutt3
t2
t1
expire := t1 + d
{t2 < expire}
{t3 = expire}
Figure 20.12: Use of a timer
and {0 < t−r < 5} on lifeline i. We do, however, chose a more operational approach to
specifying timers: The timer is set by sending a message startTimer with the delay of
5 time units assigned to a parameter d. A variable expire is assigned the point in time
the timer should expire as the sum of the timestamp of the reception of startTimer
and the delay d. In the ﬁrst alternative, lifeline i sends a message stopTimer to T1,
and the reception of stopTimer on T1 is followed by a time constraint stating that
the timestamp of the event should be less that the value of expire. In the second
alternative, the timer sends a message timeout to lifeline i, followed by a constraint
specifying that the timestamp of transmission of timeout should be equal to the value
stored in expire.
This is obviously not the only way of specifying a timer, but in an operational
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m4
m3
m2
m1
sd TimingConstraints
obj2 obj3
e2
e3
e1
e5 e6
e7e8
obj1
{2 ≤ e4 – e1 < 5}
e4
{2(e5 – e3) – (e8 – e5) ≥ 0}
Figure 20.13: Examples of time constraints
m1
m2
m3
m4
obj2 obj3
e2
e3
e1
e5 e6
e7e8
obj1
{2 ≤ e4 – e1 < 5}
e4
{2(e5 – e3) – (e8 – e5) ≥ 0}
sd TimingConstraints’
Figure 20.14: Examples of time constraints
setting we ﬁnd this the most natural way. This is because it recognizes the timer as an
independent entity in the speciﬁcation, and because it places all the responsibilities of
a timer on the timer itself.
20.2.7 Examples of timing constraints
In [106, p. 662] an example of a sequence diagram with time constraints is given. We
reproduce the diagram in ﬁgure 20.13. Each event in the diagram is given a label
representing the point in time of its occurrences, and two time constraints using these
labels are placed on the diagram.
Our version of the diagram is given in ﬁgure 20.14. The event labels are consistent
with our timestamp tags, so we simply have to place the time constraints as constraint
events on the appropriate lifelines to express the same restrictions on the timing of the
events.
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set(75,10,15,AAI)
ACK
set(75,10,15,AAI)
sd PacemakerSetup
Communications Pacing EngineDevice Programmer
«RTstimulus»
{RTstart = 8
RTend = 10
«RTstimulus»
{RTstart = 0
RTend = 8
{0}
{15}
{10}
Figure 20.15: Pacemaker setup scenario
20.2.8 Pacemaker setup scenario
In [41, p. 239] a speciﬁcation of a setup scenario for a pacemaker is provided. The
speciﬁcation uses constructs (stereotypes) from the UML Proﬁle for Schedulability,
Performance, and Time (often abbreviated UML-RT, for “UML Real-Time”) [132].
We reproduce the speciﬁcation in ﬁgure 20.15. A simpliﬁcation is made in that use
of executions speciﬁcations, a UML construct we do not deal with in our formalism,
and time constraints on these are removed. Time constraints on messages are given by
constraints labeled RTstimulus attached to the messages. In these constraints the
points in time of the transmission and reception of a message are given by the variables
RTstart and RTend, respectively. In addition, constraints on the occurrence of events
are given beside the lifelines.
Because all the time constraints in the speciﬁcation are simple references to points
in time, we can simply introduce timestamp tags and constraints on timestamps after
ACK
set(a2:=a1,b2:=b1,
c2:=c1,d2:=d1)
set(a1:=75,b1:=10, 
     c1:=15,d1:=AAI)
sd PacemakerSetup’
Communications Pacing EngineDevice Programmer
{t1 = 0}
t3
t2t1
t4
t6 t5
{t2 = 8}
{t3 = 8} {t4 = 10}
{t6 = 15}
Figure 20.16: Pacemaker setup scenario
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zero
zero
zero
one
zero
zero
{e_next – g = 40}
{e_first – d = 40}
one
zero
sd T5
Sender Bus
{b – a = 40}
loop〈10〉 one
one
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
{c – b = 741}
{d – c = 781}
{f – e = 741}
{g – f = 781}
{i – h = 741}
{j – i = 781}
{h – g_last = 40}
Figure 20.17: Part of a protocol for an audio/video component
the occurrences of transmit or receive events. In order to stay consistent with our
handling of data, we have also introduced variables in the messages to hold the values
that are passed with the messages. Our version of the diagram is shown in ﬁgure 20.16.
20.2.9 Protocol for an audio/video component
In [51, pp. 655–657] a speciﬁcation of a simple protocol for communication within an
audio/video component is presented. The speciﬁcation consists of ﬁve diagram, but
because they are all very similar we choose to use only one of them in this study.
This diagram is reproduced in ﬁgure 20.17. The way of specifying time constraints in
this speciﬁcation is similar to what we saw in ﬁgure 20.13; events are given labels and
constraints over these labels are placed on the diagram along one of the lifelines. A
diﬀerence, however, is that this diagram contains a loop, and in the constraints, x ﬁrst,
x next and x last are used to denote the ﬁrst, next and last occurrence of a label x
within the loop.
In our version of the speciﬁcation, shown in ﬁgure 20.18, we use the label as times-
tamp tags and place the time constraints as constraint events on the lifeline Sender.
Because of our operational view of sequence diagrams, and because timestamp tags are
variables that are assigned values when their events are executed, the elimination of
the x ﬁrst, x next and x last constructs almost resolves itself. Only some clever use of
a variable to handle the time constraint containing e next is needed.
20.2.10 Heartbeat packet emission
In [71, p. 710] an MSC speciﬁcation of Reliable Multicast Transport Protocol (RMTP2)
is provided. We have chosen a diagram from this speciﬁcation. In this diagram, repro-
duced in ﬁgure 20.19, a new construct for specifying a special kind of time constraint
is introduced. The message heartbeat inside the loop will be transmitted repeatedly
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zero
zero
zero
one
one
one
zero
zero
one
zero
sd T5’
Sender Bus
{b – a = 40}
loop〈10〉
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
{c – b = 741}
{d – c = 781}
{f – e = 741}
{g – f = 781}
{i – h = 741}
{j – i = 781}
{h – t = 40}
t := d
t := g
{e – t = 40}
Figure 20.18: Part of a protocol for an audio/video component
heartbeat
sd SendHeartbeatPacket
Control
Node Children
loop
Thb
Figure 20.19: Heartbeat packet emission
heartbeat
sd SendHeartbeatPacket’
Control
Node Children
loop
last := now
t
{t = last + Thb}
last := t
Figure 20.20: Heartbeat packet emission
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by the lifeline Control Node. The circle attached to the transmit event of the message
means that there should be Thb time units between each transmission of the message.
Because of our operational approach to sequence diagrams we can specify the time
delay between the repeated transmission of the message by means of a variable that is
assigned the timestamp of the transmit event after each transmission, and a suitable
constraint event. Our version of this diagram is presented in ﬁgure 20.20.
20.2.11 ATM example
An example ATM speciﬁcation is found in [145, p. 2] (and also in [144, p. 33]). In this
speciﬁcation, shown in ﬁgure 20.21, some of the events are labeled by timestamp tags
and time constraints are expressed by means of notes that are attached to the last of
the events which timestamp is used in the constraint.
In our formalism we can easily express the same time constraints by placing them
as constraint events on the appropriate lifeline, using the same timestamp tags. Our
version of the speciﬁcation is found in ﬁgure 20.22.
withdraw(amount)
sd CashWithdrawal
ATM Bank
card
Customer
prompt ”Enter amount”
request(amount)
prompt ”Transaction 
accepted”
t3
t2
t1
accept
card back
money(amount)
t3 – t2 < 5
t2 – t1 < 10
Figure 20.21: ATM example
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withdraw(a1 := amount)
sd CashWithdrawal’
ATM Bank
card
Customer
request(a2 := amount)
t3
t2
t1
accept
card back
money(a3 := amount)
prompt ”Enter amount”
prompt ”Transaction 
accepted”
amount := a1
{t3 – t2 < 5}
{t2 – t1 < 10}
Figure 20.22: ATM example
20.2.12 AMT test case
In the UML Testing Proﬁle (UML-TP) [133, p. 54] an example speciﬁcation of a test
case with time constraints is given. We reproduce the speciﬁcation in ﬁgure 20.23, with
some simpliﬁcation; testing speciﬁc information and execution speciﬁcations have been
removed, and return messages have been replaced by ordinary messages.
isPinCorrect(false)
isPinCorrect(invalidPIN)
sd InvalidPin
ATM Current
storeCardData(current)
HWE
display(”Enter PIN”)
isPinCorrect(invalidPIN)
display(”Invalid PIN”)
display(”Enter PIN again”)
isPinCorrect(false)
t1(2.0)
t1
{0..3}
Figure 20.23: ATM test case
207
Case study
isPinCorrect(ret := false)
isPinCorrect(pin :=
                       invalidPIN)
sd InvalidPin’
ATM Current
storeCardData(c:=current)
HWE
display(s:=Enter PIN”)
isPinCorrect(pin’ := pin)
display(s:=”Invalid PIN”)
display(s :=
         ”Enter PIN again”)
isPinCorrect(ret’ := ret)
t1
startTimer(d := 2.0)
stopTimer
r2
r1
expire := r1 + d
{0 ≤ r4 – r3 ≤ 3}
r4
r3
{r2 < expire}
Figure 20.24: ATM test case
The speciﬁcation uses both a timer and a time constraint between events at the
lifeline HWE. When we make our version of the speciﬁcation, shown in ﬁgure 20.24,
we use the same method for specifying the timer as we did for the timer in ﬁgure 20.11
and use the same method for specifying the time constraint as we did for the time
constraint in ﬁgure 20.1.
20.2.13 ATM specification
From [17, pp. 15–17] (and also [18, pp. 103–104]) we get a larger speciﬁcation of an
example ATM that uses both timers and time delays. We reproduce this speciﬁcation
in ﬁgures 20.25–20.31, however with several changes. The speciﬁcation is originally
made by means of high-level MSCs while we use high-level operators and references.
In the original speciﬁcation there are at some places speciﬁed time delays between the
top of a diagram and the ﬁrst event, or between the last event and the bottom of the
diagram. In the transformation from MSCs to UML sequence diagrams, the structure
has been somewhat altered so that time delays are always between events. We have
also made sure that the starting, stopping and expiring of a timer always are present
in the same diagram. In addition we have removed all loops in the speciﬁcation,
some inconsistencies have been corrected, and we have added a new message (the
welcome msg message) in order to make the speciﬁcation more consistent. Despite
these changes, all the main functionality and all time constraints of the speciﬁcation
are intact.
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valid
[0,4]
invalid
(5,60)
sd ATM
ATM Bank
card
User
verify
cancel
req_pin
processing
xalt
ref ReturnCard
enter_pin
T1
xalt
T1
ref TryAgain
T1
ref ConfiscateCard
T1
ref Transaction
Figure 20.25: ATM speciﬁcation
[2,3)
sd ReturnCard
ATM Bank
return_card
User
welcome_msg
Figure 20.26: ReturnCard
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sd TryAgain
ATM Bank
timeout_msg
User
abort
ref ReturnCard
Figure 20.27: TryAgain
[2,3)
sd ConfiscateCard
ATM Bank
inv_pin_msg
User
take_card_msg
welcome_msg
Figure 20.28: ConﬁscateCard
[Q1,Q2]
[0,4]
sd Transaction
ATM BankUser
withdraw
cancel
xalt
ref GetBalance
option
xalt
ref ReturnCard
ref Withdraw
Figure 20.29: Transaction
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[Q1,Q2]
[0,T1]
[3,5)
sd GetBalance
ATM Bank
option
User
statement
print_stmt
req_balance
balance
Figure 20.30: GetBalance
[B1,B2]
[W1,W2]
[W1,W2]
[0,T1]
[2,3)
balance
[3,5)
sd Withdraw
ATM Bank
req_amount
User
approve_amt
req_balance
ent_amount
not_possible
xalt
ref ReturnCard
give_money
T1
T1
ref TryAgain
T1
not_approved
T1
amt_approved
print_record
return_card
welcome_msg
Figure 20.31: Withdraw
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Our version of this speciﬁcation is presented in ﬁgures 20.32–20.38. The time con-
straints are handled by introduction of timestamp tags and constraint events over the
timestamps. The timers are handled in the same manner as the timers of ﬁgures 20.11
and 20.23. In the original, the timers are labeled by T1, and it is somewhat unclear
whether this is the name of the timer or the time delay of the timer. Since T1 also
occurs in time constraints in the speciﬁcation, we interpret it as a constant value and
assume the timer to be anonymous. In our version of the speciﬁcation we simply call
the timer lifeline for Timer.
timeout
valid
invalid
sd ATM’
ATM Bank
card
User
verify
cancel
req_pin
processing
xalt
ref ReturnCard’
enter_pin
xalt
ref Transaction’
Timer
t1
t2
{0 ≤ t2 – t1 ≤ 4}
{5 < t3 – t1 < 60}
t3
startTimer(d := T1) t4
expire := t4 + d
{t6 < expire}
{t5 = expire}
ref TryAgain’
stopTimer
ref ConfiscateCard’
{t7 < expire}
stopTimer
t5
t6
t7
Figure 20.32: ATM speciﬁcation
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sd ReturnCard’
ATM Bank
return_card
User
welcome_msg
t8
t9
{2 ≤ t9 – t8 < 3}
Figure 20.33: ReturnCard’
sd TryAgain’
ATM Bank
timeout_msg
User
abort
ref ReturnCard’
Figure 20.34: TryAgain’
sd ConfiscateCard’
ATM Bank
inv_pin_msg
User
take_card_msg
welcome_msg
t10
t11
{2 ≤ t11 – t10 < 3}
Figure 20.35: ConﬁscateCard’
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sd Transaction’
ATM BankUser
withdraw
cancel
xalt
ref GetBalance’
option
ref ReturnCard’
ref Withdraw’
t12t13
{0 ≤ t14 – t12 ≤ 4}
t14
t15
{Q1 ≤ t15 – t13 ≤ Q2}
xalt
Figure 20.36: Transaction’
t18
t19
t16
t17
sd GetBalance’
ATM Bank
option
User
statement
print_stmt
req_balance
balance{Q1 ≤ t17 – t16 ≤ Q2}
{3 ≤ t20 – t19 < 5}
{0 ≤ t19 – t18 ≤ T1}
t20
Figure 20.37: GetBalance’
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req_amount
balance
sd Withdraw’
ATM BankUser
approve_amt
req_balance
ent_amount
not_possible
ref ReturnCard’
give_money
ref TryAgain’
not_approved
amt_approved
welcome_msg
Timer
startTimer(d := T1) t22
expire := t22 + d
timeout
{t23 = expire}
t23
t21
{t24 < expire}
stopTimer t24
{W1 ≤ t25 – t21 ≤ W2}
t25
{t26 < expire}
stopTimer t26
t27
{W1 ≤ t27 – t21 ≤ W2}
xalt
{0 ≤ t29 – t28 ≤ T1}
print_record
{3 ≤ t30 – t29 < 5}
return_card
{B1 ≤ t31 – t30 ≤ B2}
{2 ≤ t32 – t31 < 3}
t29
t28
t30
t31
t32
Figure 20.38: Withdraw’
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Description Original Our version Result
Request-reply 1 20.1 20.3
√
Request-reply 2 20.2 20.4
√
Delayed message 20.5 20.6
√
Absolute and relative delay 20.7 20.8
√
Speciﬁcation of timer 20.9 20.10
√
Use of timer 20.11 20.12
√
Examples of timing constraints 20.13 20.14
√
Pacemaker setup scenario 20.15 20.16
√
Protocol for an audio/video component 20.17 20.18
√
Heartbeat packet emission 20.19 20.20
√
ATM example 20.21 20.22
√
AMT test case 20.23 20.24
√
ATM speciﬁcation 20.25–20.31 20.32–20.38
√
Table 20.2: Results of the case study
20.2.14 Summary of results
In table 20.2 we summarize the results of the case study. Each speciﬁcation in the
collection has one row in the table. In each row we give the short description of
the speciﬁcation, a reference to the ﬁgure(s) where we have reproduced the original
speciﬁcation, and a reference to the ﬁgure(s) with our version. In the last column
of the table we have checked of the speciﬁcations where we were able to express the
real-time properties of the original with our time enhanced sequence diagrams.
20.3 Discussion
In section 20.1 we formulated two success criteria for the case study. The ﬁrst criterion
was that we, with our time enhanced sequence diagrams, have suﬃcient generality to
express the real-time properties formalized by the variety of techniques and notations
identiﬁed trough our literature survey. This criterion must be said to be fulﬁlled. As is
shown by table 20.2 we were able to express all real-time properties in the collection,
even though there is a large variation in the approaches to specifying the properties.
Further, we can say that in all but one of the cases (the “protocol for an audio/video
component” speciﬁcation) we found a general way “translating” the speciﬁcation, which
may be applied to similar cases. From this we cannot draw the conclusion that we
have the generality to express every real-time property that can be express by all
of the other approaches. It is most likely possible to construct examples we cannot
handle, speciﬁcally because we only have local variables and local constraints. We do,
however, have the generality to express all of the real-time properties the authors of
the publications in the survey considered interesting to present, and most of them in
a schematic fashion.
The second success criterion stated that our time enhanced sequence diagrams
should have the expressiveness to capture the real-time properties of the speciﬁcations
in the collection. As shown by table 20.2, we were able express all the real-time
properties present in the collection of speciﬁcation, and can say that the criterion is
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fulﬁlled. However, as explained below, this conclusion must be restricted to hard real-
time properties expressed as time constraints strictly over transmit and receive events
of messages.
It is possible to criticize the collection of speciﬁcations made on basis of the litera-
ture survey. As explained in section 20.2.1, we do consider the collection representative
of the speciﬁcations found in the literature. But this only applies to time constraints
strictly over events of messages, as there are things we deliberately have overlooked
because they are out of scope. Examples of this are the time constraints on execution
speciﬁcation we removed from the speciﬁcation we got from [41], and speciﬁcations
in [144, 145] where time constraints are given certain probabilities with which they
apply.
We clearly have no guarantee that there are not any publications that we have over-
looked or that our selection based on the surveyed publications is not biased. Further,
we do not have any guarantee that such a literature survey reveals all interesting cases.
Despite these shortcomings, we have managed to sample and handle a large class of
the existing approaches for specifying real-time properties in sequence diagrams, and a
large class of what must be considered interesting real-time speciﬁcations. Hence, we
believe we can conclude that the case study has given support to the hypothesis that
our approach to specifying real-time properties has the generality to capture real-time
properties expressed by other approaches and the expressiveness to capture interesting
real-time properties.
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Chapter 21
Related work on timed specification
and analysis
This chapter presents work related to our operational semantics with data and time.
We start by discussing the relation to STAIRS in section 21.1. Then, in section 21.2
we have a look at other formalisms for timed speciﬁcation and analysis. Finally, in
section 21.3 we discuss other approaches to data and time in sequence diagrams.
21.1 Relation to STAIRS
In the following we discuss the relation between STAIRS and the operational semantics
with data and time. In section 21.1.1 the extended operational semantics is related
to STAIRS’ treatment of data, and in section 21.1.2 we do the same with respect to
timed STAIRS.
21.1.1 Relation to STAIRS with data
STAIRS with data is deﬁned in [158]. The operational semantics with data is inspired
by STAIRS with data, but we have at some points deviated from it. In the following
we have a look at the similarities and diﬀerences, and provide rationale for our choices
where the two semantics diﬀer.
An obvious diﬀerence is that the variables are local to the lifeline in the opera-
tional semantics, while in the denotational semantics, variables are global. By naming
conventions and constraints on the syntax one can easily simulate local variables by
global variables, so in this sense the denotational semantics is more general than the
operational semantics. This is however not the main diﬀerence, and we do not consider
the local/global distinction any further in the following discussion.
The main diﬀerence between the operational semantics with data and STAIRS
with data is the intention with which they have been deﬁned. In [158] the intention
is to deﬁne an extension to the denotational semantics of STAIRS in which earlier
established results with respect of reﬁnement of STAIRS speciﬁcations still hold. In
contrast, our intention when deﬁning the operational semantics with data, was to make
a semantics where we actually do manipulation of data while executing a diagram.
This diﬀerence in intention results in some diﬀerences between the denotational and
our operational semantics.
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The denotational semantics does not have states in the sense of the execution states
of the operational semantics. An assignment is therefore characterized by an event
write(σ, σ′) that holds the data state σ before the assignment and that data state σ′
after the assignment. The denotational deﬁnition of assignment is:
[[ assign(v, x, l) ]]
def
= {({〈write(σ, σ′)〉 | σ′(v) = eval(x{σ}) ∧
∀v′ ∈ Var : (v = v′ ∨ σ′(v′) = σ(v′))}, ∅)}
This provides one trace for each possible pair of data states that satisfy the assignment.
In diﬀerence, the operational semantics will only provide the data states before and
after assignment as they exist in the execution states. This means that in a trace of the
denotational semantics the values in the data state may implicitly change at any time
between assignments, while this will never happen in the operational semantics. Hence,
the operational semantics is sound, but not complete, with respect to the denotational
semantics.
The diﬀerence with respect to constraints is similar. In the denotational semantics,
a constraint is characterized by an event check(σ) where σ represent the data state at
the time of the evaluation of the constraint. The denotational deﬁnition is:
[[ constr(x, l) ]]
def
=
{({〈check(σ)〉 | eval(x{σ}) = true}, {〈check(σ)〉 | eval(x{σ}) = false})}
A positive trace with an event check(σ) is produced for every σ that satisﬁes the
constraint (i.e. evaluates the constraint to true) and a negative trace is produced for
every σ that does not satisfy the constraint. In the operational semantics, however,
we evaluate the constraint based on the data state at that point in the execution and
produce check(true) or check(false) depending on whether it was evaluated to true
or false.
In summary we can say that the diﬀerence is that the operational semantics does
exactly the data manipulation that is speciﬁed in the diagram (and nothing more),
while the denotational semantics characterizes the traces of all possible implicit data
manipulations that satisfy the explicit speciﬁcation of data manipulation.
A more visible diﬀerence in addition to this, is that the operational semantics
allows messages to carry data, while STAIRS with data has no syntax for this. This
is a result of the diﬀerence described above, because in STAIRS with data, messages
may implicitly carry data, while all data handling must be explicit in the operational
semantics.
21.1.2 Relation to timed STAIRS
Timed STAIRS is deﬁned in [70].1 In timed STAIRS there is a distinction between
syntactic and semantic events. In the syntax an event is a tripple (k,m, t) ∈ E of a
kind k, message m and timestamp tag t. The semantic events are deﬁned as:
[[ E ]] def= {(k,m, t → r) | (k,m, t) ∈ E ∧ r ∈ R}
1As explained in section 19.2.2, timed STAIRS is a three event semantics that for each message m
deﬁnes three events (!,m), (∼,m) and (?,m), where (∼,m) denotes that m is placed in the receiver’s
input buﬀer. We do not operate with explicit input buﬀers in the lifelines in our operational semantics
and regard our receive events (?,m) as the same as the receive events (∼,m) of timed STAIRS.
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Unlock
{d..3·d}
OK
sd UserAccepted
User ACSystem
CardOut {0..13}
Code d=duration
{t..t+3}
t=now
Figure 21.1: Sequence diagram with time constraints
In other words events where the timestamp tag maps to a timestamp represented by
a real number. With the exception that we apply variables as timestamp tags, our
deﬁnitions of events are identical to those given by timed STAIRS. In timed STAIRS a
requirement is placed on traces to ensure that time increases monotonic in every trace.
In the operational semantics, this is obtained by letting the clock variable now of all
lifelines be synchronized by the tick rule, and by asserting that time increments always
are positive numbers.
A time constraint in timed STAIRS is a Boolean expression over the timestamp
tags of the events of a diagram. The denotation of a time constraint is deﬁned as
[[ d tc x ]]
def
= {(p  x, n ∪ (p  ¬x)) | (p, n) ∈ [[ d ]]}
where
s  x def= {h ∈ s | h |= x}
and h |= x expresses that x is true when the timestamp tags of x is replaced by the
timestamps they map to in the events of trace h.
Let us again consider the diagram UserAccepted from section 19.2.3 as an example.
The diagram is shown in ﬁgure 21.1. In timed STAIRS, the diagram may be expressed
as
UserAccepted = (!Code seq ?Code seq !CardOut seq !OK
seq ?OK seq ?CardOut seq !Unlock) tc T
with timestamp tags
t.!Code = t1 t.?Code = t2
t.!CardOut = t3 t.?CardOut = t4
t.!OK = t5 t.?OK = t6
t.!Unlock = t7
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and the time constraint
T = (d = t2 − t1 ∧
d ≤ t6 − t1 ∧
t6 − t1 ≤ 3 · d ∧
t = t5 ∧
t ≤ t4 ∧
t4 ≤ t + 3 ∧
0 ≤ t4 − t3 ∧
t4 − t3 ≤ 13)
The resulting denotation of the diagram is
[[UserAccepted ]] = {(p, n)}
where p contains all the traces of the diagram that has assignments of real numbers to
t1, t2, . . . , t7 that satisfy T , and n contains the traces with assignments of real numbers
to t1, t2, . . . , t7 that do not satisfy T .
In the operational semantics we have the timestamp tags available as variables. We
can therefore simulate the time constraints of timed STAIRS with the use of constraint
events with constraints over these variables, as already illustrated in section 19.2.3.
The check events produced by executing these constraints will determine whether the
traces are positive or negative. The monotonicity of time is ensured by the tick rule,
and every possible assignment of timestamps to timestamp tags can be obtained by
providing a suitable general time model.
The only real diﬀerence between the time enhanced operational semantics and timed
STAIRS is then that the time constraints of timed STAIRS are global while the con-
straint events of the operational semantics are local to the lifelines. This means that
the constraint events of the operational semantics do not have the full generality of
the time constraints of timed STAIRS. However, as illustrated by the example diagram
UserAccepted’ of ﬁgure 19.6 in section 19.2.3, some of the limitation in having local,
rather than global, constraints may be overcome by clever use of data transmission by
messages.
21.2 Formalisms for timed specification and analy-
sis
Several approaches to making timed speciﬁcations exist. Best known is maybe the
approach of timed automata found in [4]. Timed automata accepts timed words, i.e.
sequences of labels where each label has been assigned a timestamp. A timed automa-
ton has a ﬁnite set of clocks. These clocks are incremented implicitly and simultane-
ously according to global time by giving each state in a run of the automaton a clock
interpretation that assigns time values to the clocks. This means time is incremented
at the transitions of the automaton. Transitions may reset one or more of the clocks
to zero, and transitions may have constraints over the clocks so that a transition may
only ﬁre if its clock constraints are evaluated to true.
In [21], a formalism for timed labeled transitions systems (LTSs) is applied. In
this formalism, each state holds a time value, and special transitions labeled with time
delays specify the advancement of time. We have, in chapter 13, made an analogy
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between our operational semantics and LTSs. By interpreting our now variables as
the time value of the states and our tick rule as the time delayed transitions, we can
make a similar analogy between our operational semantics with time and timed LTSs.
In [140, 141], a timed rewrite theory is deﬁned. The rewrite theory is implemented
as Real-Time Maude [138]. In this theory a special type Time for time variables is
provided and several time domains – such as discrete or dense time – deﬁned. Special
timed rewrite rules can be deﬁned. These rules provide time increments that are in
accordance with the time domain chosen, and that may or may not be restricted by
constraints. In addition, methods for timed analysis, such as timed search are provided.
In [1, 101] a simple approach to real-time speciﬁcations is suggested where an or-
dinary variable now ∈ R is added to the speciﬁcation, and advancement of time is
modeled by a special transition rule incrementing this variable. Time related concepts
such as timers and time constraints are then expressed by use of expressions over the
variable now and possibly other variables. A similar approach is used in SDL [86] where
a special expression now gives access to the system clock, i.e. returning the absolute
system time.
This is the approach we have followed, ﬁnding this to be the most suitable for
our purposes. This allows us to be more explicit in advancement of time than, e.g.,
the timed automata approach of [4]. Further, the timed automata are very focused
on the transitions of the system, which in our approach are more implicit. In our
approach we are in any case able to simulate clocks and clock constraints. Much of
the same applies to timed LTSs. The timed rewrite logic of [140,141], while providing
a solid framework for making real-time speciﬁcation in rewrite logic, and has tool
support [138], becomes too technical for our purposes. We are mostly concerned with
enabling speciﬁcation of real-time properties in sequence diagrams, and we only apply
rewrite logic indirectly through the implementation of our operational semantics. Still,
this approach is relevant to our work because it oﬀers the conﬁgurability of time models
that we are aiming at with our time extended operational semantics.
Several methods for timed analysis based on the formalisms discussed above exist.
These include analysis of clock regions (see [4]), timed search (see [140, 141]), timed
model checking (see [101, 141]), and timed testing (see [21]). As with the time models
we do not go into details on these analysis methods, but recognize that timed analysis
has been deﬁned for approaches to timed speciﬁcation similar to ours. We see a clear
potential in applying such methods for timed analysis to our operational semantics
for sequence diagrams with time. The most obvious approach for further work on this
would be an adaption of the implementation of the operational semantics to Real-Time
Maude [138, 140, 141] and make use of the time models and timed analysis methods
provided there.
21.3 Sequence diagrams with data and time
The syntax for sequence diagrams deﬁned by the UML standard [134] allows parame-
terized messages where values are assigned to named or anonymous attributes of the
message. However, the semantics of this is unclear. This handling of data may appear
to be more ﬂexible then our approach, but what we loose in ﬂexibility we gain in control
over the parameters.
In the MSC standard [85] a treatment of data is deﬁned that is similar to, but
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more general than, ours. Variables are owned by lifelines and each lifeline maintains
a state that maps the variables to values. An assignment, called a binding, binds an
expression to a variable and in the new state the expression is evaluated based on the
values of the old state. Bindings can also occur in messages, in which case the variable
to which the expression is bound must be owned by the receiving lifeline.
What makes this approach more general than ours is that the bindings may contain
wildcards, on both sides of the assignment symbol, in order to facilitate reﬁnement.
However, a binding with a wildcard cannot be evaluated without identifying the wild-
cards, e.g. by substituting arbitrary values. Modifying our data handling to allow a
version of the wildcards in bindings in MSC would require rather elaborate rules for
updating the data states, as expressions cannot always be evaluated, but it could be a
topic for further work.
As is obvious from the case study presented in chapter 20, a number of approaches
to specifying real-time properties in sequence diagrams and MSCs exist. The MSC
standard [85] deﬁnes three timing concepts: The timer that we saw applied in [192]
(see section 20.2.6) and [17, 18] (see section 20.2.13), the relative time constraints
or relative time delays we saw in [192] (see sections 20.2.4), [7] (see section 20.2.5)
and [17, 18] (see section 20.2.13), and the absolute measure or timing that we saw
in [192] (see section 20.2.4). The UML standard [134] deﬁnes four timing concepts:
Duration observation, duration constraint, time observation and time constraint. These
are demonstrated by the example reproduced in ﬁgure 21.1. The examples from [153]
(see section 20.2.2), [106] (see section 20.2.7), [144,145] (see section 20.2.11), and partly
the example from [51] (see section 20.2.9), can be considered variants over the duration
constraints speciﬁed in the UML standard. The timing concepts of the UML Testing
Proﬁle [133] are a combination of the timing concepts from the UML standard and the
timers from MSC. These are illustrated by the example reproduced in ﬁgure 20.23 (see
section 20.2.12). In the UML Proﬁle for Schedulability, Performance, and Time [132]
timing is speciﬁed by timestamps on events. An example of this we get from [41]
(see section 20.2.8). This is conceptually similar to the sendTime and receiveTime
attributes of messages we saw in [53] (see sections 20.2.2 and 20.2.3). The UML proﬁle
also has the notion of a timer and a notion of a system clock that can produce interrupt
events. In addition to the timing concepts listed above, we did in the case study also
note two constructs for specifying time constraints in loops. They are found in [51]
(see section 20.2.9) and [71] (see section 20.2.10).
What most of these approaches have in common is that they provide basically
declarative treatments of time. Even where timing concepts that may be seen as more
operational are provided, such as the timers in MSC and the time observation in UML,
the semantics given is in a denotational fashion, i.e. without any indication of how time
advances.
An exception is [51] where sequence diagrams are translated to timed automata, but
in the process they make considerably deviations from what we consider standard UML
or MSC semantics. Also in [108], timed MSCs are translated to timed automata, with
the restrictions it imposes to translate MSCs to ﬁnite automata. Another denotational
approach is the formal sematics for Time Sequence Diagrams presented in [47].
There also exist some other more operational approaches. In [62] a time extension to
LSCs (see chapter 11) is presented. This is similar to our extension to the operational
semantics, in that a clock variable Time is added to the formalism. Time is then
treated as data and time constraints can be expressed by means of ordinary variables.
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In [38], time extensions to the graphical notation of TTCN-3 are introduced, including
a now variable. In [96] timed MSCs are formalized in a timed version of Maude.
This approach, however, only deals with timers, and as explained in chapter 11 their
formalization makes restrictions on the MSC semantics.
Some of the publications cited above also describe methods for timed analysis.
When sequence diagrams are translated to timed automata they may be subjected
to timed model checking, as is done in [51]. In [7] a tool is described that analyzes
an MSC for timing conﬂicts. In [17, 18] an algorithm for time consistency analysis is
presented. The work is based on [7], but extends the approach to high-level MSCs.
The algorithm is based on constructing weighted graphs from (high-level) MSCs and
analyzing the paths of the graphs. A somewhat stronger variant of this kind of analysis
of timed MSCs is presented in [195]. In [106] an algorithm is presented that checks
time consistency of paths of high-level MSCs by means of linear programming.
In our view, these kinds of analysis are somewhat restricted, as they only analyze
consistency of time constraints in sequence diagrams/MSCs. We have more belief in a
direction where an operational semantics is connected to more general approaches to
timed analysis, as described in section 21.2.
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Chapter 22
Discussion
In chapter 2 we formulated the goal for the work of this thesis as follows:
Develop a method and tool to analyze reﬁnements and decompositions of speciﬁcations
expressed in a diagram based language. The methods and tool should:
• Handle functional behavior as well as aspects of availability.
• Have a sound formal foundation.
• Apply testing techniques.
• Be practical in use also for people without background in formal methods.
In addition we formulated 10 success criteria as requirements for the method and tool
referred to in the goal.
In this thesis we have developed an operational semantics for sequence diagrams,
a reﬁnement veriﬁcation technique and a reﬁnement testing technique for sequence di-
agrams, all based on the operational semantics, and an extension of the operational
semantics with data and time. These artifacts must together be considered the method
referred to in the goal. The operational semantics, the reﬁnement testing and the reﬁne-
ment veriﬁcation have been implemented in the Escalator tool, described in chapter 14.
Escalator is obviously the tool in the goal.
In the following we reproduce the success criteria formulated in chapter 2, and
evaluate each of them with respect to the method, as deﬁned above, and the tool.
At the end of this chapter, we also review the overall hypothesis we formulated in
chapter 2.
Success criterion 1 The method should support model driven development by oﬀer-
ing the capability of analyzing the relation between models or speciﬁcations at diﬀerent
levels of abstraction.
The method provides two techniques for analyzing the relation between speciﬁcations
at diﬀerent levels of abstraction, namely the reﬁnement veriﬁcation and the reﬁnement
testing. Speciﬁcally, the speciﬁcations are UML 2.x sequence diagrams and the relation
is reﬁnement as deﬁned in STAIRS [70,159]. The case study documented in chapter 15
demonstrates that our method can be applied to model driven development.
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While we have not done work in that direction, we believe the tests we generate from
sequence diagram speciﬁcations can be applied to more than testing other sequence di-
agram speciﬁcations. The obvious candidates are testing of state machine/statechart
speciﬁcations, and testing of code (by transforming our abstract tests into tests for test-
ing of code). We would also consider such kinds of application of our tests as “analyzing
the relation between models or speciﬁcations at diﬀerent levels of abstraction”.
Success criterion 2 The method should oﬀer the capability of analyzing aspects of
availability.
In chapter 18 we analyzed the aspects of service availability and found the main prop-
erties of availability to be exclusivity – broken down to securing access for authorized
users, providing denial of service defense mechanisms and ensuring exclusion of unau-
thorized users – and accessibility – decomposed to quality and timeliness. Our method
includes a technique for specifying real-time properties in sequence diagrams and an
operational semantics for sequence diagrams with time. These real-time properties are
closely related to timeliness. The generality and expressiveness of this technique have
been demonstrated in a case study, presented in chapter 20. While we have not imple-
mented any analysis of real-time properties, we believe, as outlined in chapter 21, that
existing techniques for doing real-time analysis can be applied to our the operational
semantics with time.
We have not done any work in the direction of exclusivity. We have, however,
great belief in sequence diagrams as a language for specifying protocols and believe
our method can be applied for analysis of authentication and authorization protocols,
which are related to exclusivity.
Success criterion 3 The method should make use of functional models.
Our method is based on UML 2.x sequence diagrams. Sequence diagram speciﬁcations
must be considered functional models, and hence we can say that our method make
use of functional models.
Success criterion 4 The method should handle modularity.
The method does not have any particular support for modularity except from what
is inherited from STAIRS. This does not mean that there is no modularity in the
method. The reﬁnement relations in STAIRS [70, 159] are modular. Because the re-
ﬁnement veriﬁcation is based directly on these reﬁnement relations, this makes the re-
ﬁnement veriﬁcation modular. This is demonstrated by the reﬁnement veriﬁcation case
study documented in chapter 15, by the fact that reﬁnement veriﬁcation of composed
diagrams (the Overview diagrams) gave the same result as applying the reﬁnement
veriﬁcation on the composites separately.
This must still be considered modularity in a weak sense because the case study
was related to modularity of services and not modularity of components. We do see a
potential for extending our method with stronger support for modularity via the reﬁne-
ment testing. In earlier work [109–111] we have demonstrated how testing techniques
can be applied for analyzing decomposition of components speciﬁed in a contract ori-
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ented1 fashion. We believe something similar can be done based on our reﬁnement
testing.
Success criterion 5 The method should be based on practical testing techniques.
Part of the method, namely the reﬁnement testing, is based on testing techniques. More
speciﬁcally, both the test generation and the test execution are based on the testing
theory often referred to as ioco theory [177–179]. The reﬁnement testing is implemented
in the Escalator tool where both the test generation and the test execution are carried
out automatically. The case study on the use of this functionality, documented in
chapter 15, demonstrates the practicality of the testing techniques, by demonstrating
that the reﬁnement testing can be applied in practice.
Success criterion 6 The method should be formally sound.
The operational semantics has been proven to be sound and complete with respect to
the denotational semantics of STAIRS. (The proofs are found in appendix A.) The
reﬁnement veriﬁcation is based on the deﬁnitions of reﬁnement given in STAIRS. These
reﬁnement relations have in [70, 158, 159] been proved to be transitive and monotone,
properties that our reﬁnement veriﬁcation inherits by applying the same deﬁnitions.
The reﬁnement veriﬁcation applies the “generate all traces” meta-strategy deﬁned in
chapter 9. The soundness of this strategy has been given additional justiﬁcation in
appendix B. The reﬁnement testing is based a formal testing theory [177–179], and
in chapter 13 we provide arguments for its soundness with respect to reﬁnement. Re-
garding the data and time extensions of the operational semantics we have not done
any proofs, but in chapter 21 we present arguments for its soundness with respect to
STAIRS with data and time. While we do not have formal proofs and irrefutable sup-
port for the soundness of all the aspects of the method, the proofs and justiﬁcations
we have listed above should still provide strong support for its soundness.
Success criterion 7 The output from the method should useful.
The method provides four kinds of output:
• Execution traces from the operational semantics with or without data and time.
In addition these traces may be categorized as positive and negative traces, or
may be structured in interaction obligations.
• From the reﬁnement veriﬁcation, the answer “yes” or “no” to the question of
whether a sequence diagram is a correct reﬁnement of another diagram, or not.
• Tests generated from sequence diagrams.
• Verdicts of test executions with test runs represented as traces. These verdicts
also answers the question of whether or not a sequence diagram is a correct
reﬁnement of another diagram.
1See e.g. [2, 172]. Contract oriented speciﬁcations are also called assumption/guarantee speciﬁca-
tions, rely/guarantee speciﬁcations and assumption/commitment speciﬁcations.
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In the case study on the use of the Escalator tool, documented in chapter 15, we saw
that both the reﬁnement veriﬁcation and the reﬁnement testing gave results that de-
termined whether the reﬁnement steps of the speciﬁcation were correct or not. Further
we saw that the reasons for unexpected results (i.e. incorrect reﬁnements) could be
identiﬁed by manual analysis of traces and test runs generated by the tool. In the set-
ting of development by stepwise reﬁnement, these outputs must be considered useful.
In the case study we also got the expected results with respect to a manual analysis of
the speciﬁcation, and we have not been able to identify any anomalies in the output.
We also believe the tests themselves can be made useful by applying them to con-
formance testing, i.e. testing of code. As discussed in chapter 12, iterative development
methodologies such as RUP [97] and agile methods [8, 88] recommend scenario based
speciﬁcations and a short way from speciﬁcation to testing. In such settings, tests
generated from sequence diagrams could be useful.
Because we have not deﬁned or implemented any availability analysis beyond trace
generation from sequence diagrams with data and time, it is hard to say something
about the usefulness of the output of our method with respect to availability.
Success criterion 8 The method should be supported by a fully or partially auto-
matic tool.
As documented in chapter 14, the reﬁnement veriﬁcation and the reﬁnement testing
have been implemented in the Escalator tool. As part of the former, also the operational
semantics, with its capabilities of producing execution traces, is implemented. Further,
the tool includes a graphical sequence diagram editor and implements a transformation
from sequence diagrams in the graphical editor to the internal textual representation
of sequence diagrams. The whole process starting with diagrams (made in the editor)
to the presentation of results is carried out by the tool without intervention from the
user. The only part of the method that is not fully automated is the setup of and
analysis of results from the reﬁnement testing, since the “testing down” part and the
“testing up” part must be speciﬁed and carried out separately.
Success criterion 9 Application of the method at early stages of the system devel-
opment improves the quality of systems with availability requirements.
We have no direct support for this from the work of this thesis. However, we did
carry out a case study (see chapter 15) that demonstrates that our method can be
applied to stepwise development of sequence diagram speciﬁcations, something that
would typically be part of the early stages of a system development. There are reasons
to believe that this can improve the quality of the speciﬁcations and that this again
can improve the quality of systems. A real investigation of this would however require
empirical studies of a much larger scale than the case studies we have carried out in
our work.
Success criterion 10 Application of the method makes development of systems with
availability requirements more eﬃcient and less costly.
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We have no real support to say whether this statement is true or not, as this would
require empirical studies at a much larger scale than we have had time and resources
to conduct within the work of this thesis.
In chapter 2 we stated our overall hypothesis as follows:
System development will beneﬁt (become more eﬀective and less costly, and produce
better software systems) from:
• Methods and tools for doing analysis of systems at the model or speciﬁcation level.
• An integration of practical or pragmatic methods with formal methods.
We cannot say that our work implies the validity of this hypothesis, but we can suggest
that our work demonstrates the feasibility of making methods and tools for doing
analysis at the speciﬁcation level, and the feasibility of making such methods and tools
by the integration of practical methods and formal methods.
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Chapter 23
Conclusions
The main contributions of this thesis are:
• An operational semantics for UML 2.x sequence diagrams, including a character-
ization of how execution strategies for this operational semantics can be deﬁned.
• A method for reﬁnement veriﬁcation of sequence diagram speciﬁcations.
• A method for reﬁnement testing of sequence diagram speciﬁcations, including a
test generation algorithm and a characterization of test execution.
• A prototype tool for analysis of sequence diagram speciﬁcations implementing
the operational semantics, the reﬁnement veriﬁcation and the reﬁnement testing.
• A characterization of the basic aspects of availability and an extension of the
operational semantics with support for one of them: real-time properties.
In section 23.1 below we go into more detail about the main contributions. In sec-
tion 23.2 we discuss the possibilities for further work.
23.1 Main contributions
We are not aware of any other operational semantics for UML 2.x sequence diagrams or
MSCs with the same strength and generality as ours. Several other approaches exist,
but all with signiﬁcant shortcomings.
Our operational semantics is simple and is deﬁned with extensibility and variation
in mind. An example of this is the possibility of deﬁning the communication model
separately from the operational semantics. This extensibility also made it possible to
make the data and time extensions with only minor adjustments. It does not involve
any translation or transformation of the diagrams into other formalisms, which makes
it easy to use and understand. It is sound and complete with respect to a reasonable
denotational formalization of the UML standard.
A major insight in the work with the operational semantics was identiﬁcation of
the need for a meta-level to assign properties to the executions and give structure to
sets of executions. This is in particular due to the semantic structure of STAIRS with
interaction obligations of positive and negative traces. For this reason the operational
semantics has a formalized meta-level. This meta-level is used for such things as distin-
guishing positive from negative traces, and distinguishing between traces of diﬀerent
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interaction obligations. In addition, this meta-level can be be used for deﬁning exe-
cution strategies. We have provided two such meta-strategies, one for generating all
traces of a diagram and one for generating an arbitrary trace and assigning properties
to it. The former is applied in the reﬁnement veriﬁcation and the latter in the test
generation algorithm.
The operational semantics is implemented in the term rewriting language Maude.
Maude is itself a formal language, and using Maude for the implementation reduces the
risk of unintentionally changing the semantics while doing the implementation. This
implementation is one of the cornerstones of the Escalator tool.
In order to analyze real-time properties, the operational semantics was given a
simple, but powerful, extension for the handling of data and time. A case study in
speciﬁcation of real-time properties showed that a broad range real-time properties
deﬁned in a wide range of approaches to timed sequence diagrams can be speciﬁed
by our time enhanced sequence diagrams. The operational semantics with time was
deﬁned with the same idea of variability as the untimed version of the operational
semantics. Therefore the time model can be deﬁned separately from the operational
semantics itself, allowing a variety of time models to be implemented.
Based on the operational semantics we have deﬁned and implemented a test gen-
eration algorithm and a characterization of test execution. What is special with our
approach is that tests are generated from sequence diagram speciﬁcations, the tests
are themselves sequence diagrams and the tests are executed against sequence diagram
speciﬁcations. Together this forms a method for reﬁnement testing, i.e. a method for
investigating whether or not a sequence diagram is a correct reﬁnement of another
sequence diagram by application of testing techniques. We are not aware of any other
methods that can do this.
The test generation algorithm is an adaption of a well-known algorithm for gener-
ation of tests for conformance testing from LTS speciﬁcations. What distinguishes our
algorithm is that it takes sequence diagrams that may contain the operators neg/refuse
and assert as input. Furhter, it is adapted to the semantic model of UML 2.x which
deﬁnes sequence diagrams as partial speciﬁcations with positive, negative and incon-
clusive behavior. The output of the test generation algorithm are tests in the format of
sequence diagrams. With a small adaption we can use the same operational semantics
for tests as for ordinary sequence diagrams. Not surprisingly, test execution is deﬁned
by a meta-strategy for this purpose. Also the test execution is adapted to the semantic
model with positive, negative and inconclusive traces.
The Escalator tool oﬀers an implementation of the analysis methods that we have
deﬁned. The main functionality is obviously the reﬁnement veriﬁcation and the reﬁne-
ment testing methods, but also trace generation, test generation and test execution
are available independently of these. The backbone of the tool is the Maude imple-
mentation of the operational semantics. The motivation behind the tool has been to
make the analysis methods easily available and practical in use. For this reason the
tool integrates a sequence diagram editor that allows the user to work with sequence
diagrams in their graphical notation rather than the abstract textual syntax of STAIRS
or the Maude representation of diagrams we use as input to the Maude implementation
of the operational semantics. All parts of trace generation, reﬁnement veriﬁcation, test
generation and test execution are automated. This means the user only has to care
about diagrams in the graphical editor and the results of the analysis, and does not
have to be bothered with internal representations and processes. While the tool is a
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prototype and is far from industrial standard, the case study we carried out using the
tool demonstrated the feasibility of our approach.
23.2 Further work
There are several possible direction for further work. With respect to the operational
semantics the most obvious is deﬁning a repository of execution strategies to support a
wider variety of analysis. One suggestion could be an execution strategy that searches
for a particular trace or traces of a particular pattern. Another possibility of fur-
ther work on the operational semantics is to deﬁne a repository of more sophisticated
communication models. An example of this could be deﬁning a lossy communication
medium, which could be useful in diﬀerent kinds of analysis, e.g. protocol analysis.
With respect to the operational semantics with data, a possibility for further work
is to make the data handling more general in the direction of the data handling in
MSC. Regarding the operational semantics with time, the obvious continuation of the
work is to deﬁne a more sophisticated time model, or a repository of time models.
This would support the work on deﬁning and implementing timed analysis of sequence
diagram speciﬁcations based on the timed operational semantics, which is the natural
next step with respect to availability analysis. Real-Time Maude seems to be a good
candidate for implementing time models and timed analysis for our timed operational
semantics.
Another possibility of further work with availability is to extend the operational
semantics with a notion of probabilities, which would support speciﬁcation and analysis
of soft real-time properties, and not only hard real-time properties. We also believe a
possibly interesting direction could be speciﬁcation and analysis of authentication and
authorization protocols, in order to support the exclusivity aspects of availability, and
not only the accessibility aspects.
Also with respect to testing there are several possibilities for continuation of the
work. At the moment the test generation and test execution, and hence also the re-
ﬁnement testing, do not support the mandatory choice operator xalt from STAIRS. An
investigation into the possibilities of extending the testing approach to support xalt,
e.g. by some use of test purpose, could be feasible. Another way of increasing the
scope of our approach to testing could be to deﬁne execution of testing against state
machines/statecharts and do reﬁnement testing between sequence diagram speciﬁca-
tions and state machine/statechart speciﬁcations. We could also deﬁne transformations
from our abstract tests to implementation speciﬁc tests and do conformance testing
against code. Both these variants could include establishing a formal relation to the
UML Testing Proﬁle.
There are other, more sophisticated, extensions we could make to the reﬁnement
testing. A possibility for further work is to deﬁne a testing strategy to support the spe-
cial class of reﬁnements that decompositions constitute. Such a testing strategy should
be based on principles from contract oriented speciﬁcations (assumption/guarantee
speciﬁcations) to handle the challenges related to mutually dependencies between the
resulting components. Other possibilities that can be considered are to extend the
reﬁnement testing with support for data or do timed testing of reﬁnements based on
the operational semantics with data and time.
Further work on the Escalator tool will obviously depend on further work on the
237
Conclusions
analysis methods, and the implementations of these. In addition to this there are sev-
eral things we could do with the tool at the more practical level. There is a performance
problem in the implementation of the reﬁnement testing, and solving this problem is
the most pressing issue with respect to improving the quality of the tool. Other obvi-
ous improvements of the tool would be to implement such things as syntax checking of
diagrams, and improving error messages and other feedback to the user. With respect
to implementing new functionality, other than new methods of analysis, we consider
import of UML models from third party UML tools, increasing the conﬁgurability (e.g.
by allowing the users to deﬁne their own communication media and execution strate-
gies) and making the tool more interactive (e.g. by providing animations of executions)
interesting possibilities.
Finally, a possible direction for further work is to strengthen the empirical support
for our hypothesis. A way to do this could be to carry out a larger industrial case
study or other experiments with the tools. This would of course require some of the
proposed improvements of the tool suggested above.
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Appendix A
Proofs of soundness, completeness
and termination of the operational
semantics
In this appendix we provide proofs of the soundness and completeness of the operational
semantics presented in chapter 8 with respect to the denotational semantics presented
in section 5.3. We also prove termination of execution of diagrams without inﬁnite
loop.
Informally, the soundness property means that that if the operational semantics
produces a trace from a given diagram, this trace should be included in the denotational
semantics of that diagram. By completeness we mean that all traces in the denotational
semantics of a diagram should be producible applying the operational semantics on that
diagram.
The proofs are based on interpreting the rules of the operational semantics as a
rewrite theory. For a formal treatment of rewrite theories, see [28,123]. We assume the
communication model with one FIFO buﬀer for each message as deﬁned in section 8.2.1.
In section A.1 we deﬁne a notion of environment of diagrams. In section A.2 we
prove soundness and completeness of simple diagrams (theorem 1 on page 279 and
theorem 2 on page 293). In section A.3 we prove termination (theorem 3 on page
297), soundness (theorem 4 on page 304) and completeness (theorem 5 on page 306) of
diagrams with high-level operators, but without inﬁnite loop. In section A.4 we prove
soundness (theorem 6 on page 311) and completeness (theorem 7 on 317) of diagrams
with inﬁnite loops.
A.1 Environment
The denotational semantics has an implicit notion of environment, which allows for,
e.g., the diagram in ﬁgure A.1 which consists of only one input event as long as the
lifeline of the corresponding output event does not occur in the diagram. In the op-
erational semantics, the state of the communication medium β in an execution state
[β, d] may be seen as an explicit notion of the environment. Given the diagram d in
ﬁgure A.1, the operational semantics produces the trace of [[ d ]] only if the message m
is available in the state of the communication medium, i.e.
(m, j, i) ∈ β ⇒ [β, d] (?,(m,j,i))−−−−−→ [β \ {(m, j, i)}, skip]
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d = (?, (m, j, i))
[[ d ]] = {〈(?, (m, j, i))〉}
Figure A.1: Diagram with single receive event
(m, j, i) ∈ β ⇒ [β, d] 
In order to align the two semantics we must make explicit the environment of the
denotational semantics.
Definition 1 (Environment) The function env. ∈ D → P(E) returns the environ-
ment of a diagram d
env.d
def
= {(k,m)|k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.d ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d}
Further we deﬁne
envM.d
def
= {m.e|e ∈ env.d}
envk.d
def
= {(k,m)|(k,m) ∈ env.d}
envkM.d
def
= {m|(k,m) ∈ env.d}
A.2 Simple sequence diagrams
In this section we prove soundness and completeness of what we refer to as simple
diagrams; diagrams without high-level constructs such as loop and choice. The general
case is addressed in section A.3. In section A.3 we also prove termination.
Definition 2 (Simple diagram) A diagram is called simple iﬀ it only contains
• events
• skip
• the operators seq, par and strict
In this section we are only concerned with simple diagrams. We also restrict our-
selves to diagrams where no event occurs more than once:
d = d1 seq d2 ⇒ ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅
d = d1 par d2 ⇒ ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅
d = d1 strict d2 ⇒ ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅
It follows from this condition that no message can occur in more than one transmit
and one receive event.
Lemma 1 If d is a simple diagram, then
[[ d ]] = {(T, ∅)} with T ⊆ H
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Proof of lemma 1
Assume: d simple
Prove: [[ d ]] = {(T, ∅)} ∧ T ⊆ H
Proof: by induction on the structure of d
〈1〉1. Case: d = skip (induction step)
〈2〉1. [[ d ]] = {({〈〉}, ∅)}
Proof: Def. 5.3.
〈2〉2. {〈〉} ⊆ H
Proof: Def. of H and (5.1)
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2
〈1〉2. Case: d = e (induction step)
〈2〉1. [[ e ]] = {({〈e〉}, ∅)}
Proof: Def. 5.4.
〈2〉2. {〈e〉} ⊆ H
Proof: Def. of H and (5.1).
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉3. d = d1 seq d2 (induction step)
Assume: 1. [[ d1 ]] = {(T1, ∅)} (induction hypothesis)
2. [[ d2 ]] = {(T2, ∅)} (induction hypothesis)
3. T1, T2 ⊆ H (induction hypothesis)
Prove: [[ d1 seq d2 ]] = {(T, ∅)} ∧ T ⊆ H
〈2〉1. [[ d1 seq d2 ]] = {o1  o2|o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]}
Proof: Def. (5.7).
〈2〉2. [[ d1 seq d2 ]] = {(T1, ∅)  (T2, ∅)}
Proof: 〈2〉1 and induction hypothesis.
〈2〉3. [[ d1 seq d2 ]] = {(T1  T2, (∅  T2) ∪ (∅  ∅) ∪ (T1  ∅))}
Proof: 〈2〉2 and def. (5.6).
〈2〉4. [[ d1 seq d2 ]] = {(T, ∅)}, with T = T1  T2 ⊆ H
〈3〉1. T1  T2 is a set, and T1  T2 ⊆ H
Proof: Def. (5.5).
〈3〉2. (∅  T2) ∪ (∅  ∅) ∪ (T1  ∅) = ∅
Proof: Def. (5.5).
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉3, 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2.
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉4
〈1〉4. d = d1 par d2 (induction step)
Assume: 1. [[ d1 ]] = {(T1, ∅)} (induction hypothesis)
2. [[ d2 ]] = {(T2, ∅)} (induction hypothesis)
3. T1, T2 ⊆ H (induction hypothesis)
Prove: [[ d1 par d2 ]] = {(T, ∅)} ∧ T ⊆ H
〈2〉1. [[ d1 par d2 ]] = {o1 ‖ o2|o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]}
Proof: Def. (5.10).
〈2〉2. [[ d1 par d2 ]] = {(T1, ∅) ‖ (T2, ∅)}
Proof: 〈2〉1 and induction hypothesis.
〈2〉3. [[ d1 par d2 ]] = {(T1 ‖ T2, (∅ ‖ T2) ∪ (∅ ‖ ∅) ∪ (T1 ‖ ∅))}
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Proof: 〈2〉2 and def. (5.9).
〈2〉4. [[ d1 par d2 ]] = {(T, ∅)}, with T = T1 ‖ T2 ⊆ H
〈3〉1. T1 ‖ T2 is a set, and T1 ‖ T2 ⊆ H
Proof: Def. (5.8).
〈3〉2. (∅ ‖ T2) ∪ (∅ ‖ ∅) ∪ (T1 ‖ ∅) = ∅
Proof: Def. (5.8).
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉3, 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2.
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉4
〈1〉5. d = d1 strict d2 (induction step)
Assume: 1. [[ d1 ]] = {(T1, ∅)} (induction hypothesis)
2. [[ d2 ]] = {(T2, ∅)} (induction hypothesis)
3. T1, T2 ⊆ H (induction hypothesis)
Prove: [[ d1 strict d2 ]] = {(T, ∅)} ∧ T ⊆ H
〈2〉1. [[ d1 strict d2 ]] = {o1  o2|o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]}
Proof: Def. (5.13).
〈2〉2. [[ d1 strict d2 ]] = {(T1, ∅)  (T2, ∅)}
Proof: 〈2〉1 and induction hypothesis.
〈2〉3. [[ d1 strict d2 ]] = {(T1  T2, (∅  T2) ∪ (∅  ∅) ∪ (T1  ∅))}
Proof: 〈2〉2 and def. (5.12).
〈2〉4. [[ d1 strict d2 ]] = {(T, ∅)}, with T = T1  T2 ⊆ H
〈3〉1. T1  T2 is a set, and T1  T2 ⊆ H
Proof: Def. (5.11).
〈3〉2. (∅  T2) ∪ (∅  ∅) ∪ (T1  ∅) = ∅
Proof: Def. (5.11).
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉3, 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2.
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉4
〈1〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, 〈1〉3, 〈1〉4 and 〈1〉5.

Given lemma 1 we will in the following associate [[ d ]] with T , and write t ∈ [[ d ]]
when t ∈ T as shorthand notation.
Lemma 2 Given two simple diagrams d1, d2 ∈ D, then
env.(d1 seq d2) = env.(d1 par d2) = env.(d1 strict d2) = (env.d1\ev.d2)∪(env.d2\ev.d1)
Proof of lemma 2
〈1〉1. env.(d1 seq d2)
= {(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.(d1 seq d2)
∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.(d1 seq d2)} (Def. 1 of env. )
= {(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ (msg.d1 ∪msg.d2)
∧ (k,m) ∈ (ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2)} (Defs. of ev. and msg. )
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〈1〉2. env.(d1 par d2)
= {(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.(d1 par d2)
∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.(d1 par d2)} (Def. 1 of env. )
= {(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ (msg.d1 ∪msg.d2)
∧ (k,m) ∈ (ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2)} (Defs. of ev. and msg. )
〈1〉3. env.(d1 strict d2)
= {(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.(d1 strict d2)
∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.(d1 strict d2)} (Def. 1 of env. )
= {(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ (msg.d1 ∪msg.d2)
∧ (k,m) ∈ (ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2)} (Defs. of ev. and msg. )
〈1〉4. {(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ (msg.d1 ∪msg.d2) ∧ (k,m) ∈ (ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2)}
= {(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧ (m ∈ msg.d1 ∨m ∈ msg.d2)
∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d1 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d2}
= {(k,m) | (k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.d1 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d1 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d2)
∨ (k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.d2 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d1 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d2)
= {(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.d1 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d1 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d2}
∪{(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.d2 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d1 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d2}
= ({(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.d1 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d1} ∩
{(k,m) | (k,m) ∈ ev.d2}) ∪
({(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.d2 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d2} ∩
{(k,m) | (k,m) ∈ ev.d1})
= ({(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.d1 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d1} \
{(k,m) | (k,m) ∈ ev.d2}) ∪
({(k,m) | k ∈ {!, ?} ∧m ∈ msg.d2 ∧ (k,m) ∈ ev.d2} \
{(k,m) | (k,m) ∈ ev.d1})
= (env.d1 \ {(k,m) | (k,m) ∈ ev.d2})
∪ (env.d2 \ {(k,m) | (k,m) ∈ ev.d1})
= (env.d1 \ ev.d2) ∪ (env.d2 \ ev.d1)
Proof: Def. of env. , and set theory.
〈1〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, 〈1〉3 and 〈1〉4.

Definition 3 The function ev. ∈ E∗ → P(E) returns the events of a trace t. The
function is deﬁned recursively:
ev.〈〉 def= ∅
ev.(〈e〉t) def= {e} ∪ ev.t
Lemma 3 Given t1, t2 ∈ E∗, then ev.(t1t2) = ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2
Proof of lemma 3
Assume: t1, t2 ∈ E∗
Prove: ev.(t1
t2) = ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2
Proof: by induction on t1.
〈1〉1. Induction start. t1 = 〈〉
〈2〉1. ev.(t1t2) = ev.(〈〉t2) = ev.t2
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Proof: 〈1〉1 and identity of  .
〈2〉2. ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2 = ev.〈〉 ∪ ev.t2 = ∅ ∪ ev.t2 = ev.t2
Proof: 〈1〉1 and def. of ev. .
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉2. Induction step
Assume: ev.(t1
t2) = ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2 (induction hypothesis)
Prove: ev.((〈e〉t1)t2) = ev.(〈e〉t1) ∪ ev.t2
〈2〉1. ev.((〈e〉t1)t2) = ev.(〈e〉(t1t2)) = {e} ∪ ev.(t1t2)
= {e} ∪ ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2
Proof: Associativity of  , def. of ev. and induction hypothesis.
〈2〉2. ev.(〈e〉t1) ∪ ev.t2 = {e} ∪ ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2
Proof: Def. of ev. .
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2.

Lemma 4 Given simple diagrams d, d′ ∈ D without repetition of events. Then, for all
traces t, if there exist β, β ′ ∈ B such that
[β, d]
t−→ [β ′, d′]
then
ev.t = ev.d \ ev.d′
Proof of lemma 4
Assume: [β, d]
t−→ [β ′, d′]
Prove: e ∈ ev.t ⇐⇒ e ∈ (ev.d \ ev.d′)
〈1〉1. e ∈ (ev.d \ ev.d′) ⇐⇒ (e ∈ ev.d ∧ e ∈ ev.d′)
Proof: Set theory.
〈1〉2. e ∈ ev.t ⇒ e ∈ ev.d ∧ e ∈ ev.d′
Proof: Assume e ∈ ev.t. Then there must exist t1, t2 such that t = t1〈e〉t2 and
β1, β2, d1, d2 such that
[β, d]
t1−→ [β1, d1] e−→ [β2, d2] t2−→ [β ′, d′]
By the assumption that d, and therefore also d1 and d2, are simple and have no
repetition of events, and by rules (8.3)-(8.14) we must have that e ∈ ev.d1 and
e ∈ ev.d2. Because events cannot reappear during rewrite of a diagram, this also
means that e ∈ ev.d and e ∈ ev.d′
〈1〉3. e ∈ ev.d ∧ e ∈ ev.d′ ⇒ e ∈ ev.t
Proof: Assume e ∈ ev.d and e ∈ ev.d′. Because application of rules (8.3)-(8.14) is
the only way of removing an event there must exist a sequence of rewrites such that
[β, d]
t1
〈e〉t2−−−−−−→ [β ′, d′]
which means there must exist t1 and t2 such that t = t1
〈e〉t2. By the deﬁnition
of ev.t we then have that e ∈ ev.t.
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〈1〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2 and 〈1〉3.

Lemma 5 Given simple diagram d ∈ D. For all traces t, if there exist β, β ′ ∈ B such
that
[β, d]
t−→ [β ′, skip]
then
ev.t = ev.d
Proof of lemma 5 Assume [β, d]
t−→ [β ′, skip]. By lemma 4 and the deﬁnition of
ev.skip, we have
ev.t = ev.d \ ev.skip = ev.d \ ∅ = ev.d

Definition 4 We formally deﬁne the ﬁltering operator S© for ﬁnite sequences over
A:
V S©〈〉 def= 〈〉
v ∈ V ⇒ V S©(〈v〉t) def= 〈v〉(V S©t)
v ∈ V ⇒ V S©(〈v〉t) def= V S©t
(with V ⊆ A and t ∈ A∗).
Lemma 6 Given simple diagram d ∈ D. For all t ∈ E∗, if there exists β such that
[env!M.d, d]
t−→ [β, skip]
then
t ∈ H
Proof of lemma 6
Assume: [env!M.d, d]
t−→ [β, skip]
Prove: t ∈ H
〈1〉1. t ∈ H ⇐⇒
∀i ∈ [1..#t] : k.t[i] = !⇒ #({(!, m.t[i])} S©t|i) > #({(?, m.t[i])} S©t|i)
Proof: Semantic constraint on traces (5.1).
〈1〉2. ∀i ∈ [1..#t] : k.t[i] = !⇒ #({(!, m.t[i])} S©t|i) > #({(?, m.t[i])} S©t|i)
Let: j be arbitrary j ∈ [1..#t]
Prove: k.t[j] = !⇒ #({(!, m.t[j])} S©t|j) > #({(?, m.t[j])} S©t|j)
〈2〉1. Case: t[j] transmit event
Let: t[j] = (!, m). Then k.t[j] = ! and m.t[j] = m
Prove: #({(!, m)} S©t|j) > #({(?, m)} S©t|j)
〈3〉1. #({(!, m)} S©t|j) = 1
Proof: The assumptions that d is simple and has no repetition of events, and
lemma 5.
〈3〉2. #({(?, m)} S©t|j) = 0
Proof: by contradiction
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Assume: #({(?, m)} S©t|j) > 0
〈4〉1. There exist s, s′ such that
t|j = s〈(?, m)〉s′
Proof: Defs. of # and S© .
〈4〉2. There exist β ′, β ′′, β ′′ ∈ B, d′, d′′, d′′ ∈ D such that
[env!M.d, d]
s−→ [β ′, d′] (?,m)−→ [β ′′, d′′] s′−→ [β ′′′, d′′′]
Proof: Assumption and 〈4〉1.
〈4〉3. m ∈ β ′
Proof: 〈4〉2 and rules (8.3)-(8.14).
〈4〉4. m ∈ env!M.d
Proof: (!, m) ∈ ev.t = ev.d (by assumption, and lemma 5) and def. 1 of
env!M. .
〈4〉5. (!, m) ∈ ev.s
Proof: 〈4〉3, 〈4〉4 and rules (8.3)-(8.14).
〈4〉6. #({(!, m)} S©t|j−1) = 0
Proof: 〈3〉1 and defs. of # and S© and assumption that t[j] = (!, m).
〈4〉7. (!, m) ∈ ev.t|j−1
Proof: 〈4〉6 and def. of S© .
〈4〉8. (!, m) ∈ ev.s
Proof: 〈4〉7, 〈4〉1 and def. of ev. .
〈4〉9. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉5 and 〈4〉8 yield a contradiction, so we must have that
#({(?, m)} S©t|j) = 0
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2
〈2〉2. Case: t[j] receive event
Let: t[j] = (?, m)
〈3〉1. Q.E.D.
Proof: Trivial since k.t[j] = ? and therefore (k.t[j] = !) = false.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof:〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2.

Lemma 7 Given simple diagrams d1, d2 ∈ D. For all traces t, if there exists β ∈ B
such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
then there exist traces t1, t2 and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[end!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = e.l S©t1e.l S©t2
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Proof of lemma 7
Assume: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
Prove: There exist traces t1, t2, and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = e.l S©t1e.l S©t2
〈1〉1. There exist trace t1, t2, and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip]
〈2〉1. Let: t = 〈e〉t′
〈2〉2. There exist β ′1, β ′2 ∈ B, d′1, d′2 ∈ D such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
e−→ [β ′1, d′1] 
[env!M.d2, d2]
e−→ [β ′2, d′2]
(where  denotes exclusive or)
〈3〉1. There exist β ′ ∈ B, d′ ∈ D such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
e−→ [β ′, d′] t′−→ [β, skip]
Proof: Assumption and 〈2〉1
〈3〉2. [env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2] e−→ [β ′, d′1 seq d2] 
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
e−→ [β ′, d1 seq d′2]
Proof: 〈3〉1, rules (8.3), (8.11) and (8.12), the assumption ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅
and lemma 4.
〈3〉3. Case: [env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2] e−→ [β ′, d′1 seq d2]
Prove: [env!M.d1, d1]
e−→ [β ′1, d′1] ∧ [env!M.d2, d2] e
〈4〉1. [env!M.d1, d1] e−→ [β ′1, d′1]
〈5〉1. Π(ll.(d1 seq d2), env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2) e−→
Π(ll.(d1 seq d2), env
!
M.(d1 seq d2), d
′
1 seq d2)
Proof: By rule (8.3) this is a necessary condition for 〈3〉3 to be satisﬁed.
〈5〉2. Π(ll.d1 ∩ ll.(d1 seq d2), env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1) e−→
Π(ll.d1 ∩ ll.(d1 seq d2), env!M.(d1 seq d2), d′1)
Proof: By rule (8.11) this is a necessary condition for 〈5〉1 to be satisﬁed.
〈5〉3. Π(ll.d1, env!M.d1, d1) e−→ Π(ll.d1, env!M.d1, d′1)
〈6〉1. ll.d1 ∩ ll.(d1 seq d2) = ll.d1 ∩ (ll.d1 ∪ ll.d2) = ll.d1
Proof: Def. of ll.
〈6〉2. Case: e = (!, m)
It follows from the rules that the state of the communication medium is
irrelevant.
〈6〉3. Case: e = (?, m)
In this case it must be shown that m ∈ env!M.d1.
〈7〉1. m ∈ msg.d1
Proof: Defs. of ev. and msg. , rules (8.10)-(8.14), 〈6〉3 and 〈5〉2.
〈7〉2. m ∈ env!M.(d1 seq d2)
Proof: It follows from the recursive use of rules (8.3)-(8.14), and def.
of ready that this is a necessary condition for 〈3〉3 to be satisﬁed.
〈7〉3. m ∈ env!M.(d1 seq d2) ⇐⇒ m ∈ env!M.d1 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2
Proof: m ∈ env!M.(d1 seq d2)
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⇔ (!, m) ∈ env.(d1 seq d2) (Def. 1)
⇔ (!, m) ∈ (env.d1 \ ev.d2) ∪ (env.d2 \ ev.d1) (Lemma 2)
⇔ ((!, m) ∈ env.d1 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2) ∨
((!, m) ∈ env.d2 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1)
⇔ ((!, m) ∈ env.d1 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2) ∨
((!, m) ∈ env.d2 ∧ (!, m) ∈ env.d1) (〈7〉1)
⇔ (!, m) ∈ env.d1 ∧
((!, m) ∈ ev.d2 ∨ (!, m) ∈ env.d2)
⇔ (!, m) ∈ env.d1 ∧ ((!, m) ∈ ev.d2 ∨
((!, m) ∈ ev.d2 ∧m ∈ msg.d2)) (Def. 1)
⇔ (!, m) ∈ env.d1 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2
⇔ m ∈ env!M.d1 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2 (Def. 1)
〈7〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈7〉2 and 〈7〉3.
〈6〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈5〉2, 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2 and 〈6〉3.
〈5〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈5〉3 and rule (8.3)
〈4〉2. [env!M.d2, d2] e
〈5〉1. e ∈ ev.d2
Proof: 〈3〉3 and application of rules imply e ∈ ev.d1, and by assumption,
ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅.
〈5〉2. e ∈ ev.d2 \ ev.d′2
Proof: 〈5〉1.
〈5〉3. ¬([env!M.d2, d2] e−→ [β ′2, d′2])
Proof: 〈5〉2 and lemma 4.
〈5〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈5〉3
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉1 and 〈4〉2
〈3〉4. Case: [env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2] e−→ [β ′, d1 seq d′2]
Prove: [env!M.d2, d2]
e−→ [β ′2, d′2] ∧ [env!M.d1, d1] e
〈4〉1. [env!M.d2, d2] e−→ [β ′2, d′2]
〈5〉1. Π(ll.(d1 seq d2), env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2) e−→
Π(ll.(d1 seq d2), env
!
M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d
′
2)
Proof: By rule (8.3) this is a necessary condition for 〈3〉4 to be satisﬁed.
〈5〉2. Π(ll.(d1 seq d2) \ ll.d1, env!M.(d1 seq d2), d2) e−→
Π(ll.(d1 seq d2) \ ll.d2, env!M.(d1 seq d2), d′2)
Proof: By rule (8.12) this is a necessary condition for 〈5〉1 to be satisﬁed.
〈5〉3. Π(ll.d2, env!M.d2, d2) e−→ Π(ll.d2, env!M.d2, d′2)
〈6〉1. l.e ∈ ll.d2
〈7〉1. l.e ∈ ll.(d1 seq d2) \ ll.d1
Proof: This follows from 〈5〉2 and the rules.
〈7〉2. l.e ∈ ll.(d1 seq d2) \ ll.d1 ⇒ l.e ∈ (ll.d1∪ ll.d2)∧ l.e ∈ ll.d1 ⇒ (l.e ∈
ll.d1 ∨ l.e ∈ ll.d2) ∧ l.e ∈ ll.d1 ⇒ l.e ∈ ll.d2
Proof: Def. of ll. and 〈7〉1.
〈7〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈7〉2.
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〈6〉2. Case: e = (!, m)
It follows from the rules that the state of the communication medium is
irrelevant.
〈6〉3. Case: e = (?, m)
In this case it must be shown that m ∈ env!M.d2.
〈7〉1. m ∈ msg.d2
Proof: Defs. of ev. and msg. , rules (8.10)-(8.14), 〈6〉3 and 〈5〉2.
〈7〉2. m ∈ env!M.(d1 seq d2)
Proof: It follows from the recursive use of rules (8.3)-(8.14), and def.
of ready that this is a necessary condition for 〈3〉4 to be satisﬁed.
〈7〉3. m ∈ env!M.(d1 seq d2) ⇐⇒ m ∈ env!M.d2 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1
Proof: m ∈ env!M.(d2 seq d1)
⇔ (!, m) ∈ env.(d1 seq d2) (Def. 1)
⇔ (!, m) ∈ (env.d1 \ ev.d2) ∪ (env.d2 \ ev.d1) (Lemma 2)
⇔ ((!, m) ∈ env.d1 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2) ∨
((!, m) ∈ env.d2 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1)
⇔ ((!, m) ∈ env.d2 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1) ∨
((!, m) ∈ env.d1 ∧ (!, m) ∈ env.d2) (〈7〉1)
⇔ (!, m) ∈ env.d2 ∧
((!, m) ∈ ev.d1 ∨ (!, m) ∈ env.d1)
⇔ (!, m) ∈ env.d2 ∧ ((!, m) ∈ ev.d1 ∨
((!, m) ∈ ev.d1 ∧m ∈ msg.d1)) (Def. 1)
⇔ (!, m) ∈ env.d2 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1
⇔ m ∈ env!M.d2 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1 (Def. 1)
〈7〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈7〉2 and 〈7〉3.
〈6〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈5〉2, 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2 and 〈6〉3.
〈5〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈5〉3 and rule (8.3)
〈4〉2. [env!M.d1, d1] e
〈5〉1. e ∈ ev.d1
Proof: 〈3〉4 and application of rules imply e ∈ ev.d1, and by assumption,
ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅.
〈5〉2. e ∈ ev.d1 \ ev.d′1
Proof: 〈5〉1.
〈5〉3. ¬([env!M.d1, d1] e−→ [β ′1, d′1])
Proof: 〈5〉2 and lemma 4.
〈5〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈5〉3
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉1 and 〈4〉2
〈3〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3 and 〈3〉4.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: We now have that [β ′, d′] t
′−→ [β, skip] where d′ = d′1 seq d2 or d′ =
d1 seq d
′
2. By substituting [env
!
M.d
′, d′] t
′−→ [β, skip] for the assumption we may
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repeat the argument until t′ = 〈〉, and we get 〈1〉1. The justiﬁcation of the
substitution is that if e = (?, m) then β ′ = env!M.d \ {m}, but we know that
e ∈ ev.d′. If e = (!, m), then β ′ = env!M.d∪{m}, and env!M.d′ = env!M.d∪{m} ⇔
(?, m) ∈ ev.d′ and env!M.d′ = env!M.d ⇔ (?, m) ∈ ev.d.
〈1〉2. ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = e.l S©t1e.l S©t2
Proof: by contradiction
Assume: 1. The traces t1 and t2 from 〈1〉1
2. l arbitrary chosen lifeline in L
3. e.l S©t = e.l S©t1e.l S©t2
〈2〉1. #t = #t1 + #t2
Proof: This follows from ev.t = ev.d = ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2 = ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2 (lemma 5)
and the assumption that there is no repetition of events in d.
〈2〉2. There exist e1, e2 ∈ e.l such that {e1, e2} S©t = {e1, e2} S©t1{e1, e2} S©t2
Proof: By assumption 3, 〈2〉1 and the assumption that there is no repetition of
events, such events must exist.
〈2〉3. Case: e1, e2 ∈ ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2
〈3〉1. {e1, e2} S©t = 〈〉
Proof: Lemma 5
〈3〉2. {e1, e2} S©t1{e1, e2} S©t2 = 〈〉〈〉 = 〈〉
Proof: Lemma 5
〈2〉4. Case: e1 ∈ ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2 ∧ e2 ∈ ev.d1
〈3〉1. {e1, e2} S©t = 〈e2〉
Proof: Lemma 5
〈3〉2. {e1, e2} S©t1{e1, e2} S©t2 = 〈e2〉〈〉 = 〈e2〉
Proof: Lemma 5
〈2〉5. Case: e1 ∈ ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2 ∧ e2 ∈ ev.d2
〈3〉1. {e1, e2} S©t = 〈e2〉
Proof: Lemma 5
〈3〉2. {e1, e2} S©t1{e1, e2} S©t2 = 〈〉〈e2〉 = 〈e2〉
Proof: Lemma 5
〈2〉6. Case: e1 ∈ ev.d1 ∧ e2 ∈ ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2
〈3〉1. {e1, e2} S©t = 〈e1〉
Proof: Lemma 5
〈3〉2. {e1, e2} S©t1{e1, e2} S©t2 = 〈e1〉〈〉 = 〈e1〉
Proof: Lemma 5
〈2〉7. Case: e1 ∈ ev.d2 ∧ e2 ∈ ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2
〈3〉1. {e1, e2} S©t = 〈e1〉
Proof: Lemma 5
〈3〉2. {e1, e2} S©t1{e1, e2} S©t2 = 〈〉〈e1〉 = 〈e1〉
Proof: Lemma 5
〈2〉8. Case: e1, e2 ∈ ev.d1
〈3〉1. e1, e2 ∈ ev.d2
Proof: Assumption ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅.
〈3〉2. t1 = ev.d1 S©t ∧ t2 = ev.d2 S©t
Proof: Lemma 4 and assumption ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅
〈3〉3. {e1, e2} S©t1{e1, e2} S©t2
= {e1, e2} S©(ev.d1 S©t){e1, e2} S©(ev.d2 S©t)
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= ({e1, e2} ∩ ev.d1) S©t({e1, e2} ∩ ev.d2) S©t
= {e1, e2} S©t∅ S©t
= {e1, e2} S©t〈〉
= {e1, e2} S©t
Proof: 〈3〉2, {e1, e2} ⊆ ev.d1 (〈2〉8) and {e1, e2} ∩ ev.d2 = ∅ (〈3〉1).
〈2〉9. Case: e1, e2 ∈ ev.d2
〈3〉1. e1, e2 ∈ ev.d1
Proof: Assumption ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅.
〈3〉2. t1 = ev.d1 S©t ∧ t2 = ev.d2 S©t
Proof: Lemma 4 and assumption ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅
〈3〉3. {e1, e2} S©t1{e1, e2} S©t2
= {e1, e2} S©(ev.d1 S©t){e1, e2} S©(ev.d2 S©t)
= {e1, e2} ∩ ev.d1 S©t{e1, e2} ∩ ev.d2 S©t
= ∅ S©t{e1, e2} S©t
= 〈〉{e1, e2} S©t
= {e1, e2} S©t
Proof: 〈3〉2, {e1, e2} ⊆ ev.d2 (〈2〉9) and {e1, e2} ∩ ev.d1 = ∅ (〈3〉1).
〈2〉10. Case: e1 ∈ ev.d1 ∧ e2 ∈ ev.d2
〈3〉1. e1 ∈ ev.d2 ∧ e2 ∈ ev.d1
Proof: Assumption ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅.
〈3〉2. t1 = ev.d1 S©t ∧ t2 = ev.d2 S©t
Proof: Lemma 4 and assumption ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅
〈3〉3. {e1, e2} S©t1 = {e1, e2} S©(ev.d1 S©t) = {e1, e2} ∩ ev.d1 S©t = {e1} S©t = 〈e1〉
Proof: Lemma 4, 〈2〉10, 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2.
〈3〉4. {e1, e2} S©t2 = {e1, e2} S©(ev.d2 S©t) = {e1, e2} ∩ ev.d2 S©t = {e2} S©t = 〈e2〉
Proof: Lemma 4, 〈2〉10, 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2.
〈3〉5. {e1, e2} S©t = 〈e2, e1〉
Proof: By assumption 3, 〈3〉3 and 〈3〉4 we have that {e1, e2} S©t = 〈e1, e2〉. By
〈2〉10 and lemma 5 we have that {e,e2} ⊆ ev.t.
〈3〉6. There exist traces s1, s2, s3 such that t = s1〈e2〉s2〈e1〉s3
Proof: 〈3〉5.
〈3〉7. There exist β, β ′ ∈ B, d′1, d′2, d′′2 ∈ D such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
s1−→ [β, d′1 seq d′2] e2−→ [β ′, d′1 seq d′′2]
Proof: e2 ∈ ev.d2 and 〈3〉6.
〈3〉8. l.e1 = l.e2 = l
Proof: 〈2〉2, defs. of e. and l. .
〈3〉9. l ∈ ll.d′1
〈4〉1. l ∈ ll.(d′1 seq d′2) \ ll.d′1
Proof: By 〈3〉7 and application of the rules this is a necessary condition for
〈3〉8.
〈4〉2. l ∈ ll.(d′1 seq d′2) ∧ l ∈ ll.d′1
Proof: 〈4〉1.
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉2
〈3〉10. l ∈ ll.d′1
〈4〉1. e1 ∈ ev.d′1
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Proof: 〈2〉10, e1 ∈ ev.s1 and lemma 4.
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉8 and def. of ll. .
〈2〉11. Case: e1 ∈ ev.d2 ∧ e2 ∈ ev.d1
〈3〉1. e1 ∈ ev.d1 ∧ e2 ∈ ev.d2
Proof: Assumption ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅.
〈3〉2. t1 = ev.d1 S©t ∧ t2 = ev.d2 S©t
Proof: Lemma 4 and assumption ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅
〈3〉3. {e1, e2} S©t1 = {e1, e2} S©(ev.d1 S©t) = {e1, e2} ∩ ev.d1 S©t = {e2} S©t = 〈e2〉
Proof: Lemma 4, 〈2〉11, 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2.
〈3〉4. {e1, e2} S©t2 = {e1, e2} S©(ev.d2 S©t) = {e1, e2} ∩ ev.d2 S©t = {e1} S©t = 〈e1〉
Proof: Lemma 4, 〈2〉11, 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2.
〈3〉5. {e1, e2} S©t = 〈e1, e2〉
Proof: By assumption 3, 〈3〉3 and 〈3〉4 we have that {e1, e2} S©t = 〈e2, e1〉. By
〈2〉10 and lemma 5 we have that {e,e2} ⊆ ev.t.
〈3〉6. There exist traces s1, s2, s3 such that t = s1〈e1〉s2〈e2〉s3
Proof: 〈3〉5.
〈3〉7. There exist β, β ′ ∈ B, d′1, d′2, d′′2 ∈ D such that
[env!M.(d1, d2), d1 seq d2]
s1−→ [β, d′1 seq d′2] e1−→ [β ′, d′1 seq d′′2]
Proof: e1 ∈ ev.d2 and 〈3〉6.
〈3〉8. l.e1 = l.e2 = l
Proof: 〈2〉2, defs. of e. and l. .
〈3〉9. l ∈ ll.d′1
〈4〉1. l ∈ ll.(d′1 seq d′2) \ ll.d′1
Proof: By 〈3〉7 and application of the rules this is a necessary condition for
〈3〉8.
〈4〉2. l ∈ ll.(d′1 seq d′2) ∧ l ∈ ll.d′1
Proof: 〈4〉1.
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉2
〈3〉10. l ∈ ll.d′1
〈4〉1. e2 ∈ ev.d′1
Proof: 〈2〉11, e2 ∈ ev.s1 and lemma 4.
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉8 and def. of ll. .
〈2〉12. Q.E.D.
Proof: All possible cases yield a contradiction, so we must have that e.l S©t =
e.l S©t1
e.l S©t2. Since l was arbitrary chosen, this must be true for all lifelines in L.
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2.

Definition 5 We deﬁne a function Ω ∈ P(E)× P(E)× E∗ → {1, 2}∗ in the following
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way
Ω(E1, E2, 〈〉) def= 〈〉
Ω(E1, E2, 〈e〉t) def=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
〈1〉Ω(E1, E2, t) if e ∈ E1
〈2〉Ω(E1, E2, t) if e ∈ E2
Ω(E1, E2, t) otherwise
where we assume E1 ∩ E2 = ∅.
Definition 6 We generalize the concatenation operator  to range over pairs of
traces:
(t1, t2)
(s1, s2) def= (t1s1, t2s2)
Lemma 8 πi(t1
s1, t2s2) = πi(t1, t2)πi(s1, s2), i ∈ {1, 2}
Proof of lemma 8
〈1〉1. πi(t1s1, t2s2) = tisi
Proof: Def. of πi.
〈1〉2. πi(t1, t2)πi(s1, s2) = tisi
Proof: Def. of πi.
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2.

Definition 7 We formally deﬁne the pair ﬁltering operator T© (for ﬁnite sequences):
P T©(t1, t2)
def
= P T©(t1|min(#t1,#t2), t2|min(#t1,#t2))
P T©(〈〉, 〈〉) def= (〈〉, 〈〉)
(v1, v2) ∈ P ⇒ P T©(〈v1〉t1, 〈v2〉t2) def= (〈v1〉, 〈v2〉)P T©(t1, t2)
(v1, v2) ∈ P ⇒ P T©(〈v1〉t1, 〈v2〉t2) def= P T©(t1, t2)
where P is a set of pairs (P ⊆ A×B, t1 ∈ A∗, t2 ∈ B∗).
Lemma 9 Given simple diagrams d1, d2 ∈ D. For all traces t, if there exists β ∈ B
such that
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
then there exist traces t1, t2 and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] ∧ π2(({1} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t), t)) = t1 ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] ∧ π2(({2} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t), t)) = t2
Proof of lemma 9
Assume: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
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Prove: There exist traces t1, t2, and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
π2(({1} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t), t)) = t1 ∧
π2(({2} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t), t)) = t2 ∧
〈1〉1. Let: t = 〈e〉t′
〈1〉2. There exist β ′1, β ′2 ∈ B, d′1, d′2 ∈ D such that
([env!M.d1, d1]
e−→ [β ′1, d′1] ∧
π2(({1} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, 〈e〉t′), 〈e〉t′)) =
〈e〉π2(({1} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t′), t′))) 
([env!M.d2, d2]
e−→ [β ′2, d′2] ∧
π2(({2} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, 〈e〉t′), 〈e〉t′)) =
〈e〉π2(({2} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t′), t′)))
〈2〉1. There exist β ′ ∈ B, d′ ∈ D such that
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
e−→ [β ′, d′] t′−→ [β, skip]
Proof: Assumption and 〈1〉1
〈2〉2. [env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2] e−→ [β ′, d′1 par d2] 
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
e−→ [β ′, d1 par d′2]
Proof: 〈2〉1, rules (8.3), (8.13), (8.14), assumption that ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅, and
lemma 4.
〈2〉3. Case: [env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2] e−→ [β ′, d′1 par d2]
〈3〉1. There exists β ′1 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
e−→ [β ′1, d′1]
Proof: Identical to proof of lemma 7.
〈3〉2. [env!M.d2, d2] e
Proof: Identical to proof of lemma 7.
〈3〉3. π2(({1} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, 〈e〉t′), 〈e〉t′))
= 〈e〉π2(({1} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t′), t′))
〈4〉1. e ∈ ev.d1
Proof: 〈3〉1 and lemma 4.
〈4〉2. Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, 〈e〉t′) = 〈1〉Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t′)
Proof: 〈4〉1, def. 5 of Ω and the assumption that ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅.
〈4〉3. π2(({1} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, 〈e〉t′), 〈e〉t′))
= π2(({1} × E)
T©(〈1〉Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t′), 〈e〉t′)) (〈4〉2)
= π2((〈1〉, 〈e〉)
(({1} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t′), t′))) (Def. 7 of T©)
= π2((〈1〉, 〈e〉))
π2(({1} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t′), t′)) (Lemma 8)
= 〈e〉π2(({1} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t′), t′)) (Def. of π2)
〈4〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉2 and 〈4〉3.
〈3〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1, 〈3〉2 and 〈3〉3.
〈2〉4. Case: [env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2] e−→ [β ′′, d1 par d′2]
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Proof: Identical to proof of 〈2〉3.
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉2, 〈2〉3 and 〈2〉4.
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: We now have that [β ′, d′] t
′−→ [β, skip] where d′ = d′1 par d2 or d′ = d1 par d′2.
By substituting [env!M.d
′, d′] t
′−→ [β, skip] for the assumption we may repeat the
argument until t′ = 〈〉, and we get what we wanted to prove. The justiﬁcation of the
substitution is that if e = (?, m) then β ′ = env!M.d\{m}, but we know that e ∈ ev.d′.
If e = (!, m), then β ′ = env!M.d∪{m}, and env!M.d′ = env!M.d∪{m} ⇔ (?, m) ∈ ev.d′
and env!M.d
′ = env!M.d ⇔ (?, m) ∈ ev.d.

Lemma 10 Given simple diagrams d1, d2 ∈ D. For all traces t, if there exists β ∈ B
such that
[env!M.(d1 strict d2), d1 strict d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
then there exist traces t1, t2 and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[end!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
t = t1
t2
Proof of lemma 10
Assume: There exists β such that
[env!M.(d1 strict d2), d1 strict d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
Prove: There exists traces t1, t2, and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
t = t1
t2
〈1〉1. There exist traces t′, t′′, and β ′ ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 strict d2), d1 strict d2]
t′−→ [β ′, skip strict d2] ∧
[β ′, d2]
t′′−→ [β, skip]
Proof: Assumption and rules (8.3) and (8.15).
〈1〉2. [env!M.d1, d1] t1−→ [β1, skip]
〈2〉1. [env!M.(d1 strict d2), d1] t
′−→ [β ′, skip]
Proof: 〈1〉1.
〈2〉2. There exists β ′′ ∈ B such that [env!M.d1, d1] t
′−→ [β ′′, skip]
Proof: by contradiction
Assume: 〈2〉2 is not the case. By 〈2〉1 and rules (8.3), (8.10), (8.11), (8.12),
(8.13), (8.14) and (8.15), two cases must be considered.
〈3〉1. Case: There exists e ∈ ev.t′ such that l.e ∈ ll.(d1 strict d2) but l.e ∈ ll.d1.
Proof: By 〈2〉1 and lemma 5, e ∈ ev.d1 so by def. of ev. and ll. we must have
that l.e ∈ ll.d1. Thus this is impossible.
〈3〉2. Case: There exists message m such that (?, m) ∈ ev.t′ and
m ∈ env!M.(d1 strict d2), but m ∈ env!M.d1.
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〈4〉1. m ∈ msg.d1
Proof: (?, m) ∈ ev.t′ (〈3〉2)
⇒ (?, m) ∈ ev.d1 (Lemma 5)
⇒ m ∈ msg.d1 (Defs. of msg and ev)
〈4〉2. (!, m) ∈ ev.d1
Proof: m ∈ env!M.d1 (〈3〉2)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ env.d1 (Def. 1)
⇒ m ∈ msg.d1 ∨ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1 (Def. 1)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1 (〈4〉1)
〈4〉3. (!, m) ∈ ev.d1
Proof: m ∈ env!M.(d1 strict d2) (〈3〉2)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ env.(d1 strict d2) (Def. 1)
⇒ m ∈ msg.(d1 strict d2) ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.(d1 strict d2) (Def. 1)
⇒ m ∈ msg.d1 ∪msg.d2 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2 (Def. of ev. )
⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2 (Set theory)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1
〈4〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉2 and 〈4〉3 yield a contradiction, so 〈3〉2 must be impossible.
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: Since 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2 are impossible, we must have 〈2〉2
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉2 by letting t1 = t′ and β1 = β ′′.
〈1〉3. [env!M.d2, d2] t2−→ [β2, skip]
〈2〉1. [β ′, d2] t
′′−→ [β, skip]
Proof: 〈1〉1.
〈2〉2. There exist β ′′′ ∈ B such that [env!M.d2, d2] t
′′−→ [β ′′′, skip]
Proof: by contradiction
Assume: 〈2〉2 is not the case
〈3〉1. There exists message m such that (?, m) ∈ ev.t′′ and m ∈ β ′, but m ∈
env!M.d2
Proof: 〈2〉1, assumption 〈2〉2 is not the case, and rules (8.3), (8.10), (8.11),
(8.12), (8.13), (8.14) and (8.15).
〈3〉2. m ∈ msg.d2
Proof: (?, m) ∈ ev.t′′ (〈3〉1)
⇒ (?, m) ∈ ev.d2 (Lemma 5)
⇒ m ∈ msg.d2 (Defs. of msg and ev)
〈3〉3. (!, m) ∈ ev.d2
Proof: m ∈ env!M.d2 (〈3〉1)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ env.d2 (Def. 1)
⇒ m ∈ msg.d2 ∨ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2 (Def. 1)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2 (〈3〉2)
〈3〉4. (!, m) ∈ ev.d2
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Proof: m ∈ β ′ (〈3〉1)
⇒ m ∈ env!M.(d1 strict d2) ∨ (!, m) ∈ ev.t′ (〈1〉1 and rules)
⇒ m ∈ env!M.(d1 strict d2) ∨ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1 (Lemma 5)
⇒ m ∈ env!M.(d1 strict d2) (ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ env.(d1 strict d2) (Def. 1)
⇒ m ∈ msg.(d1 strict d2) ∧
(!, m) ∈ ev.(d1 strict d2)
⇒ (m ∈ msg.d1 ∨m ∈ msg.d2) ∧
(!, m) ∈ ev.d1 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2 (Def. 1)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2
〈3〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉3 and 〈3〉4 yield a contradiction, so we must have 〈2〉2.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉2 by letting t2 = t′′ and β2 = β ′′′.
〈1〉4. t = t1t2
Proof: By assumption and 〈1〉1, t = t′t′′. By proofs of 〈1〉2 and 〈1〉3, t′ = t1 and
t′′ = t2.
〈1〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉2, 〈1〉3 and 〈1〉4.

Theorem 1 (Soundness) Given a simple diagram d ∈ D. Then, for all traces t, if
there exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.d, d]
t−→ [β, skip]
then
t ∈ [[ d ]]
Proof of theorem 1
Assume: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.d, d]
t−→ [β, skip]
Prove: t ∈ [[ d ]]
Proof: by induction on the structure of d
〈1〉1. Case: d = skip (induction start: empty diagram)
Assume: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.skip, skip]
t−→ [β, skip]
Prove: t ∈ [[ skip ]]
〈2〉1. t = 〈〉
Proof: Rule (8.7)
〈2〉2. 〈〉 ∈ [[ skip ]]
〈3〉1. [[ skip ]] = {〈〉}
Proof: Deﬁnition (5.3).
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈〉 ∈ {〈〉}
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
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〈1〉2. Case: d = (!, m) (induction start: single transmit event)
Assume: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(!, m), (!, m)]
t−→ [β, skip]
Prove: t ∈ [[ (!, m) ]]
〈2〉1. t = 〈(!, m)〉
〈3〉1. [env!M.(!, m), (!, m)]
(!,m)−→ [update(env!M.(!, m), m.(!, m)), skip]
〈4〉1. Π(ll.(!, m), env!M.(!, m), (!, m))
(!,m)−→ Π(ll.(!, m), env!M.(!, m), skip)
〈5〉1. ll.(!, m) = {l.(!, m)}
Proof: Def. of ll.
〈5〉2. l.(!, m) ∈ ll.(!, m)
Proof: 〈5〉1
〈5〉3. k.(!, m) =!
Proof: Def. of k.
〈5〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈5〉2, 〈5〉3 and rule (8.10)
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉1 and rule (8.3)
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1 and lemma 5
〈2〉2. 〈(!, m)〉 ∈ [[ (!, m) ]]
〈3〉1. [[ (!, m) ]] = {〈(!, m)〉}
Proof: Def. (5.4).
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈(!, m)〉 ∈ {〈(!, m)〉}.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉3. Case: d = (?, m) (induction start: single receive event)
Assume: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(?, m), (?, m)]
t−→ [β, skip]
Prove: t ∈ [[ (?, m) ]]
〈2〉1. t = 〈(?, m)〉
〈3〉1. env!M.(?, m) = {m}
〈4〉1. env.(?, m) = {(!, m)}
Proof: Def. 1
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉1 and def. 1
〈3〉2. [{m}, (?, m)] (?,m)−→ [update({m}, m.(?, m)), skip]
〈4〉1. Π(ll.(?, m), {m}, (?, m)) (?,m)−→ Π(ll.(?, m), {m}, skip)
〈5〉1. ll.(?, m) = {l.(?, m)}
Proof: Def. of ll.
〈5〉2. l.(?, m) ∈ ll.(?, m)
Proof: 〈5〉1
〈5〉3. ready({m}, m.(?, m))
Proof: ready({m}, m.(?, m)) = m ∈ {m} = true (def. (8.8) and def.
of m. )
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〈5〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈5〉2, 〈5〉3 and rule (8.10)
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉1 and rule (8.3)
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1, 〈3〉2 and lemma 5
〈2〉2. 〈(?, m)〉 ∈ [[ (?, m) ]]
〈3〉1. [[ (?, m) ]] = {〈(?, m)〉}
Proof: Def. (5.4).
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈(?, m)〉 ∈ {〈(?, m)〉}.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉4. Case: d = d1 seq d2 (induction step)
Assume: 1. There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
2. For all traces t1, if there exists β1 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip],
then t1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] (induction hypothesis)
3. For all traces t2, if there exists β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip],
then t2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] (induction hypothesis)
Prove: t ∈ [[ d1 seq d2 ]]
〈2〉1. [[ d1 seq d2 ]] = {h ∈ H|∃h1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], h2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] :
∀l ∈ L : e.l S©h = e.l S©h1e.l S©h2}
Proof: Assumption that d is simple, and defs. (5.5), (5.7) and (5.6).
〈2〉2. t ∈ H
Proof: Assumption 1 and lemma 6.
〈2〉3. ∃h1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], h2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] : ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = e.l S©h1e.l S©h2
〈3〉1. There exist traces s1, s2, and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
s1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
s2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = e.l S©s1e.l S©s2
Proof: Assumption 1 and lemma 7.
〈3〉2. s1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], s2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]
Proof: 〈3〉1and assumptions 2 and 3 (induction hypothesis).
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2
〈2〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉3.
〈1〉5. Case: d = d1 par d2 (induction step)
Assume: 1. There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
2. For all traces t1, if there exists β1 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip],
then t1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] (induction hypothesis)
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3. For all traces t2, if there exists β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip],
then t2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] (induction hypothesis)
Prove: t ∈ [[ d1 par d2 ]]
〈2〉1. [[ d1 par d2 ]] = {h ∈ H|∃p ∈ {1, 2}∞ :
π2(({1} × E) T©(p, h)) ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
π2(({2} × E) T©(p, h)) ∈ [[ d2 ]] }
Proof: Assumption that d is simple, and defs. (5.8), (5.10) and (5.9).
〈2〉2. t ∈ H
Proof: Assumption 1 and lemma 6.
〈2〉3. ∃p ∈ {1, 2}∞ : π2(({1} × E) T©(p, t)) ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
π2(({2} × E) T©(p, t)) ∈ [[ d2 ]]
〈3〉1. There exist traces s1, s2, and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
s1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
s2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
π2(({1} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t), t)) = s1 ∧
π2(({2} × E) T©(Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t), t)) = s2
Proof: Assumption 1 and lemma 9.
〈3〉2. s1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], s2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]
Proof: 〈3〉1 and assumptions 2 and 3 (induction hypothesis).
〈3〉3. Let: p = Ω(ev.d1, ev.d2, t){1}∞
〈3〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1, 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3 and def. of T© .
〈2〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉3.
〈1〉6. Case: d = d1 strict d2 (induction step)
Assume: 1. There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 strict d2), d1 strict d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
2. For all traces t1, if there exists β1 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip],
then t1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] (induction hypothesis)
3. For all traces t2, if there exists β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip],
then t2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] (induction hypothesis)
Prove: t ∈ [[ d1 strict d2 ]]
〈2〉1. [[ d1 strict d2 ]] = {h ∈ H | ∃h1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], h2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] : h = h1h2}
Proof: Assumption that d is simple, and defs. (5.11), (5.13) and (5.12).
〈2〉2. t ∈ H
Proof: Assumption 1 and lemma 6.
〈2〉3. ∃h1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], h2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] : t = h1h2
〈3〉1. There exist traces s1, s2, and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
s1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
s2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
t = s1
s2
Proof: Assumption 1 and lemma 10.
〈3〉2. s1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], s2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]
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Proof: 〈3〉1and assumptions 2 and 3 (induction hypothesis).
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2
〈2〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉3.
〈1〉7. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, 〈1〉3, 〈1〉4, 〈1〉5 and 〈1〉6.

Lemma 11 Given t ∈ E∗. Then ev.t = ⋃l∈L ev.(e.l S©t).
Proof of lemma 11
Assume: t ∈ E∗
Prove: ev.t =
⋃
l∈L ev.(e.l S©t)
Proof: by induction on t
〈1〉1. Induction start: t = 〈〉
〈2〉1. ev.t = ev.〈〉 = ∅
Proof: 〈1〉1 and def. of ev. .
〈2〉2. ⋃l∈L ev.(e.l S©t)
=
⋃
l∈L ev.(e.l S©〈〉) (〈1〉1)
=
⋃
l∈L ev.〈〉 (def. of S© )
=
⋃
l∈L ∅ (def. of ev. )
= ∅
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉2. Induction step
Assume: ev.t =
⋃
l∈L ev.(e.l S©t) (induction hypothesis)
Prove: ev.(〈e〉t) = ⋃l∈L ev.(e.l S©(〈e〉t))
〈2〉1. Assume: 1. L = {l1, l2, . . . , li, . . . , lk, . . .}
2. l.e = li
〈2〉2. e ∈ e.li
Proof: Assumption 2 and defs. of l. and e. .
〈2〉3. i = j ⇒ e ∈ e.lj
Proof: Assumption 2 and defs. of l. and e. .
〈2〉4. ev.(〈e〉t) = {e} ∪ ev.t
Proof: Def. of ev. .
〈2〉5. ⋃l∈L ev.(e.l S©(〈e〉t))
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= ev.(e.l1 S©(〈e〉t)) ∪ ev.(e.l2 S©(〈e〉t)) ∪ · · ·
∪ ev.(e.li S©(〈e〉t)) ∪ · · ·
∪ ev.(e.lk S©(〈e〉t)) ∪ · · · (Assumption 1)
= ev.(e.l1 S©t) ∪ ev.(e.l2 S©t) ∪ · · · (〈2〉2, 〈2〉3 and
∪ ev.(〈e〉e.li S©t) ∪ · · · ∪ ev.(e.lk S©t) ∪ · · · def. of S© )
= ev.(e.l1 S©t) ∪ ev.(e.l2 S©t) ∪ · · ·
∪ {e} ∪ ev.(e.li S©t) ∪ · · · ∪ ev.(e.lk S©t) ∪ · · · (Def. of ev. )
= {e} ∪ ev.(e.l1 S©t) ∪ ev.(e.l2 S©t) ∪ · · ·
∪ ev.(e.li S©t) ∪ · · · ∪ ev.(e.lk S©t) ∪ · · · (Prop. of ∪)
= {e} ∪⋃l∈L ev.(e.l S©t) (Assumption 1)
= {e} ∪ ev.t (Ind. hyp.)
〈2〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉4 and 〈2〉5.
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2.

Lemma 12 Given diagram d ∈ D. If there exist β, β ′ ∈ B, d′ ∈ D, e1, e2 ∈ E such
that
[β, d]
〈e1,e2〉−→ [β ′, d′]
and
l.e1 = l.e2, m.e1 = m.e2
then
[β, d]
〈e2,e1〉−→ [β ′, d′]
Proof of lemma 12
Assume: There exist d′ ∈ D, β, β ′ ∈ B, e1, e2 ∈ E such that
1. [β, d]
〈e1,e2〉−→ [β ′, d′]
2. l.e1 = l.e2
3. m.e1 = m.e2
Prove: [β, d]
〈e2,e1〉−→ [β ′, d′]
Proof: by contradiction
〈1〉1. Assume not [β, d] 〈e2,e1〉−→ [β ′, d′]. Then there must exist β ′′ ∈ B, d′′ ∈ D such
that [β, d]
e1−→ [β ′′, d′′] e2−→ [β ′, d′] and something in [β, d], that is not present in
[β ′′, d′′], prevents e2 from being enabled (i.e. [β, d]
e2
). There are two ways in
which this can be the case.
〈2〉1. Case: There exist d1, d′1, d2 ∈ D such that d = d1 seq d2, d′′ = d′1 seq d2,
e2 ∈ ev.d2, l.e2 ∈ ll.d1 and l.e2 ∈ ll.d′1.
This implies that e1 ∈ ev.d1 and l.e1 = l.e2 (because only e has been removed
from the diagram), which is impossible because of assumption 2.
〈2〉2. Case: k.e2 =?, ready(β,m.e2) = false and ready(β ′′, m.e2) = true.
This implies that β ′′ = add(β,m.e2) which again implies that k.e1 = ! and
m.e1 = m.e2. But this is impossible because of assumption 3
〈1〉2. Q.E.D.
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Proof: Because the assumption of 〈1〉1 leads to contradiction we must have that
[β, d]
〈e2,e1〉−→ [β ′, d′] is possible.

Lemma 13 For all traces t, if there exit traces t1, t2, and β1, β2 ∈ B, d1, d2 ∈ D such
that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = e.l S©t1e.l S©t2 ∧
t ∈ H
then there exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
Proof of lemma 13
Assume: t is given and there exit traces t1, t2, and β1, β2 ∈ B, d1, d2 ∈ D such that
1. [env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip]
2. [env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip]
3. ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = e.l S©t1e.l S©t2
4. t ∈ H
Prove: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
〈1〉1. ev.t = ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2
Proof: ev.t =
⋃
l∈L ev.(e.l S©t) (Lemma 11)
=
⋃
l∈L ev.(e.l S©t1
e.l S©t2) (Assumption 3)
=
⋃
l∈L(ev.(e.l S©t1) ∪ ev.(e.l S©t2)) (Lemma 3)
=
⋃
l∈L ev.(e.l S©t1) ∪
⋃
l∈L ev.(e.l S©t2) (Properties of ∪)
= ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2 (Lemma 11)
〈1〉2. t1 = ev.d1 S©t
〈2〉1. ev.t = ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2, ev.d1 = ev.t1
Proof: 〈1〉1, assumptions 1 and 2, and lemma 5.
〈2〉2. Let: ev.d1 S©t = t′1
Assume: t1 = t′1
〈2〉3. ev.d1 = ev.t1 = ev.t′1
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈2〉4. There exist e1, e2 ∈ ev.d1, and traces s1, s2, s′2, s3, s′3 such that
t1 = s1
〈e1〉s2〈e2〉s3
t′1 = s1
s′2〈e2, e1〉s′3
Proof: By 〈2〉2, t1 and t′1 are unequal. By 〈2〉3 and the assumption that d has
no repetition of events, we do not have the case that t1 is a proper preﬁx of t
′
1 or
that t′1 is a proper preﬁx of t1. Let s1 be the longest trace such that s1  t1 and
s1  t′1 and let e1 be the ﬁrst element of t1 after s1 (e1 = t1[#s1 + 1]). Then we
must have that e1 = t′1[#s1+1], and, by 〈2〉3, that e1 = t′1[j] for some j > #s1+1.
Let e2 = t
′
1[j − 1]. By 〈2〉3, the assumption that there are no repetition of events
and the fact that t1 and t
′
1 is equal up to s1, we must have that e2 = t1[k] for some
k > #s1 + 1.
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〈2〉5. There exist e1, e2 ∈ ev.d1 such that
{e1, e2} S©t1 = 〈e1, e2〉 and
{e1, e2} S©t′1 = 〈e2, e1〉.
Proof: 〈2〉4.
〈2〉6. {e1, e2} S©t = 〈e2, e1〉
Proof: 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉5.
〈2〉7. l.e1 = l.e2
Proof: If there exists l such that l.e1 = l.e2 = l, then e1, e2 ∈ e.l which, by 〈2〉5
and 〈2〉6, imply that ({e1, e2} ∩ e.l) S©t = ({e1, e2} ∩ e.l) S©t1. But this contradicts
assumption 3.
〈2〉8. m.e1 = m.e2
Proof: If we assume that m.e1 = m.e2, we must have, by the assumption that
there are no repetition of events, that there exists m such that e1 = (!, m) and
e2 = (?, m) or e1 = (?, m) and e2 = (!, m). The ﬁrst case contradicts, by 〈2〉6, the
assumption that t ∈ H (assumption 4), and the second case contradicts, by 〈2〉5,
the fact that t1 ∈ H (assumption 1 and lemma 6).
〈2〉9. Q.E.D.
Proof: If we assume that t1 = ev.d1 S©t (〈2〉2) we get the result that l.e1 = l.e2
(〈2〉7) and m.e1 = m.e2 (〈2〉8) for any pair of events e1, e2 ∈ ev.d1 = ev.t1 such
that {e1, e2} S©t1 = ({e1, e2}∩ ev.d1) S©t. By lemma 12, this means that the order of
e1 and e2 in t
′
1 is arbitrary and we may swap their position without this aﬀecting
assumption 1. We may repeat this argument until t′1[#s1 +1] = e1. We may then
substitute s1
〈e1〉 for s1 in 〈2〉4 and repeat the argument until t1 = t′1 = s1. For
this reason we can assume 〈1〉2 without this aﬀecting the rest of the proof.
〈1〉3. t2 = ev.d2 S©t
Proof: Identical to proof of 〈1〉2
〈1〉4. We may now describe a sequence of transitions such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
〈2〉1. Let: t = 〈e〉t′
〈2〉2. We have that either
there exists t′1 such that t1 = 〈e〉t′1 and e ∈ ev.t2, or
there exists t′2 such that t2 = 〈e〉t′2 and e ∈ ev.t1.
Proof: 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, 〈1〉3, the overall assumption that ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅, and the
facts that ev.d1 = ev.t1 and ev.d2 = ev.t2 (assumptions 1 and 2, and lemma 5.
〈2〉3. Case: t1 = 〈e〉t′1 and e ∈ ev.t2
Prove: There exists d′1 ∈ D and β ′ ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
e−→ [β ′, d′1 seq d2]
〈3〉1. There exists d′1 ∈ D such that
Π(ll.d1, env
!
M.d1, d1)
e−→ Π(ll.d1, env!M.d1, d′1)
Proof: Case assumption 〈2〉3, assumption 1 and rule (8.3).
〈3〉2. There exists d′1 ∈ D such that
Π(ll.d1 ∩ ll.(d1 seq d2), env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1) e−→
Π(ll.d1 ∩ ll.(d1 seq d2), env!M.(d1 seq d2), d′1)
〈4〉1. ll.d1 ∩ ll.(d1 seq d2) = ll.d1 ∩ (ll.d1 ∪ ll.d2) = ll.d1
Proof: Def. of ll. .
〈4〉2. k.e = ! implies that the state of the communication medium is irrelevant.
k.e =? implies that m.e ∈ env!M.(d1 seq d2)
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Proof: Rule (8.10). k.e =? implies that m.e ∈ env!M.d1 and also that
(!, m.e) ∈ ev.t′ because t ∈ H (assumption 4), which means (!, m.e) ∈ ev.d′1 ∪
ev.d2 (〈1〉1 and lemma 5). This implies m.e ∈ env!M.(d1 seq d2) because
m.e ∈ env!M.(d1 seq d2) ⇔ m.e ∈ env!M.d1 ∧ (!, m.e) ∈ ev.d2 (see proof of
lemma 7).
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1, 〈4〉1, 〈4〉2.
〈3〉3. There exists d′1 ∈ D such that
Π(ll.(d1 seq d2), env
!
M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2)
e−→
Π(ll.(d1 seq d2), env
!
M.(d1 seq d2), d
′
1 seq d2)
〈4〉1. ll.d1 ∩ ll.(d1 seq d2) = ∅
Proof: e ∈ ev.d1 and def. of ll. .
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉2, 〈4〉1 and rule (8.11)
〈3〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉3 and rule (8.3).
〈2〉4. Case: t2 = 〈e〉t′2 and e ∈ ev.t1
Prove: There exists d′2 ∈ D and β ′ ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
e−→ [β ′, d1 seq d′2]
〈3〉1. There exists d′2 ∈ D such that
Π(ll.d2, env
!
M.d2, d2)
e−→ Π(ll.d2, env!M.d2, d′2)
Proof: Case assumption 〈2〉4, assumption 2 and rule (8.3).
〈3〉2. There exists d′2 ∈ D such that
Π(ll.(d1 seq d2) \ ll.d1, env!M.(d1 seq d2), d2) e−→
Π(ll.(d1 seq d2) \ ll.d1, env!M.(d1 seq d2), d′2)
〈4〉1. l.e ∈ ll.(d1 seq d2) \ ll.d1
〈5〉1. l.e ∈ ll.(d1 seq d2) \ ll.d1
⇔ (l.e ∈ ll.e1 ∨ l.e ∈ ll.d2) ∧ l.e ∈ ll.d1
⇔ l.e ∈ ll.d2 ∧ l.e ∈ ll.d1
Proof: Def. of ll. and basic set theory.
〈5〉2. l.e ∈ ll.d2
Proof: Assumption 2, case assumption, lemma 5 and def. of ll. .
〈5〉3. l.e ∈ ll.d1
Proof: From assumption 3, 〈2〉1 and the case assumption we know that
e.(l.e) S©t1 = 〈〉. This implies that e.(l.e)∩ ev.t1 = e.(l.e)∩ ev.d2 = ∅, which
again imply that l.e ∈ ll.d1 (lemma 5, defs. of e. , l. , ev. and ll. ).
〈5〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈5〉1, 〈5〉2 and 〈5〉3.
〈4〉2. k.e = ! implies that the state of the communication medium is irrelevant.
k.e =? implies that m.e ∈ env!M.(d1 seq d2)
Proof: Rule (8.10). k.e =? implies that m.e ∈ env!M.d1 and also that
(!, m.e) ∈ ev.t′ because t ∈ H (assumption 4), which means (!, m.e) ∈ ev.d′1 ∪
ev.d2 (〈1〉1 and lemma 5). This implies m.e ∈ env!M.(d1 seq d2) because
m.e ∈ env!M.(d1 seq d2) ⇔ m.e ∈ env!M.d1 ∧ (!, m.e) ∈ ev.d2 (see proof of
lemma 7).
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉2, 〈4〉1, 〈4〉2.
〈3〉3. There exists d′2 ∈ D such that
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Π(ll.(d1 seq d2), env
!
M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2)
e−→
Π(ll.(d1 seq d2), env
!
M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d
′
2)
〈4〉1. ll.(d1 seq d2) \ ll.d1 = ∅
Proof: l.e ∈ ll.(d1 seq d2) \ ll.d1 (see 〈3〉2).
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉2, 〈4〉1 and rule (8.12)
〈3〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉3 and rule (8.3).
〈2〉5. We may now substitute t for t′ and repeat the argument until t = 〈〉. (For
justiﬁcation of this see proof of lemma 7.)
〈2〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1-〈2〉4
〈1〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1-〈1〉4

Lemma 14 Given traces t, t1, t2 and oracle p ∈ {1, 2}∞. If
π2(({1} × E) T©(p, t)) = t1 ∧
π2(({2} × E) T©(p, t)) = t2
then
ev.t = ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2
Proof of lemma 14
Assume: t, t1, t2 and p ∈ {1, 2}∞ given, and
1. π2(({1} × E) T©(p, t)) = t1
2. π2(({2} × E) T©(p, t)) = t2
Prove: ev.t = ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2
Proof: by induction on t
〈1〉1. Induction start: t = 〈〉
Prove: ev.t = ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2
〈2〉1. ev.t = ev.〈〉 = ∅
Proof: 〈1〉1 and def. of ev. .
〈2〉2. ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2
= ev.π2(({1} × E) T©(p, 〈〉))
∪ ev.π2(({2} × E) T©(p, 〈〉)) (Assumptions 1 and 2, and 〈1〉1)
= ev.π2(({1} × E) T©(〈〉, 〈〉))
∪ ev.π2(({2} × E) T©(〈〉, 〈〉)) (Def. 7 of T© )
= ev.π2(〈〉, 〈〉) ∪ ev.π2(〈〉, 〈〉) (Def. 7 of T© )
= ev.〈〉 ∪ ev.〈〉 (Def. of π2)
= ∅ ∪ ∅ (Def. of. ev. )
= ∅
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉2. Induction step
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Assume: ev.t = ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2 (induction hypothesis)
Prove: ev.(t〈e〉) = ev.π2(({1} × E) T©(p, t〈e〉))
∪ ev.π2(({2} × E) T©(p, t〈e〉))
〈2〉1. ev.(t〈e〉)
= ev.t ∪ ev.〈e〉 (lemma 3)
= ev.t ∪ {e} (def. of ev. )
〈2〉2. Let: k ∈ {1, 2}
〈2〉3. ev.π2(({k} × E) T©(p, t〈e〉))
= ev.π2(({k} × E) T©(p|#t+1, t〈e〉)) (Def. 7 of T© )
= ev.π2(({k} × E) T©(p|#t〈j〉, t〈e〉)) (j ∈ {1, 2})
= ev.π2((({k} × E) T©(p|#t, t))
(({k} × E) T©(〈j〉, 〈e〉))) (Defs. of  and T© )
= ev.(π2(({k} × E) T©(p|#t, t))
π2(({k} × E) T©(〈j〉, 〈e〉))) (Lemma 8)
= ev.π2(({k} × E) T©(p|#t, t))
∪ ev.π2(({k} × E) T©(〈j〉, 〈e〉)) (Lemma 3)
= ev.π2(({k} × E) T©(p, t))
∪ ev.π2(({k} × E) T©(〈j〉, 〈e〉)) (Def. 7 of T© )
= tk ∪ ev.π2(({k} × E) T©(〈j〉, 〈e〉)) (Assumptions 1 and 2)
〈2〉4. ev.π2(({1} × E) T©(p, t〈e〉))
∪ ev.π2(({2} × E) T©(p, t〈e〉))
= t1 ∪ ev.π2(({1} × E) T©(〈j〉, 〈e〉))
∪ t2 ∪ ev.π2(({2} × E) T©(〈j〉, 〈e〉)) (〈2〉3, j ∈ {1, 2})
= t ∪ ev.π2(({1} × E) T©(〈j〉, 〈e〉))
∪ ev.π2(({2} × E) T©(〈j〉, 〈e〉)) (induction hypothesis)
〈2〉5. Case: j = 1
t ∪ ev.π2(({1} × E) T©(〈1〉, 〈e〉))
∪ ev.π2(({2} × E) T©(〈1〉, 〈e〉))
= t ∪ ev.π2(〈1〉, 〈e〉) ∪ ev.π2(〈〉, 〈〉) (Def. 7 of T© )
= ev.t ∪ ev.〈e〉 ∪ ev.〈〉 (Def. of π2)
= ev.t ∪ {e} ∪ ∅ (Def. of ev. )
= ev.t ∪ {e}
〈2〉6. Case: j = 2
t ∪ ev.π2(({1} × E) T©(〈2〉, 〈e〉))
∪ ev.π2(({2} × E) T©(〈2〉, 〈e〉))
= t ∪ ev.π2(〈〉, 〈〉) ∪ ev.π2(〈2〉, 〈e〉) (Def. 7 of T© )
= ev.t ∪ ev.〈〉 ∪ ev.〈e〉 (Def. of π2)
= ev.t ∪ ∅ ∪ {e} (Def. of ev. )
= ev.t ∪ {e}
〈2〉7. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1-〈2〉6
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2

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Lemma 15 For all t, if there exist traces t1, t2, and β1, β2 ∈ B, d1, d2 ∈ D, and p ∈
{1, 2}∞ such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
π2(({1} × E) T©(p, t)) = t1 ∧
π2(({2} × E) T©(p, t)) = t2 ∧
t ∈ H
then there exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
Proof of lemma 15
Assume: t is given and there exist traces t1, t2, and β1, β2 ∈ B, d1, d2 ∈ D, and p ∈
{1, 2}∞ such that
1. [env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip]
2. [env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip]
3. π2(({1} × E) T©(p, t)) = t1
4. π2(({2} × E) T©(p, t)) = t2
5. t ∈ H
Prove: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
〈1〉1. ev.t = ev.t1 ∪ ev.t2
Proof: Assumptions 3 and 4, and lemma 14.
〈1〉2. We describe a sequence of transitions such that
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
We do this with guidance of the oracle p
〈2〉1. Let: t = 〈e〉t′
〈2〉2. Case: p = 〈1〉p′
Prove: There exists d′1 ∈ D and β ′ ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
e−→ [β ′, d′1 par d2]
〈3〉1. t1 = 〈e〉π2(({1} × E) T©(p′, t′))
Proof: t1 = π2(({1} × E) T©(p, t)) (Assumption 3)
= π2(({1} × E) T©(〈1〉p′, 〈e〉t′)) (〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2)
= π2((〈1〉, 〈e〉)(({1} × E) T©(p′, t′))) (Def. 7 of T© )
= π2(〈1〉, 〈e〉)π2(({1} × E) T©(p′, t′)) (Lemma 8)
= 〈e〉π2(({1} × E) T©(p′, t′)) (Def. of π2)
〈3〉2. There exists d′1 ∈ D such that
Π(ll.d1, env
!
M.d1, d1)
e−→ Π(ll.d1, env!M.d1, d′1)
Proof: 〈3〉1, assumption 1 and rule (8.3).
〈3〉3. There exists d′1 ∈ D such that
Π(ll.d1 ∩ ll.(d1 par d2), env!M.(d1 par d2), d1) e−→
Π(ll.d1 ∩ ll.(d1 par d2), env!M.(d1 par d2), d′1)
〈4〉1. ll.d1 ∩ ll.(d1 par d2) = ll.d1 ∩ (ll.d1 ∪ ll.d2) = ll.d1
Proof: Def. of ll. .
〈4〉2. k.e = ! implies that the state of the communication medium is irrelevant.
k.e =? implies that m.e ∈ env!M.(d1 par d2)
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Proof: Rule (8.10). k.e =? implies that m.e ∈ env!M.d1 and also that
(!, m.e) ∈ ev.t′ because t ∈ H (assumption 5), which means (!, m.e) ∈ ev.d′1 ∪
ev.d2 (〈1〉1 and lemma 5). This implies m.e ∈ env!M.(d1 par d2) because
m.e ∈ env!M.(d1 par d2) ⇔ m.e ∈ env!M.d1 ∧ (!, m.e) ∈ ev.d2 (see proof of
lemma 7).
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉2, 〈4〉1, 〈4〉2.
〈3〉4. There exists d′1 ∈ D such that
Π(ll.(d1 par d2), env
!
M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2)
e−→
Π(ll.(d1 par d2), env
!
M.(d1 par d2), d
′
1 par d2)
Proof: 〈3〉3, and rule (8.13)
〈3〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉4 and rule (8.3).
〈2〉3. Case: p = 〈2〉p′
Prove: There exists d′2 ∈ D and β ′ ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
e−→ [β ′, d1 par d′2]
Proof: Identical to proof of 〈2〉2 with t2 and rule (8.14) substituted for t1 and
rule (8.13).
〈2〉4. We may now substitute t for t′ and repeat the argument until t = 〈〉. (For
justiﬁcation of this see proof of lemma 9.)
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1-〈2〉3
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2

Lemma 16 For all traces t, if there exit traces t1, t2, and β1, β2 ∈ B, d1, d2 ∈ D such
that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
t = t1
t2 ∧
t ∈ H
then there exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 strict d2), d1 strict d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
Proof of lemma 16
Assume: t is given and there exist traces t1, t2 and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
1. [env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip]
2. [env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip]
3. t = t1
t2
4. t ∈ H
Prove: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 strict d2), d1 strict d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
〈1〉1. There exists β ′ ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 strict d2), d1]
t1−→ [β ′, skip]
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Proof: by contradiction
Assume: 〈1〉1 is not the case. By assumption 1 and rules (8.3), (8.10), (8.11), (8.12),
(8.13), (8.14) and (8.15), two cases must be considered.
〈2〉1. Case: There exists e ∈ ev.t1 such that l.e ∈ ll.d1, but l.e ∈ ll.(d1 strict d2)
Proof: By def. of ll. , ll.d1 ⊆ ll.(d1 strict d2) = ll.d1 ∪ ll.d2 so this is impossible.
〈2〉2. Case: There exists message m such that (?, m) ∈ ev.t1 and m ∈ env!M.d1, but
m ∈ env!M.(d1 strict d2)
〈3〉1. m ∈ msg.d1
Proof: (?, m) ∈ ev.t1 (〈2〉2)
⇒ (?, m) ∈ ev.d1 (Lemma 5)
⇒ m ∈ msg.d1 (Defs. of msg and ev)
〈3〉2. (!, m) ∈ ev.d1
Proof: m ∈ env!M.d1 (〈2〉2)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ env.d1 (Def. 1)
⇒ m ∈ msg.d1 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1 (Def. 1)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1
〈3〉3. (!, m) ∈ ev.t2
Proof: m ∈ env!M.(d1 strict d2) (〈2〉2)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ env.(d1 strict d2) (Def. 1)
⇒ m ∈ msg.(d1 strict d2) ∨
(!, m) ∈ ev.(d1 strict d2) (Def. 1)
⇒ (m ∈ msg.d1 ∧m ∈ msg.d2) ∨
(!, m) ∈ ev.d1 ∨ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2 (Defs. of msg and ev)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1 ∨ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2 (〈3〉1)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2 (〈3〉2)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.t2 (Assumption 2 and Lemma 5)
〈3〉4. There exist traces s1, s2, s3, s4 such that
t1 = s1
〈(?, m)〉s2 and
t2 = s3
〈(!, m)〉s4
Proof: 〈2〉2, 〈3〉3 and def. 3 of ev. .
〈3〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: By 〈3〉4 and assumption 3, t = s1〈(?, m)〉s2s3〈(!, m)〉s4. But
by assumption 4 this is impossible, so we get a contradiction and 〈2〉2 is impos-
sible.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: Since both 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2 are impossible we must have 〈1〉1.
〈1〉2. There exists β ′ ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 strict d2), d1 strict d2]
t1−→ [β ′, d2]
Proof: 〈1〉1, rules (8.3) and (8.15), and def. of skip as the identity element of strict.
〈1〉3. There exists β ′′ ∈ B such that
[β ′, d2]
t2−→ [β ′′, skip]
Proof: by contradiction
Assume: 〈1〉3 is not the case
〈2〉1. There exists message m such that (?, m) ∈ ev.t2 and m ∈ env!M.d2, but m ∈ β ′
Proof: Assumption 2, assumption 〈1〉3 is not the case, and rules (8.3), (8.10),
(8.11), (8.12), (8.13), (8.14) and (8.15).
〈2〉2. m ∈ msg.d2
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Proof: (?, m) ∈ ev.t2 (〈2〉1)
⇒ (?, m) ∈ ev.d2 (Lemma 5)
⇒ m ∈ msg.d2 (Defs. of msg and ev)
〈2〉3. (!, m) ∈ ev.d2
Proof: m ∈ env!M.d2 (〈2〉1)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ env.d2 (Def. 1)
⇒ m ∈ msg.d2 ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2 (Def. 1)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2
〈2〉4. (!, m) ∈ ev.d2
Proof: m ∈ β ′ (〈2〉1)
⇒ m ∈ env!M.(d1 strict d2) ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.t1 (〈1〉1 and rules)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ env.(d1 strict d2) ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1 (Def. 1 and lemma 5)
⇒ (m ∈ msg.(d1 strict d2) ∨
(!, m) ∈ ev.(d1 strict d2)) ∧ (!, m) ∈ ev.d1 (Def. 1)
⇒ ((m ∈ msg.d1 ∧m ∈ msg.d2) ∨
(!, m) ∈ ev.d1 ∨ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2) ∧
(!, m) ∈ ev.d1 (Defs. of msg and ev)
⇒ ((!, m) ∈ ev.d1 ∨ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2) ∧
(!, m) ∈ ev.d1 (〈2〉2)
⇒ (!, m) ∈ ev.d2
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉3 and 〈2〉4 yield a contradiction, so we must have that 〈1〉3 holds.
〈1〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉2, 〈1〉3 and assumption 3 by letting β = β ′′.

Theorem 2 (Completeness) Given a simple diagram d. Then, for all traces t, if
t ∈ [[ d ]]
then there exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.d, d]
t−→ [β, skip]
Proof of theorem 2
Assume: t ∈ [[ d ]]
Prove: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.d, d]
t−→ [β, skip]
Proof: by induction on the structure of d.
〈1〉1. Case: d = skip (induction start: empty diagram)
Assume: t ∈ [[ skip ]]
Prove: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.skip, skip]
t−→ [β, skip]
〈2〉1. t = 〈〉
〈3〉1. [[ skip ]] = {〈〉}
Proof: Assumption that d is simple, and deﬁnition (5.3).
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
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Proof: 〈3〉1.
〈2〉2. [env!M.skip, skip]
〈〉−→ [∅, skip]
Proof: Rule (8.7) and def. of env!M.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉2. Case: d = (!, m) (induction start: single output)
Assume: t ∈ [[ (!, m) ]]
Prove: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(!, m), (!, m)]
t−→ [β, skip]
〈2〉1. t = 〈(!, m)〉
〈3〉1. [[ (!, m) ]] = {〈(!, m)〉}
Proof: Assumption that d is simple and def. (5.4).
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1
〈2〉2. [env!M.(!, m), (!, m)]
(!,m)−→ [{m}, skip]
〈3〉1. Π(ll.(!, m), env!M.(!, m), (!, m))
(!,m)−→ Π(ll.(!, m), env!M.(!, m), skip)
Proof: l.(!, m) ∈ ll.(!, m) = {l.(!, m)} (def. of ll. ), k.(!, m) = ! (def. of
k. ), and rule (8.10).
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1, rule (8.3) and def. of env!M.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉3. Case: d = (?, m) (induction start: single input)
Assume: t ∈ [[ (?, m) ]]
Prove: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(?, m), (?, m)]
t−→ [β, skip]
〈2〉1. t = 〈(?, m)〉
〈3〉1. [[ (?, m) ]] = {〈(?, m)〉}
Proof: Assumption that d is simple and def. (5.4).
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1
〈2〉2. [env!M.(?, m), (?, m)]
(?,m)−→ [∅, skip]
〈3〉1. Π(ll.(?, m), env!M.(?, m), (?, m))
(?,m)−→ Π(ll.(?, m), env!M.(?, m), skip)
Proof: l.(?, m) ∈ ll.(?, m) = {l.(?, m)} (def. of ll. ),
ready(env!M.(?, m)), m.(?, m) = ready({m}, m) = m ∈ {m} (defs. of
ready, env!M. and m. ), and rule (8.10).
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1, rule (8.3) and def. of env!M.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉4. Case: d = d1 seq d2 (induction step)
Assume: 1. t ∈ [[ d1 seq d2 ]]
2. For all t1, if t1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], then there exists β1 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] (induction hypothesis)
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3. For all t2, if t2 ∈ [[ d2 ]], then there exists β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] (induction hypothesis)
Prove: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
〈2〉1. t ∈ {h ∈ H | ∃h1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], h2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] :
∀l ∈ L : e.l S©h = e.l S©h1e.l S©h2}
Proof: Assumption d is simple, assumption 1, and defs. (5.5), (5.7) and
(5.6).
〈2〉2. t ∈ H ∧ ∃h1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], h2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] : ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = e.l S©h1e.l S©h2
Proof: 〈2〉1
〈2〉3. There exist traces h1, h2, and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
h1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
h2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = e.l S©h1e.l S©h2 ∧
t ∈ H
Proof: Assumptions 2 and 3 (induction hypothesis), and 〈2〉2.
〈2〉4. There exist β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 seq d2), d1 seq d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
Proof: 〈2〉3 and lemma 13.
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉4.
〈1〉5. Case: d = d1 par d2 (induction step)
Assume: 1. t ∈ [[ d1 par d2 ]]
2. For all t1, if t1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], then there exists β1 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] (induction hypothesis)
3. For all t2, if t2 ∈ [[ d2 ]], then there exists β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] (induction hypothesis)
Prove: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
〈2〉1. t ∈ {h ∈ H | ∃p ∈ {1, 2}∞ :
π2(({1} × E) T©(p, h)) ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
π2(({2} × E) T©(p, h)) ∈ [[ d2 ]]
Proof: Assumption d is simple, assumption 1, and defs. (5.8), (5.10) and
(5.9).
〈2〉2. t ∈ H ∧ ∃p ∈ {1, 2}∞ :
π2(({1} × E) T©(p, t)) ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
π2(({2} × E) T©(p, t)) ∈ [[ d2 ]]
Proof: 〈2〉1
〈2〉3. There exist β1, β2 ∈ B, p ∈ {1, 2}∞ such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
π2(({1}×E) T©(p,t))−−−−−−−−−−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
π2(({2}×E) T©(p,t))−−−−−−−−−−→ [β2, skip]
Proof: 〈2〉2 and assumptions 2 and 3 (induction hypothesis).
〈2〉4. There exist traces t1, t2, and β1, β2 ∈ B, p ∈ {1, 2}∞ such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
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π2(({1} × E) T©(p, t)) = t1 ∧
π2(({2} × E) T©(p, t)) = t2 ∧
t ∈ H
Proof: 〈2〉3
〈2〉5. There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 par d2), d1 par d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
Proof: 〈2〉4 and lemma 15.
〈2〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉5.
〈1〉6. Case: d = d1 strict d2 (induction step)
Assume: 1. t ∈ [[ d1 strict d2 ]]
2. For all t1, if t1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], then there exists β1 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
t1−→ [β1, skip] (induction hypothesis)
3. For all t2, if t2 ∈ [[ d2 ]], then there exists β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d2, d2]
t2−→ [β2, skip] (induction hypothesis)
Prove: There exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 strict d2), d1 strict d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
〈2〉1. t ∈ {h ∈ H | ∃h1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], h2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] : h = h1h2}
Proof: Assumption d is simple, assumption 1, and defs. (5.11), (5.13) and
(5.12).
〈2〉2. t ∈ H ∧ ∃h1 ∈ [[ d1 ]], h2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] : t = h1h2
Proof: 〈2〉1
〈2〉3. There exist traces h1, h2, and β1, β2 ∈ B such that
[env!M.d1, d1]
h1−→ [β1, skip] ∧
[env!M.d2, d2]
h2−→ [β2, skip] ∧
t = h1
h2 ∧
t ∈ H
Proof: Assumptions 2 and 3 (induction hypothesis), and 〈2〉2.
〈2〉4. There exist β ∈ B such that
[env!M.(d1 strict d2), d1 strict d2]
t−→ [β, skip]
Proof: 〈2〉3 and lemma 16.
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉4.
〈1〉7. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, 〈1〉3, 〈1〉4, 〈1〉5 and 〈1〉6.

A.3 Sequence diagrams with high-level operators
and finite behavior
In this section we prove termination, soundness and completeness of diagrams with
high-level operators with ﬁnite behavior. This means the operators refuse, assert, alt,
xalt, and loop〈n〉 with n = ∞. Diagrams with inﬁnite loops are addresed in section
A.4.
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In the above section we assumed [[ d ]] = {(T, ∅)} for any diagram d. In this section
we assume the general semantic model [[ d ]] = {(p1, n1), (p2, n2), . . . , (pm, pm)}, but
write t ∈ [[ d ]] as a shorthand for t ∈ ⋃i=1,...,m(pi ∪ ni) when we ﬁnd this suitable.
Further we treat the denotation of assert to be [[ assert d ]] = [[ d ]] for the purpose of the
following proofs.
By termination we mean a state [β, d] where no further execution steps are possible.
Usually this means that d = skip, but it is possible to make other diagrams where no
execution is possible, e.g. the diagram d = (?, (m, l, l)) seq (!, (m, l, l)) which specify
that lifeline l receives message m from itself before it sends it.
Theorem 3 (Termination) Given a diagram d ∈ D without inﬁnite loops. If we
assume progression of execution, then execution of [env!M.d, d] will terminate.
Proof of theorem 3
Assume: Diagram d ∈ D without inﬁnite loops
Prove: Execution of [env!M.d1, d1] terminates
〈1〉1. Let: w ∈ D → N be a weight function deﬁned as
w(skip)
def
= 0
w(e)
def
= 1 (for e ∈ E)
w(d1 seq d2)
def
= w(d1 par d2)
def
= w(d1 strict d2)
def
= w(d1) + w(d2) + 1
w(d1 alt d2)
def
= w(d1 xalt d2)
def
= max(w(d1), w(d2)) + 1
w(refuse d1)
def
= w(assert d1)
def
= w(d1) + 1
w(loop〈n〉 d1) def= n · (w(d1) + 2)
〈1〉2. w(d) ≥ 0
Proof: by induction on the structure of d.
Induction start:
〈2〉1. Case: d = skip
〈3〉1. w(d) = 0
Proof: Def. of w.
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1.
〈2〉2. Case: d = e (single event)
〈3〉1. w(d) = 1
Proof: Def. of w.
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1.
Induction step:
Assume: w(d1) ≥ 0 ∧ w(d2) ≥ 0 (Induction hypothesis)
〈2〉3. Case: d = d1 seq d2 or d = d1 par d2 or d = d1 strict d2
〈3〉1. w(d) = w(d1) + w(d2) + 1 > 0
Proof: Def. of w and induction hypothesis.
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1
〈2〉4. Case: d = d1 alt d2 or d = d1 xalt d2
〈3〉1. w(d) = max(w(d1), w(d2)) + 1 > 0
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Proof: Def. of w and max(w(d1), w(d2)) ≥ 0 (induction hypothesis and prop-
erties of max).
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1
〈2〉5. Case: d = refuse d1 or d = assert d1
〈3〉1. w(d) = w(d1) + 1 > 0
Proof: Def. of w and induction hypothesis.
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1.
〈2〉6. Case: d = loop〈n〉 d1
〈3〉1. w(d) = n · (w(d1) + 2)
Proof: Def. of w.
〈3〉2. w(d1) + 2 > 0
Proof: Induction hypothesis.
〈3〉3. n ≥ 0
Proof: Def. of D.
〈3〉4. w(d) ≥ 0
Proof: 〈3〉1, 〈3〉2 and 〈3〉3.
〈3〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉4.
〈2〉7. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1-〈2〉6.
〈1〉3. [β, d] e−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ e ∈ E ∪ T ⇒ w(d) > w(d′)
Assume: [β, d]
e−→ [β ′, d′] ∧ e ∈ E ∪ T
Prove: w(d) > w(d′)
Proof: by induction on the structure of d
Induction start:
〈2〉1. Case: d = e (single event)
〈3〉1. d′ = skip
Proof: Rules (8.3) and (8.10).
〈3〉2. w(d) = 1 < 0 = w(d′)
Proof: 〈2〉1, 〈3〉1 and def. of w.
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉2.
Induction step:
Assume: [βk, dk]
e−→ [βk, d′k] ∧ e ∈ E ∪ T ⇒ w(dk) > w(d′k), k ∈ {1, 2} (induction
hypothesis)
〈2〉2. Case: d = d1 alt d2 or d = d1 xalt d2
〈3〉1. (d′ = d1 ∨ d′ = d2) ∧ e ∈ T
Proof: Rules (8.6), (8.16) and (8.17).
〈3〉2. Case: d′ = d1
〈4〉1. w(d) = max(w(d1), w(d2)) + 1 > w(d1) = w(d′)
Proof: Def. of w and max(w(d1), w(d2)) ≥ w(d1).
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉1.
〈3〉3. Case: d′ = d2
〈4〉1. w(d) = max(w(d1), w(d2)) + 1 > w(d2) = w(d′)
Proof: Def. of w and max(w(d1), w(d2)) ≥ w(d2).
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〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉1.
〈3〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1, 〈3〉2 and 〈3〉3.
〈2〉3. Case: d = refuse d1 or d = assert d1
〈3〉1. d′ = d1 ∧ e ∈ T
Proof: Rules (8.6), (8.18), (8.19).
〈3〉2. w(d) = w(d1) + 1 > w(d1) = w(d′)
Proof: Def. of w.
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉2.
〈2〉4. Case: d = loop〈n〉 d1
〈3〉1. n > 0
Proof: Assumption and n = 0⇒ d = skip (see section 8.3.9).
〈3〉2. d = d1 seq loop〈n− 1〉 d1 ∧ e ∈ T
Proof: 〈3〉1 and rules (8.6) and (8.20).
〈3〉3. w(d) = n · (w(d1) + 2) = n · w(d1) + 2 · n
Proof: Def. of w.
〈3〉4. w(d′) = w(d1) + (n− 1) · (w(d1) + 2) + 1
= w(d1) + n · w(d1) + 2 · n− w(d1)− 2 + 1 = n · w(d1) + 2 · n− 1
Proof: 〈3〉2 and def. of w.
〈3〉5. w(d) = n · w(d1) + 2 · n > n · w(d1) + 2 · n− 1 = w(d′)
Proof: 〈3〉3 and 〈3〉4.
〈3〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉5
〈2〉5. Case: d = d1 seq d2
〈3〉1. ((d′ = d′1 seq d2 ∧ [β1, d1] e−→ [β ′1, d′1])
∨(d′ = d1 seq d′2 ∧ [β2, d2] e−→ [β ′2, d′2]))
∧ e ∈ E ∪ T
Proof: By rules (8.3), (8.11) and (8.12) either d1 or d2 is executed (see also
proof of lemma 7).
〈3〉2. Case: d′ = d′1 seq d2 ∧ [β1, d1] e−→ [β ′1, d′1] ∧ e ∈ E ∪ T
〈4〉1. w(d1) > w(d′1)
Proof: Case assumption 〈3〉2 and induction hypothesis.
〈4〉2. w(d) = w(d1) + w(d2) + 1 > w(d′1) + w(d2) + 1 = w(d′)
Proof: Case assumption 〈2〉5, case assumption 〈3〉2, 〈4〉1 and def. of w.
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉2
〈3〉3. Case: d′ = d1 seq d′2 ∧ [β2, d2] e−→ [β ′2, d′2] ∧ e ∈ E ∪ T
〈4〉1. w(d2) > w(d′2)
Proof: Case assumption 〈3〉3 and induction hypothesis.
〈4〉2. w(d) = w(d1) + w(d2) + 1 > w(d1) + w(d′2) + 1 = w(d′)
Proof: Case assumption 〈2〉5, case assumption 〈3〉3, 〈4〉1 and def. of w.
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉2
〈3〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1, 〈3〉2 and 〈3〉3.
〈2〉6. Case: d = d1 par d2
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〈3〉1. ((d′ = d′1 par d2 ∧ [β1, d1] e−→ [β ′1, d′1])
∨(d′ = d1 par d′2 ∧ [β2, d2] e−→ [β ′2, d′2]))
∧ e ∈ E ∪ T
Proof: By rules (8.3), (8.13) and (8.14) either d1 or d2 is executed (see also
proof of lemma 9).
〈3〉2. Case: d′ = d′1 par d2 ∧ [β1, d1] e−→ [β ′1, d′1] ∧ e ∈ E ∪ T
〈4〉1. w(d1) > w(d′1)
Proof: Case assumption 〈3〉2 and induction hypothesis.
〈4〉2. w(d) = w(d1) + w(d2) + 1 > w(d′1) + w(d2) + 1 = w(d′)
Proof: Case assumption 〈2〉6, case assumption 〈3〉2, 〈4〉1 and def. of w.
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉2
〈3〉3. Case: d′ = d1 par d′2 ∧ [β2, d2] e−→ [β ′2, d′2] ∧ e ∈ E ∪ T
〈4〉1. w(d2) > w(d′2)
Proof: Case assumption 〈3〉3 and induction hypothesis.
〈4〉2. w(d) = w(d1) + w(d2) + 1 > w(d1) + w(d′2) + 1 = w(d′)
Proof: Case assumption 〈2〉6, case assumption 〈3〉3, 〈4〉1 and def. of w.
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉2
〈3〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉1, 〈3〉2 and 〈3〉3.
〈2〉7. Case: d = d1 strict d2
〈3〉1. d′ = d′1 strict d2 ∧ [β1, d1] e−→ [β ′1, d′1]) ∧ e ∈ E ∪ T
Proof: Rules (8.3) and (8.15).
〈3〉2. w(d1) > w(d′1)
Proof: 〈3〉1 and induction hypothesis.
〈3〉3. w(d) = w(d1) + w(d2) + 1 > w(d′1) + w(d2) + 1 = w(d′)
Proof: Case assumption 〈2〉7, 〈3〉2, and def. of w.
〈3〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉3
〈2〉8. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1-〈2〉7.
〈1〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2 and 〈1〉3.

In the previous section we assumed that diagrams do not have repetition of events.
We make the same assumption for diagrams that are have high level operators. For
the operators refuse, assert, alt and xalt this is straight forward by assuming that for a
diagram d:
d = d1 alt d2 ∨ d = d1 xalt d2 ⇒ ev.d1 ∩ ev.d2 = ∅
However, the loop is a bit more problematic. Given a diagram d, assume that we
rename every signal s in d and give it the new name sk where k ∈ N. Let dk denote
the resulting diagram. We now assume, both in the denotational and the operational
semantics, that we have an implicit counter and a way of doing this renaming every
time the body of a loop is “copied” out of the loop. A way to do this could be to
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redeﬁne the Π rule for loop as
Π(L, β, loopc〈n〉 d) τloop−→ Π(L, β, dc seq loopc+1〈n− 1〉 d) (A.1)
and the deﬁnition of semantic loop to
μcn [[ d ]]
def
= [[ dc ]]  μc+1n−1 [[ d ]] (A.2)
where c ∈ N is a counter. Further we could redeﬁne ev. and msg. as follows
msg.loopc〈n〉 d def= msg.dc ∪msg.loopc+1〈n− 1〉 d
ev.loopc〈n〉 d def= ev.dc ∪ ev.loopc+1〈n− 1〉 d
In the following we assume these new deﬁnitions, also when not writing it out explicitly.
Lemma 17 Given a diagram d. For all traces t such that (there exists β such that)
[env!M.d, d]
t−→ [β, skip]
we may ﬁnd a simple diagram d′ (and β ′) such that
[env!M.d
′, d′] E
S©t−→ [β ′, skip]
Proof of lemma 17
Assume: ∃β : [env!M.d, d] t−→ [β, skip]
Prove: ∃d′, β ′ : [env!M.d′, d′] E
S©t−→ [β ′, skip], d′ simple
Proof: by induction on d.
〈1〉1. Induction start: d simple
Proof: Trivial by letting d = d′ and β = β ′. By lemma 5, E S©t = t.
Induction step:
Assume: ∀dk, tk : ∃βk : [env!M.dk, dk] tk−→ [βk, skip]⇒
∃d′k, β ′k : [env!M.d′k, d′k] E
S©tk−−−→ [β ′k, skip], d′k simple (induction hypothesis)
〈1〉2. Case: d = d1 seq d2 or d = d1 par d2 or d = d1 strict d2
Proof: By rules (8.3), (8.11), (8.12), (8.13), (8.14) and (8.15), t is obtained by
alternately executing d1 and d2 in some suitable fashion. This means there must
exist traces t1 and t2 (and β1 and β2) such that [env
!
M.dk, dk]
tk−→ [βk, skip] for
k ∈ {1, 2} and t is (some kind of) merge of t1 and t2. By the induction hypothesis
we may ﬁnd d′k such that it produces E S©tk (for k ∈ {1, 2}). Let d′ = d′1 seq d′2 or
d′ = d′1 par d
′
2 or d
′ = d′1 strict d
′
2. Then clearly d
′ is simple. Further, by applying
the same execution scheme (i.e., alternation between the left and right hand side of
the operator), except for the silent events in t, d′ produces E S©t.
〈1〉3. Case: d = refuse d1
Proof: By assumption and rules (8.6) and (8.18), t = 〈τrefuse〉t1 such that
[env!M.refuse d1, d1]
t1−→ [β, skip]. By env!M.refuse d1 = env!M.d1 and the induction
hypothesis, we may ﬁnd simple d′1 such that [env
!
M.d
′
1, d
′
1]
E S©t1−−−→ [β ′1, skip]. Let d′ =
d′1. Clearly d
′ is simple. Further, we have that [env!M.d
′, d′] E
S©t−−→ [β ′1, skip] since
E S©〈τrefuse〉t1 = E S©t1 (by def. of S© and τrefuse ∈ E).
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〈1〉4. Case: d = assert d1
Proof: By assumption and rules (8.6) and (8.19), t = 〈τassert〉t1 such that
[env!M.assert d1, d1]
t1−→ [β, skip]. By env!M.assert d1 = env!M.d1 and the induction
hypothesis, we may ﬁnd simple d′1 such that [env
!
M.d
′
1, d
′
1]
E S©t1−−−→ [β ′1, skip]. Let d′ =
d′1. Clearly d
′ is simple. Further, we have that [env!M.d
′, d′] E
S©t−−→ [β ′1, skip] since
E S©〈τassert〉t1 = E S©t1 (by def. of S© and τassert ∈ E).
〈1〉5. Case: d = d1 alt d2
Proof: By assumption and rules (8.6) and (8.16), t = 〈τalt〉tk such that
[env!M.d, dk]
tk−→ [β, skip], for k = 1 or k = 2. Because env!M.d = env!M.d1∪env!M.d2,
env!M.d1∩ env!M.d2 = ∅ and by the induction hypothesis we may ﬁnd simple d′k such
that [env!M.d
′
k, d
′
k]
E S©tk−−−→ [β ′k, skip] for the appropriate choice of k. Let d′ = d′k (for this
choice of k). Clearly d′ is simple. Further, we have that [env!M.d
′, d′] E
S©t−−→ [β ′k, skip]
since E S©t = E S©〈τalt〉tk = E S©tk (by def. of S© and τalt ∈ E).
〈1〉6. Case: d = d1 xalt d2
Proof: By assumption and rules (8.6) and (8.17), t = 〈τxalt〉tk such that
[env!M.d, dk]
tk−→ [β, skip], for k = 1 or k = 2. Because env!M.d = env!M.d1∪env!M.d2,
env!M.d1∩ env!M.d2 = ∅ and by the induction hypothesis we may ﬁnd simple d′k such
that [env!M.d
′
k, d
′
k]
E S©tk−−−→ [β ′k, skip] for the appropriate choice of k. Let d′ = d′k (for this
choice of k). Clearly d′ is simple. Further, we have that [env!M.d
′, d′] E
S©t−−→ [β ′k, skip]
since E S©t = E S©〈τxalt〉tk = E S©tk (by def. of S© and τxalt ∈ E).
〈1〉7. Case: d = loop〈n〉 d1
Proof: by induction on n.
〈2〉1. Induction start: n = 1
Proof: By assumption and rules (8.6) and (8.20), t = 〈τloop〉t1 such that
[env!M.loop〈1〉 d1, loop〈1〉 d1]
τloop−→ [env!M.loop〈1〉 d1, d1 seq loop〈0〉 d1] = [env!M.d1∪
env!M.skip, d1 seq skip] = [env
!
M.d1, d1]. By the induction hypothesis we may ﬁnd
simple d′1 such that [env
!
M.d
′
1, d
′
1]
E S©t1−−−→ [β ′1, skip]. Let d′ = d′1. Clearly d′ is simple.
Further, we have that [env!M.d
′, d′] E
S©t−−→ since E S©t = E S©〈τloop〉t1 = E S©t1 (by def.
of S© and τloop ∈ E).
〈2〉2. Induction step: n = k + 1
Assume: For all t and d1, if these exists β such that
[env!M.loop〈k〉 d1, loop〈k〉 d1] t−→ [β, skip] then we may ﬁnd simple d′
(and β ′) such that [env!M.d
′, d′] E
S©t−−→ [β ′, skip] (induction hypothesis 2)
Proof: By assumption and rules (8.6) and (8.20), t = 〈τloop〉t′ such that
[env!M.loop〈k+1〉 d1, loop〈k +1〉 d1]
τloop−−→ [env!M.loop〈k+1〉 d1, d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1]
t′−→ [β, skip]. We have that env!M.loop〈k + 1〉 d1 = env!M.d1 ∪ env!M.loop〈k〉 d1 =
env!M.d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1. By this, the induction hypotheses and 〈1〉2 we may ﬁnd
simple d′′ such that [env!M.d
′′, d′′] E
S©t′−−−→ [β ′, skip]. Let d′ = d′′. Clearly d′ is simple.
Further, we have that [env!M.d
′, d′] E
S©t−−→ since E S©t = E S©〈τloop〉t′ = E S©t′ (by def.
of S© and τloop ∈ E).
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
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〈1〉8. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1-〈1〉7.

Lemma 18 Given a diagram d. For all traces t such that
t ∈ [[ d ]]
we may ﬁnd a simple diagram d′ such that
t ∈ [[ d′ ]]
Proof of lemma 18
Assume: t ∈ [[ d ]]
Prove: ∃d′ : t ∈ [[ d′ ]], d′ simple.
Proof: by induction on d.
〈1〉1. Induction start: d simple
Proof: Trivial: Let d = d′.
Induction step:
Assume: If tk ∈ [[ dk ]] then there exists simple d′k such that tk ∈ [[ d′k ]] (induction
hypothesis)
〈1〉2. d = d1 seq d2 or d = d1 par d2 or d = d1 strict d2
Proof: By deﬁnitions (5.5)-(5.6), (5.8)-(5.9), and (5.11)-(5.12) there exist traces t1
and t2 such that t is obtained from t1 and t2. By the induction hypothesis we may
ﬁnd simple d′1 and d
′
2 such that t1 ∈ [[ d′1 ]] and t2 ∈ [[ d′2 ]]. Let d′ = d′1 seq d′2 or
d′ = d′1 par d
′
2 or d
′ = d′1 strict d
′
2. Clearly d
′ is simple and t ∈ [[ d′ ]].
〈1〉3. d = refuse d1
Proof: By def. [[ d1 ]] = {(p1, n1), . . . , (pm, nm)} iﬀ [[ d ]] = {(∅, p1 ∪ n1), . . . , (∅, pm ∪
nm)}, so t ∈ [[ d ]] iﬀ t ∈ pi or t ∈ ni (for some i ∈ {1, . . . , m}) iﬀ t ∈ [[ d1 ]]. By
induction hypothesis there exists simple d′1 such that t ∈ [[ d′1 ]]. Let d′ = d′1. Clearly
d′ is simple and t ∈ [[ d′ ]].
〈1〉4. d = assert d1
Proof: We have assumed that [[ assert d1 ]] = [[ d1 ]] so t ∈ [[ d ]] iﬀ t ∈ [[ d1 ]]. By
induction hypothesis there exists simple d′1 such that t ∈ [[ d′1 ]]. Let d′ = d′1. Clearly
d′ is simple and t ∈ [[ d′ ]].
〈1〉5. d = d1 alt d2 or d = d1 xalt d2
Proof: By def. t ∈ [[ d1 alt d2 ]] or t ∈ [[ d1 xalt d2 ]] iﬀ t ∈ [[ d1 ]] unionmulti [[ d2 ]] or t ∈
[[ d1 ]]∪ [[ d2 ]] iﬀ t ∈ [[ d1 ]] or t ∈ [[ d2 ]]. Chose the appropriate k ∈ {1, 2}. By induction
hypothesis there exist simple d′k such that t ∈ [[ d′k ]]. Let d′ = d′k. Clearly d′ is simple
and t ∈ [[ d′ ]].
〈1〉6. d = loop〈n〉 d1
Proof: By def. [[ d ]] = [[ loop〈n〉 d1 ]] = μn [[ d1 ]] = [[ d11 ]]  [[ d21 ]]  · · ·  [[ dn1 ]].
By this and defs. (5.5)-(5.6) we have that [[ d ]] = [[ d11 seq d
2
1 seq · · · seq dn1 ]]. By
the induction hypothesis and 〈1〉2 we may ﬁnd simple d11′, d22′, . . . , dn2 ′ such that t ∈
[[ d11
′
seq d21
′
seq · · · seq dn1 ′ ]]. Let d′ = d11′ seq d21′ seq · · · seq dn1 ′. Clearly d′ is simple
and t ∈ [[ d′ ]].
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〈1〉7. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1-〈1〉6.

Theorem 4 (Soundness) Given diagram d ∈ D without inﬁnite loops. For all traces
t ∈ (E ∪ T )∗, if there exists β ∈ B such that
[env!M.d, d]
t−→ [β, skip]
then
E S©t ∈ [[ d ]]
Proof of theorem 4
Assume: ∃β : [env!M.d, d] t−→ [β, skip]
Prove: E S©t ∈ [[ d ]]
Proof: by induction on d.
〈1〉1. Induction start: d = skip, d = (!, m), d = (?, m)
Proof: This carries over from theorem 1.
Induction step:
Assume: ∃βk : [env!M.dk, dk] tk−→ [βk, skip] ⇒ E S©tk ∈ [[ d ]]
〈1〉2. Case: d = d1 seq d2 or d = d1 par d2 or d = d1 strict d2
Proof: By lemmas 17 and 18 this follows from theorem 1
〈1〉3. Case: d = refuse d1
〈2〉1. t = 〈τrefuse〉t1 such that [env!M.d, d]
τrefuse−−−→ [env!M.d, d1] t1−→ [β, skip]
Proof: Assumptions and rules (8.6) and (8.18).
〈2〉2. E S©t = E S©〈τrefuse〉t1 = E S©t1
Proof: 〈2〉1, def. of S© and τrefuse ∈ E .
〈2〉3. E S©t ∈ [[ d1 ]]
Proof: 〈2〉2 and induction hypothesis (by env!M.refuse d1 = env!M.d1).
〈2〉4. E S©t ∈ [[ refuse d1 ]]
Proof: Def. (5.19) of the denotation of refuse.
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉4.
〈1〉4. Case: d = assert d1
〈2〉1. t = 〈τassert〉t1 such that [env!M.d, d] τassert−−−→ [env!M.d, d1] t1−→ [β, skip]
Proof: Assumptions and rules (8.6) and (8.19).
〈2〉2. E S©t = E S©〈τassert〉t1 = E S©t1
Proof: 〈2〉1, def. of S© and τassert ∈ E .
〈2〉3. E S©t ∈ [[ d1 ]]
Proof: 〈2〉2 and induction hypothesis (by env!M.assert d1 = env!M.d1).
〈2〉4. E S©t ∈ [[ assert d1 ]]
Proof: Assumption that [[ assert d1 ]] = [[ d1 ]].
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉4.
〈1〉5. Case: d = d1 alt d2
〈2〉1. t = 〈τalt〉tk such that [env!M.d, d] τalt−→ [env!M.d, dk] tk−→ [β, skip] for k = 1 or
k = 2
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Proof: Assumptions and rules (8.6) and (8.16).
〈2〉2. E S©t = E S©〈τalt〉tk = E S©tk
Proof: 〈2〉1, def. of S© and τalt ∈ E .
〈2〉3. E S©t ∈ [[ dk ]] for k = 1 or k = 2
Proof: 〈2〉2 and induction hypothesis (by env!M.d = env!M.d1 ∪ env!M.d2,
env!M.d1 ∩ env!M.d2 = ∅).
〈2〉4. E S©t ∈ [[ d1 alt d2 ]]
Proof: 〈2〉3 and def. (5.14).
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉4.
〈1〉6. Case: d = d1 xalt d2
〈2〉1. t = 〈τxalt〉tk such that [env!M.d, d] τxalt−→ [env!M.d, dk] tk−→ [β, skip] for k = 1 or
k = 2
Proof: Assumptions and rules (8.6) and (8.17).
〈2〉2. E S©t = E S©〈τxalt〉tk = E S©tk
Proof: 〈2〉1, def. of S© and τxalt ∈ E .
〈2〉3. E S©t ∈ [[ dk ]] for k = 1 or k = 2
Proof: 〈2〉2 and induction hypothesis (by env!M.d = env!M.d1 ∪ env!M.d2,
env!M.d1 ∩ env!M.d2 = ∅).
〈2〉4. E S©t ∈ [[ d1 xalt d2 ]]
Proof: 〈2〉3 and def. (5.18).
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉4.
〈1〉7. Case: d = loop〈n〉 d1
Proof: Induction on n
〈2〉1. Induction start: n = 1
〈3〉1. t = 〈τloop〉t1 such that [env!M.loop〈1〉 d1, loop〈1〉 d1]
τloop−→
[env!M.loop〈1〉 d1, d1 seq loop〈0〉 d1] t1−→ [β, skip]
Proof: Assumptions and rules (8.6) and (8.20).
〈3〉2. E S©t1 ∈ [[ d1 ]]
Proof: 〈3〉1 and induction hypothesis (by d1 seq loop〈0〉 d1 = d1 seq skip = d1
and env!M.loop〈1〉 d1 = env!M.d1 ∪ env!M.skip = env!M.d1).
〈3〉3. E S©t = E S©〈τloop〉t1 = E S©t1
Proof: 〈3〉1, def. of S© and τloop ∈ E .
〈3〉4. [[ loop〈1〉 d1 ]] = μ1[[ d1 ]] = [[ d1 ]]
Proof: Defs. (5.22), (5.23).
〈3〉5. E S©t = E S©t1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] = [[ loop〈1〉 d1 ]] = [[ d ]]
Proof: 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3 and 〈3〉4.
〈3〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉5
〈2〉2. Induction step: n = k + 1
Assume: ∀d1, s : ∃β : [env!M.loop〈k〉 d1, loop〈k〉 d1] s−→ [β, skip] ⇒ E S©s ∈
[[ loop〈k〉 ]] (induction hypothesis 2)
〈3〉1. t = 〈τloop〉t′ such that [env!M.loop〈k + 1〉 d1, loop〈k + 1〉 d1]
τloop−→
[env!M.loop〈k + 1〉 , d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1] t
′−→ [β, skip]
Proof: Assumptions and rules (8.6) and (8.20).
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〈3〉2. E S©t′ ∈ [[ d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1 ]]
Proof: 〈3〉1, induction hypotheses (by env!M.loop〈k + 1〉 d1 = env!M.d1 ∪
env!M.loop〈k〉 d1 = env!M.d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1) and 〈1〉2.
〈3〉3. E S©t = E S©〈τloop〉t′ = E S©t′
Proof: 〈3〉1, def. of S© and τloop ∈ E .
〈3〉4. [[ loop〈k + 1〉 d1 ]] = μk+1[[ d1 ]] = [[ d1 ]]  μk[[ d1 ]]
= [[ d1 ]]  [[ loop〈k〉 d1 ]] = [[ d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1 ]]
Proof: Defs. (5.5), (5.7), (5.6), (5.22), (5.23).
〈3〉5. E S©t = E S©t′ ∈ [[ d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1 ]] = [[ loop〈k + 1〉 d1 ]] = [[ d ]]
Proof: 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3 and 〈3〉4.
〈3〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉5.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉8. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1-〈1〉7.

Theorem 5 (Completeness) Given a diagram d ∈ D without inﬁnite loops. For all
traces t ∈ E∗, if
t ∈ [[ d ]]
then there exist trace t′ ∈ (E ∪ T )∗ and β ∈ B such that
[env!M.d, d]
t′−→ [β, skip] and E S©t′ = t
Proof of theorem 5
Assume: t ∈ [[ d ]]
Prove: ∃t′, β : [env!M.d, d] t
′−→ [β, skip] ∧ E S©t′ = t
Proof: by induction on d.
〈1〉1. Induction start: d = skip, d = (!, m), d = (?, m)
Proof: This carries over from theorem 2.
Induction step:
Assume: tk ∈ [[ dk ]] ⇒ ∃t′k, βk : [env!M.dk, dk]
t′k−→ [βk, skip] ∧ E S©t′k = tk (induction
hypothesis)
〈1〉2. Case: d = d1 seq d2 or d = d1 par d2 or d = d1 strict d2
Proof: By 17 and 18 this follows from theorem 2.
〈1〉3. d = refuse d1
〈2〉1. t ∈ [[ d1 ]]
Proof: Assumption and def. (5.19).
〈2〉2. ∃t′1, β1 : [env!M.d1, d1]
t′1−→ [β1, skip] ∧ E S©t′1 = t
Proof: 〈2〉1 and induction hypothesis.
〈2〉3. Let: t′ = 〈τrefuse〉t′1
〈2〉4. [env!M.d, d]
τrefuse−−−→ [env!M.d, d1]
t′1−→ [β1, skip]
Proof: 〈2〉2, 〈2〉3, rules (8.6) and (8.18) and env!M.d = env!M.refuse d1 = env!M.d1.
〈2〉5. E S©t′ = E S©〈τrefuse〉t′1 = E S©t′1 = t
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Proof: 〈2〉2, 〈2〉3, def. of S© and τrefuse ∈ E .
〈2〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉3, 〈2〉4 and 〈2〉5.
〈1〉4. d = assert d1
〈2〉1. t ∈ [[ d1 ]]
Proof: Assumption that [[ assert d1 ]] = [[ d1 ]].
〈2〉2. ∃t′1, β1 : [env!M.d1, d1]
t′1−→ [β1, skip] ∧ E S©t′1 = t
Proof: 〈2〉1 and induction hypothesis.
〈2〉3. Let: t′ = 〈τassert〉t′1
〈2〉4. [env!M.d, d] τassert−−−→ [env!M.d, d1]
t′1−→ [β1, skip]
Proof: 〈2〉2, 〈2〉3, rules (8.6) and (8.19) and env!M.d = env!M.assert d1 = env!M.d1.
〈2〉5. E S©t′ = E S©〈τassert〉t′1 = E S©t′1 = t
Proof: 〈2〉2, 〈2〉3, def. of S© and τassert ∈ E .
〈2〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉3, 〈2〉4 and 〈2〉5.
〈1〉5. d = d1 alt d2
〈2〉1. t ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∨ t ∈ [[ d2 ]]
Proof: 〈1〉5 and def. (5.14).
〈2〉2. ∃t′k, βk : [env!M.dk, dk]
t′k−→ [βk, skip] ∧ E S©t′k = t for k = 1 or k = 2
Proof: 〈2〉1 and induction hypothesis.
〈2〉3. [env!M.d, d] τalt−→ [env!M.d, dk]
t′k−→ [βk, skip] for k = 1 or k = 2
Proof: 〈2〉2, rules (8.6) and (8.16), and env!M.d = env!M.d1∪env!M.d2, env!M.d1∩
env!M.d2 = ∅.
〈2〉4. Let: t′ = 〈τalt〉t′k for the appropriate choice of k ∈ {1, 2}
〈2〉5. E S©t′ = E S©〈τalt〉t′k = E S©t′k = t
Proof: 〈2〉2, 〈2〉4, def. of S© and τalt ∈ E .
〈2〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉3, 〈2〉4 and 〈2〉5.
〈1〉6. d = d1 xalt d2
〈2〉1. t ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∨ t ∈ [[ d2 ]]
Proof: 〈1〉6 and def. (5.18).
〈2〉2. ∃t′k, βk : [env!M.dk, dk]
t′k−→ [βk, skip] ∧ E S©t′k = t for k = 1 or k = 2
Proof: 〈2〉1 and induction hypothesis.
〈2〉3. [env!M.d, d] τxalt−→ [env!M.d, dk]
t′k−→ [βk, skip] for k = 1 or k = 2
Proof: 〈2〉2, rules (8.6) and (8.17), and env!M.d = env!M.d1∪env!M.d2, env!M.d1∩
env!M.d2 = ∅.
〈2〉4. Let: t′ = 〈τxalt〉t′k for the appropriate choice of k ∈ {1, 2}
〈2〉5. E S©t′ = E S©〈τxalt〉t′k = E S©t′k = t
Proof: 〈2〉2, 〈2〉4, def. of S© and τxalt ∈ E .
〈2〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉3, 〈2〉4 and 〈2〉5.
〈1〉7. d = loop〈n〉 d1
Proof: by induction on n
〈2〉1. Induction start: n = 1
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〈3〉1. t ∈ [[ loop〈1〉 d1 ]] = μ1[[ d1 ]] = [[ d1 ]]
Proof: 〈1〉7, 〈2〉1 and defs. (5.22), (5.23).
〈3〉2. ∃t′1, β1 : [env!M.d1, d1]
t′1−→ [β1, skip] ∧ E S©t′1 = t
Proof: 〈3〉1 and induction hypothesis.
〈3〉3. [env!M.loop〈1〉 d1, loop〈1〉 d1]
τloop−→
[env!M.loop〈1〉 d1, d1 seq loop〈0〉 d1]
t′1−→ [β1, skip]
Proof: 〈3〉2 and d1 seq loop〈0〉 d1 = d1 seq skip = d1, env!M.loop〈1〉 d1 =
env!M.d1 ∪ env!M.skip = env!M.d1.
〈3〉4. Let: t′ = 〈τloop〉t′1
〈3〉5. E S©t′ = E S©〈τloop〉t′1 = E S©t′1 = t
Proof: 〈3〉2, 〈3〉4, def. of S© and τloop ∈ E .
〈3〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉3, 〈3〉4 and 〈3〉5.
〈2〉2. Induction step: n = k + 1
Assume: s ∈ [[ loop〈k〉 d1 ]]⇒ ∃s′, β ′ : [env!M.loop〈k〉 d1, loop〈k〉 d1] s
′−→ [β ′, skip]∧
E S©s′ = s (induction hypothesis 2)
〈3〉1. t ∈ [[ loop〈k + 1〉 d1 ]] = μk+1[[ d1 ]] = [[ d1 ]]  μk[[ d1 ]]
= [[ d1 ]]  [[ loop〈k〉 d1 ]] = [[ d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1 ]]
Proof: Assumption, 〈2〉2 and deﬁnitions (5.23), (5.22), (5.5), (5.7) and (5.6).
〈3〉2. ∃t′′, β ′ : [env!M.(d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1), d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1] t
′′−→ [β ′, skip]∧ t = E S©t′′
Proof: 〈1〉2, 〈3〉1 and induction hypotheses.
〈3〉3. [env!M.loop〈k + 1〉 d1, loop〈k + 1〉 d1]
τloop−→
[env!M.loop〈k + 1〉 d1, d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1] t
′′−→ [β ′, skip]
Proof: 〈3〉2, rules (8.6) and (8.20), and env!M.(d1 seq loop〈k〉 d1) =
env!M.d1 ∪ env!M.loop〈k〉 d1 = env!M.loop〈k + 1〉 d1.
〈3〉4. Let: t′ = 〈τloop〉t′′
〈3〉5. E S©t′ = E S©〈τloop〉t′′ = E S©t′′ = t
Proof: 〈3〉2, 〈3〉4, def. of S© and τloop ∈ E .
〈3〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉3, 〈3〉4 and 〈3〉5.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2.
〈1〉8. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1-〈1〉7.

A.4 Sequence diagrams with infinite loops
In this section we prove soundness and completeness of diagrams that also contain the
inﬁnite loop, loop〈∞〉 d. As in the previous sections we treat the denotation [[ d ]] of a
diagram d as a ﬂat set, i.e. we write t ∈ [[ d ]] for t ∈ ⋃(p,n)∈[ d ](p ∪ n). This means we
disregard negative behavior and interaction obligations. For simplicity we assume that
env.d = ∅.
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We let dk for k ∈ N denote the diagram d with every signal s renamed to sk and
apply the loop with implicit counter loopc〈n〉 d as described by rule (A.1) and deﬁnition
(A.2). Further we deﬁne:
[[ d ]]≤1 def= [[ d1 ]]
[[ d ]]≤n+1 def= [[ d ]]≤n  [[ dn+1 ]] for n ≥ 1
(A.3)
Let U = P(H) be the powerset of H. We have that [[ d ]] ∈ U and deﬁne the chains of
trace sets of [[ d ]] as
chains([[ d ]])
def
= {u¯ ∈ U∞ | u¯[1] = [[ d1 ]] ∧ ∀j ∈ N : u¯[j + 1] = u¯[j]  [[ dj+1 ]]}
Because we treat [[ d ]] as a ﬂat set, we see that chains([[ d ]]) is a singleton set {u¯} where
u¯ = [[ d ]]≤1, [[ d ]]≤2, [[ d ]]≤3, . . .
which means we have that u¯[j] = [[ d ]]≤j for all j ∈ N. The function pos may then be
simpliﬁed to
pos(u¯)
def
= {t¯ ∈ H∞ | ∀j ∈ N : t¯[j] ∈ u¯[j] ∧ ∃h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {h}}
The approximation unionsqu¯ becomes
unionsqu¯ def=
⋃
t¯∈pos(u¯)
unionsqt¯
where unionsqt¯ is deﬁned as in appendix 5.3. Because chains([[ d ]]) is a singleton set we can
let
μ∞[[ d ]] = unionsqu¯ for chains([[ d ]]) = {u¯}
which means
μ∞[[ d ]] =
⋃
t¯∈pos(u¯)
unionsqt¯ for chains([[ d ]]) = {u¯}
In fact, if we deﬁne
tra([[ d ]])
def
=
{t¯ ∈ H∞ | ∀j ∈ N : t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∧ ∃h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {h}} (A.4)
we get that
μ∞[[ d ]]
def
=
⋃
t¯∈tra([ d ])
unionsqt¯ (A.5)
In the following we use this deﬁnition of μ∞[[ d ]].
We start by assuming that the body d of an inﬁnite loop loop〈∞〉 d only character-
izes ﬁnite behavior, i.e., we have no nesting of inﬁnite loops. Further we assume that
loop〈∞〉 is the outermost operator of a diagram. When soundness and completeness of
this case are established we consider combinations of inﬁnite loop with other operators.
Lemma 19 t ∈ [[ loop〈∞〉 d ]] ⇐⇒ t ∈ H ∧ ∃t¯ ∈ H∞ : (∀j ∈ N : (t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j∧
∃h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {h}) ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = unionsqlt¯)
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Proof of lemma 19
Prove: t ∈ [[ loop〈∞〉 d ]] ⇐⇒ t ∈ H ∧ ∃t¯ ∈ H∞ : (∀j ∈ N : (t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j∧
∃h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {h}) ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = unionsqlt¯)
〈1〉1. t ∈ [[ loop〈∞〉 d ]] = μ∞[[ d ]] =
⋃
t¯∈tra([ d ])unionsqt¯
Proof: Defs. (5.23) and (A.5).
〈1〉2. t ∈ unionsqt¯ for some t¯ ∈ tra([[ d ]])
Proof: 〈1〉1.
〈1〉3. t ∈ H ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = unionsqlt¯ for some t¯ such that t¯ ∈ H∞ ∧ ∀j ∈ N : t¯[j] ∈
[[ d ]]≤j ∧ ∃h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {h}
Proof: 〈1〉2 and defs. (5.28) and (A.4).
〈1〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉3.

Lemma 20 Given diagram d ∈ D without inﬁnite loops. If [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] may pro-
duce trace t, then, for any k, there exists a trace t′ such that [∅, d1 seq d2 seq · · · seq dk seq
loopk+1〈∞〉 d] may produce t′ and E S©t = E S©t′.
Proof of lemma 20
Assume: t is produced by [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d]
Prove: There exists a trace t′ such that t′ is produced by [∅, d1 seq d2 seq · · · seq dk
seq loopk+1〈∞〉 d] and E S©t = E S©t′.
Proof: by induction on k
〈1〉1. Case: k = 1
(induction start)
〈2〉1. The only possible execution step from [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] is [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] τloop−→
[∅, d1 seq loop2〈∞〉 d]
Proof: Rules (8.6) and (A.1).
〈2〉2. There exists trace s such that s is produced by [∅, d1 seq loop2〈∞〉 d] and
t = 〈τloop〉s
Proof: Assumption and 〈2〉1.
〈2〉3. Let: t′ = s
〈2〉4. E S©t = E S©(〈τloop〉t′) = E S©t′
Proof: 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2, 〈2〉3, def. of S© and τloop ∈ E .
〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉4.
〈1〉2. Case: k = j + 1 (induction step)
Assume: t′ is produced by [∅, d1 seq d2 seq · · · seq dj seq loopj+1〈∞〉 d] and E S©t =
E S©t′ (induction hypothesis)
Prove: t′′ is produced by [∅, d1 seq d2 seq · · · seq dj seq dj+1 seq loopj+2〈∞〉 d]
and E S©t = E S©t′′
〈2〉1. There exist traces s, s′, diagram d′ ∈ D, and β ∈ B such that
[∅, d1 seq d2 seq · · · seq dj seq loopj+1〈∞〉 s−→ [β, d′ seq loopj+1〈∞〉 d] τloop−→
[β, d′ seq dj+2 seq loopj+1〈∞〉 d] s′−→
and t′ = s〈τloop〉s′
Proof: Induction hypothesis and rules (8.6), (8.11), (8.12) and (A.1).
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〈2〉2. [∅, d1 seq d2 seq · · · seq dj seq dj+1loopj+2〈∞〉 d] s−→
[β, d′ seq dj+1 seq loopj+2〈∞〉 d] s′−→
Proof: 〈2〉1.
〈2〉3. Let: t′′ = ss′
〈2〉4. E S©t′ = E S©(s〈τloop〉s′) = E S©(ss′) = E S©t′′
Proof: 〈2〉1, 〈2〉3, properties of S© and τloop ∈ E .
〈2〉5. E S©t = E S©t′′
Proof: Induction hypothesis and 〈2〉4.
〈2〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉2, 〈2〉4 and 〈2〉5.
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2.

Theorem 6 (Soundness) Let d be a diagram without inﬁnite loops. If
[∅, loop〈∞〉 d] produces the trace t, then E S©t ∈ [[ loop〈∞〉 d ]].
Proof of theorem 6
Assume: 1. d is a diagram without inﬁnite loops
2. [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] produces trace t
Let: t′ = E S©t
Prove: t′ ∈ [[ loop〈∞〉 d ]]
〈1〉1. t′ ∈ [[ loop〈∞〉 d ]] ⇐⇒ t′ ∈ H ∧ ∃t¯ ∈ H∞ : (∀j ∈ N : (t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j∧
∃h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {h}) ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t′ = unionsql t¯)
Proof: Lemma 19.
〈1〉2. t′ ∈ H ∧ ∃t¯ ∈ H∞ : (∀j ∈ N : (t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∧ ∃h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]} 
{h}) ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t′ = unionsql t¯)
Proof: by contradiction
Assume: t′ ∈ H ∨ ∀t¯ ∈ H∞ : (∃j ∈ N : (t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∨ ∀h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]} 
{h}) ∨ ∃l ∈ L : e.l S©t′ = unionsql t¯)
Prove: Contradiction
〈2〉1. Case: t′ ∈ H
Proof: We have assumed that all messages are unique, so this must mean that
there exist a message m, traces s, s′, diagrams d1, d2, d3, d4 and states of the com-
munication medium β ′1, β
′
2, β
′
3, β
′
4 such that
[∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] s−→ [β ′1, d1]
(?,m)−→ [β ′2, d2] s
′−→ [β ′3, d3]
(!,m)−→ [β ′4, d4]
and
E S©(s〈(?, m)〉s′〈(!, m)〉)  t′
By rules (8.3) and (8.10) this is clearly not possible and we must have that t′ ∈ H
and the case assumption is impossible.
〈2〉2. Case: ∀t¯ ∈ H∞ : (∃j ∈ N : (t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∨ ∀h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]} 
{h}) ∨ ∃l ∈ L : e.l S©t′ = unionsql t¯)
〈3〉1. Let: s1, s2, s3, . . . , si, . . . be traces and β1, β2, β3, . . . , βi, . . . be states of the
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communication medium such that
[∅, d1] s1−→ [β1, skip]
[∅, d1 seq d2] s1−→ [β1, d2] s2−→ [β2, skip]
[∅, d1 seq d2 seq d3] s1

s2−−−−→ [β2, d3] s3−→ [β3, skip]
...
[∅, d1 seq d2 · · · seq di] s1

s2
···si−1−−−−−−−−−−→ [βi−1, di] si−→ [βi, skip]
...
where we choose s1, s2, . . . , si, . . . such that ev.d
i
S©si = ev.di S©t. Fur-
ther we let t1, t2, t3, . . . , ti, . . . be traces such that
t1 = E S©s1
t2 = t1
(E S©s2)
t3 = t2
(E S©s3)
...
ti = ti−1
(E S©si)
...
〈3〉2. tj ∈ [[ d ]]≤j for all j ∈ N
Proof: 〈3〉1 and theorem 4.
〈3〉3. Let: t¯ = t1, t2, t3, . . . , ti, . . .
〈3〉4. Case: ∃j ∈ N : (t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∨ ∀h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {h})
〈4〉1. Choose arbitrary j ∈ N
〈4〉2. Case: t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j
〈5〉1. t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j
Proof: By 〈3〉3, t¯[j] = tj and by 〈3〉2, tj ∈ [[ d ]]≤j.
〈5〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: By 〈5〉1, 〈4〉2 is impossible.
〈4〉3. Case: ∀h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {h}
〈5〉1. t¯[j + 1] = tj+1 = tj(E S©sj+1) = t¯[j](E S©sj+1)
Proof: 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉3.
〈5〉2. t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {E S©sj+1}
Proof: 〈5〉1.
〈5〉3. E S©sj+1 ∈ H
Proof: By 〈3〉1, [βj , dj+1] sj+1−→ [βj+1, skip], so this follows from lemma 6
and theorem 4.
〈5〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: Let h = E S©sj+1. By 〈5〉2 and 〈5〉3 it is clear that 〈4〉3 is impossible.
〈4〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: Since j is chosen arbitrarily, and 〈4〉2 and 〈4〉3 are impossible for this
arbitrarily chosen j, 〈3〉4 is impossible.
〈3〉5. Case: ∃l ∈ L : e.l S©t′ = unionsql t¯
This means that there must exist l such that e.l S©t′  unionsql t¯ or unionsqlt¯  e.l S©t′ or
∃j ∈ N : (e.l S©t′)[j] = (unionsqlt¯)[j].
〈4〉1. Choose arbitrary l ∈ L.
〈4〉2. For any k, e.l S©s1e.l S©s2 · · ·e.l S©sk  e.l S©t
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〈5〉1. There exists t′′ such that t′′ is produced by [∅, d1 seq d2 seq · · · seq dk seq
loopk+1〈∞〉 d] and E S©t = E S©t′′
Proof: Lemma 20.
〈5〉2. (e.l ∩ ev.d1) S©s1(e.l ∩ ev.d2) S©s2 · · ·(e.l ∩ dk) S©sk
= e.l ∩ (ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2 ∪ · · · ∪ ev.dk) S©t′′
Proof: 〈3〉1, ev.dm ∩ ev.dn = ∅ for m = n, and rules (8.3), (8.11) and
(8.12) (which handles the ordering on l).
〈5〉3. (e.l ∩ ev.d1) S©s1(e.l ∩ ev.d2) S©s2 · · ·(e.l ∩ ev.dk) S©sk
= e.l S©s1
e.l S©s2 · · ·e.l S©sk
Proof: ev.di S©si = E S©si for 1 ≤ i ≤ k (〈3〉1) and e.l ⊆ E (by def. of
e. ), which implies that (e.l ∩ ev.di) S©si = e.l S©(ev.di S©si) = e.l S©(E S©si) =
(e.l ∩ E) S©si = e.l S©si.
〈5〉4. e.l ∩ (ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2 ∪ · · · ∪ ev.dk) S©t′′  e.l S©t′′
Proof: (ev.d1∪ev.d2∪· · ·∪ev.dk)∩ (ev.loopk+1〈∞〉 d) = ∅ and rules (8.3),
(8.11) and (8.12).
〈5〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: e.l S©s1
e.l S©s2 · · ·e.l S©sk
= (e.l ∩ ev.d1) S©s1(e.l ∩ ev.d2) S©s2
· · ·(e.l ∩ ev.dk) S©sk (〈5〉3)
= e.l ∩ (ev.d1 ∪ ev.d2 ∪ · · · ∪ ev.dk) S©t′′ (〈5〉2)
 e.l S©t′′ (〈5〉4)
= e.l S©t (〈5〉1 and e.l ⊆ E)
〈4〉3. e.l S©t′ = e.l S©t
Proof: Assumption that t′ = E S©t and e.l ⊆ E .
〈4〉4. Case: e.l S©t′  unionsql t¯
〈5〉1. ∃h ∈ H : h = 〈〉 ∧ unionsql t¯ = (e.l S©t′)h
Proof: Case assumption (〈4〉4) and the properties of .
〈5〉2. #(e.l S©t′) = ∞ (i.e. e.l S©t′ is ﬁnite)
Proof: 〈5〉1 and #s =∞⇒ sr = s
〈5〉3. Let: k be the smallest number such that e.l S©tk = e.l S©s1e.l S©s2 · · ·
e.l S©sk = e.l S©t′
Proof: By 〈4〉2, 〈4〉3 and 〈5〉2 such k must exist (because at some point
the si stops containing events from e.l or else e.l S©t′ would not be ﬁnite).
〈5〉4. e.l S©si = 〈〉 for all i > k
Proof: This follows direclty from 〈5〉3.
〈5〉5. unionsqlt¯ = e.l S©tk
Proof: By 〈3〉1, 〈3〉3 and def. of unionsqlt¯, unionsqlt¯ is the least upper bound of
e.l S©t1, e.l S©t2, . . . , e.l S©tk, e.l S©tk+1, . . . = e.l S©s1, e.l S©(s1
s2), . . . ,
e.l S©(s1
s2 · · ·sk), e.l S©(s1s2 · · ·sksk+1), . . .
By 〈5〉4 we must have that unionsql t¯ = e.l S©tk or else it would not be the least
upper bound.
〈5〉6. unionsqlt¯ = e.l S©t′
Proof: 〈5〉3 and 〈5〉5.
〈5〉7. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈5〉5 contradicts 〈5〉1, and hence e.l S©t′  unionsqlt¯ is impossible.
〈4〉5. Case: unionsqlt¯  e.l S©t′
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〈5〉1. ∃h ∈ H : h = 〈〉 ∧ e.l S©t′ = (unionsqlt¯)h
Proof: Case assumption (〈4〉5) and properties of .
〈5〉2. #(unionsqlt¯) = ∞ (i.e. unionsqlt¯ is ﬁnite)
Proof: 〈5〉1 and #s =∞⇒ sr = s.
〈5〉3. There exists k such that e.l S©tk = e.l S©ti for all i > k
Proof: By 〈5〉2, unionsqlt¯ is ﬁnite and by def. e.l S©ti  unionsqlt¯ for all i, so there
exists a ﬁnite bound on e.l S©ti and a place where the e.l S©ti for i ∈ N stop
growing.
〈5〉4. e.l S©si = 〈〉 for all i > k
Proof: 〈3〉1 and 〈5〉3.
〈5〉5. unionsqlt¯ = e.l S©tk
Proof: 〈3〉3, 〈5〉3 and the def. of unionsqlt¯ as the least upperbound of
e.l S©t¯[1], e.l S©t¯[2], . . . , e.l S©t¯[k], . . .
〈5〉6. Let: h[1] = e. Then (unionsqlt¯)〈e〉  e.l S©t′
Proof: This follows directly from 〈5〉1.
〈5〉7. There exists n ∈ N such that t′[n] = e
Proof: 〈5〉6.
〈5〉8. There exists j ∈ N such that e ∈ ev.dj
Proof: 〈5〉7, assumption 2, assumption that t′ = E S©t and lemma 20.
〈5〉9. e.l S©tj  e.l S©t′
Proof: 〈4〉2 and 〈4〉3.
〈5〉10. j > k
Proof: By 〈5〉5 and 〈5〉6, (e.l S©tk)〈e〉  e.l S©t′, so by 〈5〉8 and 〈5〉9 this
must be the case (or else rule (8.12) is violated).
〈5〉11. (e.l S©tk)〈e〉  e.l S©tj = e.l S©s1e.l S©s2 · · ·e.l S©sk · · ·e.l S©sj
Proof: 〈3〉1, 〈4〉3, 〈5〉5, 〈5〉6, 〈5〉9 and 〈5〉10.
〈5〉12. e.l S©sj = 〈〉
Proof: 〈3〉1, 〈5〉8 and 〈5〉11.
〈5〉13. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈5〉10 and 〈5〉12 contradicts 〈5〉4, so we must have that 〈4〉5 is
impossible.
〈4〉6. Case: ∃j ∈ N : (e.l S©t′)[j] = (unionsqlt¯)[j]
Assume: j is the smallest such number, i.e.:
(e.l S©t′)|j−1 = (unionsqlt¯)|j−1 ∧ (e.l S©t′)[j] = (unionsqlt¯)[j]
〈5〉1. Let: k be the smallest number such that #(e.l S©t¯[k]) ≥ j
Proof: Such k must exist. unionsql t¯ is deﬁned as the least upper bound of
e.l S©t¯[1], e.l S©t¯[2], . . . , e.l S©t¯[i], . . . If unionsql t¯ is ﬁnite, then by the case assumption
(〈4〉6), #(unionsql t¯) ≥ j, and there must exist k such that e.l S©t¯[k] = unionsqlt¯ (or else
it is not the least upper bound), which implies #(e.l S©t¯[k]) ≥ j. If unionsql t¯ is
inﬁnite this means there is no ﬁnite bound on the length of the e.l S©t¯[i] and
we may ﬁnd k such that #(e.l S©t¯[k]) ≥ n for any n ∈ N.
〈5〉2. e.l S©t¯[k]  e.l S©t′
〈6〉1. e.l S©t¯[k] = e.l S©s1e.l S©s2 · · ·e.l S©sk
〈7〉1. t¯[k] = tk = E S©s1E S©s2 · · ·E S©sk
Proof: 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉3.
〈7〉2. Q.E.D.
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Proof: 〈7〉1 and e.l ⊆ E .
〈6〉2. e.l S©s1e.l S©s2 · · ·e.l S©sk  e.l S©t
Proof: 〈4〉2.
〈6〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈4〉3, 〈6〉1 and 〈6〉2.
〈5〉3. e.l S©t¯[k]  unionsql t¯
Proof: This follow directly from the deﬁnition of unionsql t¯.
〈5〉4. (e.l S©t′)[j] = (unionsqlt¯)[j]
Proof: From 〈5〉2 and 〈5〉3 we have that e.l S©t¯[k]  e.l S©t′ and e.l S©t¯[k] 
unionsql t¯. By assumption j ≤ #(e.l S©t¯[k]), so we must have that (e.l S©t′)[j] =
(e.l S©t¯[k])[j] = (unionsql t¯)[j].
〈5〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: From 〈5〉4 it is clear that 〈4〉6 is impossible.
〈4〉7. Q.E.D.
Proof: Because 〈4〉4, 〈4〉5 and 〈4〉6 is impossible for an arbitrarily chosen l,
〈3〉5 is also impossible.
〈3〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: Because 〈3〉4 and 〈3〉5 are impossible, we have found a t¯ that contradicts
〈2〉2.
〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: Because 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2 are impossible we must have that 〈1〉2 is true.
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2.

Lemma 21 Let d be a diagram without inﬁnite loops and with env.d = ∅ (i.e. no
external communication). If t ∈ [[ loop〈∞〉 d ]], then for all k ∈ N∪{0} there exist trace
t′, β ∈ B and d′ ∈ D such that
[∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] t′−→ [β, d′] ∧ E S©t′ = t|k
Proof of lemma 21
Assume: 1. d is a diagram without inﬁnite loops
2. env.d = ∅
3. t ∈ [[ loop〈∞〉 d ]]
Prove: For all k ∈ N ∪ {0} there exist t′, β, d′ such that
[∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] t′−→ [β, d′] ∧ E S©t′ = t|k
Proof: by induction on k
〈1〉1. Case: k = 0 (induction start)
〈2〉1. t|k = t|0 = 〈〉
Proof: 〈1〉1 and properties of | .
〈2〉2. Let: t′ = 〈τloop〉
〈2〉3. E S©〈τloop〉 = 〈〉
Proof: τloop ∈ E and properties of S© .
〈2〉4. [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] t′−→ [∅, d1 seq loop2〈∞〉 d] ∧ E S©t′ = t|k
Proof: This follows trivially from 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2, and rule (A.1).
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〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: This follows from 〈2〉3 and 〈2〉4 by letting β = ∅ and d′ = d1 seq loop2〈∞〉 d.
〈1〉2. Case: k + 1 (induction step)
Assume: ∃t′′, β ′, d′′ : [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] t′′−→ [β ′, d′′]∧E S©t′′ = t|k (induction hypothesis)
Prove: ∃t′, β, d′ : [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] t′−→ [β, d′] ∧ E S©t′ = t|k+1
〈2〉1. Let: t[k + 1] = e
〈2〉2. t|k+1 = t|k〈e〉  t
Proof: 〈2〉1 (here we assume t to be inﬁnite, but the case t|k+1 = t would not
change the following argument).
〈2〉3. ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t|k+1 = e.l S©(t|k〈e〉)  e.l S©t
Proof: 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2 and properties of l. and S© .
〈2〉4. t ∈ H ∧ ∃t¯ ∈ H∞ : (∀j ∈ N : (t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j∧ ∃h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]} 
{h}) ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = unionsqlt¯)
Proof: Assumption 3 and lemma 19.
〈2〉5. Let: n ∈ N be the number such that e ∈ dn and let m ∈ N be the largest
number such that ev.dm ∩ ev.t|k = ∅
Proof: By our assumption that all messages are unique and are enumerated by
the iterations of the loop (cf. rule (A.1)), both n and m are uniquely identiﬁed.
〈2〉6. Let: j = max(m,n)
〈2〉7. ∃t¯ ∈ H∞ : t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t|k+1  e.l S©t¯[j]  e.l S©t
〈3〉1. ∃t¯ ∈ H∞ : t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = unionsql t¯
Proof: 〈2〉4.
〈3〉2. ∃t¯ ∈ H∞ : t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t¯[j]  unionsql t¯ = e.l S©t
Proof: 〈3〉1 and def. of unionsql.
〈3〉3. ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t|k+1  e.l S©t
Proof: 〈2〉3.
〈3〉4. ∃t¯ ∈ H∞ : t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t|k+1  e.l S©t¯[j]
Proof: By 〈3〉2 and 〈3〉3 we must have that, for all l, e.l S©t|k+1  e.l S©t¯[j],
e.l S©t|k+1 = e.l S©t¯[j] or e.l S©t¯[j]  e.l S©t|k+1. But by 〈2〉5 and 〈2〉6 we must have
that #t¯[j] ≥ #t|k+1, so the latter is not possible.
〈3〉5. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3 and 〈3〉4.
〈2〉8. Let: t¯ be such that t¯ ∈ H∞ ∧ t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t|k+1  e.l S©t¯[j] 
e.l S©t
Proof: By 〈2〉6, such t¯ exists.
〈2〉9. ∃β ′, t′′, d′′ : E S©t′′ = t|k ∧ [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] t
′′−→ [β ′, d′′ seq loopj+1〈∞〉 d] ∧
t′′[#t′′] ∈ E
Proof: This follows from the induction hypothesis, 〈2〉5 and 〈2〉6. (Because m
is the largest number such that ev.dm ∩ ev.t|k = ∅ and j ≥ m, j iterations of the
loop is suﬃcient to produce t′′.) t′′[#t′′] ∈ E is obtained by not execution silent
events after the execution of t[k].
〈2〉10. ∃β ′, t′′, d′′ : E S©t′′ = t|k ∧ [∅, loop1〈j〉 d] t
′′−→ [β ′, d′′] ∧ t′′[#t′′] ∈ E
Proof: This follows directly from 〈2〉9.
〈2〉11. Let: β ′, t′′ and d′′ be such that E S©t′′ = t|k ∧ [∅, loop1〈j〉 d] t
′′−→ [β ′, d′′] ∧
t′′[#t′′] ∈ E
Proof: By 〈2〉10, such β ′, t′′ and d′′ must exist.
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〈2〉12. t¯[j] ∈ [[ loop〈j〉 d ]]
Proof: This follows from 〈2〉8 (see theorem 8 on page 332).
〈2〉13. ∃tj , βj : E S©tj = t¯[j] ∧ [∅, loop1〈j〉 d] tj−→ [βj, skip]
Proof: 〈2〉12 and theorem 5.
〈2〉14. Let: tj , and βj be such that E S©tj = t¯[j] ∧ [∅, loop1〈j〉 d] tj−→ [βj, skip]
Proof: By 〈2〉13 such tj and βj exist.
〈2〉15. Let: l.e = l
〈2〉16. e.l S©t|k+1 = e.l S©(t|k〈e〉) = e.l S©(t|k)〈e〉  e.l S©t¯[j]
Proof: This follows from 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉7 by 〈2〉2, e.l ⊆ E and the properties of S© .
〈2〉17. e.l S©t′′〈e〉  e.l S©tj
Proof: This follow from 〈2〉11, 〈2〉14 and 〈2〉16 by e.l ⊆ E and properties of S© .
〈2〉18. ∃s, β ′′, d′′′ : s ∈ T ∗ ∧ [β ′, d′′] s
〈e〉−−−→ [β ′′, d′′′]
Proof: There are three way this may not be the case. 1) e is blocked by an event
on lifeline e. But by 〈2〉14 and 〈2〉17 we know that a execution with e following
l.e S©t′′ is possible. 2) e is a receive event and its message is not available in β ′. But
we have assumed no external communication, t must obey the message invariant
and we have assumed all messages to be unique, so this is not possible. 3) e is
selected away in the execution of a choice operator. But, by 〈2〉8 and 〈2〉14 we
know that all events of t|k can be executing without choosing away e, and after
the execution of t[k] we have full control over the choices by choosing s in the
appropriate way.
〈2〉19. Let: s, β ′′ and d′′′ be such that s ∈ T ∗ ∧ [β ′, d′′] s
〈e〉−−−→ [β ′′, d′′′]
Proof: By 〈2〉18 such s, β ′′ and d′′′ exist.
〈2〉20. Let: t′ = t′′s〈e〉, β = β ′′ and d′ = d′′′ seq loopj+1〈∞〉 d
〈2〉21. [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] t′−→ [β, d]
Proof: This follows from 〈2〉20, because from 〈2〉9, 〈2〉11 and 〈2〉18 we have
[∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] t′′−→ [β ′, d′′ seq loopj+1〈∞〉 d] s
〈e〉−→ [β ′′, d′′′ seq loopj+1〈∞〉 d].
〈2〉22. E S©t′ = t|k+1
Proof: By 〈2〉1, 〈2〉11, 〈2〉19 and 〈2〉20 we have
E S©t′ = E S©(t′′s〈e〉) = (E S©t′′)(E S©s)(E S©〈e〉) = t|k〈〉〈e〉 = t|kt[k + 1] =
t|k+1.
〈2〉23. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈2〉21 and 〈2〉22.
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2.

Theorem 7 (Completeness) Let d be a diagram without inﬁnite loop, and env.d = ∅
(i.e. without external communication). If t ∈ [[ loop〈∞〉 d ]] then there exists trace t′
such that E S©t′ = t and [∅, loop〈∞〉 d] produces t′.
Proof of theorem 7
Assume: 1. d is a diagram without inﬁnite loop
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2. env.d = ∅
3. t ∈ [[ loop〈∞〉 d ]]
Prove: There exists t′ such that E S©t′ = t and [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] produces t′
Proof: by contradiction
There are two cases that must be considered: 1) There exists some point where
further execution of t is impossible. 2) t does not satisfy the fairness constraints of
the operational semantics.
〈1〉1. Case: ∃k ∈ N : ∀s, β, d′ : (E S©s = t|k ∧ [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] s−→ [β, d′])⇒ [β, d′] t[k+1]
〈2〉1. t|k+1 = t|k〈t[k + 1]〉  t
Proof: Properties of | and [ ].
〈2〉2. Q.E.D.
Proof: By 〈2〉1, t|k+1 is a ﬁnite preﬁx of t. But by assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and
lemma 21 we are able to produce any ﬁnite preﬁx, so 〈1〉1 is impossible.
〈1〉2. Case: ∀k ∈ N : ∃s, β, d′ : (E S©s = t|k ∧ [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] s−→ [β, d′]
∧ [β, d′] t[k+1]−−−→) ∧ ∀t′ : (E S©t′ = t ⇒ ¬wft(t′, loop1〈∞〉 d))
〈2〉1. ∀k ∈ N : ∃s, β, d′ : (E S©s = t|k ∧ [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] s−→ [β, d′] ∧ [β, d′] t[k+1]−−−→)
Proof: This follows from the fact that 〈1〉1 is impossible.
〈2〉2. ∀t′ : (E S©t′ = t ⇒ ¬wft(t′, loop1〈∞〉 d))
Proof: 〈1〉2 and 〈2〉1.
〈2〉3. Assume: t′ is such that E S©t′ = t
〈2〉4. ¬wft(loop1〈∞〉 d, t′)
Proof: 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉3.
〈2〉5. ¬∃σ ∈ Ξ : π2(head(σ)) = loop1〈∞〉 d ∧ tr(σ) = t′ ∧ wfe(σ)
Proof: 〈2〉4 and def. (8.27) of wft .
〈2〉6. ∀σ ∈ Ξ : π2(head(σ)) = loop1〈∞〉 d ∨ tr(σ) = t′ ∨ ¬wfe(σ)
Proof: 〈2〉5.
〈2〉7. Assume: σ is an execution such that
σ = [β1, d1]
x1−→ [β2, d2] x2−→ [β3, d3] x3−→ · · · ∧
[β1, d1] = [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] ∧ tr(σ) = 〈x1, x2, x3, . . .〉 = t′
Proof: By 〈2〉1 such σ must exist.
〈2〉8. ¬wfe(σ)
Proof: 〈2〉6 and 〈2〉7.
〈2〉9. ∃d′ ∈ D, i ∈ N : (∀j ∈ N ∪ {0} : enabled(d′, [βi+j, di+j]) ∧ ¬∃k ∈ N ∪ {0} :
executed(d′, [βi+k, di+k], xi+k, [βi+k+1, di+k+1]))
Proof: 〈2〉8 and def. (8.25) of wfe.
〈2〉10. Let: d′ be the least complex diagram projection part (as by the weight func-
tion w deﬁned in the proof of theorem 3) such that
∃i ∈ N : (∀j ∈ N ∪ {0} : enabled(d′, [βi+j , di+j]) ∧ ∀k ∈ N ∪ {0} :
¬executed(d′, [βi+k, di+k], xi+k, [βi+k+1, di+k+1]))
Proof: By 〈2〉9 such d′ exists, and we must then be able to ﬁnd the least complex
d′.
〈2〉11. Let: i be the smallest number such that
∀j ∈ N ∪ {0} : enabled(d′, [βi+j, di+j]) ∧
∀k ∈ N ∪ {0} : ¬executed(d′, [βi+k, di+k], xi+k, [βi+k+1, di+k+1])
Proof: By 〈2〉10 such i exists, and we may then ﬁnd the smallest.
〈2〉12. enabled(d′, [βi, di])
Proof: 〈2〉11.
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〈2〉13. d′ is a single event or d′ is a diagram with a high-level operator as its most
signiﬁcant operator
Proof: Assume not. Then there exists d′′ and d′′′ such that d′ = d′′ seq d′′′,
d′ = d′′ par d′′′ or d′ = d′′ strict d′′′. But then by defs. (8.21), (8.22) and (8.23) we
must have enabled(d′, [βn, dn]) ⇒ enabled(d′′, [βn, dn]) ∨ enabled(d′′′, [βn, dn]) and
likewise for executed . But d′′ and d′′′ are less complex that d′, so then d′ is not the
least complex diagram projection part that satisfy 〈2〉10.
〈2〉14. Case: d′ is a single event
〈3〉1. Let: d′ = e ∈ E
〈3〉2. e  d1
Proof: 〈2〉12 and defs. (8.22) and (8.23) of executed and enabled .
〈3〉3. ∃c ∈ N, d′′ ∈ D : di = d′′ seq loopc〈∞〉 d ∧ e  d′′
Proof: By 〈2〉7, rules (A.1) and (8.6), and def. (8.21) of  this is the only way
to obtain 〈3〉2.
〈3〉4. Let: c be the smallest number and d′′ be such that di = d′′ seq loopc〈∞〉 d∧
e  d′′
Proof: By 〈3〉3 such c and d′′ exists.
〈3〉5. e ∈ ev.dc−1
Proof: By 〈3〉4, c is the smallest number such that di = d′′ seq loopc〈∞〉 d ∧
e  d′′. If there existed n < c − 1 such that e ∈ ev.dn there would have existed
d′′′ such that di = d′′′ seq loop
n+1〈∞〉 d, but then c would not be the smallest
number to satisfy 〈3〉3.
〈3〉6. [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] 〈x1,x2,...,xi−1〉−−−−−−−−→ [βi, d′′ seq loopc〈∞〉 d]
Proof: 〈2〉7 and 〈3〉4.
〈3〉7. [∅, loop1〈c− 1〉 d] 〈x1,x2,...,xi−1〉−−−−−−−−→ [βi, d′′]
Proof: By 〈3〉6 and deﬁnition of the loop rules.
〈3〉8. There exist s, β such that [βi, d′′] s−→ [β, skip]
Proof: Because of the syntactical constraints we can assume this to be the
case, i.e. that there is nothing in d′′ that prevent the execution to reach skip.
〈3〉9. Let: s and β be such that [βi, d′′] s−→ [β, skip]
Proof: By 〈3〉8, s and β must exist.
〈3〉10. e ∈ ev.(E S©s)
Proof: By 〈3〉3, e  d′′, so by the rules of the operational semantics this must
be the case in an execution from d′′ to skip.
〈3〉11. E S©(〈x1, x2, . . . , xi−1〉s) ∈ [[ d ]]≤c−1
Proof: loop1〈c − 1〉 d and be considered as d1 seq d2 seq · · · seq dc−1, so by
〈3〉7, 〈3〉9, defs. (5.23), (A.2) and (A.3), and theorem 4 this must be the case.
〈3〉12. t ∈ H ∧ ∃t¯ ∈ H∞ : (∀j ∈ N : (t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∧ ∃h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]} 
{h}) ∧ ∀l ∈ L : e.l S©t = unionsqlt¯)
Proof: Assumption 3 and lemma 19.
〈3〉13. Let: t¯ ∈ H∞ be such that
∀j ∈ N : t¯[j] ∈ [[ d ]]≤j ∧ ∃h ∈ H : t¯[j + 1] ∈ {t¯[j]}  {h}) ∧ ∀l ∈ L :
e.l S©t = unionsql t¯
Proof: By 〈3〉12 such t¯ exists.
〈3〉14. e ∈ ev.t¯[c− 1]
Proof: We have established that E S©(〈x1, x2, . . . , xi−1〉s) ∈ [[ d ]]≤c−1 with e ∈
ev.(E S©s) (〈3〉10 and 〈3〉11), t¯[c − 1] ∈ [[ d ]]≤c−1 (〈3〉13) and e ∈ ev.dc−1 (〈3〉5).
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The only way we may have e ∈ ev.t¯[c − 1] is that e is inside and alt or xalt in
dc−1. But then, by theorem 4, there does not exist any ﬁnite execution
σ′ = [β ′1, d
′
1]
x′1−→ [β ′2, d′2]
x′2−→ · · · x
′
n−1−→ [β ′n, d′n]
with β ′1 = ∅, d′1 = loop1〈c − 1〉 d and d′n = skip such that ∃j ∈ [1..n − 1] :
executed(e, [β ′j , d
′
j], e, [β
′
j+1, d
′
j+1]). I.e. we have that
∀j ∈ [1..n− 1] : ¬executed(e, [βj,′ d′j ], e, [β ′j+1, d′j+1])
but then we we also have that
∀j ∈ [1..n] : ¬enabled(e, [β ′j , d′j])
because reaching skip means either that e is executed or is never enabled, and
enabled(e, [β ′n, d
′
n]) is impossible since d
′
n = skip. Because we have chosen an
execution σ = [β1, d1]
x1−→ [β2, d2] x2−→ · · · with enabled(e, [βi, di]) (〈2〉7, 〈2〉12
and 〈3〉1) this is not an interesting situation, and we may safely assume 〈3〉14.
〈3〉15. ∃m ∈ N : t[m] = e
〈4〉1. Let: l.e = l
〈4〉2. ∃p ∈ N : (unionsqlt¯)[p] = e
Proof: 〈3〉14, def. of unionsqlt¯ (because e.l S©t¯[c − 1]  unionsqlt¯) and 〈4〉1 (because
l.e = l ⇔ e ∈ e.l)
〈4〉3. ∃p ∈ N : (e.l S©t)[p] = e
Proof: unionsqlt¯ = e.l S©t (by 〈3〉13) and 〈4〉2.
〈4〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: By 〈4〉3 and properties of e. , l. and S© such m must exist.
〈3〉16. ∃q ∈ N : q ≥ i ∧ xq = e
Proof: 〈2〉3, 〈2〉7, 〈2〉12 and 〈3〉15.
〈3〉17. executed(e, [βq, dq], e, [βq+1, dq+1])
Proof: 〈3〉16 and the assumption that all events are unique.
〈3〉18. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉17 contradict 〈2〉10.
〈2〉15. Case: d′ is a diagram with a high-level operator as its most signiﬁcant oper-
ator
〈3〉1. ∃x, β†, d† : executed(d′, [βi, di], x, [β†, d†])
Proof: 〈2〉12 and def. (8.23) of enabled .
〈3〉2. Let: x, β† and d† be such that executed(d′, [βi, di], x, [β†, d†])
Proof: By 〈3〉1 such x, β† and d† must exist.
〈3〉3. x ∈ T ∧ β† = βi
Proof: By 〈2〉15 and rule (8.6) this must be the case.
〈3〉4. Let: xi = x, βi+i = βi = β† and di+1 = d†
Proof: This not aﬀect t because, by 〈2〉3 and 〈2〉7, t = E S©tr(σ) and, by 〈3〉3,
xi = x ∈ T . By 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉6 we can use any σ and t′ that have the property
that tr(σ) = t′ and E S©t′ = t, and hence, by 〈3〉2 and 〈3〉3, we can safely do the
assumption that xi = x, βi+1 = βi and di+1 = d
†.
〈3〉5. executed(d′, [βi, di], xi, [βi+1, di+1])
Proof: 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3 and 〈3〉4.
〈3〉6. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈3〉5 contradicts 〈2〉10.
〈2〉16. Q.E.D.
Proof: Both 〈2〉14 and 〈2〉15 leads to contradictions, so 〈1〉2 is impossible.
〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
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Proof: Both 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2 are impossible, so we must have that there exists trace
t′ such that E S©t′ = t and [∅, loop1〈∞〉 d] produces t′.

The above soundness and completeness theorems are concerned with diagrams that
have only one inﬁnite loop, and the inﬁnite loop as the most signiﬁcant operator. In
the following we make some reﬂections on how these results carry over to other more
complex cases. There are three main cases that must be considered:
1. Combinations d1 op d2 where op is an simple operator and d1 or d2 or both
characterize inﬁnite behavior.
2. Inﬁnite loops inside other high-level operators.
3. The body d of an inﬁnite loop loop〈∞〉 d itself contains inﬁnite loops.
In the ﬁrst case, we have two simple sub-cases, and one more complicated. Consider
the diagram (loop〈∞〉 d1) strict (loop〈∞〉 d2). It is obvious that the left operand of the
strict will block the right operand, so that the diagram is semantically equivalent to
loop〈∞〉 d1. The other simple sub-case is the diagram (loop〈∞〉 d1) par (loop〈∞〉 d2),
which simply yields the merges of the traces of loop〈∞〉 d1 and loop〈∞〉 d2. The weak
fairness ensures that none of the par operands are starved inﬁnitely long. Soundness
and completeness considerations are then reduced to considerations of the oracle p in
the denotational deﬁnition of par with respect to our deﬁnition of weak fairness. The
complicated sub-case is the case of (loop〈∞〉 d1) seq (loop〈∞〉 d2). If we have that
ll.d2 ⊆ ll.d1 this is semantically equivalent to (loop〈∞〉 d1) strict (loop〈∞〉 d2). If, on
the other hand ll.d1∩ ll.d2 = ∅, the case is equivalent to (loop〈∞〉 d1) par (loop〈∞〉 d2).
The diﬃcult situation is when ll.d1 = ll.d2 and ll.d1 ∩ ll.d2 = ∅, because d1 will
block some, but not all of the lifelines, in d2. However, this means that the result of
(loop〈∞〉 d1) seq (loop〈∞〉 d2) is the behavior of loop〈∞〉 d1 merged with the behavior
of loop〈∞〉 d2 not blocked by loop〈∞〉 d1, which easily can be handled.
The case of a inﬁnite loop inside the high-level operators refuse, assert, alt and xalt
poses no problems as its result is just the execution of a silent event before execution
of the loop itself. The diagram loop〈n〉 (loop〈∞〉 d) is equivalent to loop〈∞〉 d, because
the ﬁrst iteration of the outer loop will block all subsequent iterations.
Finally, consider a diagram of the form loop〈∞〉 (d1 seq (loop〈∞〉 d2) seq d3). The
behavior characterized by this diagram is actually the same behavior as characterized
by a diagram d1 seq ((loop〈∞〉 d2) par (loop〈∞〉 (d′3 seq d′1)) where d′1 and d′3 are the
parts of d1 and d3 not blocked by loop〈∞〉 d2.
Because diagrams with nested inﬁnite loops can be reduced to diagrams without
nested inﬁnite loops, and because composition of diagrams with inﬁnite loop can be
accounted for, there are strong indications that the soundness and completeness results
carry over to these more complex situations.
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Appendix B
The normal form used in the “all
traces” execution strategy
In the “all traces” meta-strategy for execution of sequence diagrams deﬁned in sec-
tion 9.2, a normal form for the sequence diagrams is applied. This appendix provides
additional information on this normal form. In section B.1 we provides details on how
to obtain the normal of a diagram. In section B.2 we elaborate on the justiﬁcation for
using such a normal form. In section B.3, proofs of the equivalence of the normal form
are given.
B.1 Normal form for sequence diagrams
The normal form is such that xalts, if present, must be the most signiﬁcant operators
of the diagram. After xalts, alts are the most signiﬁcant, and after alts, the refuse
operator is the most signiﬁcant operator. Below these high-level operators, the simple
operators seq, par and strict may occur in any order. The “all traces” meta-strategy
is not deﬁned for the assert operator, so this operator is not part of the normal form.
Neither does the normal form have loops, but ﬁnite loops may be represented by the
weak sequencing operator seq as we will see below.
For a diagram that contains the operators seq, par, strict, xalt, alt, refuse and loop〈n〉
(ﬁnite loop), the normal from can be obtained by application of the 24 transformation
rules deﬁned below. The rules should be applied from left to right and should be
applied repeatedly until no more applications are possible.
1. loop〈n〉 d1 = d1 seq d1 seq · · · seq d1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
2. d1 alt (d2 xalt d3) = (d1 alt d2) xalt (d1 alt d3)
3. (d1 xalt d2) alt d3 = (d1 alt d3) xalt (d2 alt d3)
4. d1 par (d2 xalt d3) = (d1 par d2) xalt (d1 par d3)
5. (d1 xalt d2) par d3 = (d1 par d3) xalt (d2 par d3)
6. d1 seq (d2 xalt d3) = (d1 seq d2) xalt (d1 seq d3)
7. (d1 xalt d2) seq d3 = (d1 seq d3) xalt (d2 seq d3)
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8. d1 strict (d2 xalt d3) = (d1 strict d2) xalt (d1 strict d3)
9. (d1 xalt d2) strict d3 = (d1 strict d3) xalt (d2 strict d3)
10. refuse (d1 xalt d2) = (refuse d1) xalt (refuse d2)
11. d1 par (d2 alt d3) = (d1 par d2) alt (d1 par d3)
12. (d1 alt d2) par d3 = (d1 par d3) alt (d2 par d3)
13. d1 seq (d2 alt d3) = (d1 seq d2) alt (d1 seq d3)
14. (d1 alt d2) seq d3 = (d1 seq d3) alt (d2 seq d3)
15. d1 strict (d2 alt d3) = (d1 strict d2) alt (d1 strict d3)
16. (d1 alt d2) strict d3 = (d1 strict d3) alt (d2 strict d3)
17. refuse (d1 alt d2) = (refuse d1) alt (refuse d2)
18. refuse refuse d1 = refuse d1
19. d1 par refuse d2 = refuse (d1 par d2)
20. (refuse d1) par d2 = refuse (d1 par d2)
21. d1 seq refuse d2 = refuse (d1 seq d2)
22. (refuse d1) seq d2 = refuse (d1 seq d2)
23. d1 strict refuse d2 = refuse (d1 strict d2)
24. (refuse d1) strict d2 = refuse (d1 strict d2)
Each of these transformations preserves the semantics of the diagram being trans-
formed. This result is stated and proved as theorem 8 on page 332 in section B.3
below.
With respect to the constraint that an event syntactically should occur only once
in a diagram, we assume that events are implicitly given a unique identity (similar to
the handling of loop in section A.3) if they are duplicated in the transformation to the
normal form.
B.2 Justification for the normal form
Consider the diagram
d = (e1 alt e2) seq (e3 xalt e4)
where (for simplicity) the events e1, e2, e3, e4 are all on the same lifeline. The denotation
of d is:
[[ d ]] = {({〈e1, e3〉, 〈e2, e3〉}, ∅), ({〈e1, e4〉, 〈e2, e4〉}, ∅)}
The operational semantics gives us executions:
[β0, (e1 alt e2) seq (e3 xalt e4)]
τalt−→ [β0, ei seq (e3 xalt e4)]
ei−→ [β1, e3 xalt e4] τxalt−→ [β1, ej] ej−→ [β2, skip]
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with i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {3, 4}. If the meta-strategy for all traces is applied on this
diagram (without applying the normal form), the execution ﬁrst branches because of
the alt, and then the xalt makes a split of the interaction obligation for each of these
executions. Because of this we would get four interaction obligations:
{({〈e1, e3〉, 〈e2, e3〉}, ∅), ({〈e1, e4〉, 〈e2, e4〉}, ∅),
({〈e1, e3〉, 〈e2, e4〉}, ∅), ({〈e1, e4〉, 〈e2, e3〉}, ∅)}
By applying the normal form we avoid this.
B.3 Proofs of equivalence of the normal form
Definition 8 Let O,O′ ⊆ O be sets of interaction obligations and let p, p′, n, n′ ⊆ H
be trace sets. We then deﬁne , unionmulti and ¬ as follows:
O  O′ def= {o  o′ | o ∈ O ∧ o′ ∈ O′}
(p, n) unionmulti (p′, n′) def= (p ∪ p′, n ∪ n′)
O unionmultiO′ def= {o unionmulti o′ | o ∈ O ∧ o′ ∈ O′}
¬(p, n) def= (∅, p ∪ n)
¬O def= {¬o | o ∈ O}
Lemma 22 Let d1, d2 be diagrams. Then
1. [[ d1 seq d2 ]] = [[ d1 ]]  [[ d2 ]]
2. [[ d1 alt d2 ]] = [[ d1 ]] unionmulti [[ d2 ]]
3. [[ refuse d1 ]] = ¬[[ d1 ]]
Proof of lemma 22
〈1〉1. Prove: [[ d1 seq d2 ]] = [[ d1 ]]  [[ d2 ]]
Proof: [[ d1 seq d2 ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. seq)
= [[ d1 ]]  [[ d2 ]] (Def. )
〈1〉2. Prove: [[ d1 alt d2 ]] = [[ d1 ]] unionmulti [[ d2 ]]
Proof: [[ d1 alt d2 ]]
= {(p1 ∪ p2, n1 ∪ n2) | (p1, p2) ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ (p2, n2) ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. alt)
= {(p1, n1) unionmulti (p2, n2) | (p1, p2) ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ (p2, n2) ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. unionmulti)
= [[ d1 ]] unionmulti [[ d2 ]] (Def. unionmulti)
〈1〉3. Prove: [[ refuse d1 ]] = ¬[[ d1 ]]
Proof: [[ refuse d1 ]]
= {(∅, p ∪ n) | (p, n) ∈ [[ d1 ]]} (Def. refuse)
= {¬(p, n) | (p, n) ∈ [[ d1 ]]} (Def. ¬)
= ¬[[ d1 ]] (Def. ¬)
〈1〉4. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2 and 〈1〉3.

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Lemma 23 o1‖(o2 unionmulti o3) = (o1‖o2) unionmulti (o1‖o3)
Proof of lemma 23
Prove: o1‖(o2 unionmulti o3) = (o1‖o2) unionmulti (o1‖o3)
Proof: o1‖(o2 unionmulti o3)
= (p1, n1)‖((p2, n2) unionmulti (p3, n3))
= (p1, n1)‖(p2 ∪ p3, n2 ∪ n3) (Def. unionmulti)
= (p1‖(p2 ∪ p3),
n1‖(p2 ∪ p3) ∪ n1‖(n2 ∪ n3) ∪ p1‖(n2 ∪ n3)) (Def. ‖)
= (p1‖p2 ∪ p1‖p3,
n1‖p2 ∪ n1‖p3 ∪ n1‖n2 ∪ n1‖n3 ∪ p1‖n2 ∪ p1‖n3) (1)
= (p1‖p2 ∪ p1‖p3,
(n1‖p2 ∪ n1‖n2 ∪ p1‖n2) ∪ (n1‖p3 ∪ n1‖n3 ∪ p1‖n3)) (2)
= (p1‖p2, n1‖p2 ∪ n1‖n2 ∪ p1‖n2)
unionmulti (p1‖p3, n1‖p3 ∪ n1‖n3 ∪ p1‖n3) (Def. unionmulti)
= ((p1, n1)‖(p2, n2)) unionmulti ((p1, n1)‖(p3, n3)) (Def. ‖)
= (o1‖o2) unionmulti (o1‖o3)
Notes:
1. s1‖(s2 ∪ s3) = (s1‖s2) ∪ (s1‖s3) [70, Lemma 12].
2. Associativity and commutativity of ∪.

Lemma 24 o1  (o2 unionmulti o3) = (o1  o2) unionmulti (o1  o3)
Proof of lemma 24
Prove: o1  (o2 unionmulti o3) = (o1  o2) unionmulti (o1  o3)
Proof: o1  (o2 unionmulti o3)
= (p1, n1)  ((p2, n2) unionmulti (p3, n3))
= (p1, n1)  (p2 ∪ p3, n2 ∪ n3) (Def. unionmulti)
= (p1  (p2 ∪ p3),
n1  (p2 ∪ p3) ∪ n1  (n2 ∪ n3) ∪ p1  (n2 ∪ n3)) (Def. )
= (p1  p2 ∪ p1  p3,
n1  p2 ∪ n1  p3 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ p1  n2 ∪ p1  n3) (1)
= (p1  p2 ∪ p1  p3,
(n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2) ∪ (n1  p3 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ p1  n3)) (2)
= (p1  p2, n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2)
unionmulti (p1  p3, n1  p3 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ p1  n3) (Def. unionmulti)
= ((p1, n1)  (p2, n2)) unionmulti ((p1, n1)  (p3, n3)) (Def. )
= (o1  o2) unionmulti (o1  o3)
Notes:
1. s1  (s2 ∪ s3) = (s1  s2) ∪ (s1  s3) [70, Lemma 14].
2. Associativity and commutativity of ∪.

Lemma 25 (o1 unionmulti o2)  o3 = (o1  o3) unionmulti (o2  o3)
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Proof of lemma 25
Prove: (o1 unionmulti o2)  o3 = (o1  o3) unionmulti (o2  o3)
Proof: (o1 unionmulti o2)  o3)
= ((p1, n1) unionmulti (p2, n2))  (p3, n3))
= (p1 ∪ p2, n1 ∪ n2)  (p3, n3) (Def. unionmulti)
= ((p1 ∪ p2)  p3,
(n1 ∪ n2)  p3 ∪ (n1 ∪ n2)  n3 ∪ (p1 ∪ p2)  n3) (Def. )
= (p1  p3 ∪ p2  p3,
n1  p3 ∪ n2  p3 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ n2  n3 ∪ p1  n3 ∪ p2  n3) (1)
= (p1  p3 ∪ p2  p3,
(n1  p3 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ p1  n3) ∪ (n2  p3 ∪ n2  n3 ∪ p2  n3)) (2)
= (p1  p3, n1  p3 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ p1  n3)
unionmulti (p2  p3, n2  p3 ∪ n2  n3 ∪ p2  n3) (Def. unionmulti)
= ((p1, n1)  (p3, n3)) unionmulti ((p2, n2)  (p3, n3)) (Def. )
= (o1  o3) unionmulti (o2  o3)
Notes:
1. (s1 ∪ s2)  s3 = (s1  s3) ∪ (s2  s3) [70, Lemma 15].
2. Associativity and commutativity of ∪.

Lemma 26 s1  (s2 ∪ s3) = (s1  s2) ∪ (s1  s3)
Proof of lemma 26
Prove: s1  (s2 ∪ s3) = (s1  s2) ∪ (s1  s3)
Proof: s1  (s2 ∪ s3)
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1 ∈ s1, h2 ∈ (s2 ∪ s3) : h = h1h2} (Def. )
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : h1 ∈ s1 ∧ h2 ∈ (s2 ∪ s3) ∧ h = h1h2} (1)
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : h1 ∈ s1 ∧ (h2 ∈ s2 ∨ h2 ∈ s3) ∧ h = h1h2} (2)
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : (h1 ∈ s1 ∧ h2 ∈ s2 ∧ h = h1h2)
∨ (h1 ∈ s1 ∧ h2 ∈ s3 ∧ h = h1h2)} (3)
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : (h1 ∈ s1 ∧ h2 ∈ s2 ∧ h = h1h2)
∨ ∃h1, h2 : (h1 ∈ s1 ∧ h2 ∈ s3 ∧ h = h1h2)} (4)
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : (h1 ∈ s1 ∧ h2 ∈ s2 ∧ h = h1h2)}
∪ {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : (h1 ∈ s1 ∧ h2 ∈ s3 ∧ h = h1h2)} (5)
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1 ∈ s1, h2 ∈ s2 : h = h1h2)}
∪ {h ∈ H | ∃h1 ∈ s1, h2 ∈ s3 : h = h1h2)} (1)
= (s1  s2) ∪ (s1  s3) (Def. )
Notes:
1. ∃x ∈ X : P (x)⇔ ∃x : x ∈ X ∧ P (x).
2. Set theory: u ∈ A ∪B ⇔ u ∈ A ∨ u ∈ B.
3. DeMorgan: (A ∨B) ∧ C ⇔ (A ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ C).
4. Propositional logic: ∃x : A(x) ∨ B(x) ⇔ ∃x : A(x) ∨ ∃x : B(x).
5. Set theory: {x |φ1(x) ∨ φ2(x)} = {x |φ1(x)} ∪ {x |φ2(x)}.

Lemma 27 (s1 ∪ s2)  s3 = (s1  s3) ∪ (s2  s3)
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Proof of lemma 27
Prove: (s1 ∪ s2)  s3 = (s1  s3) ∪ (s2  s3)
Proof: (s1 ∪ s2)  s3
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1 ∈ (s1 ∪ s2), h2 ∈ s3 : h = h1h2} (Def. )
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : h1 ∈ (s1 ∪ s2) ∧ h2 ∈ s3 ∧ h = h1h2} (1)
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : (h1 ∈ s1 ∨ h1 ∈ s2) ∧ h2 ∈ s3 ∧ h = h1h2} (2)
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : (h1 ∈ s1 ∧ h2 ∈ s3 ∧ h = h1h2)
∨ (h1 ∈ s2 ∧ h2 ∈ s3 ∧ h = h1h2)} (3)
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : (h1 ∈ s1 ∧ h2 ∈ s3 ∧ h = h1h2)
∨ ∃h1, h2 : (h1 ∈ s2 ∧ h2 ∈ s3 ∧ h = h1h2)} (4)
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : (h1 ∈ s2 ∧ h2 ∈ s3 ∧ h = h1h2)}
∪ {h ∈ H | ∃h1, h2 : (h1 ∈ s2 ∧ h2 ∈ s3 ∧ h = h1h2)} (5)
= {h ∈ H | ∃h1 ∈ s1, h2 ∈ s3 : h = h1h2)}
∪ {h ∈ H | ∃h1 ∈ s2, h2 ∈ s3 : h = h1h2)} (1)
= (s1  s3) ∪ (s2  s3) (Def. )
Notes:
1. ∃x ∈ X : P (x)⇔ ∃x : x ∈ X ∧ P (x).
2. Set theory: u ∈ A ∪B ⇔ u ∈ A ∨ u ∈ B.
3. DeMorgan: (A ∨ B) ∧ C ⇔ (A ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ C).
4. Propositional logic: ∃x : A(x) ∨ B(x) ⇔ ∃x : A(x) ∨ ∃x : B(x).
5. Set theory: {x |φ1(x) ∨ φ2(x)} = {x |φ1(x)} ∪ {x |φ2(x)}.

Lemma 28 o1  (o2 unionmulti o3) = (o1  o2) unionmulti (o1  o3)
Proof of lemma 28
Prove: o1  (o2 unionmulti o3) = (o1  o2) unionmulti (o1  o3)
Proof: o1  (o2 unionmulti o3)
= (p1, n1)  ((p2, n2) unionmulti (p3, n3))
= (p1, n1)  (p2 ∪ p3, n2 ∪ n3) (Def. unionmulti)
= (p1  (p2 ∪ p3),
n1  (p2 ∪ p3) ∪ n1  (n2 ∪ n3) ∪ p1  (n2 ∪ n3)) (Def. )
= (p1  p2 ∪ p1  p3,
n1  p2 ∪ n1  p3 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ p1  n2 ∪ p1  n3) (1)
= (p1  p2 ∪ p1  p3,
(n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2) ∪ (n1  p3 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ p1  n3)) (2)
= (p1  p2, n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2)
unionmulti (p1  p3, n1  p3 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ p1  n3) (Def. unionmulti)
= ((p1, n1)  (p2, n2)) unionmulti ((p1, n1)  (p3, n3)) (Def. )
= (o1  o2) unionmulti (o1  o3)
Notes:
1. s1  (s2 ∪ s3) = (s1  s2) ∪ (s1  s3) (Lemma 26).
2. Associativity and commutativity of ∪.

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Lemma 29 (o1 unionmulti o2)  o3 = (o1  o3) unionmulti (o2  o3)
Proof of lemma 29
Prove: (o1 unionmulti o2)  o3 = (o1  o3) unionmulti (o2  o3)
Proof: (o1 unionmulti o2)  o3)
= ((p1, n1) unionmulti (p2, n2))  (p3, n3))
= (p1 ∪ p2, n1 ∪ n2)  (p3, n3) (Def. unionmulti)
= ((p1 ∪ p2)  p3,
(n1 ∪ n2)  p3 ∪ (n1 ∪ n2)  n3 ∪ (p1 ∪ p2)  n3) (Def. )
= (p1  p3 ∪ p2  p3,
n1  p3 ∪ n2  p3 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ n2  n3 ∪ p1  n3 ∪ p2  n3) (1)
= (p1  p3 ∪ p2  p3,
(n1  p3 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ p1  n3) ∪ (n2  p3 ∪ n2  n3 ∪ p2  n3)) (2)
= (p1  p3, n1  p3 ∪ n1  n3 ∪ p1  n3)
unionmulti (p2  p3, n2  p3 ∪ n2  n3 ∪ p2  n3) (Def. unionmulti)
= ((p1, n1)  (p3, n3)) unionmulti ((p2, n2)  (p3, n3)) (Def. )
= (o1  o3) unionmulti (o2  o3)
Notes:
1. (s1 ∪ s2)  s3 = (s1  s3) ∪ (s2  s3) (Lemma 27).
2. Associativity and commutativity of ∪.

Lemma 30 ¬(o1 unionmulti o2) = ¬o1 unionmulti ¬o2
Proof of lemma 30
Prove: ¬(o1 unionmulti o2) = ¬o1 unionmulti ¬o2
Proof: ¬(o1 unionmulti o2)
= ¬((p1, n1) unionmulti (p2, n2))
= ¬(p1 ∪ p2, n1 ∪ n2) (Def. unionmulti)
= (∅, p1 ∪ p2 ∪ n1 ∪ n2) (Def. ¬)
= (∅, (p1 ∪ n1) ∪ (p2 ∪ n2)) (1)
= (∅, p1 ∪ n1) unionmulti (∅, p2 ∪ n2) (Def. unionmulti)
= ¬(p1, n1) unionmulti ¬(p2, n2) (Def. ¬)
= ¬o1 unionmulti ¬o2
Notes:
1. Associativity and commutativity of ∪.

Lemma 31 ¬¬o = ¬o
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Proof of lemma 31
Prove: ¬¬o = ¬o
Proof: ¬¬o
= ¬¬(p, n)
= ¬(∅, p ∪ n) (Def. ¬)
= (∅, ∅ ∪ p ∪ n) (Def. ¬)
= (∅, p ∪ n)
= ¬(p, n) (Def. ¬)
= ¬o

Lemma 32 o1‖¬o2 = ¬(o1‖o2)
Proof of lemma 32
Prove: o1‖¬o2 = ¬(o1‖o2)
Proof: o1‖¬o2
= (p1, n1)‖¬(p2, n2)
= (p1, n1)‖(∅, p2 ∪ n2) (Def. ¬)
= (p1‖∅, n1‖∅ ∪ n1‖(p2 ∪ n2) ∪ p1‖(p2 ∪ n2)) (Def. ‖)
= (∅, n1‖(p2 ∪ n2) ∪ p1‖(p2 ∪ n2)) (1)
= (∅, n1‖p2 ∪ n1‖n2 ∪ p1‖p2 ∪ p1‖n2) (2)
= (∅, p1‖p2 ∪ n1‖p2 ∪ n1‖n2 ∪ p1‖n2) (3)
= ¬(p1‖p2, n1‖p2 ∪ n1‖n2 ∪ p1‖n2) (Def. ¬)
= ¬((p1, n1)‖(p2, n2)) (Def. ‖)
= ¬(o1‖o2)
Notes:
1. s‖∅ = ∅‖s = ∅.
2. s1‖(s2 ∪ s3) = (s1‖s2) ∪ (s1‖s3) [70, Lemma 12].
3. Associativity and commutativity of ∪.

Lemma 33 o1  ¬o2 = ¬(o1  o2)
Proof of lemma 33
Prove: o1  ¬o2 = ¬(o1  o2)
Proof: o1  ¬o2
= (p1, n1)  ¬(p2, n2)
= (p1, n1)  (∅, p2 ∪ n2) (Def. ¬)
= (p1  ∅, n1  ∅ ∪ n1  (p2 ∪ n2) ∪ p1  (p2 ∪ n2)) (Def. )
= (∅, n1  (p2 ∪ n2) ∪ p1  (p2 ∪ n2)) (1)
= (∅, n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  p2 ∪ p1  n2) (2)
= (∅, p1  p2 ∪ n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2) (3)
= ¬(p1  p2, n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2) (Def. ¬)
= ¬((p1, n1)  (p2, n2)) (Def. )
= ¬(o1  o2)
Notes:
1. s  ∅ = ∅  s = ∅.
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2. s1  (s2 ∪ s3) = (s1  s2) ∪ (s1  s3) [70, Lemma 14].
3. Associativity and commutativity of ∪.

Lemma 34 (¬o1)  o2 = ¬(o1  o2)
Proof of lemma 34
Prove: (¬o1)  o2 = ¬(o1  o2)
Proof: (¬o1)  o2
= (¬(p1, n1))  (p2, n2)
= (∅, p1 ∪ n1)  (p2, n2) (Def. ¬)
= (∅  p2, (p1 ∪ n1)  p2 ∪ (p1 ∪ n1)  n2 ∪ ∅  n2) (Def. )
= (∅, (p1 ∪ n1)  p2 ∪ (p1 ∪ n1)  n2) (1)
= (∅, p1  p2 ∪ n1  p2 ∪ p1  n2 ∪ n1  n2) (2)
= (∅, p1  p2 ∪ n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2) (3)
= ¬(p1  p2, n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2) (Def. ¬)
= ¬((p1, n1)  (p2, n2)) (Def. )
= ¬(o1  o2)
Notes:
1. s  ∅ = ∅  s = ∅.
2. (s1 ∪ s2)  s3 = (s1  s3) ∪ (s2  s3) [70, Lemma 15].
3. Associativity and commutativity of ∪.

Lemma 35 o1  ¬o2 = ¬(o1  o2)
Proof of lemma 35
Prove: o1  ¬o2 = ¬(o1  o2)
Proof: o1  ¬o2
= (p1, n1)  ¬(p2, n2)
= (p1, n1)  (∅, p2 ∪ n2) (Def. ¬)
= (p1  ∅, n1  ∅ ∪ n1  (p2 ∪ n2) ∪ p1  (p2 ∪ n2)) (Def. )
= (∅, n1  (p2 ∪ n2) ∪ p1  (p2 ∪ n2)) (1)
= (∅, n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  p2 ∪ p1  n2) (2)
= (∅, p1  p2 ∪ n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2) (3)
= ¬(p1  p2, n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2) (Def. ¬)
= ¬((p1, n1)  (p2, n2)) (Def. )
= ¬(o1  o2)
Notes:
1. s  ∅ = ∅  s = ∅.
2. s1  (s2 ∪ s3) = (s1  s2) ∪ (s1  s3) (Lemma 26).
3. Associativity and commutativity of ∪.

Lemma 36 (¬o1)  o2 = ¬(o1  o2)
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Proof of lemma 36
Prove: (¬o1)  o2 = ¬(o1  o2)
Proof: (¬o1)  o2
= (¬(p1, n1))  (p2, n2)
= (∅, p1 ∪ n1)  (p2, n2) (Def. ¬)
= (∅  p2, (p1 ∪ n1)  p2 ∪ (p1 ∪ n1)  n2 ∪ ∅  n2) (Def. )
= (∅, (p1 ∪ n1)  p2 ∪ (p1 ∪ n1)  n2) (1)
= (∅, p1  p2 ∪ n1  p2 ∪ p1  n2 ∪ n1  n2) (2)
= (∅, p1  p2 ∪ n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2) (3)
= ¬(p1  p2, n1  p2 ∪ n1  n2 ∪ p1  n2) (Def. ¬)
= ¬((p1, n1)  (p2, n2)) (Def. )
= ¬(o1  o2)
Notes:
1. s  ∅ = ∅  s = ∅.
2. (s1 ∪ s2)  s3 = (s1  s3) ∪ (s2  s3) (Lemma 27).
3. Associativity and commutativity of ∪.

Theorem 8 Given diagrams d1, d2, d3 we have the following equations:
1. [[ loop〈n〉 d1 ]] = [[ d1 seq d1 seq · · · seq d1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
]]
2. [[ d1 alt (d2 xalt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 alt d2) xalt (d1 alt d3) ]]
3. [[ (d1 xalt d2) alt d3 ]] = [[ (d1 alt d3) xalt (d2 alt d3) ]]
4. [[ d1 par (d2 xalt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 par d2) xalt (d1 par d3) ]]
5. [[ (d1 xalt d2) par d3 ]] = [[ (d1 par d3) xalt (d2 par d3) ]]
6. [[ d1 seq (d2 xalt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 seq d2) xalt (d1 seq d3) ]]
7. [[ (d1 xalt d2) seq d3 ]] = [[ (d1 seq d3) xalt (d2 seq d3) ]]
8. [[ d1 strict (d2 xalt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 strict d2) xalt (d1 strict d3) ]]
9. [[ (d1 xalt d2) strict d3 ]] = [[ (d1 strict d3) xalt (d2 strict d3) ]]
10. [[ refuse (d1 xalt d2) ]] = [[ (refuse d1) xalt (refuse d2) ]]
11. [[ d1 par (d2 alt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 par d2) alt (d1 par d3) ]]
12. [[ (d1 alt d2) par d3 ]] = [[ (d1 par d3) alt (d2 par d3) ]]
13. [[ d1 seq (d2 alt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 seq d2) alt (d1 seq d3) ]]
14. [[ (d1 alt d2) seq d3 ]] = [[ (d1 seq d3) alt (d2 seq d3) ]]
15. [[ d1 strict (d2 alt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 strict d2) alt (d1 strict d3) ]]
16. [[ (d1 alt d2) strict d3 ]] = [[ (d1 strict d3) alt (d2 strict d3) ]]
332
B.3 Proofs of equivalence of the normal form
17. [[ refuse (d1 alt d2) ]] = [[ (refuse d1) alt (refuse d2) ]]
18. [[ refuse refuse d1 ]] = [[ refuse d1 ]]
19. [[ d1 par refuse d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 par d2) ]]
20. [[ (refuse d1) par d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 par d2) ]]
21. [[ d1 seq refuse d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 seq d2) ]]
22. [[ (refuse d1) seq d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 seq d2) ]]
23. [[ d1 strict refuse d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 strict d2) ]]
24. [[ (refuse d1) strict d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 strict d2) ]]
Proof of theorem 8
〈1〉1. Prove: [[ loop〈n〉 d1 ]] = [[ d1 seq d1 seq · · · seq d1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
]]
Proof: [[ loop〈n〉 d1 ]]
= μn[[ d1 ]] (Def. loop)
= [[ d1 ]]  μn−1[[ d1 ]] (Def. μ)
= [[ d1 ]]  [[ d1 ]]  μn−2[[ d1 ]] (Def. μ)
...
= [[ d1 ]]  [[ d1 ]]  · · ·  [[ d1 ]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
 μ1[[ d1 ]] (Def. μ)
= [[ d1 ]]  [[ d1 ]]  · · ·  [[ d1 ]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
 [[ d1 ]] (Def. μ)
= [[ d1 ]]  [[ d1 ]]  · · ·  [[ d1 ]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
= [[ d1 seq d1 seq · · · seq d1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
]] (Lemma 22)
〈1〉2. Prove: [[ d1 alt (d2 xalt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 alt d2) xalt (d1 alt d3) ]]
Proof: [[ d1 alt (d2 xalt d3) ]]
= {o1 unionmulti o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 xalt d3 ]]} (Def. alt)
= {o1 unionmulti o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∪ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. xalt)
= {o1 unionmulti o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ (o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∨ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])} (1)
= {o1 unionmulti o2 | (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]])
∨ (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])} (2)
= {o1 unionmulti o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]}
∪ {o1 unionmulti o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (3)
= [[ d1 alt d2 ]] ∪ [[ d1 alt d3 ]] (Def. alt)
= [[ (d1 alt d2) xalt (d1 alt d3) ]] (Def. xalt)
Notes:
1. Set theory: u ∈ A ∪B ⇔ u ∈ A ∨ u ∈ B.
2. DeMorgan: A ∧ (B ∨ C) = (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C).
3. Set theory: {x |φ1(x) ∨ φ2(x)} = {x |φ1(x)} ∪ {x |φ2(x)}.
〈1〉3. Prove: [[ (d1 xalt d2) alt d3 ]] = [[ (d1 alt d3) xalt (d2 alt d3) ]]
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Proof: [[ (d1 xalt d2) alt d3 ]]
= [[ d3 alt (d1 xalt d2) ]] (1)
= [[ (d3 alt d1) xalt (d3 alt d2) ]] (〈1〉2)
= [[ (d1 alt d3) xalt (d2 alt d3) ]] (1)
Notes:
1. of alt [70, theorem 1].
〈1〉4. Prove: [[ d1 par (d2 xalt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 par d2) xalt (d1 par d3) ]]
Proof: [[ d1 par (d2 xalt d3) ]]
= {o1‖o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 xalt d3 ]]} (Def. par)
= {o1‖o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∪ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. xalt)
= {o1‖o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ (o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∨ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])} (1)
= {o1‖o2 | (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]])
∨ (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])} (2)
= {o1‖o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]}
∪ {o1‖o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (3)
= [[ d1 par d2 ]] ∪ [[ d1 par d3 ]] (Def. par)
= [[ (d1 par d2) xalt (d1 par d3) ]] (Def. xalt)
Notes:
1. Set theory: u ∈ A ∪B ⇔ u ∈ A ∨ u ∈ B.
2. DeMorgan: A ∧ (B ∨ C) = (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C).
3. Set theory: {x |φ1(x) ∨ φ2(x)} = {x |φ1(x)} ∪ {x |φ2(x)}.
〈1〉5. Prove: [[ (d1 xalt d2) par d3 ]] = [[ (d1 par d3) xalt (d2 par d3) ]]
Proof: [[ (d1 xalt d2) par d3 ]]
= [[ d3 par (d1 xalt d2) ]] (1)
= [[ (d3 par d1) xalt (d3 par d2) ]] (〈1〉4)
= [[ (d1 par d3) xalt (d2 par d3) ]] (1)
Notes:
1. Commutativity of par [70, theorem 5].
〈1〉6. Prove: [[ d1 seq (d2 xalt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 seq d2) xalt (d1 seq d3) ]]
Proof: [[ d1 seq (d2 xalt d3) ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 xalt d3 ]]} (Def. seq)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∪ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. xalt)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ (o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∨ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])} (1)
= {o1  o2 | (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]])
∨ (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])} (2)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]}
∪ {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (3)
= [[ d1 seq d2 ]] ∪ [[ d1 seq d3 ]] (Def. seq)
= [[ (d1 seq d2) xalt (d1 seq d3) ]] (Def. xalt)
Notes:
1. Set theory: u ∈ A ∪B ⇔ u ∈ A ∨ u ∈ B.
2. DeMorgan: A ∧ (B ∨ C) = (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C).
3. Set theory: {x |φ1(x) ∨ φ2(x)} = {x |φ1(x)} ∪ {x |φ2(x)}.
〈1〉7. Prove: [[ (d1 xalt d2) seq d3 ]] = [[ (d1 seq d3) xalt (d2 seq d3) ]]
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Proof: [[ (d1 xalt d2) seq d3 ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 xalt d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. seq)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∪ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. xalt)
= {o1  o2 | (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∨ o1 ∈ [[ d2 ]]) ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (1)
= {o1  o2 | (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])
∨ (o1 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])} (2)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]}
∪ {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (3)
= [[ d1 seq d3 ]] ∪ [[ d2 seq d3 ]] (Def. seq)
= [[ (d1 seq d3) xalt (d2 seq d3) ]] (Def. xalt)
Notes:
1. Set theory: u ∈ A ∪B ⇔ u ∈ A ∨ u ∈ B.
2. DeMorgan: (A ∨ B) ∧ C ⇔ (A ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ C).
3. Set theory: {x |φ1(x) ∨ φ2(x)} = {x |φ1(x)} ∪ {x |φ2(x)}.
〈1〉8. Prove: [[ d1 strict (d2 xalt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 strict d2) xalt (d1 strict d3) ]]
Proof: [[ d1 strict (d2 xalt d3) ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 xalt d3 ]]} (Def. strict)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∪ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. xalt)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ (o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∨ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])} (1)
= {o1  o2 | (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]])
∨ (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])} (2)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]}
∪ {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (3)
= [[ d1 strict d2 ]] ∪ [[ d1 strict d3 ]] (Def. strict)
= [[ (d1 strict d2) xalt (d1 strict d3) ]] (Def. xalt)
Notes:
1. Set theory: u ∈ A ∪B ⇔ u ∈ A ∨ u ∈ B.
2. DeMorgan: A ∧ (B ∨ C) = (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C).
3. Set theory: {x |φ1(x) ∨ φ2(x)} = {x |φ1(x)} ∪ {x |φ2(x)}.
〈1〉9. Prove: [[ (d1 xalt d2) strict d3 ]] = [[ (d1 strict d3) xalt (d2 strict d3) ]]
Proof: [[ (d1 xalt d2) strict d3 ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 xalt d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. strict)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∪ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. xalt)
= {o1  o2 | (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∨ o1 ∈ [[ d2 ]]) ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (1)
= {o1  o2 | (o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])
∨ (o1 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]])} (2)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]}
∪ {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (3)
= [[ d1 strict d3 ]] ∪ [[ d2 strict d3 ]] (Def. strict)
= [[ (d1 strict d3) xalt (d2 strict d3) ]] (Def. xalt)
Notes:
1. Set theory: u ∈ A ∪B ⇔ u ∈ A ∨ u ∈ B.
2. DeMorgan: (A ∨ B) ∧ C ⇔ (A ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ C).
3. Set theory: {x |φ1(x) ∨ φ2(x)} = {x |φ1(x)} ∪ {x |φ2(x)}.
〈1〉10. Prove: [[ refuse (d1 xalt d2) ]] = [[ (refuse d1) xalt (refuse d2) ]]
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Proof: [[ refuse (d1 xalt d2) ]]
= {(∅, p ∪ n) | (p, n) ∈ [[ d1 xalt d2 ]]} (Def. refuse)
= {(∅, p ∪ n) | (p, n) ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∪ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. xalt)
= {(∅, p ∪ n) | (p, n) ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∨ (p, n) ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (1)
= {(∅, p ∪ n) | (p, n) ∈ [[ d1 ]]}
∪ {(∅, p ∪ n) | (p, n) ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (2)
= [[ refuse d1 ]] ∪ [[ refuse d2 ]] (Def. refuse)
= [[ (refuse d1) xalt (refuse d2) ]] (Def. xalt)
Notes:
1. Set theory: u ∈ A ∪ B ⇔ u ∈ A ∨ u ∈ B.
2. Set theory: {x |φ1(x) ∨ φ2(x)} = {x |φ1(x)} ∪ {x |φ2(x)}.
〈1〉11. Prove: [[ d1 par (d2 alt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 par d2) alt (d1 par d3) ]]
Proof: [[ d1 par (d2 alt d3) ]]
= {o1‖o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 alt d3 ]]} (Def. par)
= {o1‖o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
o2 ∈ {o3 unionmulti o4 | o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]}} (Def. alt)
= {o1‖(o3 unionmulti o4) | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (1)
= {(o1‖o3) unionmulti (o1‖o4) | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Lemma 23)
= {o1‖o3 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]]}
unionmulti {o1‖o4 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. unionmulti)
= [[ d1 par d2 ]] unionmulti [[ d1 par d3 ]] (Def. par)
= [[ (d1 par d2) alt (d1 par d3) ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This can be shown using the set theory operation
∀u : [u ∈ {〈x1, . . . , xn〉 |φ(x1, . . . , xn, Y1, . . . , Ym)}
⇔ ∃x1, . . . , xn : u = 〈x1, . . . , xn, Y1, . . . , Ym〉 ∧ φ(x1, . . . , xn, Y1, . . . , Ym)] like
this:
{o1‖o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ {o3 unionmulti o4 | o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]}}
= {o1‖o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 = o3 unionmulti o4 ∧ o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]}
= {o1‖(o3 unionmulti o4) | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]}
〈1〉12. Prove: [[ (d1 alt d2) par d3 ]] = [[ (d1 par d3) alt (d2 par d3) ]]
Proof: [[ (d1 alt d2) par d3 ]]
= [[ d3 par (d1 alt d2) ]] (1)
= [[ (d3 par d1) alt (d3 par d2) ]] (〈1〉11)
= [[ (d1 par d3) alt (d2 par d3) ]] (1)
Notes:
1. Commutativity of par [70, theorem 5].
〈1〉13. Prove: [[ d1 seq (d2 alt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 seq d2) alt (d1 seq d3) ]]
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Proof: [[ d1 seq (d2 alt d3) ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 alt d3 ]]} (Def. seq)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
o2 ∈ {o3 unionmulti o4 | o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]}} (Def. alt)
= {o1  (o3 unionmulti o4) | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (1)
= {(o1  o3) unionmulti (o1  o4) | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Lemma 24)
= {o1  o3 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]]}
unionmulti {o1  o4 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. unionmulti)
= [[ d1 seq d2 ]] unionmulti [[ d1 seq d3 ]] (Def. seq)
= [[ (d1 seq d2) alt (d1 seq d3) ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This operation is the same as the one found in 〈1〉11.
〈1〉14. Prove: [[ (d1 alt d2) seq d3 ]] = [[ (d1 seq d3) alt (d2 seq d3) ]]
Proof: [[ (d1 alt d2) seq d3) ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 alt d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. seq)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ {o3 unionmulti o4 | o3 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} ∧
o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. alt)
= {(o3 unionmulti o4)  o2 | o3 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧
o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (1)
= {(o3  o2) unionmulti (o4  o2) | o3 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧
o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Lemma 25)
= {o3  o2 | o3 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]}
unionmulti {o4  o2 | o4 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. unionmulti)
= [[ d1 seq d3 ]] unionmulti [[ d2 seq d3 ]] (Def. seq)
= [[ (d1 seq d3) alt (d2 seq d3) ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This operation is the same as the one found in 〈1〉11.
〈1〉15. Prove: [[ d1 strict (d2 alt d3) ]] = [[ (d1 strict d2) alt (d1 strict d3) ]]
Proof: [[ d1 strict (d2 alt d3) ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 alt d3 ]]} (Def. strict)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
o2 ∈ {o3 unionmulti o4 | o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]}} (Def. alt)
= {o1  (o3 unionmulti o4) | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (1)
= {(o1  o3) unionmulti (o1  o4) | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧
o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Lemma 28)
= {o1  o3 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o3 ∈ [[ d2 ]]}
unionmulti {o1  o4 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. unionmulti)
= [[ d1 strict d2 ]] unionmulti [[ d1 strict d3 ]] (Def. strict)
= [[ (d1 strict d2) alt (d1 strict d3) ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This operation is the same as the one found in 〈1〉11.
〈1〉16. Prove: [[ (d1 alt d2) strict d3 ]] = [[ (d1 strict d3) alt (d2 strict d3) ]]
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Proof: [[ (d1 alt d2) strict d3) ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 alt d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. strict)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ {o3 unionmulti o4 | o3 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} ∧
o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. alt)
= {(o3 unionmulti o4)  o2 | o3 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧
o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (1)
= {(o3  o2) unionmulti (o4  o2) | o3 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o4 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧
o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Lemma 29)
= {o3  o2 | o3 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]}
unionmulti {o4  o2 | o4 ∈ [[ d2 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d3 ]]} (Def. unionmulti)
= [[ d1 strict d3 ]] unionmulti [[ d2 strict d3 ]] (Def. strict)
= [[ (d1 strict d3) alt (d2 strict d3) ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This operation is the same as the one found in 〈1〉11.
〈1〉17. Prove: [[ refuse (d1 alt d2) ]] = [[ (refuse d1) alt (refuse d2) ]]
Proof: [[ refuse (d1 alt d2) ]]
= {¬o | o ∈ [[ d1 alt d2 ]]} (Def. refuse)
= {¬o | o ∈ {o1 unionmulti o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]}} (Def. alt)
= {¬(o1 unionmulti o2) | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (1)
= {¬o1 unionmulti ¬o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Lemma 30)
= {¬o1 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]]} unionmulti {¬o2 | o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. unionmulti)
= [[ refuse d1 ]] unionmulti [[ refuse d2 ]] (Def. refuse)
= [[ (refuse d1) alt (refuse d2) ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This operation is the same as the one found in 〈1〉11.
〈1〉18. Prove: [[ refuse refuse d1 ]] = [[ refuse d1 ]]
Proof: [[ refuse refuse d1 ]]
= {¬o | o ∈ [[ refuse d1 ]]} (Def. refuse)
= {¬o | o ∈ {¬o′ | o′ ∈ [[ d1 ]]}} (Def. refuse)
= {¬¬o′ | o′ ∈ [[ d1 ]]} (1)
= {¬o′ | o′ ∈ [[ d1 ]]} (Lemma 31)
= ¬{o′ | o′ ∈ [[ d1 ]]} (Def. ¬)
= ¬[[ d1 ]]
= [[ refuse d1 ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This operation is the same as the one found in 〈1〉11.
〈1〉19. Prove: [[ d1 par refuse d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 par d2) ]]
Proof: [[ d1 par refuse d2 ]]
= {o1‖o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ refuse d2 ]]} (Def. par)
= {o1‖o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ {¬o | o ∈ [[ d2 ]]}} (Def. par)
= {o1‖¬o | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (1)
= {¬(o1‖o) | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Lemma 32)
= ¬{o1‖o | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. ¬)
= ¬[[ d1 par d2 ]] (Def. par)
= [[ refuse (d1 par d2) ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This operation is the same as the one found in 〈1〉11.
〈1〉20. Prove: [[ (refuse d1) par d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 par d2) ]]
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Proof: [[ (refuse d1) par d2 ]]
= [[ d2 par refuse d1 ]] (1)
= [[ refuse (d2 par d1) ]] (〈1〉20)
= [[ refuse (d1 par d2) ]] (1)
Notes:
1. Commutativety of par [70, theorem 5].
〈1〉21. Prove: [[ d1 seq refuse d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 seq d2) ]]
Proof: [[ d1 seq refuse d2 ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ refuse d2 ]]} (Def. seq)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ {¬o | o ∈ [[ d2 ]]}} (Def. seq)
= {o1  ¬o | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (1)
= {¬(o1  o) | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Lemma 33)
= ¬{o1  o | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. ¬)
= ¬[[ d1 seq d2 ]] (Def. seq)
= [[ refuse (d1 seq d2) ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This operation is the same as the one found in 〈1〉11.
〈1〉22. Prove: [[ (refuse d1) seq d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 seq d2) ]]
Proof: [[ (refuse d1) seq d2 ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ refuse d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. seq)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ {¬o | o ∈ [[ d2 ]]} ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. seq)
= {(¬o)  o2 | o ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (1)
= {¬(o  o2) | o ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Lemma 34)
= ¬{o  o2 | o ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. ¬)
= ¬[[ d1 seq d2 ]] (Def. seq)
= [[ refuse (d1 seq d2) ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This operation is the same as the one found in 〈1〉11.
〈1〉23. Prove: [[ d1 strict refuse d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 strict d2) ]]
Proof: [[ d1 strict refuse d2 ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ refuse d2 ]]} (Def. strict)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ {¬o | o ∈ [[ d2 ]]}} (Def. strict)
= {o1  ¬o | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (1)
= {¬(o1  o) | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Lemma 35)
= ¬{o1  o | o1 ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. ¬)
= ¬[[ d1 strict d2 ]] (Def. strict)
= [[ refuse (d1 strict d2) ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This operation is the same as the one found in 〈1〉11.
〈1〉24. Prove: [[ (refuse d1) strict d2 ]] = [[ refuse (d1 strict d2) ]]
339
The normal form used in the “all traces” execution strategy
Proof: [[ (refuse d1) strict d2 ]]
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ [[ refuse d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. strict)
= {o1  o2 | o1 ∈ {¬o | o ∈ [[ d2 ]]} ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. strict)
= {(¬o)  o2 | o ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (1)
= {¬(o  o2) | o ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Lemma 36)
= ¬{o  o2 | o ∈ [[ d1 ]] ∧ o2 ∈ [[ d2 ]]} (Def. ¬)
= ¬[[ d1 strict d2 ]] (Def. strict)
= [[ refuse (d1 strict d2) ]] (Lemma 22)
Notes:
1. This operation is the same as the one found in 〈1〉11.
〈1〉25. Q.E.D.
Proof: 〈1〉1-〈1〉24.

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Appendix C
Maude implementation of the
operational semantics
This appendix provides all the details of the implementation of the operational seman-
tics presented in chapter 10. Section C.1 contains the implementation of the syntax
presented in section 5.2, section C.2 contains the implementation of the operational
semantics presented in chapter 8, and section C.3 contains the implementation of the
meta-strategies presented in chapter 9.
C.1 Syntax
fmod LIFELINE is
sorts LLName Lifeline Gate .
subsort Gate < Lifeline .
op l : LLName -> Lifeline [ctor] .
op g : LLName -> Gate [ctor] .
endfm
fmod LLSET is
including LIFELINE .
including NAT .
sort LLSet .
subsort Lifeline < LLSet .
op emptyLLSet : -> LLSet [ctor] .
op _;_ : LLSet LLSet -> LLSet [ctor assoc comm id: emptyLLSet] .
op _in_ : Lifeline LLSet -> Bool .
op intersect : LLSet LLSet -> LLSet .
op _\_ : LLSet Lifeline -> LLSet .
op _\_ : LLSet LLSet -> LLSet .
vars L L’ : Lifeline .
vars LS LS’ : LLSet .
eq L ; L = L .
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eq L in emptyLLSet = false .
eq L in (L’ ; LS) =
if L == L’ then
true
else
L in LS
fi .
eq intersect(emptyLLSet, LS) = emptyLLSet .
eq intersect(L ; LS, LS’) =
(if L in LS’ then L else emptyLLSet fi) ;
intersect(LS, LS’) .
eq LS \ emptyLLSet = LS .
ceq LS \ (L ; LS’) = (LS \ L) \ LS’ if LS’ =/= emptyLLSet .
eq (L ; LS) \ L’ =
if L == L’ then
LS
else
L ; (LS \ L’)
fi .
eq emptyLLSet \ L = emptyLLSet .
endfm
fmod MESSAGE is
including LIFELINE .
sorts Signal Msg .
op (_,_,_) : Signal Lifeline Lifeline -> Msg [ctor] .
ops tr re : Msg -> Lifeline .
var S : Signal .
vars T R L : Lifeline .
eq tr(S, T, R) = T .
eq re(S, T, R) = R .
endfm
fmod EVENT is
including MESSAGE .
sorts Event EventKind SEvent SEventKind .
subsort SEvent < Event .
ops ! ? : -> EventKind [ctor] .
op (_,_) : EventKind Msg -> Event [ctor] .
op tau : SEventKind -> SEvent [ctor] .
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op k : Event -> EventKind .
op m : Event -> Msg .
ops tr re l l-1 : Event -> Lifeline .
var M : Msg .
var K : EventKind .
eq k(K,M) = K .
eq m(K,M) = M .
eq tr(K,M) = tr(M) .
eq re(K,M) = re(M) .
ceq l(K,M) = tr(M) if K = ! .
ceq l(K,M) = re(M) if K = ? .
ceq l-1(K,M) = re(M) if K = ! .
ceq l-1(K,M) = tr(M) if K = ? .
endfm
fmod SD-SYNTAX is
including EVENT .
including LLSET .
sort SD .
subsort Event < SD .
op skip : -> SD [ctor] .
op _seq_ : SD SD -> SD [ctor assoc prec 20] .
op _strict_ : SD SD -> SD [ctor assoc prec 25] .
op _par_ : SD SD -> SD [ctor assoc comm prec 30] .
op ll : SD -> LLSet .
op gates : SD -> LLSet .
vars D D’ : SD .
var E : Event .
eq D par skip = D .
eq skip seq D = D .
eq D seq skip = D .
eq D strict skip = D .
eq skip strict D = D .
eq ll(skip) = emptyLLSet .
eq ll(E) = l(E) .
eq ll(D seq D’) = ll(D) ; ll(D’) .
eq ll(D par D’) = ll(D) ; ll(D’) .
eq ll(D strict D’) = ll(D) ; ll(D’) .
eq gates(skip) = emptyLLSet .
eq gates(E) = if l-1(E) :: Gate then l-1(E) else emptyLLSet fi .
eq gates(D seq D’) = gates(D) ; gates(D’) .
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eq gates(D par D’) = gates(D) ; gates(D’) .
eq gates(D strict D’) = gates(D) ; gates(D’) .
endfm
fmod EXTENSION-ALT is
including SD-SYNTAX .
op _alt_ : SD SD -> SD [ctor assoc comm prec 35] .
op opt_ : SD -> SD [ctor prec 15] .
op alt : -> SEventKind [ctor] .
vars D D’ : SD .
eq skip alt skip = skip .
eq opt D = D alt skip .
eq ll(D alt D’) = ll(D) ; ll(D’) .
eq gates(D alt D’) = gates(D) ; gates(D’) .
endfm
fmod EXTENSION-XALT is
including SD-SYNTAX .
op _xalt_ : SD SD -> SD [ctor assoc comm prec 40] .
op xalt : -> SEventKind [ctor] .
vars D D’ : SD .
eq skip xalt skip = skip .
eq ll(D xalt D’) = ll(D) ; ll(D’) .
eq gates(D xalt D’) = gates(D) ; gates(D’) .
endfm
fmod EXTENSION-REFUSE is
including SD-SYNTAX .
including EXTENSION-ALT .
op refuse_ : SD -> SD [ctor prec 1] .
op refuse : -> SEventKind [ctor] .
op neg_ : SD -> SD [ctor prec 10] .
var D : SD .
eq neg D = refuse D alt skip .
eq ll(refuse D) = ll(D) .
eq gates(refuse D) = gates(D) .
endfm
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fmod EXTENSION-ASSERT is
including SD-SYNTAX .
op assert_ : SD -> SD [ctor prec 5] .
op assert : -> SEventKind [ctor] .
var D : SD .
eq ll(assert D) = ll(D) .
eq gates(assert D) = gates(D) .
endfm
fmod NAT-SET is
including NAT .
sort NatSet .
subsort Nat < NatSet .
op emptyNatSet : -> NatSet [ctor] .
op _,_ : NatSet NatSet -> NatSet [ctor assoc comm id: emptyNatSet] .
op toSet : Nat Nat -> NatSet .
vars N N’ : Nat .
var NS : NatSet .
eq N , N = N .
ceq toSet(N,N’) = N , toSet(s N, N’) if N <= N’ .
ceq toSet(N,N’) = emptyNatSet if N > N’ .
endfm
fmod EXTENSION-LOOP is
including SD-SYNTAX .
including NAT-SET .
including EXTENSION-ALT .
op loop{_}_ : NatSet SD -> SD [ctor prec 7] .
op loop<_>_ : Nat SD -> SD [ctor prec 7] .
op loop(_,_)_ : Nat Nat SD -> SD [ctor prec 7] .
op loop : -> SEventKind [ctor] .
var D : SD .
vars N N’ : Nat .
var I : NatSet .
eq loop< 0 > D = skip .
eq loop(N,N’) D = loop{toSet(N,N’)} D .
eq loop{emptyNatSet} D = skip .
eq loop{N} D = loop< N > D .
ceq loop{N , I} D = loop< N > D alt loop{I} D if I =/= emptyNatSet .
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eq ll(loop< N > D) = ll(D) .
eq gates(loop< N > D) = gates(D) .
endfm
fmod SD-FULL-SYNTAX is
including SD-SYNTAX .
including EXTENSION-ALT .
including EXTENSION-XALT .
including EXTENSION-REFUSE .
including EXTENSION-ASSERT .
including EXTENSION-LOOP .
endfm
C.2 Operational semantics
C.2.1 Communication medium
fmod COMMUNICATION is
including MESSAGE .
including SD-FULL-SYNTAX .
sort Comm .
op emptyComm : -> Comm [ctor] .
ops add rm : Comm Msg -> Comm .
op ready : Comm Msg -> Bool .
op initC : SD -> Comm .
endfm
fmod ONE-FIFO-MESSAGE is
including COMMUNICATION .
subsort Msg < Comm .
op _::_ : Comm Comm -> Comm [ctor assoc comm id: emptyComm] .
vars M M’ : Msg .
var B : Comm .
vars D1 D2 : SD .
var N : Nat .
var E : Event .
eq add(B,M) = B :: M .
eq rm(emptyComm, M) = emptyComm .
eq rm(M :: B, M) = B .
ceq rm(M :: B, M’) = M :: rm(B,M’) if M =/= M’ .
eq ready(emptyComm, M) = false .
eq ready(M :: B, M’) = (M == M’) or ready(B,M’) .
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eq initC(skip) = emptyComm .
ceq initC(E) = emptyComm if k(E) == ! or not tr(E) :: Gate .
ceq initC(E) = m(E) if k(E) == ? and tr(E) :: Gate .
eq initC(D1 seq D2) = initC(D1) :: initC(D2) .
eq initC(D1 par D2) = initC(D1) :: initC(D2) .
eq initC(D1 strict D2) = initC(D1) :: initC(D2) .
eq initC(D1 alt D2) = initC(D1) :: initC(D2) .
eq initC(D1 xalt D2) = initC(D1) :: initC(D2) .
eq initC(refuse D1) = initC(D1) .
eq initC(assert D1) = initC(D1) .
eq initC(loop< s N > D1) = initC(D1) :: initC(loop< N > D1) .
endfm
fmod ONE-FIFO-PAIR-LIFELINES is
including COMMUNICATION .
sort Channel .
sort Fifo .
subsort Msg < Fifo .
subsort Channel < Comm .
op emptyFifo : -> Fifo [ctor] .
op _::_ : Fifo Fifo -> Fifo [ctor assoc id: emptyFifo] .
op _,_:_ : Lifeline Lifeline Fifo -> Channel [ctor] .
op _;_ : Comm Comm -> Comm [ctor assoc comm id: emptyComm] .
op _<<_ : Comm Channel -> Comm .
op _<<_ : Comm Comm -> Comm .
vars T T’ R R’ : Lifeline .
vars B B’ : Fifo .
vars C C’ : Comm .
vars M M’ : Msg .
vars D1 D2 : SD .
var N : Nat .
var E : Event .
eq emptyComm << (T,R : B) = T,R : B .
eq ((T,R : B) ; C) << (T,R : B’) = (T,R : B :: B’) ; C .
ceq ((T,R : B) ; C) << (T’,R’ : B’) = (T,R : B) ; (C << (T’,R’ : B’))
if T =/= T’ or R =/= R’ .
eq C << emptyComm = C .
ceq C << ((T,R : B) ; C’) = (C << (T,R : B)) << C’
if C’ =/= emptyComm .
eq add(C,M) = C << (tr(M),re(M) : M) .
eq rm((T,R : M :: B) ; C , M’) =
if tr(M) == T and re(M) == R and M == M’ then
(T,R : B) ; C
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else
(T,R : M :: B) ; rm(C,M’)
fi .
eq ready (emptyComm,M) = false .
eq ready((T,R : M :: B) ; C, M’) = (tr(M) == T and re(M) == R and M == M’)
or ready(C,M’) .
eq initC(skip) = emptyComm .
ceq initC(E) = emptyComm if k(E) == ! or not tr(E) :: Gate .
ceq initC(E) = tr(E),re(E) : m(E) if k(E) == ? and tr(E) :: Gate .
eq initC(D1 seq D2) = initC(D1) << initC(D2) .
eq initC(D1 par D2) = initC(D1) << initC(D2) .
eq initC(D1 strict D2) = initC(D1) << initC(D2) .
eq initC(D1 alt D2) = initC(D1) << initC(D2) .
eq initC(D1 xalt D2) = initC(D1) << initC(D2) .
eq initC(refuse D1) = initC(D1) .
eq initC(assert D1) = initC(D1) .
eq initC(loop< s N > D1) = initC(D1) << initC(loop< N > D1) .
endfm
fmod ONE-FIFO-LIFELINE is
including COMMUNICATION .
sort Channel .
sort Fifo .
subsort Msg < Fifo .
subsort Channel < Comm .
op emptyFifo : -> Fifo [ctor] .
op _::_ : Fifo Fifo -> Fifo [ctor assoc id: emptyFifo] .
op _:_ : Lifeline Fifo -> Channel [ctor] .
op _;_ : Comm Comm -> Comm [ctor assoc comm id: emptyComm] .
op _<<_ : Comm Channel -> Comm .
op _<<_ : Comm Comm -> Comm .
vars L L’ : Lifeline .
vars F F’ : Fifo .
var B : Comm .
vars M M’ : Msg .
vars D1 D2 : SD .
var N : Nat .
var E : Event .
eq L : emptyFifo = emptyComm .
eq emptyComm << (L : F) = L : F .
eq ((L : F) ; B) << (L : F’) = (L : F :: F’) ; B .
ceq ((L : F) ; B) << (L’ : F’) = (L : F) ; (B << (L’ : F’))
if L =/= L’ .
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eq add(B,M) = B << (re(M) : M) .
eq rm(emptyComm, M) = emptyComm .
eq rm((L : (M :: F)) ; B, M’) =
if re(M) == L and M == M’ then
(L : F) ; B
else
(L : (M :: F)) ; rm(B, M’)
fi .
eq ready(emptyComm, M) = false .
eq ready((L : (M :: F)) ; B, M’) = (re(M) == L and M == M’)
or ready(B,M’) .
endfm
fmod GLOBAL-FIFO is
including COMMUNICATION .
subsort Msg < Comm .
op _::_ : Comm Comm -> Comm [ctor assoc id: emptyComm] .
vars M M’ : Msg .
var B : Comm .
eq add(B,M) = B :: M .
eq rm(emptyComm, M) = emptyComm .
eq rm(M :: B, M) = B .
ceq rm(M :: B, M’) = M :: B if M =/= M’ .
eq ready(emptyComm, M) = false .
eq ready(M :: B, M’) = (M == M’) .
endfm
C.2.2 Projection system
fmod PI is
including SD-SYNTAX .
including COMMUNICATION .
sort Pi .
op PI : LLSet Comm SD -> Pi [ctor] .
op {_}_ : Event Pi -> Pi [ctor] .
endfm
mod PI-SIMPLE is
including PI .
vars D1 D1’ D2 D2’ : SD .
var E : Event .
vars L L’ : LLSet .
var B : Comm .
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crl [PI-event] :
PI(L, B, E) => {E}PI(L, B, skip)
if l(E) in L /\
k(E) == ! or ready(B,m(E)) .
crl [PI-seq-left] :
PI(L, B, D1 seq D2) => {E}PI(L, B, D1’ seq D2)
if intersect(ll(D1),L) =/= emptyLLSet /\
PI(intersect(ll(D1),L), B, D1) => {E}PI(L’, B, D1’) .
crl [PI-seq-right] :
PI(L, B, D1 seq D2) => {E}PI(L, B, D1 seq D2’)
if L \ ll(D1) =/= emptyLLSet /\
PI(L \ ll(D1), B, D2) => {E}PI(L’, B, D2’) .
crl [PI-par] :
PI(L, B, D1 par D2) => {E}PI(L, B, D1’ par D2)
if PI(intersect(ll(D1),L), B, D1) => {E}PI(L’, B, D1’) .
crl [PI-strict] :
PI(L, B, D1 strict D2) => {E}PI(L, B, D1’ strict D2)
if intersect(ll(D1), L) =/= emptyLLSet /\
PI(intersect(ll(D1), L), B, D1) => {E}PI(L’, B, D1’) .
endm
mod PI-ALT is
including PI .
including EXTENSION-ALT .
vars D1 D2 : SD .
var L : LLSet .
var B : Comm .
crl [PI-alt] :
PI(L, B, D1 alt D2) => {tau(alt)}PI(L, B, D1)
if intersect(ll(D1 alt D2), L) =/= emptyLLSet .
endm
mod PI-XALT is
including PI .
including EXTENSION-XALT .
vars D1 D2 : SD .
var L : LLSet .
var B : Comm .
crl [PI-xalt] :
PI(L, B, D1 xalt D2) => {tau(xalt)}PI(L, B, D1)
if intersect(ll(D1 alt D2), L) =/= emptyLLSet .
endm
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mod PI-REFUSE is
including PI .
including EXTENSION-REFUSE .
var D : SD .
var L : LLSet .
var B : Comm .
crl [PI-refuse] :
PI(L, B, refuse D) => {tau(refuse)}PI(L, B, D)
if intersect(ll(refuse D), L) =/= emptyLLSet .
endm
mod PI-ASSERT is
including PI .
including EXTENSION-ASSERT .
var D : SD .
var L : LLSet .
var B : Comm .
crl [PI-assert] :
PI(L, B, assert D) => {tau(assert)}PI(L, B, D)
if intersect(ll(assert D), L) =/= emptyLLSet .
endm
mod PI-LOOP is
including PI .
including EXTENSION-LOOP .
var D : SD .
var L : LLSet .
var B : Comm .
var N : Nat .
crl [PI-loop-dec] :
PI(L, B, loop< s N > D) => {tau(loop)}PI(L, B, D seq loop< N > D)
if intersect(ll(loop< s N > D), L) =/= emptyLLSet .
endm
mod PI-FULL is
including PI-SIMPLE .
including PI-ALT .
including PI-XALT .
including PI-REFUSE .
including PI-ASSERT .
including PI-LOOP .
endm
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C.2.3 Execution system
fmod EXEC is
including PI .
sort Exec .
op {_}_ : Event Exec -> Exec [ctor] .
op init : SD -> Exec .
op update : Comm Event -> Comm .
var B : Comm .
var E : Event .
ceq update(B,E) =
(if k(E) == ! then
add(B,m(E))
else
rm(B,m(E))
fi)
if not E :: SEvent .
ceq update(B,E) = B if E :: SEvent .
endfm
mod EXECUTION is
including EXEC .
op [_,_] : Comm SD -> Exec [ctor] .
var B : Comm .
vars D D’ : SD .
var E : Event .
var L : LLSet .
eq init(D) = [initC(D), D] .
crl [execute] :
[B, D] => {E}[update(B,E), D’]
if PI(ll(D), B, D) => {E}PI(L, B, D’) .
endm
C.3 Meta-strategies
fmod TRACE is
including EVENT .
sort SDTrace .
subsort Event < SDTrace .
op emptyTrace : -> SDTrace [ctor] .
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op _._ : SDTrace SDTrace -> SDTrace [ctor assoc id: emptyTrace] .
endfm
mod TRACES-COMMON is
including META-LEVEL .
including EXEC .
op mod : -> Module .
op getExec : Substitution -> Exec .
op getEvent : Substitution -> Event .
op getComm : Substitution -> Comm .
op getDiagram : Substitution -> SD .
op external : Event LLSet -> Bool .
op error : -> [Exec] .
op error : -> [Event] .
op error : -> [SD] .
op error : -> [Comm] .
var S : Substitution .
var TERM : Term .
var V : Variable .
var EV : Event .
var L : LLSet .
ceq getExec(S ; V <- TERM) = downTerm(TERM, (error).Exec)
if V == ’E:Exec .
ceq getExec(S ; V <- TERM) = getExec(S) if V =/= ’E:Exec .
ceq getComm(S ; V <- TERM) = downTerm(TERM, (error).Comm)
if V == ’B:Comm .
ceq getComm(S ; V <- TERM) = getComm(S) if V =/= ’B:Comm .
ceq getDiagram(S ; V <- TERM) = downTerm(TERM, (error).SD)
if V == ’D’:SD .
ceq getDiagram(S ; V <- TERM) = getDiagram(S) if V =/= ’D’:SD .
ceq getEvent(S ; V <- TERM) = downTerm(TERM, (error).Event)
if V == ’F:Event .
ceq getEvent(S ; V <- TERM) = getEvent(S) if V =/= ’F:Event .
eq external(EV, L) = (l(EV) in L) or (l-1(EV) in L) .
endm
C.3.1 One trace with mode
mod META-EXEC-MODE is
including EXEC .
including TRACE .
sort Meta .
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sort Mode .
op <_,_,_,_> : SDTrace Exec LLSet Mode -> Meta [ctor] .
op mode : SEvent Mode -> Mode .
endm
mod DEFAULT-MODE is
including META-EXEC-MODE .
ops positive negative : -> Mode [ctor] .
var T : SEvent .
var MO : Mode .
ceq mode(T,MO) = positive if MO == positive /\ T =/= tau(refuse) .
ceq mode(T,MO) = negative if MO == negative or T == tau(refuse) .
endm
fmod MYRANDOM is
protecting RANDOM .
op ran : Nat Nat Nat -> Nat .
vars N M K R MAX : Nat .
ceq ran(N, M, K) = N + ((sd(N,M) + 1) * R) quo MAX
if R := random(K) /\
MAX := 4294967295 .
endfm
mod EXTERNAL-TRACE-MODE is
including META-EXEC-MODE .
including SD-FULL-SYNTAX .
var T : SDTrace .
var E : Event .
vars V V’ : Exec .
var L : LLSet .
vars M M’ : Mode .
var D : SD .
var B : Comm .
var TAU : SEvent .
crl < T, V, L, M > => < T . E , V’, L, M >
if V => {E}V’ /\
not E :: SEvent /\
(l(E) in L or l-1(E) in L) .
crl < T, V, L, M > => < T, V’, L, M >
if V => {E}V’ /\
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not E :: SEvent /\
not l(E) in L /\
not l-1(E) in L .
crl < T , V, L, M > => < T, V’, L, mode(TAU,M) >
if V => {TAU}V’ .
endm
mod RESULT-LIST is
including META-LEVEL .
sort ResultList TraceAndMode .
subsort ResultTriple < ResultList .
op emptyRL : -> ResultList [ctor] .
op _::_ : ResultList ResultList -> ResultList [ctor assoc id: emptyRL] .
op length : ResultList -> Nat .
op _[_] : ResultList Nat -> ResultTriple .
var R3 : ResultTriple .
var RL : ResultList .
var N : Nat .
eq length(emptyRL) = 0 .
eq length(R3 :: RL) = s length(RL) .
eq (R3 :: RL)[1] = R3 .
ceq (R3 :: RL)[s N] = RL[N] if N > 0 .
endm
mod RANDOM-TRACE is
including META-EXEC-MODE .
including DEFAULT-MODE .
including RESULT-LIST .
including MYRANDOM .
including TRACES-COMMON .
including PI-FULL .
op {_|_} : SDTrace Mode -> TraceAndMode [ctor] .
op randomTrace : Exec LLSet Nat -> TraceAndMode .
op exec : Meta Nat -> TraceAndMode .
op getExecs : Exec Nat -> ResultList .
var RL : ResultList .
var R3? : ResultTriple? .
vars N K R : Nat .
var X : Exec .
var L : LLSet .
var T : SDTrace .
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var M : Mode .
var EV : Event .
var TAU : SEvent .
eq randomTrace(X, L, N) = exec( < emptyTrace, X, L, positive > , N ) .
ceq exec( < T , X , L , M > , N ) =
if K == 0 then
{T | M}
else
exec( < (if not (EV :: SEvent) and external(EV, L) then
T . EV
else
T
fi),
getExec(getSubstitution(RL[R])),
L,
(if EV :: SEvent then
mode(EV, M)
else
M
fi) > , s N)
fi
if RL := getExecs(X, 0) /\
K := length(RL) /\
R := if K == 0 then 0 else ran(1,K,N) fi /\
EV := if K == 0 then tau(loop)
else getEvent(getSubstitution(RL[R])) fi .
ceq getExecs(X, N) =
if R3? :: ResultTriple then
R3? :: getExecs(X, s N)
else
emptyRL
fi
if R3? := metaSearch(mod, upTerm(X), ’‘{_‘}_[’F:Event,’E:Exec],
nil, ’+, 1, N) .
endm
C.3.2 All traces
mod META-EXEC is
including EXEC .
including TRACE .
sort Meta .
op {|_,_,_|} : SDTrace Exec LLSet -> Meta [ctor] .
endm
mod SEMANTICS is
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including TRACE .
sort TraceSet .
sort InteractionObligation .
sort IOSet .
subsort SDTrace < TraceSet .
subsort InteractionObligation < IOSet .
op emptyTSet : -> TraceSet [ctor] .
op _+_ : TraceSet TraceSet -> TraceSet [ctor assoc comm id: emptyTSet] .
op _in_ : SDTrace TraceSet -> Bool .
op subseteq : TraceSet TraceSet -> Bool .
op (_,_) : TraceSet TraceSet -> InteractionObligation [ctor] .
op emptyIOSet : -> IOSet [ctor] .
op _&_ : IOSet IOSet -> IOSet [ctor assoc comm id: emptyIOSet] .
vars T T’ : SDTrace .
vars TS P N TS’ : TraceSet .
var O : InteractionObligation .
eq T in emptyTSet = false .
eq T in (T’ + TS) =
if T == T’ then
true
else
T in TS
fi .
eq T + T = T .
eq O & O = O .
eq subseteq(emptyTSet, TS’) = true .
eq subseteq(T + TS, TS’) = T in TS’ and subseteq(TS, TS’) .
endm
fmod TRANSFORMATIONS is
including SD-FULL-SYNTAX .
vars D1 D2 D3 : SD .
var N : Nat .
eq loop< s N > D1 = D1 seq loop< N > D1 .
eq D1 alt (D2 xalt D3) = (D1 alt D2) xalt (D1 alt D3) .
eq D1 par (D2 xalt D3) = (D1 par D2) xalt (D1 par D3) .
eq D1 seq (D2 xalt D3) = (D1 seq D2) xalt (D1 seq D3) .
eq (D1 xalt D2) seq D3 = (D1 seq D3) xalt (D2 seq D3) .
eq D1 strict (D2 xalt D3) = (D1 strict D2) xalt (D1 strict D3) .
eq (D1 xalt D2) strict D3 = (D1 strict D3) xalt (D2 strict D3) .
eq refuse (D1 xalt D2) = (refuse D1) xalt (refuse D2) .
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eq D1 par (D2 alt D3) = (D1 par D2) alt (D1 par D3) .
eq D1 seq (D2 alt D3) = (D1 seq D2) alt (D1 seq D3) .
eq (D1 alt D2) seq D3 = (D1 seq D3) alt (D2 seq D3) .
eq D1 strict (D2 alt D3) = (D1 strict D2) alt (D1 strict D3) .
eq (D1 alt D2) strict D3 = (D1 strict D3) alt (D2 strict D3) .
eq refuse (D1 alt D2) = (refuse D1) alt (refuse D2) .
eq refuse refuse D1 = refuse D1 .
eq D1 par refuse D2 = refuse (D1 par D2) .
eq D1 seq refuse D2 = refuse (D1 seq D2) .
eq (refuse D1) seq D2 = refuse (D1 seq D2) .
eq D1 strict refuse D2 = refuse (D1 strict D2) .
eq (refuse D1) strict D2 = refuse (D1 strict D2) .
endfm
mod ALL-TRACES is
including META-EXEC .
including TRANSFORMATIONS .
including SEMANTICS .
including TRACES-COMMON .
including EXECUTION .
subsort Meta < SDTrace .
op allTraces : Exec LLSet -> IOSet .
op execXalt : IOSet -> IOSet .
op getXalts : InteractionObligation -> IOSet .
op execAlt : IOSet -> IOSet .
op execAlt : TraceSet -> TraceSet .
op getAlts : SDTrace -> TraceSet .
op execRefuse : IOSet -> IOSet .
ops getPos getNeg : TraceSet -> TraceSet .
op execEvents : IOSet -> IOSet .
op execEvents : TraceSet -> TraceSet .
op getEvents : SDTrace Nat -> TraceSet .
ops xaltTop altTop refuseTop : SD -> Bool .
var X : Exec .
var L : LLSet .
var IOS : IOSet .
var R3? : ResultTriple? .
var T : SDTrace .
var N : Nat .
vars TS TS’ POS NEG : TraceSet .
vars D1 D2 D : SD .
var B : Comm .
var E : Event .
eq xaltTop(D1 xalt D2) = true .
eq xaltTop(D1 alt D2) = false .
eq xaltTop(refuse D) = false .
eq xaltTop(D1 seq D2) = false .
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eq xaltTop(D1 par D2) = false .
eq xaltTop(D1 strict D2) = false .
eq xaltTop(E) = false .
eq xaltTop(skip) = false .
eq altTop(D1 xalt D2) = false .
eq altTop(D1 alt D2) = true .
eq altTop(refuse D) = false .
eq altTop(D1 seq D2) = false .
eq altTop(D1 par D2) = false .
eq altTop(D1 strict D2) = false .
eq altTop(E) = false .
eq altTop(skip) = false .
eq refuseTop(D1 xalt D2) = false .
eq refuseTop(D1 alt D2) = false .
eq refuseTop(refuse D) = true .
eq refuseTop(D1 seq D2) = false .
eq refuseTop(D1 par D2) = false .
eq refuseTop(D1 strict D2) = false .
eq refuseTop(E) = false .
eq refuseTop(skip) = false .
eq allTraces(X, L) = execEvents(execRefuse(execAlt(
execXalt(({| emptyTrace, X, L |}, emptyTSet))))) .
ceq getXalts( ( {| T, [B,D] , L |}, emptyTSet ) ) =
( {| T , [B, D] , L |}, emptyTSet )
if not xaltTop(D) .
eq getXalts( ( {| T, [B,D1 xalt D2], L |}, emptyTSet ) ) =
getXalts( ( {| T, [B, D1], L |} , emptyTSet ) ) &
getXalts( ( {| T, [B, D2], L |} , emptyTSet ) ) .
eq execXalt(emptyIOSet) = emptyIOSet .
eq execXalt( IOS & ( {| T, X, L |}, emptyTSet ) ) =
execXalt(IOS) & getXalts( ( {| T, X, L |}, emptyTSet ) ) .
ceq getAlts( {| T, [B, D], L |} ) = {| T, [B, D], L |}
if not altTop(D) .
eq getAlts( {| T, [B, D1 alt D2], L |} ) =
getAlts( {| T, [B,D1], L |} ) + getAlts( {| T, [B,D2], L |} ) .
eq execAlt(emptyIOSet) = emptyIOSet .
eq execAlt( IOS & ( TS , emptyTSet ) ) =
execAlt(IOS) & ( execAlt(TS), emptyTSet ) .
eq execAlt(emptyTSet) = emptyTSet .
eq execAlt( TS + {| T, X, L |} ) =
execAlt(TS) + getAlts( {| T, X, L |} ) .
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eq getPos(emptyTSet) = emptyTSet .
eq getPos( TS + {| T, [B, refuse D], L |} ) = getPos(TS) .
ceq getPos( TS + {| T, [B,D], L |} ) = getPos(TS) + {| T, [B,D], L |}
if not refuseTop(D) .
eq getNeg(emptyTSet) = emptyTSet .
eq getNeg( TS + {| T, [B, refuse D], L |} ) =
getNeg(TS) + {| T, [B, D], L |} .
ceq getNeg( TS + {| T, [B,D], L |} ) = getNeg(TS)
if not refuseTop(D) .
eq execRefuse(emptyIOSet) = emptyIOSet .
ceq execRefuse(IOS & (TS , emptyTSet)) = execRefuse(IOS) & ( POS, NEG )
if POS := getPos(TS) /\
NEG := getNeg(TS) .
eq execEvents(emptyIOSet) = emptyIOSet .
eq execEvents(IOS & (POS, NEG) ) =
execEvents(IOS) & (execEvents(POS), execEvents(NEG)) .
eq execEvents(emptyTSet) = emptyTSet .
ceq execEvents( TS + {| T, X, L |} ) =
if TS’ =/= emptyTSet then
execEvents(TS + TS’)
else
execEvents(TS) + T
fi
if TS’ := getEvents( {| T, X, L |}, 0 ) .
ceq getEvents( {| T, X, L |}, N) =
if R3? :: ResultTriple then
{| (if external(getEvent(getSubstitution(R3?)), L) then
T . getEvent(getSubstitution(R3?))
else
T
fi) ,
getExec(getSubstitution(R3?)), L |} +
getEvents( {| T, X, L |} , s N )
else
emptyTSet
fi
if R3? := metaSearch(mod, upTerm(X), ’‘{_‘}_[’F:Event,’E:Exec],
nil, ’+, 1, N) .
endm
C.3.2.1 Refinement verification
mod MAPPING is
including SEMANTICS .
including LLSET .
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sort Mapping .
op _->_ : Lifeline Lifeline -> Mapping [ctor prec 10] .
op emptyMapping : -> Mapping [ctor] .
op _*_ : Mapping Mapping -> Mapping
[ctor assoc comm id: emptyMapping prec 20] .
op dom : Mapping -> LLSet .
op get : Mapping Lifeline -> Lifeline .
op subst : IOSet Mapping -> IOSet .
op subst : InteractionObligation Mapping -> InteractionObligation .
op subst : TraceSet Mapping -> TraceSet .
op subst : SDTrace Mapping -> SDTrace .
op subst : Event Mapping -> Event .
op subst : Msg Mapping -> Msg .
vars L L’ : Lifeline .
vars MP MP’ : Mapping .
var M : Msg .
var E : Event .
var T : SDTrace .
var S : Signal .
var K : EventKind .
var IO : InteractionObligation .
var IOS : IOSet .
vars P N TS : TraceSet .
eq dom(emptyMapping) = emptyLLSet .
eq dom(L -> L’) = L .
ceq dom(MP * MP’) = dom(MP) ; dom(MP’)
if MP =/= emptyMapping /\ MP’ =/= emptyMapping .
eq get((L -> L’) * MP , L) = L’ .
eq subst(emptyIOSet, MP) = emptyIOSet .
ceq subst(IO & IOS, MP) = subst(IO, MP) & subst(IOS,MP)
if IOS =/= emptyIOSet .
eq subst((P,N), MP) = (subst(P,MP),subst(N,MP)) .
eq subst(emptyTSet, MP) = emptyTSet .
ceq subst(T + TS, MP) = subst(T,MP) + subst(TS,MP)
if TS =/= emptyTSet .
eq subst(emptyTrace, MP) = emptyTrace .
ceq subst(E . T, MP) = subst(E, MP) . subst(T, MP)
if T =/= emptyTrace .
eq subst((K, M), MP) = (K, subst(M,MP)) .
eq subst((S, L, L’), MP) =
(S, if L in dom(MP) then get(MP,L) else L fi,
if L’ in dom(MP) then get(MP,L’) else L’ fi) .
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endm
mod REFINEMENT is
including MAPPING .
ops _~>r_ _~>rr_ : InteractionObligation InteractionObligation -> Bool .
ops _~>g_ _~>rg_ _~>l_ _~>l’_ _~>rl_ _~>rl’_ : IOSet IOSet -> Bool .
ops _~>g_ _~>rg_ : InteractionObligation IOSet -> Bool .
ops _~>l’_ _~>rl’_ : IOSet InteractionObligation -> Bool .
vars P1 N1 P2 N2 : TraceSet .
vars IOS1 IOS2 : IOSet .
vars IO1 IO2 : InteractionObligation .
eq (P1,N1) ~>r (P2,N2) = subseteq(P1, P2 + N2) and subseteq(N1, N2) .
eq (P1,N1) ~>rr (P2,N2) = (P1,N1) ~>r (P2,N2) and subseteq(P2,P1) .
eq emptyIOSet ~>g IOS2 = true .
ceq (IO1 & IOS1) ~>g IOS2 = (IO1 ~>g IOS2) and (IOS1 ~>g IOS2)
if IOS1 =/= emptyIOSet .
eq IO1 ~>g emptyIOSet = false .
eq IO1 ~>g (IO2 & IOS2) = (IO1 ~>r IO2) or (IO1 ~>g IOS2) .
eq emptyIOSet ~>rg IOS2 = true .
ceq (IO1 & IOS1) ~>rg IOS2 = (IO1 ~>rg IOS2) and (IOS1 ~>rg IOS2)
if IOS1 =/= emptyIOSet .
eq IO1 ~>rg emptyIOSet = false .
eq IO1 ~>rg (IO2 & IOS2) = (IO1 ~>rr IO2) or (IO1 ~>rg IOS2) .
eq IOS1 ~>l IOS2 = (IOS1 ~>g IOS2) and (IOS1 ~>l’ IOS2) .
eq IOS1 ~>l’ emptyIOSet = true .
ceq IOS1 ~>l’ (IO2 & IOS2) = (IOS1 ~>l’ IO2) and (IOS1 ~>l’ IOS2)
if IOS2 =/= emptyIOSet .
eq emptyIOSet ~>l’ IO2 = false .
eq (IO1 & IOS1) ~>l’ IO2 = (IO1 ~>r IO2) or (IOS1 ~>l’ IO2) .
eq IOS1 ~>rl IOS2 = (IOS1 ~>rg IOS2) and (IOS1 ~>rl’ IOS2) .
eq IOS1 ~>rl’ emptyIOSet = true .
ceq IOS1 ~>rl’ (IO2 & IOS2) = (IOS1 ~>rl’ IO2) and (IOS1 ~>rl’ IOS2)
if IOS2 =/= emptyIOSet .
eq emptyIOSet ~>rl’ IO2 = false .
eq (IO1 & IOS1) ~>rl’ IO2 = (IO1 ~>rr IO2) or (IOS1 ~>rl’ IO2) .
endm
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